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ABSTRACT		What	is	a	“humanistic	drama”?	Although	we	might	describe	narrative	works	as	humanist,	and	references	to	the	humanistic	drama	abound	across	a	breadth	of	critical	media,	including	film	and	literary	theory,	the	parameters	of	these	terms	remain	elliptical.	My	work	attempts	to	clarify	the	narrative	conditions	of	humanism.	In	particular,	humanists	ask	how	we	use	narrative	texts	to	complicate	our	understanding	of	others,	and	question	the	ethics	and	efficacy	of	attempts	to	represent	human	social	complexity	in	fiction.		After	historicising	narrative	humanism	and	situating	it	among	related	philosophies,	I	develop	humanist	hermeneutics	as	a	method	for	reading	fictive	texts,	and	provide	examples	of	such	readings.	I	integrate	literary	Darwinism,	anthropology,	cognitive	science	and	social	psychology	into	a	social	narratology,	which	catalogues	the	social	functions	of	narrative.	This	expansive	study	asks	how	we	can	unite	the	descriptive	capabilities	of	social	science	with	the	more	prescriptive	ethical	inquiry	of	traditional	humanism,	and	aims	to	demonstrate	their	productive	compatibility.		From	this	groundwork,	I	then	look	at	a	cluster	of	humanistic	film	texts:	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy,	a	phenomenon	in	millennial	American	cinema	politicising	the	quotidian	and	the	domestic.	Popular	works	include	The	Kids	Are	All	Right,	Little	Miss	Sunshine,	Little	
Children,	Junebug,	The	Oranges,	and	what	is	arguably	the	inciting	feature	in	a	wave	of	such	films	entering	production,	American	Beauty.	I	provide	examples	of	humanist	readings	of	these	films	at	two	levels:	an	overview	of	genre	development	as	social	phenomenon	(including	histories	of	suburban	depiction	onscreen,	ensemble	cinema	and	affective	experimentation	in	recent	American	filmmaking),	followed	by	a	close	reading	of	a	progenitor	text,	Ron	Howard's	1989	film	Parenthood.			 	
 4	
	
	
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
	
	Thank	you	first	and	foremost	to	Dr	David	Kelly	whose	supervisory	acumen,	encouragement	and	attentiveness	have	been	invaluable	–	I	could	not	have	asked	for	better	guidance	throughout	this	project.	Thanks	to	Sophia	Harris	for	love,	support	and	for	keeping	me	intellectually	honest	over	the	past	three	years.	Thank	you	also	to	my	colleagues	at	Sydney	University,	in	particular	Dr	Rebecca	Johinke,	Dr	Kim	Wilkins,	Professor	Peter	Marks,	Dr	Bruce	Isaacs	and	Associate	Professor	Sarah	Gleeson-White,	among	others,	who	have	all	influenced	my	work	in	various	ways.	I	also	extend	my	gratitude	to	the	editorial	staff	of	the	Projections,	
Film	International	and	Forum	journals,	whose	close	scrutiny	and	expertise	have	impacted	the	following.	Finally,	thank	you	to	my	family	and	friends	for	support	while	I	have	been	engaged	with	this	research,	thinking,	writing,	and	deliberating	–	I	owe	you	all	a	beverage.	
	 	
 5	
	
	
CONTENTS	
	
	
Introduction:	Humanist	Hermeneutics	 	 	 	 	 	 	 6	
	
Social	Narratology:	A	Catalogue	of	Storytelling	Social	Functions	
from	a	Humanist	Perspective	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 47	
	
The	Suburban	Ensemble	Dramedy:	History,	Taxonomy	and	
Discussions	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 130	
	
Parenthood:	A	Humanistic	Close	Reading	 	 	 	 	 	 195	
	
Afterword	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 259	
	
Bibliography	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 265	
	 	
 6	
INTRODUCTION:	
Humanist	Hermeneutics			 We	are	all	story	addicts.	We	might	go	to	bed	with	a	book	or	film,	or	wake	up	to	the	news;	our	immersion	in	micronarratives	on	the	internet	has	scarcely	made	a	dent	in	television	use	(United	States	of	America	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	np);	the	expansion	of	television	into	epic	serialised	narratives	made	for	intensive	or	“binge”	consumption	tells	of	an	increasing	appetite	for	fictive	immersion	throughout	the	day;	narratives	in	songform	now	follow	us	relentlessly	throughout	the	urban	environment;	and	we	tell	of	our	lives	by	ordering	autobiographical	memories	into	comprehensible	narratives.	Much	of	our	day	is,	thus,	engaged	in	storied	activities,	a	phenomenon	that	some	have	positioned	as	a	contemporary	Western	“addiction”	or	“obsession”	with	narrative	(Landy	497).	In	fact,	for	a	narrative	theorist	like	Walter	Fisher,	storytelling	is	the	foundation	of	all	human	reason	and	communication	(“Narration	as	a	Human	Communication	Paradigm”).	Although	we	perform	multiple	acts	of	sustained	creativity	in	our	lives,	which	arguably	have	further	reaching	impact	on	participants	–	childrearing	and	teaching,	for	example	–	we	single	out	the	fictive	storyteller	for	special	regard	and	loftier	status,	in	many	cases	aspiring	to	similar	creativity,	while	ignoring	our	own	quotidian	creative	practices.	So	why	should	this	activity,	concocting	and	disseminating	creative	fictions,	matter	to	us	so	much?	As	Dennis	Dutton	writes:		 Human	beings	across	the	globe	expend	staggering	amounts	of	time	and	resources	on	creating	and	experiencing	fantasies	and	fictions.	The	human	fascination	with	fiction	is	so	intense	that	it	can	amount	to	a	virtual	addiction.	(109)		Joseph	Carroll	has	pointed	out	that	many	evolutionary	interpretations	of	the	genesis	of	art	fail	to	account	for	the	insatiable	need	to	create	and	consume	narrative,	our	story	“addiction”	(Literary	Darwinism	xxi).	Considering	the	widespread	use	of	narrative	arts	in	the	daily	life	of	a	majority,	it	would	not	be	right	to	characterise	this	addiction	as	pathological;	instead,	it	appears	to	be	foundational	to	human	sociobiology,	one	of	those	very	few	qualities	that	can	truly	be	considered	pancultural.	Once	investigated,	we	begin	to	witness	the	diversity	of	uses	we	have	found	for	the	storytelling	instinct,	and	they	are	terrifically	manifold.		
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	 The	following	thesis	largely	concerns	the	utility	and	the	ethics	of	narrative.	Specifically,	it	looks	at	our	motivations	for	storytelling,	and	the	way	we	might	extend	research	in	human	sociobiology	to	ask	ethical	questions:	how	we	ought	to	live.	As	such,	I	begin	with	an	attempt	to	come	to	grips	with	what,	precisely,	a	narrative	is,	and	ground	a	sense	of	narrative	purpose	in	human	history	and	development.	Following	from	these	foundations,	I	will	introduce	my	central	concerns:	what	humanistic	narrative	and	humanist	hermeneutics	might	look	like.	From	the	start,	however,	it	is	necessary	to	be	careful	in	delineating	the	confines	of	sociobiological	speculation	and	literary	Darwinism:	given	that	we	find	new	uses	for	old	adaptations	(exaptation	occurring	at	a	complex	cultural	level,	for	instance),	we	cannot	explain	all	human	behaviours	via	portrayals	of	their	origins	(Buller	Adapting	Minds;	Turvey	49),	and	further,	evolutionary	theory	contains	no	prescriptive	value	and	cannot	tell	us	how	to	act.	Accounting	for	these	dilemmas	will	be	one	substantial	component	in	the	project	I	am	calling	humanist	narratology.		 I	take	a	broad	view	of	story.	Story	is	a	communicative	act	that	specifically	implies	a	chain	of	causality,	and	story	as	we	popularly	know	it	is	any	series	of	descriptors,	transmitted	via	any	sensory	means,	which	can	be	read	as	causal,	or	“a	chain	of	events	in	cause-effect	relationship	occurring	in	time	and	space”	(Bordwell	and	Thompson	69).	In	effect,	stories	mimic	how	we	think:	due	to	our	necessary	abstraction	of	the	world	into	causal	patterns,	if	we	receive	any	communication	from	another,	we	intuitively	attempt	to	unpack	its	concept	of	causality.1	Likewise,	when	concocting	imagery	using	tools	from	the	written	word	to	a	stage	prop,	the	storyteller	suggests	“a	set	of	perceptual	processes	that	the	reader	then	uses	to	construct	a	particular	idea	or	experience”	(Mar	and	Oatley	178).	For	example,	we	may	neuroaesthetically	react	to	the	ornamentality	of	an	abstract	painting	and	thus	be	drawn	to	consider	it,	but	once	considered	we	apply	meanings	based	on	a	pattern	of	causal	understandings,	by	which	we	know	the	world	–	thus	our	relationship	with	the	artwork,	and	how	we	explain	its	meaning	to	ourselves,	although	abstract,	is	“storied,”	founded	on	narrative.	It	is	also	an	implicitly	human	narrative	we	are	attempting	to	read,	as	we	discern	and	empathise	with	emotional	states	the	artist	moved	through	in	their	creative	process:	“the	relationship	between	embodied	simulation-driven	empathic	feelings	in	the	observer	and	the	
content	of	art	works,	in	terms	of	the	actions,	intentions,	objects,	emotions,	and	sensations																																																									1	Perhaps	this	is	why,	in	Marie-Laure	Ryan’s	view,	the	meaning	of	“narrative”	has	been	diluted	into	concepts	including	“‘belief,’	‘value,’	‘experience,’	‘interpretation,’	or	simply	‘content’”	(Avatars	of	Story	6);	because	all	of	these	things	rely	on	a	mental	causality	that	narrative	does	not	quite	copy,	but	simply	is.	
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portrayed	in	a	given	painting	or	sculpture”	(Gallese	“Mirror	Neurons	and	Art”	446).	That	is,	artworks	and	still	images	tell	all	kinds	of	stories:	stories	of	the	emotional	and	interior	process	of	their	creation,	stories	of	the	kind	of	person	we	are	when	we	react	to	them,	or	the	culture	we	mutually	exist	within,	a	prompting	to	conceptual	causality	that	ignites	a	reasoning	that	fortifies	or	puts	into	question	our	values.	So	even	if	an	image	does	not	suggest	a	narrative	in	itself,	it	connects	to	other	narratives,	or	reductions	to	pertinent	causal	details	–	self-narratives,	cultural	narratives	and	so	on	–	to	become	meaningful.2	Likewise,	if	we	describe	to	an	acquaintance	two	separate	and	seemingly	unrelated	objects,	merely	by	offering	them	in	succession	we	have	suggested	a	story:	our	friend	cannot	help	but	attempt	to	read	their	relationship,	and	effectively	put	together	a	narrative	in	their	mind	which	will	suggest	a	causal	perspective	on	the	world.	Our	pattern	recognition	faculties	beget	a	storied	understanding	of	the	world.		Fiction	“is	a	particularly	useful	simulation	because	negotiating	the	social	world	effectively	is	extremely	tricky,	requiring	us	to	weigh	up	myriad	interacting	instances	of	cause	and	effect”	(Oatley	“The	Science	of	Fiction”	43).	Not	only	is	storied	behaviour	vital	to	retaining	complex	social	structures,	we	may	also	be	more	likely	to	remember	the	exertion	of	piecing	together	causality,	and	thus	recall	information	or	analysis	gleaned	from	emotionally	stimulating	narrative.	Causal	narrative’s	use	in	stimulating	memorability	can	also	be	observed	in	the	mnemonic	link	system	–	the	practice	of	constructing	a	story	to	memorise	unconnected	items.	These	are	accounts	of	the	uses	and	perhaps	the	origins	of	fictive	storytelling.	Laura	Ashe	dates	literary	fiction	to	1155	(“1155	and	the	Beginnings	of	Fiction”),	we	often	refer	to	Greek	theatre	as	the	birth	of	a	specifically	Western	formalised	narrative	practice,	and	Palaeolithic	cave	paintings	from	sites	across	the	globe,	dated	as	old	as	40,000	years,	contain	narrative	information;	however	such	accounts	refer	only	to	literary	and	artistic	histories,	which	have	the	benefit	of	a	visual	record.	There	is,	of	course,	no	way	to	timestamp	the	birth	of	oral	storied	imaginings.		There	are	equivalent	non-fictive	paradigms	of	causal	storytelling.	In	the	construction	of	memory	into	autobiographical	self-narrative,	for	instance,	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	writing	one’s	story	assists	trauma	recovery	(see	Joshua	M.	Smyth’s	summary	of	such	findings	in	“Written	Emotional	Expression:	Effect	Sizes,	Outcome	Types,	and	Moderating	Variables”).																																																									2	This	is	not	to	deny	that	we	have	thoughts,	dispositions	and	convictions	that	are	acausal;	causality	is	simply	our	provision	of	meaning,	how	we	develop	and	justify	those	thoughts,	dispositions	and	convictions.	
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However	research	conducted	by	James	W.	Pennebaker	and	Anna	Graybeal	in	2001	also	found	that:		 individuals	who	showed	an	overall	increase	in	the	use	of	causal	words	(e.g.,	“because,”	“cause,”	“reason”)	and	insight	words	(e.g.,	“realize,”	“know,”	“understand”)	demonstrated	comparatively	larger	and	more	significant	health	improvements	than	those	who	did	not	increase	their	use	of	causal	words.		(91-92)		This	contrasted	with	predominant	use	of	emotional	words,	which	they	found	“only	weakly	related	to	health”	(91).	Similarly,	Amanda	Barnier	and	Penny	Van	Bergen	offer	a	rundown	on	the	individual	and	relational	health	benefits	of	sharing	autobiographical	memory	stories	in	“‘Remember	when	we…?’	Why	sharing	memories	is	soul	food”,	in	particular	highlighting	the	research	of	Robyn	Fivush.3	Developing	causal	narratives	appears	to	be	essential	for	our	mental	health	–	it	is	the	provision	of	meaning	by	which	we	may	feel	in	control	of	our	environment,	and	ourselves,	and	know	how	to	act	accordingly.	Perhaps	the	more	causal	attributions	we	make	also,	the	more	likely	our	account	is	to	acknowledge	complex	multi-causality,	and	capitulate	to	the	interrogation	of	distilled	and	discrete	causal	theories	which	are	essentially	tied	into	a	composite	account;	we	know	by	their	multifariousness	that	such	accounts	do	not	summarise	the	world,	but	provide	a	few	of	the	many	explanations	we	require	to	make	collective	meaning	from	its	boundless	causal	convolutions.	However,	in	this	thesis	I	will	mostly	be	concerned	with	fictional	narratives,	and	while	life	narratives	and	fiction	are	both	storied	behaviours,	the	similarities	may	well	end	with	their	founding	causal	structure,	or	as	Peter	Lamarque	suggests	in	his	article	“On	the	distance	between	literary	narratives	and	real-life	narratives”,	their	most	superficial	aspects.	On	the	other	hand,	divorcing	the	two	completely	would	be	inappropriate,	neglecting	how	each	informs	the	other:	Katherine	Nelson	(125-136),	as	well	as	Qi	Wang	and	Jens	Brockmeier	(45-64),	describe	the	interdependence	of	autobiographical	memory	and	collectively	produced	narratives,	Dan	P.	McAdams	discusses	the	influence	of	biographical	genres	(in	particular	redemptive	biographies	which	fortify	generativity)	in	The	Redemptive	Self:	Stories	Americans	Live	By,	while	Tilmann	Habermas	and	Susan	Bluck	describe	how	life	narratives	begin	in	adolescence	(“Getting	a	Life”),	which	could	also	be	seen	as	a	primary	age	for	developing	and	negotiating	awareness	of	cultural	narrative																																																									3	C.f.	Fivush’s	2006	work	with	Catherine	A.	Haden	and	Elaine	Reese	“Elaborating	on	Elaborations:	Role	of	Maternal	Reminiscing	Style	in	Cognitive	and	Socioemotional	Development.”		
 10	
absorption.4	In	cinema	studies,	the	debate	on	what	constitutes	documentary	filmmaking	shows	us	just	how	difficult	it	can	be	to	separate	fictive	and	non-fictive	storytelling	acts	(Eitzen	“When	is	a	Documentary”).5	The	following	analysis	will	acknowledge	how	freely	we	can	exchange	between	fictive	and	non-fictive	storytelling,	while	at	the	same	time	noting	distinctions	between	the	two.	Ultimately,	though,	all	comparisons	between	fictive	and	real-life	narratives	reveal	just	how	deeply	storytelling	behaviours	are	ingrained	in	our	cognition:	it	is	the	“structure	of	sense”	(Burkert	5)	particular	to	humans.		 Further	to	the	causality	account	of	storied	behaviours,	in	Alan	Palmer’s	conception	of	narrative	explored	through	2004’s	Fictional	Minds,	we	concoct	a	psychological	map	of	other	autonomous	agents	and	their	intentions,	and	use	our	resultant	understanding	of	motivational	interactivity	to	navigate	the	complex	social	world.	Raymond	A.	Mar	and	Keith	Oatley	see	this	process	as	the	same	as	any	kind	of	psychological	simulation,	which	has	two	functions:	to	“provide	information	by	offering	a	model	when	access	cannot	be	direct”	(174),	as	in	another’s	mind	and	motivation,	and	“to	understand,	and	to	some	extent	predict,	the	behavior	of	systems	made	up	of	many	processes	in	interaction”	(ibid.	175),	as	in	the	complex	social	world.	In	theoretical	discourse	the	understanding	of	narrative	as	a	network	of	causal	intentionality	also	reaches	back	to	Kenneth	Burke’s	grammar	and	rhetoric	of	motives,	which,	while	innovative	in	its	time,	in	Jerome	S.	Bruner’s	view	suffers	from	a	negligence	of	“character”	(20);	there	is	something	indubitably	human	missing	from	such	a	mathematical	approach.	Perhaps	a	multiplicity	of	motivational	causalities	in	fiction,	by	which	we	must	work	to	extend	the	bounds	of	our	simulation	of	social	structures,	is	what	we	read	as	a	more	“human”	and	“complex”	narrative,	a	psychological	verisimilitude	or	a	more	lifelike	conception	of	other	minds.	Although	all	simulation	is	a	reductive	abstraction	to	comprehensible	formulae,	what	matters	then	is	how	reductive	our	abstraction	is:	how	many	causal	factors	our	simulation	takes	into	account.		
																																																								4	Note	that	many	of	these	discussions	are	centred	on	American	cultural	contingencies.	Where	Nelson	assumes	a	societal	trend	in	American	“personalisation	of	culture”	(133),	variously	labelled	the	individualist	or	narcissistic	trend	in	popular	debate,	McAdams	contends,	“All	societies	have	their	share	of	generative	adults.	Americans	are	likely	to	be	no	more	or	less	generative	than	any	other	people”	(96)	although	the	manifestation	of	self-narratives	will	differ	between	cultures.		5	See	also	Bill	Nichols’s	foundational	Representing	Reality,	the	groundwork	and	point	of	departure	for	critiques	like	Eitzen’s	“When	is	a	Documentary.”	
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Although	story	is	possible	without	intentional	causality,	it	is	rare	to	encounter,	as	narrative	quickly	becomes	tiresome	(perhaps	obsolete	and	robbed	of	purpose)	when	the	intrigue	of	motivation	is	extracted.	In	Bruner’s	account	of	the	difference	between	logical	debate	and	narrative,	which	he	positions	as	different	cognitive	modes	–	a	distinction	defining	the	“narrative	turn”	of	the	1980s,	echoed	by	Donald	E.	Polkinghorne	in	the	similarly	influential	Narrative	Knowing	and	the	Human	Sciences	(35)	–	the	former	“leads	to	a	search	for	universal	truth	conditions,	the	other	for	likely	particular	connections	between	two	events”	(Bruner	12).	This	account	splits	human	causal	thinking	into	two	categories	that	we	could	equally	call	the	cerebral	and	the	procedural,	although	clearly	they	are	interdependent	and	each	can	inspire	the	other;	a	strict	contradistinction	of	this	nature	will	be	problematized	in	ensuing	chapters.	However,	Bruner	also	makes	a	case	that,	within	narrative	cognition,	“good”	and	“gripping”	and	“believable”	stories	will	deal	in	“human	or	human-like	intention	and	action	and	the	vicissitudes	and	consequences	that	mark	their	course”	(ibid.	13).	In	fact,	for	Bruner,	instead	of	causality,	exploring	the	vicissitudes	of	intention	is	the	one	true	condition	for	stories	to	be	stories	(ibid.	17).		We	are	always	looking	for	intentions	as	they	provoke	us	to	wonder	how	to	act;	this	suggests	that	ethics	are	the	crux	of	narrative	interest.	However,	we	also	tend	to	apply	such	readings	of	intention	beyond	the	human.	Bruner’s	analysis	points	to	research	from	Fritz	Heider	and	Marianne	Simmel	in	1944	to	Judith	Ann	Stewart	in	1982,	demonstrating	that	we	read	motivation	and	intention	in	abstract	animated	figures	(18).	We	thus	find	ourselves	mapping	human	intentionality	onto	things	that	may	not	be	similarly	motivated	(including	other	living	things,	the	inhuman	and	posthuman,	as	well	as	nature,	the	cosmic,	and	the	physical	world,	the	origin	of	theistic	and	teleological	thinking	as	explored	by	Pascal	Boyer	in	
Religion	Explained).	This	meta-ethical	challenge	to	humanist	narratology	will	be	addressed	later	in	the	chapter,	in	my	introduction	to	the	philosophy	of	humanism.		For	now,	I	work	with	the	assumption	that	at	base	level,	stories	offer	causalities,	and	thereafter	may	apply	intention	and	motivation	to	causalities,	which	leads	us	to	ethical	pondering.			 On	first	reflection,	it	almost	goes	without	saying	that	offering	stories	–	perspectives	on	series	of	causalities	and	intentional	mapping	–	is	adaptive,	foundationally	aiding	survival	goals	including	hunting	prey	and	resisting	predation,	for	example,	or	promoting	group	
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bonding	and	coordination,	but	thereafter,	as	immersion	in	a	mediated	environment	became	more	extensive,	our	storytelling	instinct	splintered	into	countless	other	utilities	connected	to	survival	and	thriving	in	the	increasingly	mutable	social	world.	Story	provides	such	a	boggling	array	of	uses,	both	obvious	and	undiscovered,	that	it	is	daunting	to	consider	its	totality.	It	is	part	of	our	job	as	analysts	in	the	humanities	to	exhume	far-reaching	concepts	of	what	story	can	do,	and	for	some	scholars	(myself	included)	to	make	our	own	inferences	about	how	stories	can	serve	us	better	to	reduce	suffering	and	promote	equality,	globally	and	without	prejudice.	For	the	past	century	has	taught	us,	if	nothing	else,	that	such	ambitions	are	realistic	and	achievable,	as	Edward	Said	insists	in	Humanism	and	Democratic	Criticism:		 People	all	over	the	world	can	be	and	are	moved	by	ideals	of	justice	and	equality–the	South	African	victory	in	the	liberation	struggle	is	a	perfect	case	in	point–and	the	affiliated	notion	that	humanistic	ideals	of	liberty	and	learning	still	supply	most	disadvantaged	people	with	the	energy	to	resist	unjust	war	and	military	occupation,	for	instance,	and	to	try	to	overturn	despotism	and	tyranny,	both	strike	me	as	ideas	that	are	alive	and	well.	And	despite	the	(in	my	opinion)	shallow	but	influential	ideas	of	a	certain	facile	type	of	radical	antifoundationalism,	with	its	insistence	that	real	events	are	at	most	linguistic	effects,	and	its	close	relative,	the	end-of-history	thesis,	these	are	so	contradicted	by	the	historical	impact	of	human	agency	and	labor	as	to	make	a	detailed	refutation	of	them	here	unnecessary.	Change	is	human	history,	and	human	history	as	made	by	human	action	and	understood	accordingly	is	the	very	ground	of	the	humanities.		(10)		There	is	indeed	evidence	that	real	positive	change	has	been	made	over	the	years	in	which	we	have	been	engaged	with	humanist	thinking,	redeeming	belief	in	human	autonomy	and	progress	toward	a	vast	mutual	benefit.	According	to	Charles	R.	Varela,	the	last	century’s	history	of	emergent	social	sciences	is	also	the	history	of	reclaiming	faith	in	a	human	agency	for	positive	change	(ix).	I	start	from	the	assumption	that	storytelling	entails	responsibility,	and	that	improvements	can	be	made	to	the	narratives	we	distribute	(as	well	as	our	theories	of	narrative	purpose)	that	will	promote	mutual	care	and	prosociality	–	thence	a	focus	on	narrative	ethics.	Humanism	is	a	kind	of	hope,	and	hope	presupposes	agency	to	make	positive	changes	in	the	world,	even	if	the	blueprint	is	elusive,	even	if	we	fight	about	what	that	blueprint	should	be.	As	such,	this	thesis	presupposes	analysable	human	agency.	Further,	it	requests	specificity	about	the	conditions	of	change	in	lieu	of	totalising	answers	to	
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unresolvable	questions	of	free	will,	or	insistence	on	intellectual	attendance	to	its	limitations.6	With	theory	we	have	the	power	to	imagine	new	ways	of	living;	some	of	these	imaginings	will	come	to	fruition.		 Not	long	ago	I	became	aware	that	a	lot	of	the	narratives	I	enjoyed	were	consistently	nominated	by	analysts	as	human	or	humanistic	dramas;	however	when	perusing	the	literature	on	humanism’s	philosophical	lineage,	the	two	appeared	to	have	little	in	common.	I	became	intrigued	by	the	space	between	the	humanisms	I	had	read	about,	and	the	potential	for	a	narrative	humanism	–	what	was	the	relationship	between	the	two?	This	thesis	is	in	part	an	attempt	to	shine	a	light	on	that	space,	but	it	is	also	both	a	descriptive	and	demonstrative	argument	for	narrative	humanism’s	utility	today.	The	thesis	comes	in	two	parts:	a	theoretical	description,	in	which	I	exhume	hermeneutic	possibilities	from	a	humanist	narratology	and	its	associated	ethics,	and	later	an	application,	in	which	I	demonstrate	its	use	in	a	particular	case	study.	 	In	this	introduction,	I	expand	on	histories	of	narrative	theory	and	humanism	to	locate	and	detail	a	humanist	hermeneutics,	its	reasoning	and	methodology.	In	the	ensuing	chapter	I	provide	a	social	narratology	–	a	list,	as	comprehensive	as	possible,	of	narrative’s	social	usages	–	and	highlight	the	ways	in	which	these	functions	of	narrative	may	be	of	interest	to	a	humanist	narrative	theorist.	I	will	then	apply	an	emergent	humanist	narratological	paradigm	to	my	primary	case	study:	the	American	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	film	after	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	historicising	this	cinematic	mode,	tracing	its	development,	and	extrapolating	some	of	the	concerns	this	cinema	raises,	before	moving	closer	into	a	reading	of	an	early	exemplary	film,	Parenthood	(Ron	Howard,	1989).	I	use	“social	narratology”	to	describe	inquiry	into	the	social	functions	of	narrative,	and	“humanist	hermeneutics”	to	describe	the	means	for	reading	and	evaluating	specific	works.	Together,	I	abbreviate	this	discourse	to																																																									6	Fundamentally,	this	is	a	difference	of	focus:	humanism	focuses	on	locating	and	describing	the	conditions	of	human	change	rather	than	stasis.	Writers	after	a	Foucauldian	constructivist	tradition	have	complicated	notions	of	agency,	instead	preferring	to	emphasise	how	our	identities	are	inherited	or	governed.	Problem	identification	alone	yields	no	template	for	living,	however	–	humanism	demands	that	after	the	complexity	of	a	cultural	problem	is	identified,	we	extend	ourselves	to	look	for	ethical	solutions.	Failure	to	search	for	such	an	agency	permits	theory	to	self-sustain	in	tandem	with	the	circumstances	it	describes.	I	refer	to	John	Dewey’s	“first-rate	test”	of	value	in	any	philosophy:	“does	it	end	in	conclusions	which,	when	they	are	referred	back	to	ordinary	life-experiences	and	their	predicaments,	render	them	more	significant,	more	luminous	to	us,	and	make	our	dealings	with	them	more	fruitful?”	(7).	We	cannot	end	with	problem	description	alone.	
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“humanist	narratology,”	connoting	the	range	of	humanist	examinations	available	in	the	storytelling	arts.		In	this	way	I	am	attempting	a	demonstrative	application	of	humanist	narratology	by	magnifying	it	to	ever	closer	readings,	suggestive	of	its	scope:	humanist	hermeneutics	are	applied	to	storytelling	at	large,	then	a	specific	genre	often	described	as	“humanistic”,	offering	analytic	readings	of	films	within	that	genre,	and	finally	a	close	reading	of	a	prototypical	film.	I	hope	to	communicate	humanist	narratology’s	use	in	capturing	detail	at	many	levels	of	the	study	of	human	interaction,	and	craft	the	thesis	into	an	exciting	narrative	itself,	magnifying	its	detail	as	I	progress	through	broad	theoretical	understandings	to	situated	close	study.	The	latter	half	primarily	concerns	film	analysis	as	an	example	of	humanistic	story	reading.	I	agree	with	Murray	Smith	that	“film	theory	has,	throughout	its	history,	overstated	the	significance	of	the	specificity	of	film	as	a	medium	and	consequently	underplayed	the	extent	to	which	fiction	films	perform	the	same	imaginative	functions	as	fictions	in	other	media”	(“Film	Spectatorship”	113-114),	and	so	I	will	regularly	draw	from	fields	outside	of	film	theory	in	analysing	film.7	Classical	narratology	has	changed	shape	in	the	age	of	media	convergence	(Jenkins	2)	and	a	new	field	has	opened	up,	seeking	to	integrate	awareness	of	a	changing	media	landscape	into	narrative	theory,	as	in	volumes	like	Storyworlds	Across	Media	in	2014	(Ryan	and	Thon).	I	believe	that	it	is	best	to	analyse	narratives	as	they	are	used	by	their	creators	and	consumers	in	order	to	determine	their	social	meaning.	This	means	respecting	the	ways	people	choose	to	work	with,	negotiate	through,	and	relate	to	each	other	using	stories	–	narrative	function	–	even	while	we	emphasise	medium	specificity	and	question	differences	in	meaning	across	media.		Finally,	the	humanism	I	refer	to	must	be	swiftly	severed	from	universalising,	essentialist	or	exceptionalist	claims	enshrining	a	truer	humanity.	We	must	be	careful	not	to	universalise	a	particular	storied	language	use,	as	various	languages	contain	different	causal	emphases:	sentence	construction	in	the	native	west	Canadian	Nuu-chah-nulth	(Nootka)	language,	for	example,	is	uniquely	dependent	on	articulation	of	the	cause	of	an	action,	event	or	property,	where	in	English	we	can	construct	sentences	without	referring	to	causes.	It	is,	in	many	cases,	impossible	to	translate	directly	between	these	languages.	For	now,	where	I	refer	to	humanism,	I	could	briefly	summarise	the	perspective	as	the	presumption	that	we	can	have																																																									7	See	also	Rodowick	Philosophy’s	Artful	Conversation.	Film	philosophy	is	a	good	way	into	a	discussion	of	story,	art,	humanism	and	purpose,	and	this	is	how	it	will	be	used	throughout	the	thesis.	
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a	more	complex	or	deeper	understanding	of	human	otherness,	the	conviction	that	in	striving	to	complicate	our	concept	of	others	we	are	able	to	improve	our	social	and	political	relations,	and	in	my	case,	in	humanist	narratology,	the	notion	that	we	use	storytelling	as	a	primary	means	for	facilitating	this	more	realistically	complicated	view	of	others,	which	in	turn	allows	for	more	inclusive	and	specific	ethical	considerations.	As	I	believe	it	is	misguided	to	attempt	narrative	or	textual	readings	without	first	asking	what	the	stories	are	used	for,	and	equally	misguided	to	speak	of	narrative’s	function	without	recourse	to	specific	examples,	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	dedicated	to	unpacking	and	clarifying	humanist	hermeneutics,	and	thereby	providing	a	foundation	from	which	to	begin	the	taxonomic	work	of	social	narratology.			
Humanist	Hermeneutics:	Reading	the	Human	Drama	in	Film	and	Fiction		 If	I	mention	the	study	of	humanism,	what	am	I	talking	about?	As	a	reader,	it	would	be	hard	to	say;	too	often	we	read	of	humanism	without	any	clarifying	annotations.	We	could	be	discussing	Renaissance	pedagogy,	or	deliberating	on	the	intercession	of	divinity	and	“man”;	we	might	be	wondering	if	there	are	essential	or	stable	properties	one	could	nominate	as	human	nature,	perhaps	a	higher	order	to	the	human	extending	beyond	pure	materialism,	or	an	agency	particular	to	humans;	we	could	even	refer	to	humanism’s	precursors	in	pre-Christian	concepts	of	reason,	in	Plato,	Aristotle	and	the	Stoics,	in	Greek	paideia	and	Roman	
studium	(Torrance	164).	In	these	early	philosophies	we	witness	the	precursors	to	Friedrich	Immanuel	Niethammer’s	foundational	humanist	pedagogy	–	a	promotion	of	the	study	of	humanities	sustaining	long	after	its	vivication	during	the	Renaissance,	and	retaining	its	key	place	in	universities	today,	often	summarised	as	“humanistic	inquiry.”	As	Said	points	out,	the	purist	canonical	protectionism	of	eminent	literary	scholars	such	as	Harold	Bloom	takes	this	usage	of	the	term	to	its	absolutist	extreme	in	expressing	the	idea	that	there	is	one	true	corpus	of	classics,	which	should	be	studied	to	enrich	the	human	(Said	Humanism	27).	No	matter	what	we	think	of	canonical	humanism	and	Bloom’s	work,	however,	the	question	of	human	value	in	art,	and	thus	relativist	trends	in	assessing	the	worth	of	art,	is	part	of	humanist	dialogue.		Then	again,	increasingly	in	popular	usage	now,	humanism	appears	spuriously	distinct	from	atheism.	Robert	M.	Torrance	positions	this	extrapolation	from	secular	humanism	as	a	kind	of	shibboleth,	along	with	its	contemporary	connotations	to	a	“vague	humanness	or	
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humanitarianism”	(165)	which	ignores	Christian	humanism	and	the	substantial	role	the	church	played	in	developing	a	humanist	pedagogy	in	the	Renaissance.	In	light	of	recent	popular	usage,	though,	the	project	of	unifying	humanist	philosophy	with	the	sciences	appears	complete	(c.f.	Sarton;	Keyser).	In	fact	the	popular	secular	affinity	with	human	sciences	makes	sense	when	working	from	the	conception	of	humanism	as	the	ethical	imperative	to	defer	to	human	complexity,	as	science	is	never	complete	–	each	question	uncovers	new	possible	deeper	understandings	to	be	accessed	by	further	inquiry,	where	fideism	offers	a	holistic	explanation	that	is	an	end	in	itself.	Faith	can	lock	us	off	from	further	inquiry	and	thereby	complication	of	our	understanding	of	others,	hence	the	hostility	toward	religion	displayed	by	humanist	rationalists.	And	then	again,	it	is	possible	when	I	say	humanism	that	I	mean	something	entirely	less	Euronormative.	Scholars	such	as	Lenn	E.	Goodman	in	Islamic	
Humanism,	Hamid	Dabashi	in	The	World	of	Persian	Literary	Humanism,	and	María	Rosa	Menocal	in	The	Arabic	Role	in	Medieval	Literary	History	make	the	point	that	there	are	plenty	of	examples	of	humanist	thought	outside	of	Europe	even	before	Renaissance	humanism.	Ken	Seigneurie’s	work	clearly	identifies	a	progression	to	what	he	calls	Arab	humanism	in	contemporary	literature	(109),	while	conversely	Ziauddin	Sardar	and	Merryl	Wyn	Davies	characterise	the	early	humanist	movement	as	“a	reaction	against	Muslim	learning”	(np).	Emily	Apter’s	reading	of	a	new	Saidian	Welt-humanism	moots	“that	humanism	itself	be	rezoned	to	avoid	misleading	cartographic	divisions	between	European	and	non-European”	(52).	While	it	is	not	hard	to	locate	instances	of	Niethammer’s	Humanismus,	Francesco	Petrarch’s	epochal	Renaissance	Catholic	pedagogy	in	Secretum,	or	even	the	explicit	educational	liberalism	of	Wilhelm	von	Humboldt	–	humanism’s	antecedents	–	used	as	tools	of	oppression,	this	“flattening	[of]	the	term	‘humanism’	and	backdating	it	uncritically	to	the	Renaissance”	(Mousley	19)	wilfully	ignores	diversity	and	inconsistency	in	early	modern	concepts	of	human	essentialism,	sovereignty,	and	individualism,	as	well	as	“original	humanism’s	disruption	of	the	institution-	and	elite-centred	middle	ages”	(Holland	6).	It	also	overlooks	the	new	humanism	of	scholars	including	Said,	Seigneurie	and	Goodman	emergent	today,	motivating	the	concept	in	projects	of	inclusion	and	social	equity.			 I	prefer	to	begin	from	Murray	Bookchin’s	defence	of	humanist	conviction	in	Re-
Enchanting	Humanity:	“the	serious	thinker	must	look	beyond	the	‘real’	to	speculate	what	
should	be	rather	than	validate	what	is”	(258).	If	this	is	a	pragmatic	ethic	to	start	from	in	encouraging	progressive	thought,	it	should	also	be	true	of	the	language	we	use	to	describe	
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that	thought.	In	this	case,	it	would	be	important	to	define	how	humanism	might	be	discursively	useful,	looking	forward,	rather	than	assert	one	true	Humanism	of	yore.		 In	both	popular	and	scholarly	film	discourse,	the	descriptor	“humanistic	drama”	appears	to	signify	something	else	again.	It	is	my	intention	in	this	thesis	to	locate	a	contemporary	humanist	narrative	theory	that	draws	from	these	philosophies	in	order	to	sketch	the	parameters	of	an	on-screen	humanism,	and	suggest	a	hermeneutic	sensibility	that	may	result.	It	is	also	my	intent	to	use	humanist	theory	more	common	in	the	history	of	literary	studies	and	apply	it	to	film	theory.	In	cinema	the	humanistic	drama	–	or	“human	drama”	–	connotes	an	attempt	to	replicate	the	complexity	of	human	sociality	in	fiction.	Yet	this	gives	rise	to	certain	questions:	whose	complexity	is	represented,	and	how	do	we	decide	what	complexity	is?	There	is	also	the	problem	of	fabricated	complexity,	in	that	complex	explanations	do	not	always	reach	more	truthful	or	verifiable	conclusions.	For	example,	we	may	have	a	complex	reason	to	explain	a	social	phenomenon,	but	we	can	still	be	verifiably	wrong	about	its	causes;	or	we	may	have	a	complex	explanation	for	another’s	behaviour,	but	again,	we	can	still	be	wrong	about	their	motivation.	Complexity	does	not	equal	truth,	and	we	can	construct	complexity	anew	rather	than	finding	it	in	the	world.	Noël	Carroll	objected	to	a	confounding	assembly	of	semiotics,	psychoanalysis	and	Marxism	in	1988’s	Mystifying	Movies,	for	example,	and	Karl	Popper	called	into	question	the	unfalsifiability	of	Marx,	Freud	and	Adler	in	1963’s	Conjectures	and	Refutations	(34-35),	yet	suppositions	drawn	from	their	works	sustain	as	the	leading	mode	of	evaluation	in	film	theory.8	Assessing	whether	or	not	a	complex	portrayal	of	human	sociality,	in	theory	or	in	fictional	representation,	is	fabricated	mystification	or	truly	reveals	reliable	human	detail	is	the	trickiest	component	in	humanist	hermeneutics.	Once	again,	recourse	to	human	sciences	helps	us	to	achieve	such	assessments,	but	more	on	science	later.																																																										8	Subject	position	theory	is	essentially	the	same,	and	as	disempowering,	as	a	conspiracy	theory.	Per	Popper’s	critique	of	Marx,	Freud	and	Adler,	not	only	are	the	subjectivists’	claims	unable	to	be	falsified,	but	all	contrary	arguments	may	also	be	taken	to	reinforce	the	initial	conviction.	Literary	postmodernists	are	“suspicious	of	the	truth	claims	of	science”	(Wells	“Humanism	and	Human	Nature”	232),	likely	to	be	seen	as	part	of	a	“system”	of	hierarchical	power	from	which	they	are	born,	and	to	protect	unconstrained	association,	“both	subject-position	theorists	and	culturalists	tend	to	shy	away	from	inductive,	deductive,	and	abductive	reasoning”	(Bordwell	“Contemporary	Film	Studies”	23).	All	evidence,	again,	will	reinforce	the	theory,	the	defining	psychopathology	of	conspiracists.	This	manner	of	subjectivism	and	conspiracism	excuses	us	from	attempting	change,	as	in	both	cases	the	asserted	power	structures	are	mystified	and	placed	out	of	reach:	a	proof	by	intimidation.		
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Humanising	the	Other		 If	humanism	has	a	significant	challenge	in	scholarly	thought	at	the	moment,	it	is	less	an	antihumanist	attack	on	human	autonomy	for	positive,	progressive	or	even	transhuman	change	–	it	is	the	idea	of	the	posthuman.	We	cannot	say	with	certainty	that	we	know	the	parameters	of	the	human;	we	cannot	any	longer	agree	on	what	a	human	actually	is,	suggesting	it	may	be	an	inadequate	concept	to	start	from	in	understanding	the	workings	of	the	world.	In	his	book	The	Posthuman	Condition	Robert	Pepperell	suggests	that	we	cannot	pretend	the	mind	is	synonymous	with	human	identity.	Neuron	activity	defines	the	mind,	yet	we	also	have	neurons	in	our	stomach	–	in	this	case	we	must	consider	our	stomach	a	human	entity	(Pepperell	93-97,	for	a	more	sensitive	analysis	of	what	we	might	call	the	“mind-tummy”	problem).	As	we	discover	more	parasites,	pathogens	and	other	microbes	that	have	significant	effects	on	our	behaviour,	often	co-adaptive	behavioural	influences	(Moalem	and	Satonick	
Survival	of	the	Sickest	passim),	concepts	of	human	selfhood	again	come	under	scrutiny.9	Also,	if	we	use	machines	as	ambassadors	for	our	thought	–	recording	our	ideas	on	a	computer,	for	instance,	which	will	go	on	to	represent	a	version	of	our	thoughts	–	we	are	already	in	a	position	whereby	we	cannot	easily	separate	our	mind	and	the	machine.	This	conceptualisation	of	cultural	symbol	as	akin	to	life,	however,	is	similar	to	memetics,	which	has	been	contradicted	by	geneticists	including	Eva	Jablonka	and	Marion	J.	Lamb,	as	memes	do	not	contain	information	of	themselves:	“In	each	case	the	organism	(or	group)	actively	reconstructs	the	pattern	of	behaviour,	or	the	pattern	of	emotions	and	ideas,	through	learning.	And	learning	is	not	blind	copying—it	is	a	function-	or	meaning-sensitive	developmental	process”	(209)	so	“the	copying	mechanism	is	not	independent	of	what	is	copied”	(210).	Thus	it	remains	problematic	to	assume	non-living	ambassadors	for	our	thought	have	life	akin	to	our	own.		On	the	other	hand,	nor	have	we	ever	been	able	to	pinpoint	exactly	where	life	begins	or	ends.	Japanese	researchers	have	recently	announced	the	creation	of	the	first	artificial	copper	sulphide	synapse	with	little	fanfare	(Nayak	et	al.),	perhaps	making	the	posthumanist	discussion	all	the	more	urgent.	David	Boyle	rejects	notions	of	human-machine	indivisibility,	however:	“The	truth	is	that	only	if	you	define	humanity	as	a	simple	matter	of	data	processing	
																																																								9	Recent	focus	on	toxoplasmosis’s	relationship	with	intermittent	explosive	disorder	(dubbed	“crazy	cat	lady	syndrome”	in	the	news	media)	provides	a	good	example.	
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can	you	ever	believe	that	human	beings	and	machines	are	alike”	(200).	He	goes	on	to	critique	the	cybernetic	totalism	of	Donna	Haraway’s	“Manifesto	for	Cyborgs”:		 There	is	fatalism	to	this	debate	–	as	if	those	who	believe	there	is	no	difference	between	real	and	virtual,	being	alive	and	being	‘better	than	well’,	and	no	such	thing	as	irony	or	intimacy	or	partiality,	are	somehow	bound	to	win	…	yet	we	have	retained	enough	of	a	sense	of	ourselves	to	feel	nostalgic	about	the	idea	of	real	relationships,	real	sex,	real	passion,	real	bank	managers,	face-to-face	public	services,	that	we	have	created	an	underground	backlash	in	their	favour.	Artificial	intelligence	is	just	that:	it’s	artificial.	‘Intelligence’	has	become	just	a	metaphor	–	and	the	prophets	of	AI	are	like	religious	fundamentalists	in	the	way	they	mistake	their	metaphors	for	real	descriptions	of	the	
world	…	people	are	reacting	against	this	kind	of	reductionism.	The	closer	the	AI	people	get,	the	more	authenticity	becomes	the	critical	concept	at	the	heart	of	culture.		(202,	emphasis	added)		So	despite	the	excitement	of	such	transhuman	idylls,	there	is	an	observable	movement	pulling	us	back	toward	some	notion	of	authenticity:	a	real	that	recognises	something	more	than	just	
known	data,	an	unreachable	complexity	that	posthuman	daydreamers	–	resurrecting	a	Galilean	mechanistic	theism10	–	deign	to	conquer	with	a	comforting	reduction	of	human	ambiguities	to	the	consistent	machine.		 As	intriguing	and	urgent	as	the	posthuman	ethical	debate	may	be,	I	would	like	to	suggest	a	way	of	looking	at	the	human	that	makes	it	possible	to	move	beyond	the	ontology	and	semantics	of	the	human	entity.	We	can	embrace	the	fluidity	of	the	human	mind	and	form	at	the	same	time	as	acknowledging	that	the	human	is	what	we	have	to	work	with,	even	if	its	parameters	cannot	be	known	or	subject	to	essentialist	certainty.	We	cannot	sample	another	reality	beyond	that	dictated	by	the	recurring,	evolving	natural	pattern	of	the	human	form	and	the	perspective	(obviously	limited,	as	Pepperell	stresses)	it	allows.	The	fact	that	the	human	is																																																									10	As	in	Pierre	Bourdieu’s	“Scholastic	Point	of	View,”	scholarly	analytical	methods	mechanise	the	social	world	even	where	our	complex	relations	cannot	be	so	rigidly	determined,	simply	because	such	systemisation	is	convenient	for	theories	that	seek	to	master	human	interactivity;	the	neatness	of	this	process	in	explaining	the	importance	of	our	work	as	social	theorists	should	not	overwhelm	our	acknowledgement	of	the	limitations	of	our	models,	simulations	and	metaphors	(Bono	passim).	This	gives	rise	to	all	sorts	of	terms	expressing	excess,	unknowables	and	ineffables	(c.f.	terms	like	the	“really	real”	and	“the-rest-of-what-is”	in	works	of	existential	anthropology	such	as	Mattijs	van	de	Port’s	Ecstatic	Encounters).		
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fluid	should	not	dismiss	our	striving	to	understand	this	perspective	and	how	it	works	–	we	must	still	be	able	to	discuss	concepts	and	entities	without	reference	to	essential	properties,	or	all	argument	devolves	to	the	same	ontological	impasse.11	Humanism	is,	instead,	a	kind	of	methodological	naturalism:	we	proceed	with	the	understanding	of	the	unknowable	nature	of	reality,	but	it	behoves	us	to	accept	these	limitations	and	make	decisions	based	on	our	experience	of	what	is	real.	At	the	same	time	we	understand	our	phenomenal	perspective	will	always	be	bound	to	our	experience	as	a	human.	In	deeply	understanding	other	things,	thus,	we	“humanise”	them.	In	effect,	anthropomorphising	is	all	that	we	can	do	to	understand	the	experience	of	a	life	not	our	own.	“Humanising	the	other”	involves	a	projection	of	what	it	might	be	like	to	be	another	entity;	we	need	the	imaginative	process,	this	kind	of	anthropomorphising,	in	order	to	incorporate	other	living	things	into	any	system	of	personal	moral	accountability,	including	fellow	humans,	nonhuman	entities	and	indistinct	entities	like	animals	and,	for	some,	machines	–	we	consistently	need	to	imagine	what	it	is	like	to	be	them	in	order	to	accept	them	as	worthy	of	ethical	inclusion.	Normative	ethics	and	this	variety	of	humanism	can,	then,	begin	to	look	like	the	same	thing	–	the	indivisibility	of	ethical	culture	and	humanism	is	acknowledged	by	one	of	the	largest	international	bodies	representing	the	movement,	the	International	Humanist	and	Ethical	Union.	It	is	perhaps	useful	to	look	at	humanism	as	the	philosophy	around	the	reasons	for	foregrounding	ethical	discussions;	the	emphasis	on	ethics	results	from	a	humanist	position.		While	it	is	fallacious	to	suggest	we	also	have	a	science	that	can	reliably	summarise	the	mysteries	of	empathic	modelling	and	projection,	we	should	at	least	acknowledge	that	we	are	referring	to	a	cognitive	process.	This	is	why	humanism	inquires	into	the	experience	of	empathy	with	an	emphasis	on	the	social	sciences	rather	than	metaphysics	or	speculative	ontology.	We	can	have	“humanism	without	the	human”	and	an	“ethics	without	metaphysics”	(Sheehan	64).		So	our	process	of	understanding	other	things	has	to	involve	some	amount	of	projection.	Our	imaginative	capacities	cannot	exist	in	a	vacuum,	they	are	ordered	by	our	own	experience	–	that	is,	human	experience.	To	comprehend	a	narrative,	we	immediately	try	to	connect	its	events	with	our	own	recollected	experiences;	in	this	way	empathy	is	an	act	that	innately	works	from	introspection.	This	is	an	insurmountable	position,	and	no	amount	of	lip																																																									11	This	pragmatism	is,	perhaps,	what	Jean-Paul	Sartre	sought	to	achieve	in	exploring	the	conditions	of	human	agency	within	an	experimental	existential	humanism	(see	Existentialism	
and	Humanism).	
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service	to	the	erroneous	centrality	of	the	imagined	panhuman,	umwelt	or	qualia,	can	shift	us	into	seeing	wholly	as	another	sees.	In	Erica	Fudge’s	notion	of	inevitable	anthropocentrism,	Francis	Bacon’s	“false	mirror,	which,	receiving	rays	irregularly,	distorts	and	discolours	the	nature	of	things	by	mingling	its	own	nature	with	it”	(Bacon	54)	is	“natural	to	the	human	mind	and	therefore	impossible	to	dismiss”	(Fudge	5).	The	human	is	central	because	for	all	of	us	bar	none,	the	human	perspective	is	what	we	have	to	work	with,	and	what	we	then	must	study	to	comprehend	the	moral	behaviours	and	quandaries	we	foreground	as	cultural	theorists.	Or,	as	Adam	Smith	put	it,	“I	judge	of	your	sight	by	sight,	of	your	ear	by	my	ear,	of	your	reason	by	my	reason,	of	your	resentment	by	my	resentment,	of	your	love	by	my	love.	I	never	have,	nor	can	have,	any	other	way	of	judging	about	them”	(23).	As	in	Fudge’s	work	on	early	modern	English	drama,	attention	to	the	values	of	Renaissance	humanists	reveals	disapproval	levelled	at	the	killing	of	both	people,	in	a	militaristic	sense,	and	animals,	in	the	crown	hunt.	See	in	particular	Michel	de	Montaigne’s	essay	Of	Cruelty,	which	by	its	radically	personal	nature	demonstrates	a	humanistic	departure	in	opinion	writing:	the	essay	form	elevates	a	nascent	phenomenological	description	and	resultant	empathy	into	philosophy.	Here,	analogising	human	and	animal	suffering	does	not	necessarily	promote	the	human	above	other	living	things,	as	in	much	religious	doctrine	prior	to	the	Renaissance,	but	instead	is	a	necessary	condition	of	liberalising	compassion.	In	Shakespeare’s	As	You	Like	It,	for	example,	Jacques	is	reported	to	lament	a	deer	killed	during	a	pastoral	hunt.	However,	he	first	imagines	himself	as	like	the	deer,	their	melancholy	and	outrage	at	human	incivility	being	one	and	the	same,	and	makes	elegiac	use	of	metaphors	linking	the	deer’s	situation	to	various	contexts	in	human	cultures.	Despite	the	deer	clearly	not	possessing	these	human	qualities,	the	imaginative	leap	permits	Jacques	access	to	an	empathy	he	could	not	otherwise	entertain,	as	human	culture	is	his	only	framework	for	understanding	any	suffering,	and	in	turn	such	imagination	translates	to	(extremely	performative)	compassion.	This	language	“shows	that	[Jacques	and	Duke	Senior]	can	only	feel	animal	suffering	when	it	is	imagined	as	human	suffering,	a	response	that	might	be	said	to	deny	the	reality	and	authenticity	of	animal	experience”	(Berry	176).	Yet	what	is	the	alternative;	is	it	direct	access	to	a	real	or	authentic	animal	experience?	As	this	is	impossible,	Shakespeare	instead	explores	problems	with	our	attempts	at	human-animal	and	civility-nature	delineation.	Even	in	early	humanist	thinking,	compassion	begins	from	imaginatively	and	speculatively	connecting	our	experience	to	the	experience	of	other	things	–	our	own	(human)	vantage	is	the	only	tool	we	have	for	reaching	compassion,	with	respect	to	its	limitations.12	Thereafter	we	can	attempt	to	push	against	these	limitations	by	learning	more																																																									12	In	Disowning	Knowledge	in	Seven	Plays	by	Shakespeare,	Stanley	Cavell	describes	this	as	the	
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about	the	context,	the	ecology	and	biology	of	the	other,	but	this	will	still	in	turn	be	unpacked	by	human	pattern-seeking	perception.		Consequently,	if	this	is	all	we	can	do,	it	is	better	to	have	more	complex	modelling	and	projection	of	others,	which	should	lead	to	better	decision-making	in	collective	matters.	So	we	come	to	ask	what	it	is	that	storytelling	and	the	storytelling	arts	offer	in	this	process.	The	simple	answer	is	that	story	can	complicate	our	conception	of	others	in	revealing	ways.	Imagining	the	experience	of	another	entity,	be	it	another	person	in	a	remote	location	or	circumstance,	or	an	animal	to	be	slaughtered	for	consumption,	is	going	to	lead	to	superior	ethical	judgments	about	our	engagement	with	them	the	more	nuanced	and	realistic	our	understanding	of	their	circumstance	–	this	is,	for	example,	what	social	realism	has	sought	to	provide	for	the	underprivileged.	As	Brian	Boyd	puts	it:		 Narrative	especially	helps	coordinate	groups,	by	informing	their	members	of	one	another’s	actions.	It	spreads	prosocial	values,	the	likeliest	to	appeal	to	both	tellers	and	listeners.	It	develops	our	capacity	to	see	from	different	perspectives,	and	this	capacity	in	turn	both	arises	from	and	aids	the	evolution	of	cooperation	and	the	growth	of	human	mental	flexibility.		(On	the	Origin	of	Stories	176)13		Although	his	analysis	foregrounds	the	role	of	gossip	in	social	accountability	structures,	he	does	go	on	to	suggest,	“But	maximum	flexibility,	in	humans	as	in	others,	depends	on	play”	(176).	In	cinema	ethics,	this	process	puts	to	practical	work	Stanley	Cavell’s	cinema-as-quotidian-philosophising	reclaimed	from	rarefied	establishments:	“the	latest	of	the	great	arts,	[showing]	philosophy	to	be	the	often	invisible	accompaniment	of	the	ordinary	lives	that	film																																																																																																																																																																																									difference	between	knowing	and	acknowledging.	Knowing	another	is	both	necessary	and	impossible,	and	so	our	attempts	at	knowing	the	other	become	a	kind	of	acknowledgement.	As	Cavell	has	it,	Shakespeare’s	works	show	us	that	applying	epistemological	scepticism	to	our	social	world	can	become	corrosively	alienating.	The	kind	of	scepticism	we	fetishize	as	cultural	theorists,	then,	can	fail	to	build	bridges	between	people.	This	is	the	problem	encountered	when	we	assume	our	job	is	to	emphasise	the	limitations	of	empathic	and	compassionate	connections	rather	than	merely	accept	them.	All	knowing	and	acknowledging	of	the	other	can	know	its	own	limitations	while	acknowledging	its	utility	and	necessity.		13	A	story’s	effectiveness	in	this	regard	would	naturally	depend	on	the	story	being	told.	Although	Boyd	is	correct	to	identify	the	broad	appeal	of	prosocial	morals	in	popular	narrative,	not	all	stories	will	perform	the	same	work,	even	if	we	are	to	nominate	the	adoption	of	plural	perspectives	and	attendant	group	coordination	as	foundational	functions	in	the	genesis	of	human	storytelling.	This	will	be	elaborated	in	the	following	chapter.		
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is	so	apt	to	capture”	(Cavell	Cities	of	Words	6).	If	we	are	to	evaluate	responses	to	ethical	problems	beyond	those	presented	by	direct	interaction	with	others	in	our	immediate	community,	we	need	hypothetical	characters:	fiction.	Writers	such	as	Alex	Neill	consider	empathy	for	actual	persons	and	fictional	characters	as	one	and	the	same,	as	projection	of	the	feelings	of	another	is,	in	essence,	always	an	imaginative	act	(257).	Hypothetical	empathic	subjects	do	not	represent	the	totality	of	storytelling’s	place	in	our	lives,	of	course	–	stories	are	much	more	powerful	than	that	–	but	these	are	the	functions	of	storytelling	a	humanist	may	be	interested	in.		 Much	storytelling	that	fosters	group	cohesion	equally	defines	that	cohesion	in	relation	to	outgroup	members,	in	some	cases	by	vilifying	them;	think	of	Jud	Süß	(Veit	Harlan,	1940),	or	political	and	religious	quasi-historical	narratives	that	nominate	a	“chosen	people.”	Humanistic	narrative,	on	the	other	hand,	adopts	plural	perspectives	without	needing	to	concoct	an	inferior	opposite	which	they	will	be	judged	against.	So	if	the	type	of	story	matters,	then	it	makes	sense	to	focus	on	how	we	might	achieve	kinder	stories	–	the	conditions	of	storytelling	responsibility	–	and	evaluative	claims	are	available	to	be	made.	Thence	the	humanistic	focus	on	human	kindness.	If	humanistic	scholars	omit	the	study	of	such	storied	kindnesses	in	favour	of	hermeneutic	admonishments	levelled	at	narrativised	bigotry	and	the	cultures	that	produce	it,	then	we	will	never	learn	the	conditions	under	which	kinder	narratives	flourish.	This	points	to	a	politics	of	emphasis	that	circulates	philosophical	discussions	around	humanism	and	antihumanism.	Kwame	Anthony	Appiah	points	to	the	negotiation	of	“value	terms,	meant	to	shape	our	responses	to	the	movie.	And	if	the	story	it	tells	is	truly	representative,	our	discussion	of	it	will	help	us	decide	not	only	what	we	feel	about	the	characters	but	how	we	should	act	in	the	world”	(Cosmopolitanism	29).	Thus,	he	says	of	film,	“It	keeps	our	vocabulary	of	evaluation	honed,	ready	to	do	its	work	in	our	lives.	And	that	work,	as	I	say,	is	first	to	help	us	act	together”	(ibid.	30).	After	grappling	with	the	way	cosmopolitanism	might	deal	with	the	antihumanist	charge	of	normalising	humanity	and	disregarding	human	difference,	he	settles	for	the	fact	that	this	“acting	together”	after	discussion	cannot	be	a	reprehensible	moral	aim,	despite	its	imperfectability.14	We	can	locate	complex	understanding	of	both	similarities	and																																																									14	All	communication,	including	cinema,	might	be	flawed	and	imperfect	transmission,	but	this	should	not	lead	us	to	devalue	the	efficacy	of	all	communicative	intent,	as	with	Jacques	Derrida’s	“decentred	subject,”	a	particular	poststructural	nihilism	(Schwartz	“Antihumanism”	33).	Mary	K.	Holland	describes	recent	opposition	to	these	poststructural	cues:	“contemporary	calls	for	humanism	characterize	exactly	the	baby	that	antihumanism	discarded:	literature	and	theory’s	ability	to	be	about	something,	to	matter,	to	communicate	meaning,	to	foster	the	sense	
that	language	connects	us	more	than	it	estranges	us,	so	that	we	can	come	together	in	ways	that	
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differences	in	the	experience	of	the	other	without	needing	to	refer	to	human	exceptionalism	or	requiring	differences	to	be	quelled;	indeed,	wonder	at	difference	and	similarity	alike	is	an	important	part	of	comprehension.		 There	is	a	lack	of	vulnerability	and	humility	in	much	poststructural	and	antihumanist	theory	that	humanism	may	seek	to	recover.	A	humanist	alternative	might	proffer	vulnerability	as	a	necessary	condition	of	discovery,	and	attempts	to	reach	between	people	to	forge	connections,	which	may	then	avoid	the	worst	of	intrahuman	cynicism	(bigotry,	violence,	objectification,	oppression).	Humility,	in	this	case,	is	the	attribute	by	which	we	might	access	vulnerability,	and	learn	of	the	new.	As	Said	put	it,	the	“possibility	of	a	critical	understanding	that	may	never	be	completed	but	can	certainly	be	provisionally	affirmed	…	there	can	be	heroic	first	readings	that	enable	many	others	after	them”	(Humanism	67-68).	All	of	these	alternatives	require	imaginative	empathic	effort,	flawed	and	culturally	contingent	as	these	processes	may	be.	Recognising	this	imperfection,	we	begin	to	emphasise	the	effort	people	put	into	complex	comprehension.	To	extend	this	to	an	ethic:	we	try	to	connect	our	experiences	to	complex	otherness	despite	barriers	or	boundaries	–	we	do	the	best	we	can.		Similar	values	can	be	seen	put	to	use	in	anthropology.	As	in	mainstream	anthropological	method,	we	empathise	with	disparate	people	and	cultures	not	to	adopt	their	perspective	(which	is	impossible),	but	to	learn	the	complexities	and	nuances	of	their	being,	which	allows	us	to	work	together	from	an	enhanced	intersubjective	comprehension.	But	crucially,	this	does	not	invalidate	any	ethical	debate.	In	other	words,	suspending	moral	judgment	in	order	to	listen	and	learn	–	what	Edmund	Husserl	called	the	“phenomenological	epoché”	(91-100)	and	is	now	referred	to	as	“bracketing”	–	does	not	preclude	later	resolution	on	moral	issues.	In	participant	observation,	or	the	fieldwork	prior	to	an	ethnography,	a	kind	of	methodological	relativism	is	employed	to	learn	from	other	peoples:	“a	commitment	to	suspending	moral	judgment	until	an	attempt	can	be	made	to	understand	another	culture’s	beliefs	and	practices	in	their	full	cultural,	material,	and	historical	contexts”	(Turner	“Human	Rights,	Human	Difference”	275).15	This	method	appears	to	me	equally	applicable	to	narrative																																																																																																																																																																																									build	relationship	and	community	rather	than	the	alienation	and	solipsism	of	antihumanistic	postmodern	literature”	(6,	emphasis	added).		15	We	should	remember,	too,	that	“cultural	relativism”	remains	a	contested	concept	in	anthropology.	Thinking	in	identifiable	“cultures”	can	summarise	others	into	holistic	and	politically	non-transformative	units	–	a	disavowal	of	changing	global	interdependence	through	which	responsibility	becomes	isolated.	When	problems	appear	as	“separate”	to	one’s	
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theory,	as	stories	are	culturally	produced.	We	can	apply	this	listening	method	to	distant	peoples	whose	lives	are	affected	by	our	decisions,	niche	communities	within	one’s	own	vicinity,	and	even	one’s	immediate	family	members	and	peers,	as	all	people	have	their	own	distinctive	experiential	heritage	to	consider,	which	they	tell	of	in	storied	communication.	In	fact,	it	is	a	central	tenet	of	narrative	humanism	that	this	empathic	work	can	be	performed	not	just	in	understanding	distant	others,	but	proximate	others,	too;	the	latter	half	of	this	thesis	interrogates	attempts	to	understand	the	otherness	of	those	closest	to	us	in	Western	domestic	settings,	and	takes	as	a	case	study	the	methods	filmmakers	have	developed	to	represent	conflicts	and	their	resolution	across	a	diversity	of	personhood	in	American	suburbia.	The	case	study	of	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	elaborates	on	humanism	in	its	propinquitous	iterations.		The	self-reflection	and	introspection	required	in	such	an	anthropological	method	can	form	an	integral	part	of	textual	readings.	C.	Jason	Throop	expresses	the	concept	thusly:		 It	is	by	means	of	just	such	a	vulnerable,	passive	and	open	orientation	to	another	that	we	are	able	to	confront	some	of	our	most	deeply	ingrained	assumptions	about	ourselves,	our	world,	and	those	others	with	whom	we	interact.	In	so	doing	we	are	able	to	envision	new	horizons	of	experience.	To	be	compelled	by	another	to	interrupt	our	tendency	to	assimilate	experience	to	the	self-sameness	of	our	being,	we	thus	become	opened	to	possibilities	for	seeing	other	ways	of	being	that	are	not,	and	yet	may	never	be,	our	own.		(281-282)		Anthropology	is,	like	the	storytelling	arts	and	debates	around	stories,	just	one	kind	of	humanism	in	practice.	Its	heritage	of	progressively	overcoming	descriptions	that	minimise	another’s	humanity,	like	the	notion	of	the	“primitive,”	speaks	to	the	self-correcting	function	of	the	anthropological	method,	in	that	striving	for	close	listening	to	others	can	only	lead	to	a	more	generously	complex	understanding	of	their	being	and	their	context.																																																																																																																																																																																									own	culture,	interventionism	can	paradoxically	seem	more	reasonable.	In	“Do	Muslim	Women	Really	Need	Saving”	Lila	Abu-Lughod	wrote:	“The	reason	respect	for	difference	should	not	be	confused	with	cultural	relativism	is	that	it	does	not	preclude	asking	how	we,	living	in	this	privileged	and	powerful	part	of	the	world,	might	examine	our	own	responsibilities	for	the	situations	in	which	others	in	distant	places	have	found	themselves	…	A	more	productive	approach,	it	seems	to	me,	is	to	ask	how	we	might	contribute	to	making	the	world	a	more	just	place”	(789).		
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	 Close	attendance	to	another’s	perspective	is	the	same	as	a	good	story:	we	risk	losing	ourselves	in	its	liminal	space,	we	allow	ourselves	to	forget	a	little	of	our	own	lives	and	concerns,	and	when	we	emerge	we	reconstruct	a	sense	of	self	to	include	the	disturbances	we	found	so	rattling	in	the	implications	of	the	narrative.	This	pleasure	of	deep	listening	involves	risk,	as	we	have	to	allow	ourselves	to	become	unbound,	no	longer	whole,	to	truly	admit	new	knowledge	and	perspectives.	The	pleasure	is	curtailed	the	less	we	can	admit	the	inherent	self-doubt	of	coming	unbound	–	we	have	less	to	re-evaluate,	and	so	less	to	gain.	Thus	all	close	listening,	all	real	attendance	to	what	others	are	doing	and	saying,	entails	considerable	existential	risk	(Ingold	389),	the	vulnerability	and	humility	of	assuming	doubt	rather	than	projecting	it.16	However,	we	can	never	truly	let	go	of	our	values	or	our	sense	of	self;	we	just	attempt	to	take	one	another	seriously	by	undoing	our	expectations	inasmuch	as	possible,	a	courtesy	of	mutual	intersubjective	benefit,	of	learning	and	allowing	others	the	space	to	express	what	they	know	without	the	restriction	of	our	preconvictions.	So	again,	we	value	the	attempt,	or	the	work	put	in,	rather	than	the	ideal.		In	a	sense,	humanism	always	fails.	Its	project	can	never	be	complete	as	we	are	never	able	to	be	completely	inclusive	of	all	human	otherness	at	once,	just	as	we	can	never	completely	comprehend	another	human.	Christine	Gardner	commented	in	Anthropology	and	
Humanism	that	humanistic	ethnography,	“lays	bare	the	possibility	of	partial	understanding	…	by	allowing	discord	in	the	record,	by	resisting	closure	for	closure’s	sake,	by	forsaking	completeness	for	clarity’s	sake”	(166-167).	No	narrative	will	be	able	to	contain	due	consideration	of	all	relevant	humanness.	For	example,	we	always	have	the	opportunity	to	focus	on	those	symbolically	omitted	from	any	given	narrative,	and	we	tend	to	use	this	as	an	evaluative	shortcut:	does	the	narrative	represent	a	true	spectrum	of	sexualities,	ethnicities,	economic	statuses?	As	the	ideal	of	representing	an	entire	spectrum	of	human	difference	is	impossible,	we	place	emphasis	on	efforts	to	comprehend	otherness,	not	the	goal	of	pure	comprehension	of	otherness.	This	resignation	to	constant	failure	and	refinement,	the	relinquishing	of	ideals	in	favour	of	the	utility	of	the	attempt,	is	another	source	of	vulnerability	and	humility	in	humanism.																																																									16	Of	course,	self-doubt	can	be	paralyzing	too,	and	should	not	be	thought	of	as	a	catchall	exhortation	for	all	of	our	interactions.	There	is	a	kindness	to	assuming	doubt,	but	some	experience	doubt	chronically,	and	internal	balance	must	be	sought	between	reasonable	self-dubiety,	confidence	and	conviction.	This	is	no	small	task.	I	clarify	that	I	am	describing	a	method	for	close	listening	to	others,	not	a	general	prescription	for	all	thinking	and	social	interaction.	
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Character	Complexity	and	Elaboration	on	the	Attempt		 When	answering	a	question	such	as	“why	do	we	tell	stories?”	we	often	run	the	risk	of	totalising,	offering	monocausal	or	telic	accounts	to	serve	a	thesis.	My	purpose	here	is	to	offer	one	small	corner	of	the	myriad	utilities	performed	through	story	in	human	evolution,	and	in	our	daily	lives.	Identifying	complexity	in	our	interactions,	allowing	some	awe	in	the	immensity	of	human	systems	we	cannot	totalise,	and	yoking	such	an	awe	to	discover	more	about	ourselves,	are	substantial	components	in	the	contemporary	humanist	project.	Often	this	has	been	summarised	as	engaging	“wonder”	(Bookchin	Re-enchanting	Humanity)	in	our	fellow	human.			 As	such,	when	addressing	questions	regarding	what	character	complexity	is	made	up	of	and	why	it	matters	so	much,	I	offer	the	following	response:	perhaps	there	is	a	place	we	can	reach	which	both	strives	to	uncover	ever	more	complex	human	detail	(narrativised	social	and	psychological	causalities),	and	derives	self-sustaining,	generous	wonderment	from	the	interminability	and	incompleteness	of	this	project.	We	might	call	this	“human	excess.”	Clearly	there	are	many	kinds	of	effortful	cognition	that	creative	fictions	inspire	in	attempts	to	complexify	our	thinking	on	a	variety	of	concerns,	and	in	this	section	I	turn	to	elucidate	some	of	their	differences.	Yet	as	human	excess	is	foundational	to	humanistic	narrative	concerns,	I	begin	by	identifying	its	dispositional	humility	of	unknowing	–	that	in	any	attempt	to	represent	a	complex	human	system	it	is	still	not	possible	to	conceive	of	all	its	relevant	causal	detail	together	–	from	which	most	human	dramas	themselves	begin.	The	anthropologist	Michael	Jackson	marries	Theodor	Adorno’s	untruth	of	identity	in	Negative	Dialectics	with	John	Berger’s	observations	on	ineffability	and	story:	“If	every	event	which	occurred	could	be	given	a	name,	there	would	be	no	need	for	stories.	As	things	are	here,	life	outstrips	our	vocabulary”	(Berger	64).	From	these	underpinnings	he	draws	his	own	existential-humanist	concept	of	human	excess	in	the	story	arts:		 Concepts	represent	experience	at	the	cost	of	leaving	a	lot	unsaid.	So	long	as	we	use	concepts	to	cut	up	experience,	giving	value	to	some	things	at	the	expense	of	others,	we	inhibit	our	sense	of	the	plenitude	of	Being.	We	gain	some	purchase	on	the	world,	to	be	sure,	but	claiming	that	our	concepts	contain	all	that	can	be	usefully	said	about	
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experience,	we	close	off	the	possibility	of	critique	…	writers	approach	the	world	so	tortuously	and	obliquely,	using	“inept	metaphors	and	obvious	paraphrases”	to	draw	attention	to	a	subject	they	are	unwilling	to	name.	It	is	their	way	of	recognizing	that	life	eludes	our	grasp	and	remains	at	large,	always	fugitive.		(Jackson	5)17		Beyond	such	a	literary	surrender	to	the	ineffability	of	experience	lies	an	affective	and	intellectual	zone	reachable	by	fiction,	which	does	not	forfeit	knowledge	collation	but	the	very	unfinished	business	of	it	all	excites	its	pursuit:	a	seeking	to	represent	ever	more	accurately,	through	the	consilience	of	new	sciences,	observation	and	experience,	as	much	as	we	are	able	to	truthfully	express	about	life.		 Here,	multi-causality	becomes	key	in	explaining	character	complexity.	No	one	can	claim	to	have	such	knowledge	of	people	that	they	can	create	a	character	that	is	like	a	human,	rather	than	a	constellation	of	ideas	about	a	human.	Characters	are,	after	all,	constellations	of	ideas.	But	once	this	is	acknowledged,	what	we	can	do	is	offer	ideas	about	the	human	multitudinous	and	multi-causal	enough	that	they	simultaneously	offer	insightful	perspectives	to	discuss,	and	yet	also	allow	us	to	keep	in	mind	human	excess,	engaging	the	aforementioned	wonder	at	our	unreachable	complexity.	The	same	is	true	of	our	peers:	we	comprehend	them	as	constellations	of	attributes	to	which	we	have	emotional	responses,	but	if	we	are	honest,	we	never	quite	trust	our	necessary	reductions	to	discrete	explainable	details	(of	motivation,	of	personality	and	so	on)	as	truly	representing	the	sum	of	their	identity.	This	openness	is	a	humanist	disposition	–	we	can	retain	such	a	generosity	of	thought	even	as	we	construct	internal	models	to	imaginatively	map	their	individual	and	social	complexities.	If	complex																																																									17	The	paradox	of	metaphor	is	that	the	more	an	expression	can	mean,	the	less	it	does	mean.	One	can	be	aware	that	properly	descriptive	acts	suppress	lingual	alterity	in	a	way	that	cannot	match	the	world’s	depth,	as	with	science’s	less	proscriptive	use	of	metaphor	(Bono	81),	and	yet	still	see	that	restraining	conceptive	possibilities	has	utility.	This	is	because	at	the	same	time,	eliminating	possibilities	makes	way	for	new	possibilities	–	at	the	moment	of	scientific	breakthrough,	the	avenues	for	understanding	the	world	that	are	closed	are	more	often	replaced	by	many	more	avenues	for	new	knowledge.	The	same	is	true	of	cogent	language.	In	summarising	one	part	of	the	world,	lucidity	opens	new	possibilities	for	observation	and	articulation	from	the	groundwork	of	its	condensation.	The	world	becomes	bigger,	not	smaller,	in	articulation.	Jackson’s	quote	demonstrates	the	kindness	it	extends	to	its	subjects:	writing	can	be	poetic	and	specific	at	the	same	time.	Similarly,	science	and	scientific	description	can	obliterate	possibilities	and	remain	open	to	the	human	unknown.	Our	descriptions	of	the	world	become	more	negotiable	when	we	can	be	sure	we	are	negotiating	the	same	concept	–	so	again,	conceptual	precision’s	invitation	to	negotiation	is,	paradoxically,	an	opening	rather	than	a	closing	of	possibility.		
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understanding	of	peers	corresponds	with	interest	in	complex	fictive	characters,	however,	is	the	reverse	necessarily	also	true,	and	is	our	engagement	with	complex	fiction	transferrable	in	some	way	to	our	conception	of	others	in	the	real	world?	Various	researchers	have	attempted	to	measure	the	complexity	of	our	understanding	of	peers	against	the	complexity	of	comprehension	of	fictional	characters.	One	such	researcher,	Susan	D.	Hynds,	found	that:		 curiosity	about	and	understanding	of	people	in	everyday	life	is	a	strong	component	in	the	understanding	and	enjoyment	of	literature.	Further,	since	developmental	studies	have	established	that	construct	repertoires	can	indeed	be	expanded	throughout	a	lifetime,	literature	provides	a	vehicle	for	enlarging	students’	understanding	of	the	people	they	are	likely	to	encounter	in	the	social	world	…	The	reading	of	literature,	then,	demands	a	flexibility,	an	openness,	and	a	willingness	to	perceive	strange	people	and	novel	events	in	all	of	their	multiplicity	and	dimensionality.		(399)		Given	the	limitations	of	such	studies,	we	still	employ	some	conjecture	about	the	nature	of	this	generalizability,	but	surely	there	is	an	observable	transfer	as	we	use	story	to	discuss	life,	and	these	discussions	should	be	more	detailed,	more	specific,	the	more	detail	and	specificity	is	provided	to	discuss.		 The	focus	on	character	complexity	in	film	theory	is	quite	different,	with	a	tendency	to	be	more	procedural	in	nature,	clarifying	narrative	techniques	more	than	overall	effects.	Michael	Z.	Newman	attempted	to	delineate	the	differences	between	narrative	and	character	complexity	in	comparing	the	puzzle	film	21	Grams	(Alejandro	González	Iñárritu,	2003)	with	human	drama	Passion	Fish	(John	Sayles,	1992),	concluding	on	a	difference	in	the	focus	of	our	problem-solving	cognition:		 unlike	21	Grams,	Passion	Fish	is	not	the	kind	of	film	that	makes	its	audience	puzzle	out	its	story	moment	by	moment.	The	spectator	watching	the	opening	scenes	of	21	Grams	asks,	What	is	going	on?	The	spectator	watching	the	opening	scenes	of	Passion	Fish	is	shown	much	of	what	is	going	on	and	is	free	to	think	about	the	characters,	settings,	and	themes	in	more	detail	and	with	more	intensity.		(93)		After	exploring	some	of	the	means	for	developing	character	complexity	in	Passion	Fish	(which	point	to	the	social	multi-causality	of	ensemble	casts),	such	as	loading	information	about	
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primary	characters,	reversing	our	assumptions	of	their	“types,”	and	the	introduction	of	minor	characters	(103),	Newman	goes	on	to	make	a	value	judgement	that	elevates	the	human	drama:	“The	contrast	with	21	Grams	should	be	clear.	A	narrative	that	starts	out	in	confusion	is	most	likely	to	become	clearer,	less	problematic.	But	a	narrative	that	starts	out	simple	has	the	opportunity	of	developing	in	the	direction	of	intensified	interest,	of	accumulating	sophistication”	(104).	There	may	be	many	kinds	of	narrative	complexity,	all	of	worth	in	different	ways,	but	we	can	be	engaged	with	cognitive	puzzles	which	matter	internally	to	narrative	comprehension,	or	illuminate	character	points	which	make	us	think	differently	about	people.18	Finally,	Newman	makes	a	claim	that	due	to	their	trajectory	from	clarity	to	questioning,	human	dramas	provoke	a	more	substantially	thoughtful	afterlife:	“21	Grams	makes	unusual	cognitive	demands	as	it	unfolds,	as	it	makes	itself	difficult	to	understand	initially.	But	Passion	Fish	makes	you	think	when	it	ends”	(105).	Such	“character	points”	might	not	lead	to	obvious	or	ethically	unconditional	conclusions	about	how	to	behave	–	a	straightforward	moral.	However,	if	sufficiently	complexified,	character	considerations	do	fill	out	a	background	to	our	ethical	lives	by	reminding	us	of	the	enormity	of	variation	in	circumstance	and	personality	implicated	in	our	daily	decisions.		 This	state	of	openness	to	otherness	should	not	be	viewed	as	an	attainable,	conscious	permanency;	it	might	only	be	reachable	every	now	and	again.	It	does	not	make	cognitive	sense	to	sit	suspended	in	a	state	of	expansive	acceptance	of	human	complexity,	without	action	or	application,	without	the	usual	cognitive	strains	of	going	about	one’s	day	–	again,	we	must	be	careful	to	avoid	chimeric	ideals.	Perhaps	narrative	can	simply	act	as	a	reminder	that	such	openness	to	human	detail	should	be	called	upon	when	making	decisions	that	affect	others.	If	we	are	to	make	the	distinction	between	narrative	and	character	complexity	as	Newman	has	done,	this	may	also	be	what	we	refer	to	as	narrative	complexity:	too	many	concepts	conveyed	for	us	to	get	our	head	around	all	together	and	at	once,	the	excitement	of	ineffability,	intellectual	striving	and	the	capacity	for	new	knowledge	it	brings	(clearly	accessible	by	narrative	modes	outside	the	human	drama,	too).	So	perhaps	a	final	humanistic	function	of	story	is	not	just	to	suggest	human	excess	epistemologically,	but	in	the	limitations	of	our	cognition	too.	Perhaps	we	need	both	social	simulation	to	discuss	ethical	particularities,	and	reminders	that	our	simulations	will	always	be	inadequate	to	explain	the	complex	multi-causality	that	is	life.																																																									18	The	view	of	“humanism	as	striving	for	character	complexity”	is	a	familiar	strand	across	Sayles	scholarship	(Moss-Wellington	“Humanist	Ethics	in	John	Sayles’s	Casa”	109).		
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The	Use	of	Science	in	Analysis		 If	we	are	to	continue	referring	to	a	“realistic”	complexity,	we	need	to	check	the	veracity	of	our	claims	to	realism	before	proceeding.	As	mentioned	above,	it	is	a	fallacy	to	assume	an	explanation	is	correct	simply	because	it	is	complex,	so	we	cannot	conclude	the	project	of	humanism	merely	in	complexifying	our	visions	of	human	otherness	–	we	still	must	ask	who	gets	to	decide	what	is	“realistically	complex”?	This	is	the	arbitrating	purpose	of	scientific	method.	Not	because	all	methods	calling	themselves	science	are	unimpeachable	(pseudoscience	uses	the	language	of	science	without	the	method),	but	because	attempts	at	the	impartial	gathering	of	empirical	evidence	are	the	best	means	we	have	for	ascertaining	the	validity	of	a	claim	–	and	so	this	should	be	equally	applicable	to	claims	made	by	philosophers	within	the	humanities.	Many	of	us	use	(limited)	social	science	in	arts	evaluation	without	even	acknowledging	that	we	are	doing	it:	pointing	out	how	American	filmmaking	fails	to	include	certain	demographically	relevant	groups,	for	example,	relies	on	impartially	gathered	data	on	such	demographics.	Advances	in	the	natural	sciences	are	gradually	subsumed	into	a	general	conception	of	the	world	philosophers	describe.	But	we	can	do	more.	Regressing	to	a	purist	notion	of	realism	or	the	real	is	precisely	what	bothers	most	antihumanists,	as	it	allegedly	offers	opportunities	to	invalidate	the	subjective	experience	of	others,	but	some	notion	of	reality	from	which	to	work	is	unavoidable.	This	often	means	referring	to	experimental	science,	a	deferring	to	the	expertise	of	well-researched	others	to	mediate	one’s	view	of	humans	and	their	sociality;	it	seems	to	me	that	such	a	practice	conversely	opens	us	up	to	further	intersubjective	potentialities	rather	than	limiting	them.	This	is	not	the	kind	of	positivism	or	scientism	philosophers	like	Popper	object	to	(in	The	Logic	of	Scientific	Discovery,	
The	Poverty	of	Historicism	and	Conjectures	and	Refutations),	whereby	the	natural	sciences	can	be	extended	to	moral	blueprints,	teleological	certitude	and	prognostication,	or	represent	the	sum	of	meaningful	human	thought,19	but	merely	the	assertion	that	evidence	gathered	by	others	should	be	a	backdrop	to	our	conception	and	evaluation	of	human	activities,	including	narrative	production.	Sometimes	we	put	ourselves	above	this	process,	and	the	humanities	and	hermeneutics	become	a	pseudoscience	–	again,	the	language	of	complexity	without	the	method	of	evaluating	its	veracity.																																																									19	As	suggested	in	works	such	as	Alexander	Rosenberg’s	The	Atheist's	Guide	to	Reality.		
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	Clearly	there	are	some	observations	that	cannot	be	referred	to	empirical	evidence,	and	measurable	data	does	not	represent	all	that	is	worthwhile	approaching	in	narrative	–	but	these	facts	should	not	excuse	narrative	theorists	from	building	familiarity	with	the	science	around	their	subject.	(Nor	can	demarcation	problems	in	the	social	sciences	–	sometimes	called	“pre-science”	as	opposed	to	“hard”	science,	drawing	from	Wilhelm	Dilthey’s	initial	problem	of	methodological	difference	in	Geisteswissenschaft	and	Naturwissenschaft	–	permit	us	to	dismiss	the	knowledge	and	expertise	of	researchers	working	outside	of	the	natural	sciences;	for	example,	we	cannot	ignore	evidence	in	psychology	simply	because	of	a	knowledge	categorisation	problem.)	At	worst,	these	two	truisms	–	the	ineffable	and	the	unquantifiable	–	are	given	as	excuses	to	dismiss	any	evidence	contradicting	a	favoured	theory.	While	“life	outstrips	our	vocabulary”	(Berger	64)	perhaps	providing	the	need	for	stories,	it	simply	is	not	true	that	the	narrative	arts	exclusively	explore	the	space	that	science	cannot	reach.	Much	of	the	social	detail	that	can	be	broached	in	narrative	has	been	equally	studied	outside	of	creative	practice.	To	suggest	otherwise	smacks	of	poorly	conducted	research,	or	willing	oversight.	Nor	does	it	reduce	the	impact	of	arts,	but	rather	the	extra	richness	of	detail	gleaned	in	attention	to	the	expertise	of	others	matches	a	richer	experience	of	narrative	engagement,	evaluation,	and	creation.		In	cinema	studies	in	particular,	after	Bordwell	and	Carroll	we	have	seen	a	blossoming	of	cognitivist	approaches,	with	a	few,	such	as	Joseph	D.	Anderson	in	The	Reality	of	Illusion,	attempting	a	union	of	cognitive	and	evolutionary	approaches	to	explain	film	perception.	Following	debate	around	the	discovery,	implications	and	relevance	of	mirror	neurons,	it	may	seem	to	the	cognitivists	“preposterous	to	claim	that	our	capacity	to	reflect	on	the	intentions,	beliefs	and	desires	determining	the	behaviour	of	others	is	all	there	is	in	social	cognition”	(Gallese	“Before	and	Below	‘Theory	of	Mind’”	659),	which	put	“the	Grand	Theory	rooted	in	semiotics	and	psychoanalysis	in	a	difficult	position,	foreseeing	the	advent	of	a	biocultural	approach	to	cinema”	(Gallese	and	Guerra	188).	It	also	may	be	time	for	cinema	studies	to	put	the	sociality	back	into	social	cognition,	exploring	the	mental	space	between	people	involved	with	cinema	rather	than	the	isolated	neurological	studies	of	individual	mental	states	we	have	relied	on	in	the	past.	Thus	I	propose	to	look	broader	afield,	integrating	social	research	around	issues	such	as,	for	example,	prejudice,	ostracism	and	group	dynamics	into	understanding	the	storytelling	act,	and	the	film	experience.	An	attendance	to	the	communal	features	of	cinema	
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and	story	does	not	allow	us	to	ignore	the	substantial	contribution	fields	like	social	psychology	and	evolutionary	anthropology	can	make	to	the	discipline.20		Popper	contemporary	Jarvie	wonders	why	his	fellow	cognitive	film	theorists	and	analytic	philosophers,	for	all	their	love	of	science,	“study	and	cite	philosophers,	not	scientists”	(“Is	Analytic	Philosophy	the	Cure	for	Film	Theory?”	436).	Theorists	can	be	released	from	some	of	the	demand	to	directly	cite	scientists	when	dealing	with	questions	that	can	have	no	definitive	or	falsifiable	answer	–	questions	of	purpose,	for	example,	or	ethics	–	but	Jarvie’s	imperative	to	reference	scientists,	not	science	in	general	(ibid.	437),	could	be	a	helpful	one	in	descriptive	or	evaluative	work,	or	in	our	application	of	hermeneutics.	However,	I	am	primarily	making	a	case	here	for	a	scientific	backgrounding	(especially	in	the	social	sciences)	from	which	to	work,	not	pure	scientism.	Such	a	backgrounding	merely	helps	us	avoid,	inasmuch	as	possible,	saying	things	that	are	untrue,	and	helps	us	grapple	with	the	truth	claims	of	others,	including	storytellers.		The	nominal	problems	of	science	and	analysis	remain	important.	While	I	believe	it	is	remiss	to	neglect	what	social	sciences	may	tell	us	about	story	culture,	I	also	believe	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	our	own	practice	–	theory	without	testing	–	cannot	and	should	not	have	pretence	to	a	scientific	legitimacy.	When	theory	applies	science,	we	cherry-pick	studies	to	make	a	point,	which	is	fine	as	long	as	the	theorising	is	not	conflated	with	science	merely	by	using	it	as	a	reference.21	The	legitimacy	theory	can	claim	is	in	imaginative	agitation	and	uplift,	which	may	be,	at	least	in	a	humanistic	paradigm,	of	equal	importance	in	finding	our	way	forward	(ethically	determining	what	to	do)	as	the	descriptive	and	diagnostic	potentials	of	hard	science.																																																										20	This	is	in	addition	to	the	thorough	cognitivist	perception	studies	and	mysticising	psychoanalytic	pseudoscience	now	so	familiar	in	film	theory.	While	psychoanalysis	could	be	seen	as	having	poetic	value	in	its	circuitous	ambiguity,	when	it	is	used	to	colonise	other	people’s	experiences	with	static,	universally	applicable	metaphors	that	do	not	admit	cultural	variation,	it	should	be	put	into	question.	If	only	an	elite	community	possesses	access	to	acquisition	of	such	a	language,	which	is	then	used	to	describe	the	experience	of	others	with	a	pretence	to	empirical	truth	or	science	without	contact,	psychoanalysis	could	be	seen	as	a	kind	of	class	violence	(and	another	example	of	fallacious	proof	by	verbose	intimidation).		21	This	is	not	to	delegitimise	the	ambitious	rumination	that	is	theory,	which	Tim	Ingold	describes	as	“an	imagination	nourished	by	its	observational	engagements	with	the	world.	The	rupture	between	reality	and	imagination—the	one	annexed	to	fact,	the	other	to	theory—has	been	the	source	of	much	havoc	in	the	history	of	consciousness”	(393).	
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Since	at	least	1931,	figures	including	George	Sarton	and	Cassius	Jackson	Keyser	were	publishing	monographs	in	an	attempt	to	unify	humanism	and	science	(see	The	History	of	
Science	and	the	New	Humanism	and	Humanism	and	Science	respectively).	Humanism	and	science	appear	to	me	to	have	a	natural	home	together	as	they	both	start	from	a	place	of	unknowing	rather	than	top-down	theoretical	explication	–	they	search	for	knowledge	rather	than	defend	pre-existing	knowledge	–	and	they	both	pursue	ever	more	complex	detail	and	explanations	for	our	selves	and	the	world	around	us.	Indeed,	sometimes	humanism	and	scientific	rationalism	are	taken	to	be	synonymous:	the	Rationalist	Association,	for	example,	publishes	the	New	Humanist	quarterly.	As	in	Edward	O.	Wilson’s	version	of	complexity	theory,	the	complexity	of	social	systems	is	akin	to	the	complexity	of	biological	systems,	or	any	other	process	of	interaction	making	up	the	physical	world,	and	thus	emerges	the	possibility	for	a	non-reductive	physicalism:		To	recite	one	of	the	mantras	of	science,	the	explanations	of	the	physical	sciences	are	necessary	but	not	sufficient.	There	is	too	much	idiosyncrasy	in	the	arrangement	of	a	particular	cell’s	nucleus	and	other	organelles	as	well	as	the	molecules	composing	them,	and	too	much	complexity	in	the	cell’s	constantly	shifting	chemical	exchanges	with	the	environment,	to	accomplish	such	a	conceptual	traverse.	And	beyond	these	particularities	awaits	the	still-hidden	history	of	the	prescriptive	DNA,	stretched	across	countless	generations.		(Consilience	74)		So	again,	as	in	the	diverse	sciences	Wilson	cites,	social	narratologists	and	humanist	hermeneuticians	might	strive	for	ever	greater	descriptions	of	complex	interaction	with	respect	to	our	limitations	–	the	absence	of	holistic	causal	explanation	–	preventing	us	from	presuming	or	imposing	any	totalised	conception	of	human	identity,	and	keeping	discovery	alive.		 Despite	monistic	physicalist	fantasies	of	the	explanatory	powers	of	a	oneness	of	sciences	and	associated	dogma,	a	humanist	epistemology	holds	that	it	may	be	dangerous	to	believe	that	our	cognitive	capacities	can	hold	all	meaningful	information	about	the	human	together	at	once	–	from	this	reductive	position,	we	will	always	miss	deference	to	an	infinite	complexity,	the	acceptance	of	which	mediates	our	morality	and	behaviour.	In	this	case,	as	we	will	never	be	able	to	descriptively	and	meaningfully	totalise	human	experience	into	a	singular	conception,	we	need	theorists	to	suggest	and	simulate	the	excess	beyond	the	sciences	we	
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already	have	awareness	of,	make	imaginative	connections	between	sciences,	observe	theoretical	convergences	and	concoct	hypotheses	with	such	imagination:	like	story	itself,	imaginatively	providing	“the	ability	to	see	possible	formal	connections	before	one	is	able	to	prove	them	in	any	formal	way”	(Bruner	13).	The	theorist	can	then	challenge	holistic	myths	by	which	we	may	act	on	a	fallacious	assumption	that	what	we	already	know	explains	everything,	or	could	explain	everything	if	we	just	found	the	right	data:	“knowledge	is	not	built	from	facts	that	are	simply	there,	waiting	to	be	discovered	and	organized	in	terms	of	concepts	and	categories	…	it	rather	grows	and	is	grown	in	the	forge	of	our	relations	with	others”	(Ingold	391).	Fields	like	film	theory,	in	this	case,	can	move	past	the	necessary	specialist	study	of	minutiae	to	connect	a	macro	perspective	between	scientific	knowledges	(an	epistemic	consilience),	and	allow	us	to	imagine	what	to	do	with	the	diverse	information	received.	Bruner’s	“paradigmatic	mode”	of	abstracted	logic,	to	which	science	belongs,	thereby	forfeits	its	particularity	in	application,	which	imaginative	and	storied	modes	can	recover.	Story	applies	directly	to	our	lives	in	a	way	descriptions	of	the	world	cannot	–	it	provides	the	link	between	abstract	knowledge	and	our	lived	procedures	by	playing	out	knowledge	and	ideas	in	realised	scenarios.	It	is	our	abstract	information	applied,	which	subsequently	generates	new	abstractions	and	new	theories	of	life.	In	turn,	I	believe	we	must	pay	attention	to	those	who	go	to	test	resultant	theories,	or	we	are	not	part	of	the	human	epistemological	journey,	we	are	obscuring	it.	
	
	
Antihumanism	and	Alternatives	to	Humanist	Hermeneutics		 So	far,	we	have	established	that	we	must	“humanise”	things	to	ethically	include	them;	that	this	process	should	involve	some	complication	of	our	understanding	of	others;	that	any	such	resultant	complex	understanding	should	be	evaluated	against	available	empirical	evidence	where	possible,	so	that	we	know	whether	or	not	we	are	empathising	with	something	complex	and	real	rather	than	a	fabricated	or	misconstrued	complexity;	further,	that	we	must	acknowledge	any	such	project	as	always	incomplete,	thereby	valuing	the	attempt	to	understand	above	total	comprehension;	and	that	storytelling,	along	with	the	evaluative	work	we	do	around	stories,	is	a	primary	method	for	achieving	these	goals.	I	have	also	begun	to	make	the	case	that	film	is	well	positioned	to	provide	an	experience	whereby	we	can	exercise	our	complex	empathy	for	the	other.	This	is	what	humanistic	narratives	seek	to	do,	and	what	a	humanist	hermeneutics	can	evaluate.	
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		 While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis	to	respond	to	all	of	the	claims	of	the	various	antihumanisms,	it	is	necessary	for	any	narrative-based	humanism	to	approach	some	of	the	common	objections	raised	against	a	humanist	hermeneutics	in	particular.	I	must	reiterate	that	there	is	good	reason	to	be	sceptical	of	humanism,	in	that	the	term	has	a	history	of	use	in	appeals	to	a	universally	dominant	humanity,	and	these	appeals	are	in	turn	used	to	deny	outsiders	sovereignty	of	cultural	self-determination	and	identity:		 The	single	normative	foundation	of	humanism	can	be	used	to	disqualify	some	human	beings	as	less	qualified	to	self-governance	than	others,	based	on	culturally	specific	criteria	for	virtuous	human	behaviour.	For	example,	the	development	of	liberal	humanism	in	European	political	discourses	during	the	seventeenth,	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries	can	be	linked	to	the	popular	notion	of	the	‘civilizing	mission’	used	to	legitimate	colonial	expansion.		(Laurie	143-144)		Andy	Mousley	counters:	“the	Renaissance	has	been	located	if	not	as	the	unprecedented	source	of	individualism,	then	as	a	key	agent	in	its	development”	(16),	and	yet	a	literary	or	narrative	humanism	drawn	from	early	modern	hope	and	textual	inquiry,	he	argues,	“has	little	to	do	with	the	humanism	which	was	attacked	on	various	grounds	by	anti-humanists	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	but	ever	since	then	the	humanism	of	the	anti-humanists	has	been	routinely	invoked	as	though	it	encompassed	the	whole	of	the	humanist	tradition”	(ibid.	14).	He	disrupts	the	humanist/antihumanist	binary	by	suggesting	that	ideas	of	authenticity	and	ethics,	what	the	human	being	is	and	the	conditions	of	its	flourishing	or	compromise:		 are	present,	for	example,	in	the	hope	of	Marxists	that	class	exploitation	and	the	commodification	of	human	life	might	one	day	end.	They	are	also	implicated	in	post-colonialism’s	critique	of	dehumanising	ideologies	of	race,	even	when	or	especially	when	such	ideologies	are	perpetrated	in	the	name	of	humanity.	And	they	are	also	evident	in	the	feminist	commitment	to	terminate	the	subjugation	of	women	by	men.		(ibid.	11)		While	some	may	hold	that	imperialism	is	the	inevitable	conclusion	of	all	humanist	philosophy,	a	humanism	that	entertains	any	notion	of	a	locus	for	a	truer	humanity	is	not	the	humanism	I	speak	of	–	in	fact,	it	is	a	perversion	of	humanist	discourse,	if	humanist	discourse	principally	comprises,	as	I	am	proposing	here,	learning	from	others	through	empathy.	
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	 Ousting	imperial	attitudes	from	the	academy	appears	to	have	come	at	a	price:	a	contemporaneous	conflation	of	reasonable	(and	necessary)	cultural	relativism	(suggested	even	in	use	of	the	term	hermeneutics)	with	vague	and	generalised	disrespect	for	the	insurmountably	intrinsic	human	act	of	publically	discussing	ethics.	Today,	we	remain	sceptical	of	the	prescriptive	values	of	humanistic	texts,	and	any	associated	methodology	of	evaluation.	In	short,	constructivism	compels	disavowal	of	moral	arguments	as	such	arguments	can	only	reflect	the	status	of	the	moraliser,	ergo	moral	conclusions	made	through	art	may,	after	all,	be	mere	statements	of	taste,	the	kind	of	status	symbol	Pierre	Bourdieu	criticized	as	symbolic	class	violence	in	La	Distinction.	However,	moral	resolution	–	even	after	attempts	at	a	suspension	of	judgement	–	must	be	permissible	in	any	humanist	reading	method.	Perhaps	pragmatist	Jarvie	put	it	best:	“Methods	are	not	true	or	false,	but	adequate	or	inadequate,	fruitful	or	barren	…	but	they	can	be	moral	or	immoral,	above	all	in	the	investigation	of	humans”	(“Relativism	and	Historicism”	582).	We	should	still	analyse	our	ability	to	harm	or	aid	through	narrative	texts.	It	may	be	time	now	to	find	a	way	to	reintegrate	morality	into	narrative	theory,	while	retaining	respect	for	the	different	contextual	challenges,	power	relations	and	identities	in	flux	across	the	globe.	These	values	need	not	be	in	conflict:	we	can	ask	an	ethical	question	and	understand	the	political	context	in	which	ethical	decisions	will	be	made.	Otherwise,	we	forfeit	the	use	of	moral	language	to	those	powerful	interests	that	continue	to	harness	moral	discourse	as	a	mechanism	for	hegemonic	social	control.		Said’s	“nontotalizing,	nonessentializing	humanism	that	admits	fallibility,	limitations	in	understanding	and	difference”	(Holland	6)	suggested	one	such	way	forward	while	exploring	the	bounds	between	secular	and	theological	humanisms:		 One	might	say	that	Saidian	secular	criticism	sublimates	a	repressed	politics	of	transcendence	while	unmasking	organized	religion’s	pose	of	impartiality.	But	one	might	also	venture	that	Said’s	attentiveness	to	theological	exegesis	in	the	preface	to	Mimesis	attests	to	an	intellectual	curiosity	toward	cultures	of	belief,	a	willingness	to	engage	‘religiously’	with	the	matter	of	how	philosophies	of	transcendence	have	shaped	revolutionary	ethical	militance	and	subjective	freedom.		(Apter	47)		This	is,	if	anything,	a	Saidian	humanism.	Said	was	instrumental	in	exhuming	a	secular,	emancipatory,	optimistically	leftist	spiritualism	from	humanism’s	theological	underpinnings,	
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one	that	located	wonderment	in	identifying	commonalities	across	the	depth	and	detail	of	texts	and	languages.	It	is	hopeful	in	a	human	agency	at	once	apparent	–	the	evidence	is	found	in	stirring	literature	from	all	places,	all	times	–	and	unknowable,	hence	the	presence	of	a	necessary	spiritualism	in	Said’s	work.	If	humanism	has	been,	as	Apter	says,	“a	tradition	shaped	and	structured	historically	by	tensions	between	religion	and	secular	culture”	(46),	then	after	Said’s	sublimation	of	humanism	beyond	national,	ethnic	or	theological	fealties	to	reflect	a	world	of	increasingly	unbound	identities,	associated	languages	and	texts,	we	can	ask	what	is	salvageable	from	the	old	humanism.	For	literary	Darwinist	Joseph	Carroll,	it	is	reaffirmation	of	“three	core	ideas	in	traditional	humanism:	individual	identity,	authorial	intentions,	and	reference	to	a	real	world”	(Reading	Human	Nature	x).	This	reintroduces	the	humility	and	utility	of	listening	to	others,	yet	moreover	for	Said,	in	philological	close	study	(or	what	one	might	call	a	close	listening	through	sympathetic	study,	in	an	anthropological-hermeneutic	sense,	to	human	development	and	movement),	we	are	able	to	reveal	and	honour	an	untotalisable	humanity,	and	in	so	doing	“intuit”	(Orientalism	258)	a	human	excess,	an	unknowable	something-more	that	is	our	agency,	our	sympathy	toward	complex	otherness,	and	thus	our	will	to	progress	together.	In	a	way,	by	listening	closely	to	the	uplift	transmitted	through	human-produced	texts,	we	access	a	great	relief	in	not	knowing	a	human	essence.	We	are	relieved	from	the	pretence	to	totally	know	the	variability	of	human	identity	and	activity	which	is	beyond	our	ken,	a	hubristic	reductionism	that,	especially	working	from	the	cues	of	grand	theory,	it	can	seem	we	must	accept	simply	to	make	an	ethical	or	political	argument;	at	the	same	time,	we	also	appreciate	the	human	labouring	to	communicate	through	narrative	which	is	the	fruit	of	our	unified	complexity.	Thus,	to	argue	against	universalising	notions	of	the	human	misses	the	point:	we	do	not	need	to	naturalise	hierarchical	views	of	superior	humanness	to	engage	any	of	these	humanistic	pursuits.		 For	many	of	the	aforementioned	antihumanist	critics,	the	fact	that	some	have	more	access	to	sympathetic	narrative	distribution	than	others	invalidates	the	process;22	for	example,	older	white	male	dominance	in	the	demography	of	the	Hollywood	Academy	of	Arts	and	Science	unquestionably	dictates	the	kind	of	people	their	mass-produced	stories	will	ask	us	to	sympathise	with.	A	humanist	might	counter	that	these	empathic	processes	remain	the	only	means	(however	imperfect)	by	which	we	will	overcome	such	disparity.	The	production																																																									22	As	well	as	Derrida,	the	post-Foucaldian	subjectivists,	and	others	I	have	mentioned	like	Laurie,	Sardar	and	Merryl	Wyn	Davies;	in	later	chapters	I	will	engage	with	recent	political	writers	like	Lauren	Berlant	who	critique	the	sympathy	management	of	specific	humanist	texts.	
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and	direction	of	sympathy	is	undeniably	political,	but	such	critics	have	put	us	in	a	lose-lose	situation:	extension	of	group	identification	is	both	the	goal	and	the	problem.	The	positioning	of	sympathiser	and	sympathised,	speaker	and	spoken	for,	is	an	inevitability	as	long	as	we	have	global	imbalanced	powers,	yet	the	alternative	–	not	listening	to,	imaginatively	connecting	with	and	facilitating	stories	told	of	the	oppressed	–	is	far	worse.	When	we	attack	attempts	at	liberal	empathy,	we	sterilise	the	means	to	seriously	address	power	imbalance:	the	ability	of	stories	to	turn	grander	structural	abstractions	and	observations	into	applied	narratives,	through	which	the	relevance	of	personal	detail	provides	a	reason	for	political	action.	Nonattendance	to	the	emotional	lives	of	others	bars	identification	and	thereby	the	search	for	self-sacrificing	answers	or	generative	cosmopolitanism	in	practice,	prolonging	inequity,	which	should	lead	us	to	a	simple	maxim:	humanism	seeks	to	cosmopolitanise	sympathy,	but	not	generalise	ethical	action.	A	liberal	sympathy	grounded	in	complex	understanding	of	local	contingencies	has	a	superior	chance	of	locating	actions	with	genuine	mutual	benefit.			 Writers	such	as	Heather	Love	have	extended	the	antihumanist	critique	to	challenge	humanist	reading	methods.	She	begins	by	asking:		 What	to	make	of	this	persistence	of	humanist	values	in	the	context	of	a	disciplinary	milieu	that	often	sees	them	as	outmoded?	It	might	be	explained	as	a	typical	contradiction	between	intellectual	conviction	and	lived	practice—there	are	no	doubt	de	facto	humanists	among	posthumanists,	just	as	there	are	Marxist	heroes	of	consumption.		(372)		Love	goes	on	to	wonder	whether	the	use	of	close	textual	readings	to	“enrich”	or	“deepen”	our	understanding	of	the	human	is	all	that	efficacious.	The	de	facto	humanist	describes	those	theorists	who	are	engaged	in	attempts	to	comprehend	complex	human	systems	yet	disavow	a	nebulously	evoked	notion	of	humanism	(the	humanism	of	antihumanists	is	also	addressed	in	Soper	18,	128;	Davies	Humanism	48-49).	Love	advances	two	alternatives:	distant	and	flat	reading.	The	distant	reading	is	really	a	quantitative	analysis,	oddly	positioned	against	qualitative	readings.	As	many	critics	have	done,	Love	here	pins	humanism	to	an	unrelated	methodology.	It	is	a	false	depiction,	however:	how	many	humanists	really	see	quantitative	analysis	as	opposed	to	a	fuller	or	more	realistic	understanding	of	the	human,	and	what	do	we	then	make	of	so	many	humanist-rationalist	societies	across	the	globe	proffering	scientism?	Of	course	both	have	their	place	in	building	a	holistic	picture	of	our	lives.	Flat	reading	is	a	more	
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intriguing	concept,	a	variant	on	Sharon	Marcus	and	Stephen	Best’s	surface	reading,	which	“suggests	the	possibility	of	an	alternative	ethics,	one	grounded	in	documentation	and	description	rather	than	empathy	and	witness”	(Love	375).	Despite	her	inability	to	provide	a	demonstration	(ibid.	383-387,	which	cannot	avoid	the	kind	of	interpretative	analysis	she	hoped	to	suppress),	perhaps	there	is	something	to	the	concept.	Perhaps	in	leaping	straight	to	the	hidden	qualities	of	a	text,	we	are	not	actually	reaching	a	“depth”	of	understanding,	and	maybe	a	realist	perspective	is	sacrificed	in	our	attempt	to	use	texts	to	uncover	submerged	meanings.	Sometimes	the	apparent	can	reveal	as	much	as	the	subtextual.	Again,	however,	this	realisation	shouldn’t	sit	in	opposition	to	any	other	analytical	activity	providing	any	other	kind	of	detail	about	living	things,	and	their	efforts	to	communicate	and	interact.	The	surface	reading	is	in	no	way	opposed	to	humanist	hermeneutics.		 One	could	call	this	an	eclectic	humanism,	then,	drawing	as	it	does	from	profoundly	diverse	perspectives	to	upset	and	extend	visions	of	a	panhuman.	However	all	humanisms	might	contain	this	egalitarian	imperative	where	they	have	fealty	to	the	accumulative	pursuit	of	comprehending	human	complexity.	If	the	human	is	understood	as	sociobiologically	adapted	to	environments	they	live	in	and	create,	never	good	or	evil	and	yet	never	able	to	be	removed	from	cultural-ethical	intercourse,	there	is	perhaps	something	we	can	learn	not	only	about	ourselves,	but	the	fascinating	and	unfathomable	complexity	of	all	life,	from	listening	deeply	to	a	multiplicity	of	perspectives	and	knowledge	(c.f.	Wilson’s	Consilience).	From	this	position,	we	do	not	have	to	take	sides	or	adhere	to	monocausal	accounts	of	arts	adaptation,	cultural	variations,	alleged	superior	ethical	frameworks	or	truths.	We	make	sense	of	the	world	by	thinking	more	generously	about	people,	epistemology	and	sociality	in	order	to,	hopefully,	ambitiously,	find	new	answers	to	old	problems.		This	egalitarian	respect	for	others’	knowledge	does	not	hold	that	all	information	is	equal.	A	principle	is	still	applied,	as	I	continue	to	insist	that	we	ask:	does	this	information	
realistically	complicate	our	understanding	of	humans	and	human	activity,	even	where	the	question	cannot	be	conclusively	answered.	Identifying	patterns	of	discrimination	and	normalised	prejudice	in	cultural	narratives	should	not	be	seen	as	opposed	to	this	humanism	in	practice.	Humanism	just	asks	what	we	can	do	instead,	or	what	the	possibilities	may	be	for	replacing	and	moving	past	discriminatory	narratives,	instead	of	concluding	with	their	documentation.		
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Perhaps	another	reason	humanist	readings	have	fallen	out	of	repute	in	academe	is	that	the	question	at	its	heart	is	too	obvious:	how	do	we	be	nicer	to	one	another?	The	answers,	however,	are	complex,	and	if	we	are	honest,	it	is	the	question	behind	all	the	rest	of	our	questions,	such	as	“what	is	a	human?”	or	“is	the	human	an	adequate	ethical	subject?”	Humanism	in	the	storytelling	arts	is,	foremost,	a	reminder	that	when	we	transmit	and	discuss	story	and	its	theory,	we	should	do	so	to	serve,	equally,	living	things.	It	is	the	way	in	which	we	go	about	this	act	of	disturbing	ourselves	into	ethical	inclusivity	that	is	of	interest,	especially	in	humanist	hermeneutics	and	narratology.			
Conclusions	and	Future	Directions		 Narrative	humanism	(for	example,	the	cinematic	human	drama)	and	humanist	hermeneutics	share	a	common	goal	–	attempts	to	comprehend	a	realistically	complex	human	otherness	–	yet	differ	in	their	means,	and	we	might	more	readily	ascertain	how	we	attempt	this	through	storytelling	than	through	scholarship	around	storytelling.	Here,	then,	is	a	summary	of	the	hermeneutic	method	I	am	proposing:	that	we	begin	by	listening	to	others	with	generosity,	which	means	approaching	storied	communication	from	a	position	of	potential	unknowing,	as	we	may	have	something	to	learn	from	the	storyteller;	that	thereafter,	as	evaluation	needs	a	backbone	in	some	sense	of	the	real,	we	ought	to	elevate	science	over	unbridled	intuition,	or	the	specialised	knowledge	of	others	beyond	ourselves;	and	that	we	can	then	evaluate	how	well	a	text,	a	cluster	of	texts,	a	cultural	movement	or	phenomenon	opens	us	up	to	complex	human	otherness,	which	includes	both	its	imaginative	and	potentially	illuminating	simulation	of	sociality	and	psychology,	as	well	as	how	it	might	represent	causal	plurality	and	the	vastness	of	the	human	unknown.	As	nothing	is	finalised	in	human	studies,	we	value	the	utility	of	the	attempt	at	comprehending	others	above	a	chimeric	completion	of	human	knowledge	projects.	Finally,	if	we	realistically	complicate	our	comprehension	of	others	through	narrative	and	evaluative	discourse	in	this	way,	we	might	access	more	truly	inclusive,	more	generous,	and	more	apt	ethical	debates	regarding	the	complex	situations	confronting	others,	and	ourselves.		This	is	clearly	something	of	a	rescue	act	that	I’ve	been	engaged	with,	a	recovery	of	wonderment	(c.f.	Bookchin)	in	an	age	of	academic	professionalization	that	impresses	upon	us	the	need	to	have	and	defend	a	presupposed	answer	to	everything	human,	in	the	tradition	of	
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much	grand	theory.	Adopting	such	summary	approaches	to	a	diversity	of	lives	in	turn	means	that	we	must	resist	the	grand	–	and	I	think	exciting	–	unknowing	of	humanism.	It	is	akin	to	the	productive	fretfulness	of	anthropology,	always	willing	to	have	core	assumptions	upset	by	new	communities	presenting	new	knowledge,	to	admit	and	work	with	failures	in	comprehending	others.	I	also	sense	that,	after	the	cognitive	turn,	film	theory	still	needs	to	catch	up	not	so	much	with	the	debate	on	the	nature	of	empathy,	but	with	integrating	new	work	such	as	literary	Darwinism,	as	a	few	philosophers,	such	as	Anderson	or	Torben	Grodal,23	are	now	engaged	with.	One	nice	thing	about	being	a	humanist	is	that	in	defending	our	field,	we	do	not	have	to	merely	defend	an	immovable	existing	framework	or	paradigmatic	reading	mechanism	–	although	we	may	cherish	such	applications,	there	is	no	portentous	answer	to	“how	culture	works.”	Foremost	we	defend	our	right	to	be	excited	by	new	knowledge	that	we	can	integrate	into	our	attempts	to	deeply	comprehend	others.			 *		The	following	chapter	is	a	social	narratology.	As	well	as	providing	a	demonstration	of	the	broadest	possible	kind	of	humanist	analysis	–	at	the	level	of	taxonomic	narrative	theory	–	it	will	also	perform	groundwork	in	establishing	the	many	uses	of	narrative	that	we	should	have	in	mind	when	we	consider,	and	offer	detailed	readings	of,	individual	texts.	Before	we	can	assume	the	mantle	of	ethical	scrutiny,	we	should	first	be	conversant	with	the	ways	people	are	actively	using	the	narratives	we	critique;	this	is	the	work	of	narratological	detail.		As	I	have	continually	suggested	throughout	this	introduction,	I	will	be	keeping	in	mind	story’s	adaptive	functions,	and	drawing	on	literary	Darwinism	as	well	as	evolutionary	anthropology	and	social	psychology	to	present	a	catalogue	of	the	vast	uses	and	purposes	of	narrative	formulation	and	distribution.	Before	proceeding,	however,	it	seems	important	to	convey	the	limitations	of	such	an	endeavour,	and	especially	to	offer	a	few	notes	on	the	explanatory	work	of	Darwinism.	I	have	already	qualified	that	I	am	not	claiming	that	biological	imperatives	explain	everything,	or	that	any	humanities	theory	using	social	science	makes	that	theory	a	science.	I	also	must	make	it	clear	that	any	action	that	is	good	for	a	majority,	utilitarian	
or	cosmopolitan,	is	not	necessarily	adaptive.	Understanding	human	adaptation	might	help	us																																																									23	In	particular,	see	Grodal	Embodied	Visions:	Evolution,	Emotion,	Culture,	and	Film.		
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uncover	realistic	solutions	to	encouraging	a	better-naturedness	(for	example,	demilitarisation)	amongst	a	global	populace;	however	we	must	remain	careful	in	our	use	of	the	term	“adaptive.”	Traits	are	adaptive	if	they	help	a	species	(interspecific	adaptation)	or	individual’s	genetic	material	(intraspecific	adaptation)	sustain	and	survive,	not	necessarily	if	they	help	people	get	on	better	(although	in	interspecific	competition	the	two	outcomes	regularly	coincide),	or	reduce	suffering	(painful	self-sacrifice	is	written	into	the	social	structures	of	many	species,	such	as	worker	ant	autothysis	or	suicidal	altruism).	In	much	of	the	popularly	employed	language	around	evolution	–	language	regarding	human	progress	in	particular	–	we	appear	to	attribute	intentionality	to	selection	and	other	natural	processes.	Fallacies	such	as	these	should	be	avoided.		Beyond	this	general	disclaimer,	however	–	that	our	purpose	is	not	nature’s	purpose	–	there	are	a	handful	of	other	objections	raised	against	the	use	of	Darwinian	considerations	in	arts	evaluation	that	require	abatement.	The	first	is	a	perceived	primacy	attributed	to	biological	over	cultural	explanations	of	human	behaviour	when	we	admit	evolutionary	theory	into	the	humanities.	In	On	the	Origin	of	Stories:	Evolution,	Cognition,	and	Fiction,	Boyd	dismisses	the	circular	logic	of	arguments	about	the	construction	of	human	as	culturally	determined	or	otherwise	(23),	and	goes	on	to	present	a	discussion	of	some	of	the	possible	human	functions	of	storytelling	from	an	evolutionary	perspective.	Boyd	points	out	–	and	I	agree	–	that	the	apparent	opposition	between	cultural	constructivist	and	sociobiological	explanations	of	human	behaviour	is	a	mirage.	Although	much	theory	rests	on	this	presumption,	there	is	no	naturalist	or	biologically	determinist	consensus	among	evolutionary	theorists,	and	many	now	work	from	the	conviction	that	our	biology	and	our	culture	are	synergetic	and	react	to	one	another.	How	this	happens	is	the	subject	of	debate.24	Genetics	can	be	conceived	as	a	series	of	switches	reacting	to	an	environment:	as	such,	nature	or	nurture	is	almost	always	the	wrong	question	to	ask.	Phenotypic	plasticity	(how	our	genes	are	expressed	within	an	environment,	which	can	change	throughout	our	lifetime)	must	clearly	inform	any	such	analysis;	this	process	begins	from	the	time	we	are	conceived,	as	we	receive	information	about	the	environment	we	will	be	born	into	from	the	gametes	of	both	partners,	and	from	within	the	womb.	This	perspective	on	evolutionary	synthesis,	then,	is	compatibilist,	often	described	as	a	“gene-culture	coevolution”	(Wilson	Consilience	139),	which	makes	possible	a																																																									24	Neuroscientists	and	neuroanthropologists	such	as	Merlin	Donald	(Origins	of	the	Modern	
Mind;	A	Mind	So	Rare)	have	begun	to	explore	our	coevolution	with	technology-supported	culture	at	a	cognitive	level,	for	example.		
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Lamarckian	study	of	acquired	characteristics	within	constructed	niches	(cultural	variance,	in	this	case),	admitting	that	human	niche	construction	in	turn	changes	which	traits	will	be	adaptive	in	the	new	environment,	and	ergo	selected	for.25	We	do	not	just	inherit	genes	from	our	ancestors,	we	also	inherit	the	environment	those	genes	will	react	to.		For	example,	a	reductive	or	ad	hoc	evolutionary	theory	might	look	at	sexual	activities	as	stemming	solely	from	biological	imperatives	to	reproduce,26	but	as	we	are	highly	socially	adapted	animals,	a	post-Mendelian	evolutionary	synthesis	provides	the	understanding	that	our	sexuality	and	sexual	behaviour	are	equally	driven	by	complex	socio-cultural	behaviours	extending	beyond	direct	individual	fitness	and	reproductive	goals.	The	plasticity	of	psychological	mechanisms	and	malleability	of	their	function	to	vast	unplanned	environmental	variation	and	contingencies	(Joyce	6-7)	means	the	relationship	between	our	biology	and	the	environments	we	create	cannot	be	considered	reducible	to	a	simple	argument	of	cultural	or	innate	primacy.	Evolution	does	not	equate	to	biological	determinism.	The	polarity	of	grand	nature	versus	nurture	theories	misses	a	breadth	of	possibilities	in	uncovering	the	way	we	interact	with	environments	we	create,	and	exaptation	in	manipulated	environments.	Extending	this	perspective	to	the	pancultural	occurrence	of	human	morality,	one	could	say	that	while	the	framework	is	hardwired,	our	programming	is	flexible	–	and	this	is	a	culturally	dynamic	phenomenon,	so	does	not	invalidate	cultural	analytical	theories.		If	we	are	scared	of	the	prospect	of	sociobiological	determinism	not	allowing	for	the	ethical	sovereignty	of	cultural	exchange,	we	should	remind	ourselves	too	that	there	is	agency	in	mate	selection	–	and	its	subsequent	genetic	reformulations	–	as	well	as	in	cultural	negotiation.	We	may	choose	a	mate	based	equally	on	matching	ideology	(Buston	and	Emlen	“Cognitive	processes	underlying	human	mate	choice”)	as	we	do	on	other	complementary	factors.	Presuming	this	process	as	deterministic	is	revealed	merely	as	a	desire	to	witness	the	long-term	effects	of	a	direct	agency	within	our	lifetime,	but	change	often	happens	much	more	slowly	and	indirectly,	hence	a	constructivist	philosophical	focus	on	cultural	negotiation	as	the																																																									25	We	might	note	too	that	vice	versa,	our	genes	predispose	us	to	choose	and	manipulate	certain	environments	that	then	affect	the	expression	of	those	genes,	a	process	known	as	“gene-environment	correlation.”		26	Geoffrey	Miller	elaborates	this	apprehension	to	an	extreme	position,	contending	in	The	
Mating	Mind	that	sexual	display	is	the	adaptive	genesis	of	social	behaviours	including	conversation	and	art.	In	a	sense	he	distils	natural	selection	until	only	sexual	selection,	mate	choice	and	signalling	remain.	
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totality	of	human	agency.	It	is	indeed	a	convenient	position	for	the	cultural	theorist	to	be	in	if	culture	has	primacy	over	all	human	behaviour	and	cognition,	and	happens	to	dictate	all	other	outcomes.	The	conscious	interactivity	of	culture	is	simply	more	visible,	more	observable,	and	therefore	makes	the	case	for	human	agency	and	change	easier	to	put	forward.		Sometimes	in	cultural	criticism	too,	it	seems	that	the	biological	is	aligned	with	conservative	interests,	as	they	have	been	misused	in	the	past.	However	this	is	far	from	the	truth.	Peter	Singer	has	argued	for	a	new	Darwinian	progressive	politics	in	A	Darwinian	Left:	
Politics,	Evolution	and	Cooperation,	and	in	so	doing,	made	the	point	that	Darwinism	is	not	so	much	a	blow	to	human	agency	as	it	is	to	leftist	utopianism	–	a	changing	of	the	goal	posts.	Accepting	and	striving	to	understand	the	nature	of	the	human	form	leads	us	to	more	modest	goals	than	the	elimination	of	competitiveness,	power	relations	and	general	human	strife,	so	the	call	to	a	scientific	realism	concerning	human	capabilities	renders	the	ambition	of	reducing	the	harms	of	inequity	more	attainable.	Asking	for	us	to	analyse	how	we	are	sociobiologically	ushered	to	mutually	beneficial	cooperation	takes	the	place	of	a	former	idealism	which	mystifies	the	act	and	places	it	out	of	reach;	Singer	summarises	all	of	this	in	a	brief	list	of	projected	features	for	a	Darwinian	left	distinct	from	the	prophetic	past	(60-63).	Others,	such	as	Robert	H.	Frank	in	The	Darwin	Economy:	Liberty,	Competition,	and	the	Common	Good,	have	used	Darwinian	insight	to	argue	convincingly	for	progressive	economics,	and	writers	such	as	Barbara	Creed,	who	described	a	“Darwinian	gaze”	(102-126),	Elizabeth	Grosz	(13-33),	and	Rebecca	J.	Hannagan	in	articles	including	“Gendered	Political	Behavior:	A	Darwinian	Feminist	Approach”	have	admitted	the	utility	of	the	Darwinian	perspective	in	the	project	of	equalising	gender	inequity.		So	finally,	if	we	are	indeed	driven	to	fasten	ourselves	to	storied	causalities,	we	should	make	certain	we	are	not	misrepresenting	what	we	do	know	about	human	altruistic	capabilities	in	order	to	moralise	about	what	others	should	do.	In	extrapolating	Darwinism	
directly	to	an	ethic	(rather	than	using	evolutionary	studies	as	an	epistemic	background	to	our	ethics),	we	may	concoct	something	akin	to	social	Darwinism	or	eugenics.27	How	do	we	avoid	this?	Literary	Darwinism	should	heed	Darwin’s	own	counsel,	a	maxim	he	repeated	more	than	once,	frustrated	by	distortion	of	his	claims:																																																										27	Anxieties	like	these,	and	the	“biologisation”	of	political	rhetoric,	are	historicised	by	Virginia	Richter	in	Literature	After	Darwin.	
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As	my	conclusions	have	lately	been	much	misrepresented,	and	it	has	been	stated	that	I	attribute	the	modification	of	species	exclusively	to	natural	selection,	I	may	be	permitted	to	remark	that	in	the	first	edition	of	this	work,	and	subsequently,	I	placed	in	a	most	conspicuous	position—namely	at	the	close	of	the	Introduction—the	following	words:	“I	am	convinced	that	natural	selection	has	been	the	main	but	not	the	exclusive	means	of	modification.”	This	has	been	of	no	avail.	Great	is	the	power	of	steady	misrepresentation.		(The	Origin	of	Species	451)		Our	comprehension	of	natural	selection	cannot	explain	all	of	life.	This	means,	however,	that	if	we	resist	natural	fallacies	in	approaching	Darwinism	(of	deservedness,	or	of	unilineal	progress),	attention	to	its	profound	elucidatory	potentials	can	–	perhaps	counterintuitively	–	temper	the	claims	of	theory	rather	than	rendering	theory	conclusive.		 Storytellers,	yarn-spinners	and	producers	of	narrative	art	continue	to	conduct	the	natural	storytelling	of	the	conscious	mind,	making	sense	of	our	lives	in	an	internal	dramatic	narrative,	into	intersubjective	experience.	This	begets	a	moral	issue:	how	ought	we	attempt	to	shape	one	another’s	internal	narrative?	Just	as	humanist	storytelling	must	permit	complex	multi-causality	to	offer	any	workable	or	realistic	view	of	human	operations,	so	must	humanist	media	studies	and	hermeneutics	permit	complex	social	multi-causality	in	their	readings	of	narrative	function	and	textual	analysis	alike.	So	statements	on	the	true	function	of	fiction,	portrayals	of	the	origins	of	storytelling	to	explain	current	circumstances,	and	doctrinaire	readings	from	a	single-purpose	paradigm	are	not	enough.	When	we	ask	these	questions	of	art,	we	keep	in	mind	how	little	we	can	keep	in	mind	in	order	to	think	more	generously	about	one	another,	and	the	humility	of	wonder	retained	creates	new	opportunities	for	knowledge	rather	than	intellectual	turf	protectionism	and	paradigmatic	warfare.	In	this	ambitious	project,	I	hope	to	both	demonstrate	this	capability	and	establish	for	my	reader	a	position	of	openness	to	complex	humanness	that	we	could	go	on	to	apply	to	all	our	practices	of	cultural	analysis.				 	
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SOCIAL	NARRATOLOGY:	
A	Catalogue	of	Storytelling	Social	Functions	from	a	Humanist	Perspective			 There	was	not	enough	time	for	human	heredity	to	cope	with	the	vastness	of	new	contingent	possibilities	revealed	by	high	intelligence	…	The	arts	filled	the	gap.	Early	humans	invited	them	in	an	attempt	to	express	and	control	through	magic	the	abundance	of	the	environment,	the	power	of	solidarity,	and	other	forces	in	their	lives	that	mattered	most	to	survival	and	reproduction.		(Edward	O.	Wilson	Consilience	255)			I	begin	with	Wilson’s	much-quoted	passage,	as	in	respecting	a	multiplicity	of	the	uses	of	art	it	reminds	us	that	communication	itself	has	evolutionary	causes.	Story,	he	suggests,	helped	manage	the	confusions	arising	as	a	result	of	the	processing	power	of	incomparable	neurological	development.	As	such,	it	is	also	a	good	place	to	start	in	mapping	out	just	some	of	the	functions	of	narrative	in	our	daily	lives.	These	early	developments	introduced	complex	internal	worlds	that	more	direct	communication	could	not	fully	represent	the	dynamism	of:	projections,	including	imagined	future	events,	the	existential	terror	and	anxieties	made	possible	in	reflexive	rumination	on	those	projections,	simulations	of	another’s	internal	state,	metacognition,	social	cognition	and	complex,	blended	affect	may	not	be	fully	conveyed	without	utilising	the	drama	and	refracted	interior	conflicts	of	storytelling.	Fiction	introduces	new	resources	to	represent	complex	internal	states,	in	some	cases	mirroring	the	inherent	speculation,	imprecision,	and	boundlessness	of	everyday	imaginative	capacities.	Heeding	Wilson’s	own	advice,	we	should	recall,	however,	that	the	evolutionary	perspective	can	only	take	us	so	far:	the	origins	of	a	human	activity	do	not	necessarily	account	for	our	appropriation	of	the	activity	for	different	purposes	across	millennia,	any	more	than	we	could	claim	that	our	hands	developed	to	facilitate	typing	on	a	keyboard.	We	find	new	uses	for	old	adaptations,	which	cannot	necessarily	be	traced	to	a	clear	and	direct	survival	goal.	We	refract	instincts	and	goals	through	complex	culture,	which	is	multi-purposeful.	Human	systems	–	epistemological,	sociocultural,	historical	–	are	gestalt.	This	is	a	core	principle	of	social	narratology.		Much	of	what	we	call	narratology	appears	to	me	to	be	concerned	with	cataloguing,	in	particular	making	lists	of	story	mechanics	and	functions:	from	Mieke	Bal’s	structuralist	or	Algirdas	Julien	Greimas’s	semiotic	narratology	to	Mar	and	Oatley’s	psychological	narratology,	
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and	from	Gerald	Prince’s	Dictionary	of	Narratology	to	Peter	Hühn	et	al.’s	“Living	Handbook	of	Narratology”	at	The	University	of	Hamburg,	narratology	has	always	been	taxonomic.	Social	narratology	is,	along	with	previous	works	in	the	narratological	field,	a	kind	of	complexivism,	in	that	it	seeks	to	describe	a	complex	system.	However,	the	complex	system	it	seeks	to	describe	is	social	–	it	is	the	space	between	people	that	is	facilitated	by	stories.	Where	cognitive	narratology	has	been	particularly	good	at	describing	the	psychological	relationship	between	a	reader	and	a	text,	social	narratology	refocuses	the	science	of	storytelling	to	the	relationship	between	two	or	more	people	engaged	with	a	text.			 To	put	it	another	way,	although	many	cognitive	theorists	have	been	at	pains	to	point	out	the	non-exclusive	nature	of	the	applications	of	cognitive	studies	(Herman	“Cognitive	Narratology”),	much	of	the	current	research	leans	toward	perception	studies	precisely	because	the	cognitive	sciences	are	good	at	investigating	the	moment	of	engagement	with	narrative.28	Social	narratology,	on	the	other	hand,	extends	from	our	knowledge	of	textual	responses	to	ask	questions	regarding	the	social	use	these	relationships	with	narrative	are	then	put	to	–	how	a	story	facilitates	or	mediates	relations	between	people,	for	instance.	It	might	be	regarded	as	a	particular	application	of	cognitive	theory	rather	than	a	difference	of	kind	(it	draws	on	many	of	the	same	sources),	or	simply	a	shifting	of	the	focus	of	cognitive	studies.	Social	narratology	reintegrates	some	of	cognitive	science’s	formative	disciplines,	and	as	such	engages	more	extensively	with	anthropological	and	evolutionary	biological	research,	and	turns	to	the	explanatory	powers	of	social	psychology	more	so	than	neuroscience	(although	again,	they	are	not	in	any	way	exclusive,	but	rather	complementary	fields	of	inquiry).29	In	the	conclusion	to	his	work	on	cognitive	film	theory	and	emotion,	Moving	
Viewers,	Carl	Plantinga	suggests	room	for	further	direction	on	social	cognition:	“Popular	narratives	have	a	communal	function,	the	significance	of	which	can	easily	be	undervalued.	In	embodying	virtual	solutions	to	traumatic	problems,	they	play	a	role	in	the	development	of																																																									28	Some,	such	as	Malcolm	Turvey,	have	questioned	the	ability	of	perception	studies	to	tell	us	much	at	all	about	film.	He	argues	that	the	mantra	of	many	cinematic	Darwinists	from	Joseph	D.	Anderson	onward	–	that	the	language	of	film	developed	to	appeal	to	perceptual	faculties	originating	in	the	Pleistocene	–	is	hardly	surprising,	and	a	slight	claim	that	does	little	to	illuminate	anything	about	cinema	in	particular	(50-51).		29	As	in	much	of	the	work	within	cognitive	film	studies,	these	accounts	sit	alongside	insights	from	literary	theory,	philosophy	and	experimental	media	research	to	see	what	can	be	gleaned	from	their	comparison.	I	will	be	calling	upon	much	more	wide-ranging	sources	in	addition	to	those	noted	here,	presenting	an	attempt	at	interdisciplinary	consilience,	or	a	humanistic	unifying	of	knowledge	from	various	backgrounds.		
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what	might	be	called	distributed	or	social	cognition”	(225-226).	I	intend	to	pick	up	where	these	works	leave	off,	and	I	hope	that	this	will	in	turn	inspire	a	broadening	of	the	epistemic	palette	cognitivists	might	draw	from.		 The	purpose	of	the	current	chapter	is	both	to	lay	a	foundational	comprehension	of	this	extraordinary	human	behaviour	that	we	might	retain	when	offering	closer	textual	readings,	and	to	suggest	a	human	excess	by	the	very	span,	multiplicity,	and	challenge	of	this	list.	The	ineffable	untotalisability	of	any	life	is	always	subject	to	the	limits	of	reliable	human	science	–	limits	we	must	acknowledge	in	order	to	remain	realistic	about	any	claims	of	a	“human	nature”	or	our	moral	capabilities.	This	honesty	in	turn,	I	hope,	should	stimulate	wonder	and	deepen	understanding	at	the	same	time.	I	will	extend	each	description	of	a	storied	behaviour	and	its	social	purpose	to	speculate	on	humanist-ethical	approaches	to	the	responsibilities	of	narrative.	The	point,	too,	is	not	just	to	list	pre-existing	narrative	theories,	but	also	to	explore	new	ground	that	might	be	less	familiar	in	narrative	theory,	to	develop	and	interrogate	new	insights	into	the	social	functions	of	fiction.	In	keeping	with	the	explorative	values	of	humanism	and	wonderment,	this	narratology	should	provide	expansion,	not	stagnation.		Although	the	latter	half	of	this	thesis	uses	filmic	genre	study	as	a	primary	example	of	humanist	analysis,	I	am	determined	not	to	pretend	that	humanism	or	the	human	drama	
belongs	to	any	one	expression	or	art.	This	is	why,	in	the	following	narratology,	I	analyse	a	broad	range	of	story	media,	and	join	a	growing	number	of	theorists	in	calling	for	a	media-conscious	narratology	(Ryan	and	Thon	Storyworlds	Across	Media).	This	means	that	while	we	can	remain	aware	of	each	medium’s	distinctive	characteristics,	possible	effects,	and	devices	for	carrying	a	story,	we	can	also	look	beyond	medium	specificity	to	stress	the	foundational	narrative	functions	that	unite	various	storied	acts.	Working	as	a	film	scholar,	there	can	be	a	pressure	to	specialise	in	that	which	is	unique	to	the	medium	rather	than	how	films	are	received	and	used	as	narrative,	much	like	any	other	art.	Film,	then,	should	not	be	discussed	in	isolation	from	other	media	as	comparison	generates	a	broader	understanding	of	how	stories	function	in	different	contexts,	yet	while	we	remain	aware	of	media	differences,	it	is	important	not	to	overstate	their	value.	To	an	extent,	social	narratology	equalises	media	forms	by	treating	them	on	the	same	level	–	as	acts	of	storytelling.30																																																									30	It	should	be	noted	too	that	the	following	narratology	errs	toward	English-language	texts,	simply	because	these	are	the	texts	I	am	most	intimately	acquainted	with	and	best	equipped	to	offer	studies	of.	Examples	for	many	of	the	following	points	could	be	found	in	a	breadth	of	storytelling	contexts.	Some	of	the	following	functions	will	speak	specifically	to	Western	
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	What	ensues	is	a	social	narratology	(emphasising	the	relationship	between	individuals	as	facilitated	by	narrative),	working	from	a	cinematic	Darwinism,	cognitivism	and	anthropology	(privileging	examples	from	the	cinema),	resulting	in	a	humanist	ethics	(speculation	on	what	to	do	with	this	information)	and	ultimately,	a	refinement	of	humanist	hermeneutics,	which	I	will	later	apply	to	closer	readings	of	specific	examples	from	the	cinema.	I	thereby	unite	social	narratology	and	humanistic	hermeneutics	into	what	I	call	“humanist	narratology.”		This	chapter	demonstrates	four	key	points:	that	it	is	in	their	social	expression	that	the	cognitive	sciences	we	apply	to	film	and	narrative	theory	find	their	meaning,	that	we	can	use	the	findings	of	such	sciences	to	help	us	answer	questions	of	narrative	ethics	and	responsibility,	that	it	is	not	possible	to	summate	all	human	motives	for	engaging	in	narrative	behind	one	unitary	function,	and	hopefully,	to	demonstrate	that	when	investigating	and	cataloguing	a	multiplicity	of	narrative	functions,	a	tandem	story	of	human	complexity	emerges	that	opens	further	avenues	for	narratological	description	and	knowledge,	and	ultimately	understanding	the	people	we	live	with	through	their	storied	behaviours.	Finally,	the	positively	ambitious	nature	of	the	following	is	a	vulnerability	that	is	open	to	human	complexity,	and	thus	social	narratology	is	a	narrative	humanism,	an	explorative	story	of	our	interactivity	that	invites	discovery,	complication	and	extension.			
Foundational	Functions	of	Fiction		Foremost,	we	use	stories	as	part	of	a	discussion	about	what	we	can	mutually	hold	
to	be	real,	the	different	ways	we	can	understand	and	experience	what	is	real,	as	well	as	what	is	important	for	us	to	pay	attention	to.	Michelle	Scalise	Sugiyama	describes	how	non-fictive																																																																																																																																																																																									contexts	and	some	comparatively	observe	cultural	variation,	while	other	functions	speak	more	broadly	to	story	in	general.	In	a	chapter	on	“The	Geography	of	Film	Viewing”	Daniel	Barratt	points	out	that	some	cognitive	processes	are	found	to	be	universal	while	others	are	culturally	influenced;	in	a	social	narratology,	both	are	interesting.	The	following	stresses	the	importance	of	niche	cultures	within	communities	that	are	sometimes	assumed	to	be	homogeneous.	Above	all	films	are	expensive	to	produce,	and	in	a	globalised	era	they	have	become,	like	innumerable	other	commodities,	economic	balancing	acts,	the	funding	of	which	rarely	defers	to	cartographic	boundaries,	and	this	has	implications	for	the	cross-cultural	distribution	and	consumption	of	narrative.		
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causal	communication	per	se	may	have	developed	to	overcome	the	constraints	in	energy	cost,	risk	and	time	spent	on	personal	information	gathering	across	local	environmental	variation;	so	we	learned	to	receive	causal	information	second-hand	(237).	It	is	clear	how	this	may	be	attempted	through	nonfiction	–	news	stories,	for	example	–	however	fiction	also	provides	a	trigger	or	even	a	facilitator	for	discussion	about	the	actual.	Whether	the	story	is	realist,	allegorical,	abstract,	nonlinear,	or	somewhere	in	between,	we	ask	what	the	story	wanted	to	infer	about	our	world.31	The	question,	then,	is	how	the	utility	of	complex	information	sharing	translated	into	an	appetite	for	fiction.	Malcolm	Turvey	doubts	that	we	evolved	a	taste	for	fiction	in	order	to	convey	environmental	information	germane	to	our	survival,	as	the	information	imparted	in	fiction	appears	remarkably	unreliable	(56).	All	evolutionary	theory	can	really	tell	us,	he	argues,	is	that	stories	betray	our	taste	for	information	in	general,	not	reliable	information.	But	the	claim	here	is	not	that	stories	tell	us	what	is	real,	rather	that	stories	provide	a	compelling	space	for	discussing	what	is	real.	We	still	need	to	explain,	though,	why	fiction	is	a	particularly	apt	place	for	these	discussions	to	occur,	rather	than	direct	communication.		The	argument	for	fiction	as	adaptation	often	hinges	upon	the	memorability	of	emotionally	contrived	information:	“The	didactic	purpose	of	storytelling	is	diminished	in	literate	cultures,	but	by	providing	a	vivid	and	memorable	way	of	communicating	information,	it	likely	had	actual	survival	benefits	in	the	Pleistocene”	(Dutton	110).	The	causality	of	narrative	is	crucial	to	this	explanation.	Because	storied	communication	links	information	causally,	it	allows	us	to	“live”	through	a	narrative.	Imagining	complex	causalities	between	sensations,	stories	activate	parts	of	the	brain	not	only	used	for	language	processing,	but	also	the	sensory,	motor	and	frontal	cortices,	and	areas	associated	with	emotions	and	social	memory,	the	co-stimulation	of	which	may	help	us	remember	the	narrative	substance	by	causal	association	to	the	narrative’s	sensation	(as	in	the	mnemonic	link	system).	Fiction	has	the	potential	to	exaggerate	conflict	and	produce	a	more	memorable	simulation.	We	see	selective	fitness	and	survival-related	goals	playing	out	in	all	manner	of	narratives	(Torben	Grodal	offers	an	especially	compelling	filmic	genre	study	from	this	perspective	in	the	first	half	of	his	2009	book	Embodied	Visions);	however,	the	transmission	of	knowledge	becomes	more	complicated	the	further	it	is	extended	into	complex	narrativity,	where	survival	goals	are	displaced	and	truth	claims	are	more	abstracted	and	conceptual.																																																									31	Even	if	the	inference	is	merely	“this	fantasy	world	is	a	better	place	to	be	for	a	number	of	hours	than	our	own	world”;	fantastical	tales	also	impart	information	corresponding	to	real-world	experience,	practice	and	information	(Sugiyama	239)	–	but	more	on	fantasy	later.	
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	For	many	this	is	a	crude	way	of	thinking	epistemically	about	the	meaning	of	the	storytelling	arts	and	their	production.	Disciples	of	popular	film	theoreticians	such	as	Gilles	Deleuze,	for	example,	may	be	openly	hostile	to	the	idea	that	a	primary	function	of	cinema	is	to	open	an	intersubjective	dialogue	and	refine	our	perspectives	on	a	mutual	ontic	externality	(rather	than	endlessly	producing	experiential	novelties).	Yet	even	when	we	accept	our	inability	to	experience,	know	or	rationalise	an	externality	or	perfectly	access	another’s	perception,	the	emphasis	on	perceptual	frailty	explains	nothing:	“If	there	were	no	common	human	experience	and	no	common	cognitive	means	of	representing	and	responding	to	that	experience,	storytelling	would	be	futile”	(Sugiyama	245).	Various	epistemological	scepticisms	present	platitudes	at	best,	and	describe	little	about	the	world	beyond	reasserting	our	undeniable	subjectivity.	As	Noël	Carroll	argues	convincingly	in	Mystifying	Movies,	these	concepts	inhibit	comprehension	of	processes	readily	understandable	by	reference	to	available	and	verifiable	knowledge	and	sciences.	When	Deleuze	uses	“brain	biology”	to	bolster	his	claims,	he	favours	obscurant	analogy	over	clarification,	“making	sometimes	difficult	to	understand	the	real	meaning	of	terms	like,	for	instance,	‘cinematic	synapses’”	(Gallese	and	Guerra	187).	These	metaphysical	alternatives	effectively	ask	us	to	solve	an	unsolvable,	speculative	ontological	question	before	we	get	to	the	work	of	discussing	human	interaction,	a	hierarchical	positioning	of	philosophical	thought	which	obscures	our	ability	to	talk	specifically	of	the	needs	of	living	things;	in	this	case	we	might	read	such	positioning	as	antihumanist.	Story	is	an	intrinsic	part	of	human	sociality	–	we	need	to	share	information,	and	we	use	causal	narratives	to	do	so.		It	is	evident	not	just	that	we	can,	but	that	we	do	use	fiction	as	an	inroad	to	discuss	not	only	truth	claims	about	fundamental	workings	of	the	world	around	us,	but	also	some	of	the	more	complex,	conceptual	and	obscured	workings	of	the	world.	When	an	audience	exits	a	film	arguing	about	the	way	women	have	been	represented,	for	example,	they	use	the	film	as	groundwork	to	discuss	what	is	and	is	not	real	about	the	fictional	world,	and	gauge	how	the	filmmakers’	perspective	may	or	may	not	match	up	with	their	own	experience.	The	same	may	be	true	of	representations	of	physics	in	fiction,	for	example	we	may	be	annoyed	that	a	film	fails	to	reflect	basic	physical	properties.32	Abstract	stories,	too,	are	often	thought	to	express	an																																																									32	This	somewhat	depends	on	the	context	of	the	film.	When	protagonists	survive	a	tornado	tied	to	flimsy	pipes	with	leather	straps	in	the	climax	of	Twister	(Jan	de	Bont,	1996),	we	may	feel	let	down	that	the	film	did	not	try	harder	to	craft	excitement	from	a	plausible	physical	scenario,	limiting	our	investment.	However	in	a	film	like	Sharknado	(Thunder	Levin,	2013),	
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internal,	emotional,	or	conceptual	“higher”	truth.	Finally	we	might	use,	for	instance,	a	biopic	as	a	pedagogical	device	not	to	accept	its	version	of	events,	but	to	craft	interest	in	those	events	and	generate	a	number	of	talking	points	from	which	we	might	debate	what	is	and	is	not	real	about	their	representation.	Hence,	we	use	story	as	a	springboard	into	articulation	of	what	we	can	mutually	hold	to	be	real;	we	do	not	need	to	solve	an	epistemological	materialist	dilemma	to	do	this.		
American	Splendor	(Shari	Springer	and	Berman	Robert	Pulcini,	2003)	is	a	good	example	of	a	film	that	calls	attention	to	an	audience’s	implicit	search	for	truth	claims.	The	film	begins	as	a	biopic.	Actors	play	characters	from	a	series	of	autobiographical	comics	by	author	Harvey	Pekar.	Initially,	the	affected	performances	of	characters	like	Toby	Radloff	(Judah	Friedlander)	might	seem	far-fetched,	but	eventually	the	film	begins	to	include	interviews	with	the	real-life	figures	being	represented	in	both	film	and	comic.	Toby’s	demeanour	and	self-presentation	is	surprisingly	even	more	affected	than	Friedlander’s	performance.	The	dissonant	moment	gives	us	pause	to	reflect	upon	our	presumptions	of	what	is	real	and	what	is	not	–	an	important	component	in	the	film’s	radical	mix	of	the	fictive	and	non-fictive.	The	search	for	a	foundational	reality	to	rely	upon	remains	with	us,	often	implicitly	and	tacitly	as	we	move	through	a	narrative.	The	actor	is	always	a	site	of	doubt,	scepticism	and	interrogation,	or	as	Huw	Griffiths	puts	it,	“the	body	of	the	actor	is	revealed	as	a	site	in	which	faith	cannot	readily	be	located”	(94).	We	wonder	what	they	intend	to	tell	us	through	their	performance,	what	parts	of	their	performance	constitute	their	intention,	how	this	connects	with	the	intentions	of	the	other	storytellers	involved	a	performance,	and	thereby	what,	if	any,	“real”	we	can	draw	from	the	actor.	Even	in	these	more	abstract	spaces	within	narrative,	beyond	its	plot	or	procedure,	we	can	search	for	a	mutual	real	–	and	crucially,	we	can	become	aware	of	our	search	for	a	mutual	real,	and	its	problems.		These	attentional	politics	lead	us	to	a	related	function	of	narrative.	As	well	as	inciting	non-fictive	discussions	about	what	is	real,	stories	can	make	a	claim	about	what	is	
important	for	us	to	pay	attention	to,	and	we	often	conflate	the	two.	As	story	theorists,	we	can	make	the	mistake	of	assuming	that	the	claim	someone	makes	when	they	put	together	a	narrative	is:	“this	is	the	way	things	are,	or	the	way	people	are.”	Yet	the	primary	claim	made	by	a	storyteller	might	be	more	attentional	than	ontological.	That	is,	it	might	have	more	to	do	with																																																																																																																																																																																									we	might	take	pleasure	in	a	complete	flouting	of	physical	properties	when	the	protagonists	use	bombs	to	eradicate	tornados.	Stories	are	able	to	disavow	truth	claims	to	focus	us	on	other	spectatorial	experiences.	
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what	kind	of	causality	is	worthy	of	our	attention	–	after	all,	we	attend	a	narrative	to	have	our	attention	diverted	from	our	daily	concerns,	which	is	a	powerful	commandeering	of	another’s	time.	Consider	the	discourse	of	public	relations	practitioners,	often	casting	themselves	as	expert	storytellers:	this	does	not	mean	that	they	attempt	to	accurately	represent	our	lives,	it	means	that	they	use	story	to	pull	our	attention	toward	their	product,	service,	public	figure	or	other	interest,	and	our	attention	is	the	prized	commodity	more	so	than	any	of	the	meanings	that	might	be	imparted	by	the	narratives	they	use	to	snag	our	time	and	consideration.	In	fact,	narrative	itself	is	sometimes	characterised	as	a	conducting	of	attentional	cues	to	produce	coherence	(Mar	and	Oatley	176).	As	story	theorists,	we	tend	to	study	the	ways	in	which	narrative	imparts	or	transmits	meaning,	often	at	the	expense	of	attentional	politics	(that	which	tells	us	what	is	important	rather	than	what	is).	The	point	I	would	like	to	make	is	that	we	can	never	assume	allegorical	readings	are	the	most	apt	to	explain	narrative’s	influence;	it	can	be	fairer	and	more	clarifying	to	start	from	a	question	of	why	a	particular	story	has	been	chosen	above	all	others.	Our	attention	is	ethical	and	political	because	stories	constitute	claims	of	relative	importance.	This	makes	subject	choice	ethically	evaluable.	We	should	remain	aware	of	how	our	attention	is	manipulated	by	all	manner	of	storytelling.33		These	two	foundational	concepts	–	of	representation	and	attention	–	become	more	complex	when	we	take	historiographical	considerations	into	account:	how	we	use	stories	in	
attempts	to	record	and	understand	our	history,	and	events	we	will	never	be	present	for	but	that	we	could	learn	from.	Without	contesting	the	subjectivity	of	storytelling	historicity,	we	can	say	we	attempt	an	understanding	and	recording	of	human	history	through	chains	of	cause	and	event.	This	is,	as	Donald	E.	Polkinghorne	has	it,	the	way	we	connect	identified	events	into	“synoptic	judgment,”	a	narrative	coherence	or	plot	(63);	only	in	this	case,	that	synopsised	plot	is	human	history.	The	selective	and	summary	nature	of	history	is	crucial	to	its	coherence.	Any	practice	of	retelling	our	past	is	a	string	of	distillations	of	causality,	and	as	events	can	rarely	be	considered	monocausal,	we	make	claims	about	the	most	important	causes	that	are	most	worthy	of	our	attention,	which	then	become	history,	told	and	redistributed	such	that	we	might	make	better	choices	in	future	–	or	sometimes,	of	course,	we	distort	such	reportage	for	
																																																								33	By	the	same	token	media	users,	readers	and	viewers	are	not	passive,	and	still	have	some	agency	to	choose	subjects	they	will	engage	with.	When	we	overemphasise	the	influence	of	storytellers,	we	disavow	the	dialogical	relationship	underpinning	all	narrative	practices.		
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political	gains.34	Yet	it	remains	that	we	are	able	to	use	our	distillation	of	the	most	important	causes	and	events	to	engage	advanced	predictive	faculties,	which	inform	our	decision-making,	both	at	an	individual	and	organisational	level.	Aristotle	in	Poetics	suggests	that	fiction	in	particular	can	locate	universals	between	past,	present	and	projected	future	events	to	predict	the	probability	of	what	may	happen;	again,	this	aids	decision-making	(13).	After	Karl	Popper’s	
The	Poverty	of	Historicism,	though,	this	can	be	no	science	of	prognostication	or	historical	determinism,	attempting	to	reduce	human	movements	to	mathematically	quantifiable	repeating	and	isolated	systems	they	will	never	conform	to	–	but	like	the	test	subject	receiving	electric	shocks	on	reaching	for	a	reward,	we	do	need	to	be	able	to	read	probability	into	past	events	to	make	informed	decisions	for	our	future.		Stories	can	also	contain	inadvertent	traces	of	our	history.	Comparative	mythology	studies	looks	at	information	regarding	environmental	locality	and	human	migration	contained	in	extant	myths	across	the	globe	(Witzel	The	Origins	of	the	World’s	Mythologies).	Versions	of	the	same	myth	can	reference	different	flora,	fauna	and	places,	telling	its	own	story	of	human	movement	and	our	shared	history.	In	fact,	much	of	the	project	of	literary	Darwinism	has	been	a	search	for	elements	of	our	shared	past	within	narrative	structures.	So	we	use	stories	to	understand	our	history	even	where	they	were	not	explicitly	crafted	to	impart	reliable	historical	details.		The	accounts	of	storytelling	above	all	refer	to	telic	sequential	narratives,	as	well	as	outlining	some	of	their	limitations.	Yet	there	is	another	kind	of	thought	available	to	us	in	fiction	when	we	resist	or	refuse	to	recognise	causality	or	patterns:	we	can	also	upset	
narratives	of	causality	with	nonlinear	structures	and,	generally,	not	making	immediate	causal	sense.	In	Bruner’s	construction:	“While	it	is	true	that	the	world	of	a	story	(to	achieve	verisimilitude)	must	conform	to	canons	of	logical	consistency,	it	can	use	violations	of	such	consistency	as	a	basis	of	drama”	(12).	Narratives	employing	such	techniques	can	conduct	our	attention	to	reflect	on	our	paucity	of	ontic	certainties,	how	little	we	know	about	our	lives,																																																									34	History	produces	another	attentional	politics:	some	have	pointed	out	that	an	academic	condescension	toward	historical	storytelling	at	an	amateur	and	practical	level,	such	as	genealogy	and	family	histories,	disavows	the	centrality	of	the	quotidian,	the	domestic,	and	in	particular	women’s	worlds	precisely	because	they	upset	another	narrative	of	the	gravitas	of	superior	male	figures,	their	achievements	and	concerns	(Evans	“Secrets	and	Lies”).	We	can	ask:	how	much	does	attention	to	these	grand	narratives	usefully	explain	how	meaning	is	made	in	our	own	lives?		
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meaning,	why	and	how	the	universe	operates.	To	an	audience	member	fixated	upon	our	existential	condition,	absurdism,	for	instance,	might	come	across	as	gratifyingly	honest	–	even	profound.	The	therapeutic	benefits	of	absurdity	have	been	recognised	by	artists	across	many	fields:	songwriter	Robert	Wyatt	uses	nonsensical	verse	alongside	pained	internal	monologues	and	political	outcries	in	Rock	Bottom	and	cartoon	blogger	Allie	Brosh	combats	depression	with	the	pictorial	non	sequitur	in	Hyperbole	and	a	Half.	Their	strategies	are	backed	up	by	research	(Brooks	et	al.	“Therapeutic	Humor”)	and	a	study	by	Christopher	R.	Long	and	Dara	N.	Greenwood	confirms	that	those	primed	with	attention	to	the	existential	find	humour	funnier	(“Joking	in	the	face	of	death”),	perhaps	because	they	need	it	more,	or	perhaps	because	its	antagonising	absurdities	seem	more	honest.	We	upset	narratives	of	causality,	predictable	spatiality	and	temporality,	to	draw	attention	to	our	perceptual	limitations,	experiential	limitations,	tendency	to	monocausality	and	empiricism;	in	sum,	how	little	we	know.	These	are	the	reasons	a	figure	such	as	David	Lynch	has	come	to	support	reams	of	scholarly	writing,	as	this	version	of	cognitive	dissonance	in	cinema	retains	critical	favour	as	a	metaphysical	“profundity”	(Moss-Wellington	“Affecting	Profundity”),	a	scholarly	narrative	and	aesthetic	interest	sustained	since	late	modernity:	rejection	of	the	perceived	telic	imposition	wrought	by	linear	narrative	conventions.		Problematic	distinctions	between	the	causally	suggestive	and	causally	disruptive	have	followed	us	throughout	the	history	of	narrative	theory,	and	they	are	bound	with	a	host	of	other	attempts	at	erecting	related	binaries:	theories	versus	narratives,	causal	events	versus	causal	ideas,	narrative	immersion	versus	reflexive	thought,	and	higher	versus	lower	art.	When	Jean	Cocteau,	for	example,	indicates	that	his	“primary	concern	in	a	film	is	to	prevent	the	images	from	flowing,	to	oppose	them	to	each	other,	to	anchor	them	and	join	them	without	destroying	their	relief”	(Fraigneau	151),	his	distinction	between	cinema	as	entertainment	and	the	cinematograph	as	a	“vehicle	for	thought”	mirrors	Bruner’s	conceptions	of	logical	debate	and	narrative	as	different	cognitive	modes.	By	inhibiting	our	ability	to	read	causal	events	in	a	film,	we	are	theoretically	drawn	into	consideration	of	a	different	and	more	cerebral	causality:	that	of	an	author’s	ideas	and	the	discussions	they	might	inspire.	Whether	or	not	these	two	attentional	causalities	are	so	clearly	separable	is	in	dispute.	Throughout	this	chapter,	I	will	be	making	an	implicit	case	that	immersion	in	(more-or-less	linear	or	discernably	causal)	narrative	should	not	be	conceived	as	negating	intellectual	or	political	concern,	or	indeed	any	
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other	reflexivity	in	spectatorship.35	There	is	scant	evidence,	in	practice	or	in	theory,	that	focussing	our	pattern-recognition	causal	cognition	upon	narrative	events	will	preclude	the	subsequent	use	of	these	same	faculties	to	ruminate	on	their	moral	implications,	or	develop	structured,	theoretical	accounts	of	those	events,	a	story’s	“meaning”;	narratives	that	upset	linear	causality	simply	foreground	the	inherent	unreliability	of	these	cognitions.		Having	explored	some	of	the	broadest	possible	functions	of	story,	I	now	turn	to	some	of	their	correlate,	yet	often	more	covert	functions.	Principally,	what	does	the	emotional	content	of	narrative	provide	for	us?			
Affective	Functions	of	Fiction		In	story,	we	can	safely	exercise	emotional	responses	and	mortality/need	threats	
not	required	in	day-to-day	life.	Different	varieties	of	emotional	arousal,	adrenaline	release	and	suspense,	focussed	on	variations	in	the	subject	causing	the	arousal	–	from	terrifying	monsters	to	romantic	anxieties	–	translate	to	pleasure,	gratification	and	enjoyment	for	different	audiences.	When	we	use	terms	such	as	“feeling	alive”	or	“having	our	buttons	pushed”	in	relation	to	audience	experience,	this	is	the	experience	we	are	talking	about:	“the	quest	for	excitement	in	unexciting	societies”	(Elias	and	Dunning	31).	However,	the	existential	components	in	this	process	need	to	be	unpacked	and	understood.	There	are	now	multiple	contexts	across	the	developed	world	in	which	humans	encounter	very	few	direct	threats	to	mortality	on	a	daily	basis,	yet	we	still	seem	to	seek	the	feeling	of	that	threat,	a	safe	activation	of	the	flight	or	fight	response,	or	we	may	well	ask,	“what	are	we	doing	here	then?”	Working	from	a	Darwinian	approach	to	story,	in	which	there	is	no	tropologically	objective	higher	ordering	of	our	motivation,	all	we	are	really	compelled	to	do	in	our	lives	is	procreate,	survive	and	help	kin	survive,	so	that	we	(or	our	genes)	keep	surviving,	even	if	this	is	a	gestalt	and	culturally	refracted	process	–	if	the	immediacy	of	this	process	is	gone,	perhaps	we	displace	the	impulse	elsewhere,	as	in	narrative.	Survival	offers	meaning	even	when	distantly	or	vicariously	related	to	our	mortality	or	fitness,	and	many	have	posited	that	other	attempts	at	creating																																																									35	As	Rita	Felski	has	it,	literary	enchantment	can	coexist	with	“a	phenomenology	of	self-scrutiny”	(Uses	of	Literature	35)	and	its	broader	political	implications,	so	she	calls	for	literary	theory	to	“face	up	to	the	limits	of	demystification	as	a	critical	method	and	a	theoretical	ideal	…	the	modern	dogma	that	our	lives	should	become	thoroughly	disenchanted”	(ibid.	76).		
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meaning	(acquisitional	culture,	relationships,	humour,	and	political	conviction	for	example)	stem	from	a	desire	to	create	distance	between	oblivion	and	our	sense	of	selfhood.	Dorothy	Rowe	describes	the	many	ways	in	which	we	are	driven	to	displace	existential	anxieties	to	corporeal	goals	throughout	her	1987	work	Beyond	Fear.36	Drama	relies	on	conflict;	we	can	create	dramatic	conflicts	as	a	safe	way	to	achieve	these	feelings,	conquer	them	by	making	it	out	the	other	end	of	the	story	alive,	and	recover	mortal	meaning	without	adding	similar	conflict	to	our	actual	lives	or	the	lives	of	those	around	us.		This	hypothesis	must	be	carefully	distinguished	from	relief	theory	or	the	argument	from	catharsis	(from	Aristotle	to	popular	psychology,	or	primal	therapy	as	a	cathartic	theory	in	practice).	In	these	models,	there	is	a	negative	affect	inside	us	that	we	have	the	opportunity	to	jettison	by	simulating	the	emotion	in	narrative.	There	is	scant	evidence	that	via	“exploration”	or	mere	re-experience	of	a	problematic	emotion,	we	curtail	it.37	It	is	not	merely	proximity	to	the	affect	that	releases	it,	although	recognition	of	that	affect	(via	personal	expression	or	narrative	engagement)	can	lead	to	reflective	listening,	problem	solving	and	reappraisal,	which	may	reduce	distress	(Littrell	“Is	the	Reexperience	of	Painful	Emotion	Therapeutic”;	“Expression	of	Emotion”).	So	an	emotion	is	not	necessarily	abated	when	addressed	through	narrative,	and	as	narrative	creators	and	consumers	we	cannot	assume	merely	airing	an	emotion	will	do	the	job	for	us	–	but	we	still	must	confront	the	phenomenon	that	people	overwhelmingly	pursue	the	opportunity	to	feel	closer	to	problematic	affect,	and	derive	pleasure	from	experiencing	affect	that	would,	outside	of	narrative	contexts,	be	something	we	choose	to	avoid.		Clearly	the	dynamism	of	human	identities	means	we	all	have	different	appetites	for	emotional	manipulation	through	story	–	for	those	who	like	a	lot	of	push	and	pull,	it	remains	a																																																									36	These	earlier	treatises	eventually	gave	way	to	the	dominant	terror	management	theory	(TMT)	in	which	existential	terror	is	alleviated	by	absorption	in	cultural	narratives	of	progress	or	longevity,	offering	symbolic	displacement	of	our	mortality	(for	example,	personal	achievement,	career	progress,	or	the	success	of	groups	that	will	last	after	our	death	such	as	the	family	or	nation	state).	Narratives	of	progress	undergird	such	goals,	and	so	threats	to	these	goals	in	story	are	proxies:	an	indirect	yet	existentially	felt	impingement	upon	our	survival.	See	Greenberg	et	al.	“The	causes	and	consequences	of	a	need	for	self-esteem”	for	the	theory’s	beginnings,	Maxfield	et	al.	for	recent	elaborations,	and	Burke	et	al.	for	a	meta-analysis	of	empirical	evidence.		37	See	Gerbner,	Gross,	Morgan	and	Signorielli’s	findings	on	cultivation	theory	and	fear,	or	Bushman,	Baumeister	and	Stack	on	venting	anger	and	aggression.		
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safe	place	to	exercise	and	explore	one’s	affective	extremities.	Consider	that	those	scoring	high	on	sensation-seeking	personality	traits	are	likely	to	attend	more	horror	movies	than	their	peers,	for	example.38	Emotions	elicited	by	fiction	can	even	reinforce	a	sense	of	identity:	if	we	identify	as	a	“deep	feeling”	person,	we	might	enjoy	rehearsing	these	responses	by	watching	tearjerker	films	(Oliver	“Exploring	the	Paradox”),	as	the	emotion	itself	reinscribes	a	grander	autobiographical	narrative	about	our	own	appropriate	responses	to	the	world’s	ills.	In	other	words,	emotions	form	part	of	our	procedural	scripts,	rehearsed	through	fiction.	These	scripts	connect	to	feelings	of	purpose	and	meaning	(this	is	largely	a	function	of	the	amygdala:	to	register	the	emotional	significance	of	events).	Moreover,	as	Ellen	Dissanayake	puts	it:	“I	suspect	that	most	people	hunger	for	a	more	profound	life.	The	arts	–	ours	and	those	of	others	–	are	ways	of	treating	the	inner	life	seriously”	(192).	She	connects	this	lack	of	a	sense	of	purpose	to	the	political	devaluation	of	arts	within	affluent	nations	in	particular.	Perhaps	too,	as	religion	has	long	been	a	primary	site	of	narrative	distribution,	the	decline	of	social	contact	through	religious	institutions	could	help	explain	our	contemporary	demand	for	fiction.	
	A	symptom	of	a	shrunken	hippocampus,	one	function	of	which	is	to	correlate	action	with	mood,	is	depression	(Schmaal	et	al.	“Subcortical	Brain	Alterations”).	There	is	clearly	an	interaction	here	between	the	amygdala	(crafting	meaning	from	emotion)	and	the	hippocampus	(suggesting	courses	of	action	based	upon	our	mood)	that	is	being	worked	through	narrative	arts	to	generate	meaning	and	derive	purpose.	This	is	why	theorists	who	suggest	that	emotional	appeal	depletes	intellectual	engagement	should	resist	disparaging	those	who	find	meaning	through	emotive	art:	it	could	be	helping	to	stave	off	purposelessness.	Mary	Beth	Oliver	and	Arthur	Raney’s	research	also	goes	some	way	toward	explaining	media	engagement	motivations	as	more	than	just	hedonic,	but	also	“eudaimonic”	(“Entertainment	as	Pleasurable	and	Meaningful”),	in	that	we	craft	meaning	directly	from	our	emotional	experiences	in	narrative	rather	than	just	feeling	their	excitations.	Tenderness,	for	example,	is	not	just	something	we	experience	for	its	own	sake,	but	because	it	can	then	spur	us	to	think	about	and	discuss	human	purpose.	Eudaimonic	responses	involve	distributed	connections	between	regions	of	the	brain	separate	to	the	reward	circuit.	For	a	species	so	aware	of	its	imminent	passing,	the	affect	of	stories	has	existential	value.	Oliver	and	Raney’s	study	shows	that	this	is	exactly	how	many	film	viewers	conceive	of	their	own	motivation	for	engaging	in	dramatic	narratives:	the	emotions	are	a	platform	to	work	from	in	thinking	through	a	film’s																																																									38	See	Oliver	and	Sanders	244-245;	we	will	return	to	the	specific	offerings	of	the	horror	genre	shortly.		
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insights	and	meaning.	We	can	go	through	an	emotional	experience,	and	then	discuss	its	outcome.39	The	eudaimonic	can	operate	“as	an	additional	(but	not	opposite)	motivation	for	individuals’	entertainment	selections”	(ibid.	989).	Oliver	and	Raney	remind	us	not	to	look	at	hedonic	motivations	in	isolation	from	other	social	and	meaning-making	motivations	in	media	selection,	as	focussing	on	hedonic	gratification	alone	misconstrues	us	all	as	solely	pleasure-seeking	machines	rather	than	complex	pleasure-	and	meaning-seeking	entities.	A	cognitive	fixation	on	the	hedonic	aspects	of	media	engagement	can	fail	to	extricate	sensation-seeking	motivations	and	dispositions	from	their	attendant	meaning-seeking	motivations;	as	they	are	so	intimately	tied,	they	can	often	look	like	the	same	thing.	No	doubt	as	neuroscience	develops,	this	picture	will	become	ever	more	complex.		Accounting	for	the	development	of	human	emotion	in	lieu	of	a	pure	reason	has	occupied	many	evolutionary	theorists.	Dylan	Evans	describes	an	“evolutionary	rationality”	in	which	our	emotions	enable	swifter	responses	to	familiar	situations	and	environments	than	reason	alone	could	provide	(without	which	the	active	possibilities	available	with	pure	reason	would	be	paralysingly	multitudinous).	As	Martin	L.	Hoffman	puts	it,	“humans	must	be	equipped	biologically	to	function	effectively	in	many	social	situations	without	undue	reliance	on	cognitive	processes”	(79);	this	is	a	popular	explanation	for	the	evolution	of	emotion.	As	we	have	established,	reason	and	rationality	are	to	an	extent	subject	to	emotional	cues:	cues	ordering	what	we	expect	to	achieve	through	reason.	This	can	take	the	form	of	an	affective	projection	or	simulation,	and	narrative	can	harness	this	capacity	for	autobiographical	projection	or	“future	thinking.”	When	we	picture	the	death	of	a	loved	one,	we	use	an	emotional	imagination	to	access	the	pain	we	project	we	may	feel,	in	order	that	we	may	avoid	behaviours	that	could	result	in	such	a	scenario.	If	we	were	not	able	to	imaginatively	feel	this	pain,	it	might	not	make	rational	sense	to	avoid	actions	that	could	result	in	their	death	–	it	would	not	matter	unless	their	life	served	another	non-emotional	goal	for	us.	One	wonders,	then,	with	what	purpose	in	mind	we	would	act	without	emotion,	if	we	would	need	to	locate	life’s	purpose	for	every	decision	we	made,	and	be	thwarted	by	our	own	rationality	which	defeats	even	the	very	idea	of	a	purpose.	That	is,	perhaps	we	would	need	to	solve	the	puzzle	of	the	reason	for	caring	about	our	survival	and	procreation	at	every	instance	of	decision-making.	Indeed,	many	of	the	psychopathologies	that	are	characterised	by	a	lack	of	feeling	are																																																									39	Meaningfulness	is	more	than	just	another	pleasurable	affect:	Corey	L.	M.	Keyes,	Dov	Shmotkin,	and	Carol	D.	Ryff	distinguish	between	subjective	wellbeing	(largely	hedonic)	and	psychological	wellbeing	(largely	attitudinal).	Meaning	and	insight	may	have	emotions	attached,	but	they	describe	more	than	just	an	affective	experience	–	they	describe	ideas.	
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correlated	with	depression,	such	as	anhedonic	depression,	and	studies	have	found	that	“psychopathy	was	negatively	correlated	with	positive	affect,	happiness,	and	life	satisfaction,	and	positively	correlated	with	negative	affect	and	depression”	(Love	and	Holder	114-115).	As	emotions	give	us	impetus	that	we	cannot	have	in	rational	thought	alone,	humanist	narrative	permits	emotive	appeal	and	may	even	rely	upon	emotional	imagination,	the	description	and	discovery	of	far-reaching	nuances	in	emotional	experience.40	Emotion	lays	a	foundation	for	the	empathic	functions	of	narrative.	The	rational	mind	also,	we	cannot	forget,	never	has	access	to	perfect	information	to	work	with,	so	in	many	cases	may	be	liable	to	lead	us	astray	when	making	decisions	from	environmentally	contingent	information,	and	without	the	innate	memory	of	emotions.	Thus,	emotions	may	be	a	way	to	keep	in	contact	with	lessons	learned	throughout	our	past,	and	even	our	collective	past	stored	in	the	human	epigenome	–	lessons	which	may	be	fatally	bypassed	by	a	purely	rational	mind.		Reaching	back	to	figures	such	as	Bertholt	Brecht,	there	has	long	been	a	theoretical	imperative	to	dismiss	emotional	responses	to	narrative,	emotional	absorption	or	emotive	appeals	in	narrative,	as	antithetical	to	our	application	of	reason	and	ergo	political	action,	but	this	could	not	be	further	from	the	truth:		 The	dominant	tradition	in	Western	thought	has	regarded	emotion	as	a	burden	to	human	existence,	an	impediment	to	reason—a	view	manifest	in	thinkers	as	varied	as	Descartes,	Kant	and	the	playwright	Bertolt	Brecht.	And	if	anything,	this	is	a	view	of	emotion	even	more	entrenched	in	popular	culture	than	it	is	in	the	realms	of	philosophy	and	art	theory—think	of	those	models	of	supreme	intelligence,	the	emotion-free	Spock	and	Data	from	Star	Trek.		(Smith	“Darwin	and	the	Directors”	259)41		
																																																								40	Exlcusive	concentration	on	negative	affect	can	preclude	attendance	to	the	use	of	blended	affect	or	complex	emotions	in	narrative	(such	as	the	many	variations	of	bittersweetness,	for	example).	The	ensuing	chapter	will	go	into	detail	on	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy’s	use	of	mixed	emotions.			41	Although	Smith	rightly	calls	attention	to	the	emotion-intellect	binary,	Spock	and	Data	are	actually	interesting	examples	of	characters	envisioned	as	a	challenge	to	this	presumption.	Characters	such	as	these	are	regularly	used	in	the	Star	Trek	universe	to	examine	logic’s	inability	to	account	for	an	inconsistent	world	(for	which	we	have	incomplete	knowledge)	or	for	the	social	utility	of	emotion.		
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David	Boyle	also	notes	this	fantasy	of	human	as	mere	data	processor	(the	computational	theory	of	mind)	as	a	driving	fantasy	behind	many	post-	and	transhuman	aspirations	(197-201).	The	limbic	system,	associated	with	mood	regulation	and	emotions,	is	one	of	the	most	primordial	networks	in	the	brain	and	has	a	much	more	complex	relationship	with	other	regions	than	could	be	described	as	merely	“computational.”	When	interrogated,	the	suggestion	of	the	emotional	automaton	–	that	we	would	be	better	off	or	more	computationally	rational	if	we	could	supress	emotive	responses,	or	at	least	not	validate	these	responses	as	authenticity	–	also	starts	to	look	suspiciously	like	a	normalisation	of	a	culture	of	psychopathy,	characterised	by	emotional	response	deficiency	(Herpertz	and	Sass),	resistant	responses	to	emotionally	provocative	stimuli	(Patrick)	as	opposed	to	operational	appraisal	of	emotional	cues	(Lorenz	and	Newman)	or	“cognitive	empathy”,	and	problems	with	early	emotional	development	and	learning	(see	The	Psychopath:	Emotion	and	the	Brain	by	James	Blair,	Derek	Mitchell	and	Karina	Blair).	Although	this	is	a	contentious	claim,	it	is	one	that	needs	to	be	made:	successive	literary	and	dramatic	theorists	in	the	Brechtian	tradition	have	advanced	notions	impelling	us	to	avoid	emotional	absorption	in	narrative	to	further	political	ends,	or	what	director	Michael	Haneke	describes	as	“clarifying	distance	in	place	of	violating	closeness”	(89),	yet	empathic	concern	relies	on	emotional	responses	that	should	then	inform	our	political	reasoning,	without	which	we	may	approach	something	akin	to	a	cultural	psychopathy.42	As	Jesse	Prinz	points	out,	“emotional	deficits	result	in	moral	blindness”	(369)	and	politics	without	moral	ends	in	mind	is	precisely	what	we	should	look	to	avoid.43																																																									42	As	Frans	de	Waal	indicates	regarding	the	kind	of	moral	perspective-taking	we	find	in	narrative:	“Without	emotional	engagement	induced	by	state-matching,	perspective-taking	would	be	a	cold	phenomenon	that	could	just	as	easily	lead	to	torture	as	to	helping	(Deacon	1997,	de	Waal	2005)”	(“Putting	the	Altruism	Back	into	Altruism”	287).	He	describes	this	as,	“the	beauty	of	the	empathy-altruism	connection:	the	mechanism	works	so	well	because	it	gives	individuals	an	emotional	stake	in	the	welfare	of	others”	(ibid.	292).	As	Douglas	Allchin	explained	in	2009’s	“The	Evolution	of	Morality”,	specific	comprehension	of	the	social	conditions	of	reciprocity	is	not	evolutionarily	essential	to	allow	for	selection	of	cooperative	and	selfless	traits	–	so	other	impulses	beyond	a	conscious,	rational,	calculated	or	self-interested	altruistic	motivation	can	still	influence	moral	behaviours.		43	In	effect,	these	admonishments	of	audience	emotion	are	an	ethical	overreach,	in	that	they	police	abstract	thoughts	rather	than	actions.	There	are	three	levels	of	moral	criticism	here.	One	can	choose	to	focus	upon	moral	issues	addressed	within	the	diegesis,	on	the	audience’s	moral	thoughts	regarding	diegetic	events,	or	on	the	audience’s	abstract	thoughts	and	emotions	while	they	are	engaged	with	the	narrative	(rather	than	their	specific	attendance	to	a	moral	quandary).	Haneke’s	modernist	alienation	principles	are	an	example	of	where	narrative	ethics	do	not	match	ethical	standards	we	apply	in	life:	we	might	understand	that	it	is	unfair	to	hold	an	acquaintance	accountable	for	an	unarticulated	thought	crime,	but	at	the	same	time	assume	that	this	is	a	reasonable	ethic	to	apply	to	audiences	in	narrative	theory.	It	remains	
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	 Some	evolutionary	theorists	come	to	a	similarly	trivialising	conclusion	about	the	emotive	values	of	art,	totalising	all	of	its	functions	as	mere	supernormal	stimuli.	Writers	such	as	Steven	Pinker,	echoing	Stephen	Jay	Gould,	dismiss	this	matrix	of	functions	the	arts	serve	as	exaptive	neural	“cheesecake,	pack[ing]	a	sensual	wallop	unlike	anything	in	the	natural	world	because	it	is	a	brew	of	megadoses	of	agreeable	stimuli”	which	potentially	evolved	to	serve	other	adaptive	functions	(How	the	Mind	Works	524-525).	He	goes	on	to	single	out	music	in	particular	as	“a	pure	pleasure	technology,	a	cocktail	of	recreational	drugs	that	we	ingest	through	the	ear	to	stimulate	a	mass	of	pleasure	circuits	at	once”	(ibid.	528).	He	positions	music	and	art	as	spandrels,	or	phenotypic	byproducts	of	other	qualities	that	were	selected	for.	Spandrels	are	not	necessarily	adaptive	–	they	“piggyback”	on	other	adaptations.	This	is	the	argument	from	mere	superstimulus,	and	Pinker	is	correct	that	we	seek	activations	of	a	dopamine	system	developed	in	earlier	humans	that	music	harnesses	(along	with	much	storytelling	art,	and	activities	ranging	in	direct	fitness	utility	from	purposeful	exercise	to	the	mere	thrill-seeking	of	a	rollercoaster	ride).44	Yet	surely	superstimuli	can	still	be	reappropriated	into	other	productive	and	purposeful	behaviours,	as	we	adapt	to	a	world	with	cheesecake	in	it,	working	it	into	peripheral	advantage	(such	as	everything	social	that	happens	around	such	a	stimulus).	Darwin	himself	thought	that	music	offered	early	humans	a	way	to	exhibit	passion,	a	demonstration	of	feeling	that	might	be	assumed	by	potential	mates	to	be	a	sign	of	strength	(even	if	this	was	not	the	case),	conferring	survival	advantage	that	was	thereby	selected	for	(The	Descent	of	Man	872).	This	function	may	have	changed	over	time,	especially	as	music	and	storytelling	formalised	and	professionalised.45	The	memorability	of	a	melody																																																																																																																																																																																									deeply	problematic	to	police	emotions	and	abstract	thoughts	rather	than	actions,	behaviours	or	our	assessment	of	specific	infringements.		44	One	impetus	for	enjoying	the	negative	affect	of	art	could	simply	be	that	the	biochemical	stimulation	triggers	homeostatic	mechanisms	to	produce	pleasure.	Just	as	crying	at	a	tragedy	in	one’s	life	might	trigger	an	increase	levels	of	the	prolactin	hormone,	consoling	us	with	sweeter	and	more	comforting	feelings	afterward,	so	might	a	sad	song	produce	the	same	endocrine	response	(Huron	“Why	is	sad	music	pleasurable”).		45	In	his	book	Sex,	Genes	&	Rock	‘n’	Roll,	Rob	Brooks	asks	what	makes	rock	musicians	international	sex	symbols,	for	example.	The	equation	of	musical	passion	with	reproductive	fitness	continues	today	–	however	we	must	admit	many	iterations	of	and	subtleties	within	this	phenomenon,	such	as	accounting	for	personal	music	taste	and	its	relationship	to	social	status.	Musicologist	David	Huron	also	argues	that	it	is	hard	to	consider	a	phenomenon	as	widespread	and	as	old	as	music	nonadaptive	(45),	especially	as	some	of	the	earliest	known	human-made	artefacts	are	musical	instruments;	even	if	music	were	nonadaptive	now,	its	enduring	prevalence	seems	to	signal	that	it	must	have	once	conferred	survival	benefit	(ibid.	
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that	may	remind	us	of	the	person	who	performed	it,	leading	toward	predisposition	toward	them	as	a	mating	partner	(Levitin	261),	might	be	less	important	now	than	an	extended	display	of	dedication	to	a	music	group,	and	what	the	allegiance	broadcasts	about	our	social	aptitudes.	Music	tells	a	story	of	affective	causality	(at	a	very	basic	level,	for	example,	the	push	and	pull	of	movement	between	major	and	minor	chords),	and	one	thing	that	both	music	and	stories	can	provide	is	a	demonstration	of	affective	aptitude	or	emotional	intelligence:	our	propensity	to	navigate	the	social	world	of	emotions,	and	sometimes	allegiance	to	a	particular	emotion	(from	Goths	to	Emos).	Consider	also	the	display	of	affective	unity	that	is	dance,	which	is	inseparable	from	music.		So	a	superstimulus	is	rarely	“mere”	superstimulus	where	more	than	one	human	is	involved.	Likewise	many	recreational	drugs	are	considered	superstimuli,	but	can	be	used	socially	or	antisocially	in	a	variety	of	ways.	The	interesting	part	of	the	story	is	not	their	status	as	superstimuli	or	spandrels,	but	the	use	such	superstimuli	are	then	put	to.	Exaptation	continues;	it	does	not	halt	at	the	generation	of	a	superstimulus.	In	Joseph	Carroll’s	summary	of	the	“cheesecake”	perspective,	art	is	“a	nonadaptive	exploitation	of	adaptive	sources	of	pleasure”	(Literary	Darwinism	64).	Carroll	goes	on	to	object	to	this	view,	as	art	and	literature	can	provoke	fitness	by	allowing	us	to	imagine	better	ways	of	living	(66-68).	His	view	connotes	a	kind	of	fulfilling	emotional	imagination,	which	encourages	us	not	only	to	foresee	possibilities	for	living	that	may	help	us	circumnavigate	environmental	challenges,	but	also	to	attach	to,	craft	meaning	and	purpose	from,	and	desire	these	changes.	This	would	also	be	foundational	to	ethical	conceptions	of	narrative’s	use,	such	as	Charles	Taylor’s	notion	of	storied	projection	as	a	means	to	imagine	possible	future	moral	identities	(Sources	of	the	Self	48).	Again,	emotional	projection	provides	the	reason	for	change,	and	we	will	often	demonstrate	our	emotional	projections	to	others	while	engaged	in	narrative	to	broadcast	these	capacities.		There	are	further	academic	attenuations	of	the	sensation-seeking	function	of	narrative	art.	One	politico-cultural	argument	proposes	mainstream	consumer	culture’s	politically	sedating	excesses	as	motivationally	centred	on	seeking	affective	commodities	(Hardt	and																																																																																																																																																																																									46).	Others	have	pointed	to	music’s	place	in	cognitive	development,	as	it	rehearses	high-level	pre-speech	abilities	from	cortically	complex	motor	skills	to	speech	perception	(Levitin	254-257),	and	socially	cohesive	abilities	like	turn	taking	behaviour,	coordination	and	cooperation	(ibid.	252).		
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Negri	62)	and	affective	newness	(Bauman	26).	Consumers	seek	affective	stimulation;	ergo	emotive	arts	are	bound	in	a	study	of	commodity	cultures.	Pointing	out	the	concurrence	of	consumer	culture	and	our	need	for	emotional	stimulation,	however,	myopically	ignores	a	rich	history	of	similar	use	for	story	and	art	spanning	millennia.	Seeking	such	emotional	stimulation	is	an	ancient	pancultural	human	behaviour,	which	we	have	consistently	used	our	free	time	to	engage	in.	If	it	has	burgeoned	today,	we	need	to	ask	why	that	may	be	–	it	may	turn	out	to	be	an	abundance	of	non-work	time	which	we	have	traditionally	used	to	engage	in	emotion-seeking	or	-mediating	activities,	in	which	case	fiction’s	proliferation	is	not	the	culprit	so	much	as	a	symptom	of	post-producer	and	post-religious	cultures.		The	above	rationalisations	of	narrative	emotion-stoking	in	contemporary	Western	cultures	may	all	be	unfair	characterisations	of	our	emotional	needs,	as	without	emotional	cues,	our	rational	thought	struggles	to	locate	pivotal	purpose	(as	in	anhedonia),	and	where	removed	entirely	can	veer	toward	the	psychopathic	(of	which	a	defining	characteristic,	in	pathology,	is	an	inhibited	response	to	emotive	stimuli).		It	is	also	likely	that	we	may	be	using	story	for	different	purposes	now	than	those	that	presumably	propelled	its	origins	in	the	Pleistocene,	thus	the	position	of	Carroll,	Dissanayake	and	myself	that	we	should	presume	in	audiences	some	manner	of	“fulfilment”	motive:	that	we	now	use	story	to	mediate	our	mood	in	a	way	that	may	keep	us	mentally	fit,	or	that	we	assume	may	make	us	feel	better,	as	in	uses	and	gratifications	theory.	The	use	of	media	to	regulate	
our	mood	or	shift	affect	has	been	recognised	by	numerous	researchers.	For	example,	Greenwood	and	Long	ask	what	media	we	are	most	likely	to	turn	to	in	differing	affective	states	(“Mood	Specific	Media	Use”),	while	Edgar	C.	O'Neal	and	S.	Levi	Taylor	look	at	how	we	might	choose	media	to	sustain	an	existing	mood	for	an	ulterior	purpose,	such	as	the	choice	of	violent	media	when	angered	subjects	perceive	the	opportunity	to	retaliate	against	a	low-status	provocateur	(“Status	of	the	Provoker”).	Shifting,	sustaining	or	otherwise	moderating	affect	through	emotive	storytelling	can	also	distract	us	from	our	own	daily	concerns,	and	perhaps	provide	welcome	relief	from	negative	affect	we	have	difficulty	self-regulating.	Consider	going	to	a	film	when	in	the	doldrums	–	the	experience	can	quite	seriously	and	lastingly	change	one’s	mood	by	transferring	thought	from	our	own	tribulations	to	sympathy	for	others.	And	we	cannot	forget	that	storytellers	as	well	as	audiences	work	to	regulate	their	own	emotional	states.	As	Kay	Redfield	Jamison	puts	it:	“creative	work	can	act	as	a	way	of	structuring	chaotic	emotions	and	thoughts,	numbing	pain	through	abstraction	and	the	rigours	of	disciplined	
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thought,	and	creating	a	distance	from	the	source	of	despair”	(123).	So	mood	regulation	provides	not	only	another	impetus	to	formulate	and	distribute	stories,	it	also	allows	us	to	
explain	emotional	shifts	to	ourselves,	and	through	narrativised	causality	feel	in	control	of	our	own	negatively	valenced	emotions	–	structuring	them,	displacing	them,	or	otherwise	taming	them.	 	Although	David	Hume	dismissed	the	“excitation”	explanation	for	fictive	negative	affect	in	his	essay	“Of	Tragedy,”	it	is	clear	that	most	audiences	exhibit	sensation-seeking	motivation	that	relies	in	some	way	on	negative	affect,	even	if	it	is	balanced	with	correlate	positive	affect,	or	what	Plantinga	calls	a	“working	through”	of	negative	emotions,	leveraging	them	against	positive	affect	to	make	our	enjoyment	of	those	emotions	stronger	(178-179).	He	postulates:	“If	strong	negative	emotions	are	accompanied	by	physiological	arousal,	this	arousal	may	contribute	to	the	strength	of	the	positive	emotions”	provoked	later	in	the	narrative	(ibid.	187);	this	is	a	version	of	excitation-transfer	theory.	Each	narrative	contains	a	roadmap	of	causal	mood	shifts	that	we	might	find	pleasurable,	perhaps	as	a	rehearsal	of	methods	for	dealing	with	negative	affect.46	However,	Hume	also	points	out	another	motive	for	enjoying	a	narrative’s	particular	suspense	and	sadness	–	they	are	turned	into	pleasure	upon	reflection	of	the	artistry	or	eloquence	of	the	author’s	expression	of	those	emotions.	We	do	clearly	like	to	have	pain	expressed	in	narrative,	as	it	is	an	acknowledgment	of	common	feeling.	When	a	sad	story	impresses	us	in	its	telling,	we	respond	to	how	well	it	matches	our	own	lived	experience	of	sorrow.	As	in	other	non-narrative	arts,	we	are	taken	by	a	kind	of	affective	verisimilitude,	if	not	a	stylistically	accurate	representation	of	the	world	then	indeed	an	emotional	one.	Once	articulated	and	shared,	a	common	emotion	often	seems	easier	to	manage.	This	reaches	behind	the	sensation-seeking	to	its	social	underpinnings:	we	feel	these	emotions	in	fiction	to	discuss	their	influence	on	us,	perhaps	gain	a	mastery	over	negative	affect,	and	perhaps	to	shift	our	mood	through	socially	distributed	recognition	of	those	feelings.		Of	course,	different	media	have	different	regulatory	capacities,	with	Greenwood	and	Long	finding:		that	individuals	may	derive	more	emotional	satisfaction	from	music,	which	they	can	tailor	to	fit	or	uplift	various	positive	and	negative	mood	states.	However,	when	feeling																																																									46	This	can	even	have	a	much	more	direct	survival	benefit:	we	are	more	likely	to	procreate	when	in	a	good	mood.		
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disengaged	from	their	immediate	social	or	emotional	environment,	television	may	offer	viewers	relaxation,	structure	and	diversion.	It	is	also	possible	that	increased	television	viewing	inhibits	the	development	of	alternative	and	perhaps	more	successful	solutions	to	boredom.	In	support	of	this	idea,	research	has	documented	a	‘‘passive	spillover	effect”	in	which	viewers	may	continue	to	watch	television	even	as	the	emotional	gratifications	of	viewing	have	receded	(McIlwraith,	Jacobvitz,	Kubey,	&	Alexander,	1991).		(620)		So	various	media	will	affect	mood	states	in	divergent	ways,	perhaps	some	more	lastingly	or	effectively	than	others.	Some	media,	for	example,	may	have	a	greater	capacity	to	orchestrate	parallel	neural	responses	across	a	range	of	viewers	(Hasson	et	al.),	or	activate	mirror	neurons,	or	be	more	effective	in	achieving	emotional	contagion,	described	by	Elaine	Hatfield	as	“the	tendency	to	automatically	mimic	and	synchronise	facial	expressions,	vocalisations,	postures,	movements	with	those	of	another	person,	and,	consequently,	to	converge	emotionally”	(96).	Emotional	contagion	is	just	one	of	the	many	contagions	a	storyteller	might	attempt	to	affect	in	their	audience,	however.	We	also	tell	stories	to	stimulate	all	manner	of	contagions	in	
addition	to	the	emotional,	from	ideas	and	ideologies	to	ways	of	life	and	states	of	being.	In	
Connected,	Nicholas	A.	Christakis	and	James	H.	Fowler	make	a	strong	argument	for	the	far-reaching	influence	of	contagions	(emotional,	ideological,	medical,	dispositional,	to	name	a	few)	across	social	networks,	extending	to	people	we	have	never	met	(our	friend’s	friend’s	friend);	thus	the	need	for	human	studies	to	commit	to	social	rather	than	individual	psychological	analysis.	Stories	are	resolutely	part	of	this	process,	and	we	will	return	to	more	specific	uses	of	various	contagions	throughout	the	remainder	of	this	chapter.		 Exploring	emotions	has	another	side,	too:	we	can	use	the	narrative	act	to	achieve	
proximity	to	extreme	emotion	or	a	trauma	that	is	hard	to	process,	in	order	to	replace	
mystification	with	causal	attributions.	Melanie	A.	Greenberg	et	al.	demonstrated	that,	beyond	the	established	benefits	of	disclosure	in	recovering	from	personal	trauma	(not	necessarily	in	a	therapeutic	setting),	sharing	narratives	of	both	real	and	imagined	traumas	amongst	fellow	victims	resulted	in	fewer	illness	visits,	perhaps	representing	recovery	or	mental	health	gains.47	In	their	abstract,	the	researchers	summarised	possible	attributions	for	their	findings,	which	“could	reflect	catharsis,	emotional	regulation,	or	construction	of	resilient	
																																																								47	In	practice,	this	could	explain	the	popularity	of	narrativised	phenomena	such	as	“sharing	circles”	both	in	person	and	online.		
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possible	selves”	(588).	James	W.	Pennebaker	and	Anna	Graybeal	contend	of	written	narratives	in	trauma	recovery,	however:		 There	is	now	sufficient	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	power	of	writing	is	not	due	to	mere	emotional	expression	in	the	sense	of	cathartic	venting,	or	“blowing	off	steam.”	For	example,	participants	who	wrote	only	about	their	emotions	about	their	most	traumatic	experience,	without	a	description	of	the	event	itself,	did	not	reap	the	benefits	seen	by	those	who	both	described	the	event	and	expressed	their	feelings	about	it	(Pennebaker	&	Beall,	1986).	Also,	those	who	reported	that	writing	served	a	cathartic	function	invariably	had	poorer	health	than	other	writers	(Pennebaker,	1989).		(91)		Jessica	McDermott	Sales	et	al.	also	found	in	2003	that	parents	naturally	tend	to	more	causal	prompting	rather	than	emotional	elaboration	in	discussing	traumatic	events	with	their	children	(“Parental	Reminiscing	About	Positive	and	Negative	Events”).	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	storytelling	as	therapy	cannot	be	liberally	applied	to	all	situations.	Camilla	Asplund	Ingemark	outlines	some	Swedish	studies	questioning	the	“cultural	imperative	to	narrate”	(12-13).	Perhaps	there	are	times	when	linear	causal	retelling	of	trauma	becomes	a	reliving	of	that	trauma,	and	needs	to	be	put	aside	as	a	therapeutic	method.48		 Whether	or	not	the	process	could	be	called	catharsis	or	a	kind	of	purging,	whether	it	allows	for	identity	reconstruction	or	the	means	for	control	over	one’s	emotions,	it	appears	that	simulating	a	proximity	to	extreme	events	and	emotions	via	storytelling	acts	is	a	beneficial	means	to	at	least	approach	difficult	psychological	processes,	and	cope	with	them	by	application	of	a	causal	narrative	structure.	I	would	also	stress	that	this	process	could	be	fictive	(an	abstraction	from	real-life	experience)	or	non-fictive.	Following	Jill	Littrell’s	“Expression	of	Emotion:	When	It	Causes	Trauma	and	When	It	Helps”,	the	exploration	and	reappraisal	is	what	matters,	and	perhaps	fictional	displacement	could	help	avoid	reignition	of	trauma	through	retelling.	Littrell’s	process	of	reflective	“listening,	paraphrasing	and	acknowledging”	followed	by	the	question	“where	to	next”	and	its	inherent	attendance	to	problem-solving	cognition	in	trauma	recovery	social	work,	the	imperative	to	“reframe,	refocus	and	rework”	(314),	is	similar	to	that	attempted	in	much	dramatic	and	humanistic	fiction	working	in	a	realist	mode:	listening	to	and	representing	problems	in	a	populace,	and	then	directing	attention	to	the																																																									48	This	is	not	a	statement	on	the	efficacy	of	techniques	such	as	“cinematherapy”	in	certain	scenarios,	which	is	in	need	of	further	clinical	research.		
 69	
agency	of	socio-ethical	problem-solving.	It	could	also	apply	to	a	humanist	hermeneutics:	listening	to	an	author,	reframing	and	refocusing	their	perspective	through	reading	and	debate,	and	then	actively	working	with	the	results	to	ask	where	we	ought	to	go	next.	I	hope	this	discussion	has	demonstrated	that	the	emotional	functions	of	narrative	reach	far	beyond	the	purely	hedonic.	I	now	turn	to	some	more	specific	emotions	bound	in	genre	fictions.			
Fear	and	Anger	in	Fiction		 Affect	studies	–	and	particularly	of	that	contradictory	experience	we	seek	out	between	the	very	controllability	of	our	engagement	in	self-selected	fiction,	and	our	involuntary	emotional	state	matching	–	leads	us	naturally	to	the	experience	of	horror	in	fiction.	I	have	addressed	appetites	for	negative	affect	such	as	sadness	and	tragedy	in	fiction;	however	we	cannot	address	all	aversive	emotions	as	one,	and	it	should	be	noted	that	horror	provides	a	very	different	set	of	experiences	deserved	of	their	own	scrutiny.49	We	use	horror	in	attempts	
to	test	our	fears	for	validity	and	deflate	fears	that	are	not	needed,	and	contrariwise	to	
indulge	and	generate	fears	in	others.	This	is	just	one	dimension	in	the	functions	horror	can	serve,	of	course,	as	people	of	differing	personalities	will	have	different	motivations	for	pursuing	horror	narrative	(for	example	gore	watching,	thrill	watching,	independent	watching	and	problem	watching	as	identified	by	Deirdre	D.	Johnston	in	“Adolescents’	motivations	for	viewing	graphic	horror”)	and	thus	such	narratives	may	produce	different	effects	accordant	to	motivation.	Aside	from	the	pleasure	of	adrenaline	(horror	provides	excesses	of	adrenaline)	and	existential	meanings	we	attribute	in	proximity	to	extreme	affect	(covered	above),	we	have	long	established	that	successive	simulated	exposure	can	be	used	to	combat	phobia,	following	Watson	and	Marks’s	findings	in	1971	(“Relevant	and	Irrelevant	Fear”).	The	same	may	be	true	of	broaching	irrational	fears	in	narrative.	Take	the	child,	for	example,	afraid	of	the	monster	in	the	closet,	growing	up	on	a	diet	of	monster	movies,	surviving,	and	effectively	bringing	themselves	to	the	realisation	that	monsters	are	not	much	of	an	issue.	Spectators	who	watch	horror	movies	consistently	report	desensitisation	to	its	manipulations	as	they	become	more	familiar	with	its	cues	(although	we	will	investigate	shortly	how	generalisable	this	desensitisation	is	to	fears	in	the	world).	This	phenomenon	could	be	explained	by	“the																																																									49	Happiness,	sadness,	and	mood	regulation	only	take	us	halfway.	Horror	is	unique	as	it	combines	the	four	other	so-called	“basic	emotions”	(c.f.	Ekman):	fear,	anger,	disgust	and	surprise.		
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developmental	shift	from	perceptual	to	conceptual	processing”	(Cantor	and	Oliver	232):	the	change	in	children’s	threat	appraisal	as	they	learn	that	things	that	look	scary	are	not	always	the	most	pertinent	dangers.	Many	writers,	especially	in	the	substantial	tradition	of	psychoanalytic	horror	studies	(including,	surprisingly,	psychoanalysis	sceptic	Noël	Carroll,	albeit	from	an	incongruity	theory	perspective),	have	focused	on	the	repulsion	felt	toward	human	or	bodily	deviation	and	otherness,	but	this	is	just	half	the	story.50		While	fears	of	threatening	animal	otherness	might	not	be	innate	(Thrasher	and	LoBue	“Do	Infants	Find	Snakes	Aversive?”),	it	makes	sense	that	attention	to	the	signs	of	danger	–	readable	malice,	the	neuroaesthetic	call	of	the	colour	red,	and	so	on	–	would	be	prominently	hereditary.	Nonhuman	monster	designs	can	dole	out	these	properties	to	a	level	of	extreme	superstimulus	as	can,	for	example,	hyper-aesetheticised	cinematography	of	a	crime	scene.	This	may	generate	in	some	a	self-sustaining	feedback	loop	of	fascination	and	repulsion;	when	we	resolve	the	cognitive	dissonance	of	these	conflicting	spectatorial	urges	by	elevating	the	value	of	one	response,	the	other	reasserts	itself,	perhaps	creating	an	internal	puzzle	over	whether	or	not	to	engage	(Moss-Wellington	“Affecting	Profundity”	48).	Although	the	heredity	of	fascination	with	violence	appears	self-evident,	as	genes	without	sensitivity	to	the	potential	for	others	(including	nonhuman	others)	to	cause	us	mortal	harm	might	not	have	lasted,	perhaps	various	facets	of	these	fears	must	be	discarded	through	our	experience	when	we	find	they	are	not	needed,	for	example	when	we	do	not	encounter	seriously	threatening	animal	otherness	in	our	daily	lives.	Humans	have	the	unique	ability	to	attempt	to	use	cognitive	control	(what	we	often	call	“executive	function”)	to	ignore	fear	responses.	Johnston	also	found	a	level	of	fear	mastery	motivation	in	attendance	to	graphic	horror	(slasher	films	with	human	antagonists)	was	applicable	across	a	number	of	personality	traits,	including	differing	levels	of	empathy:																																																										50	Horror	psychoanalysts	have	also,	unsurprisingly,	emphasised	repressed	violent	desires,	although	fascination	and	obsession	with	violence	may	in	fact	be	borne	of	our	fear	of	committing	immoral	acts	rather	than	a	foundational,	internalised	and	restrained	desire	to	harm,	or	see	others	harm	(Miller	and	Spiegel).	This	would	be	similar	to	a	“high	place	effect”	or	
l’appel	du	vide	(Hames	et	al.)	–	the	urge	some	feel	to	jump	when	near	high	places	–	as	it	does	not	express	a	desire	but	a	fear.	Desires	and	fears	should	not	be	so	easily	conflated.	The	fact	that	we	imagine	ourselves	performing	an	action	does	not	mean	we	have	a	repressed	desire	to	do	it.	We	just	tend	to	fixate	upon	that	which	irks	us,	and	many	find	themselves	imagining	the	same	frightful	scenario	again	and	again,	as	in	horror	cinema	that	depicts	the	infliction	of	violence	upon	others:	the	notion	of	causing	as	much	as	receiving	pain	could	be	one	of	our	deepest	fears.		
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Although	there	is	a	subset	of	adolescents	who	view	graphic	horror	for	gore-watching	motivations	and	who	hold	disturbing	beliefs	and	responses	to	the	viewing	of	graphic	horror	[such	as	female	victims	“getting	what	they	deserve”]	…	It	is	also	comforting	that	independent	watchers—who	seek	mastery	over	their	fears,	are	characterized	by	low	empathy,	and	report	positive	affective	responses—tend	to	identify	with	the	victim	rather	than	the	killer	in	these	movies.		(548)		It	has	also	been	suggested	that	the	long-term	effects	of	filmic	fright	(anxiety	specific	to	horrific	scenes	can	even	last	for	years,	unlike	most	other	emotions	media	elicits)	may	be	explained	by	the	extremity	of	empathic	engagement	the	genre	requires	(Cantor	297).	But	none	of	this	is	to	suggest	that	our	fear	mastery	is	necessarily	successful	–	the	important	point	is	that	we	
attempt	to	deflate	fears	through	this	kind	of	narrative,	but	perhaps	when	we	minimise	them	in	narrative,	we	in	turn	indulge	or	enlarge	them	elsewhere.		 Dolf	Zillman	is	a	staunch	sceptic	of	the	fear	relief	hypothesis	(183-187),	although	the	research	he	cites	reveals	that	we	have	no	serious	longitudinal	studies	to	ascertain	prolonged	exposure	in	young	people	to	supernatural	horror	and	recovery	from	its	terrors,	and	it	remains	that,	success	or	not,	horror	attendees	report	fear	mastery	as	one	of	their	motivators	(Johnston).	Zillman	also	postulates	that	humans	share	primal	aggressive	tendencies	and	fight-or-flight	responses	with	other	mammals,	the	utility	of	which	is	blunted	or	counterproductive	in	contemporary	societies,	and	we	address	this	through	violent	media:			 Today’s	humans	rarely	can	act	on	their	fears	and	their	anger	by	destroying	the	agents	of	circumstances	that	instigate	these	emotions.	Feeling	threatened	by	air	pollution	or	global	warming,	for	example,	is	unlikely	to	be	remedied	by	any	physical	assault	or	by	literally	running	away	from	it	…	It	is	this	lack	of	evolutionary	adjustment	by	the	brain,	then,	that	can	be	held	accountable	for	a	continuing,	not	entirely	appropriate	sensitivity	to	danger.		(“The	Psychology	of	the	Appeal	of	Portrayals	of	Violence”	194)		Although	he	remains	sceptical	of	another,	more	speculative	Darwinian	hypothesis	“that	for	millennia	blood	and	gore	were	linked	to	the	gratifications	of	food	intake,	to	well-being,	and	to	survival	…	a	trace	[from	the	selected	paleomammalian	brain]	that	manifests	itself	in	a	continuing	interest	in	blood	and	gore	and	kills	made	by	others”	(ibid.	192).	Perhaps	we	need	a	more	sensitive	theory	than	emotional	catharsis,	then	–	a	kind	of	fear	regulation	rather	than	
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expulsion,	like	the	mood	regulation	outlined	above	–	to	properly	analyse	how	horror	attendees	utilise	the	experience.51		 Stories	can	alert	us	to	dangers,	and	horror	alerts	us	to	the	intent	of	others	that	mean	us	harm,	but	potentially	not	with	the	greatest	success	in	directing	our	attention	to	the	most	relevant	or	preventable	dangers:	we	are	much	more	likely	to	be	killed	in	a	car	accident	than	by	another	living	thing	with	ill	intent,	yet	we	are	less	attuned	to	this	in	narrative	(Grodal	108).	Many	have	analysed	fear	as	a	political	tool,	however	some,	including	George	Gerbner	and	Larry	Gross,	see	the	stoking	of	fears	specifically	through	media	violence	as	a	control	mechanism	with	primacy	above	all	others,	or	“the	established	religion	of	the	industrial	order,	relating	to	governance	as	the	church	did	in	earlier	times”	(194).	These	reminders	of	the	generalisability	and	misattribution	of	fears	explain	why	horror	film	may	not	always	be	viewed	seriously,	rated	comparatively	“more	predictable,	silly,	and	low	quality”	(Oliver	and	Sanders	255)	compared	to	other	suspenseful	media,	and	why	horror	comedy	sits	at	an	intriguing	point	in	our	psyche:	through	humour,	we	are	questioning	what	may	be	a	legitimate	threat.			 Cognitive	anthropologist	Pascal	Boyer	would	hold	the	view	that,	as	we	have	developed	instinctual	cognitive	assets	for	both	predator	and	prey	detection,	and	it	has	benefited	our	ancestors	to	be	hyper-alert	to	the	mere	possibility	of	danger,	we	are	prone	to	a	kind	of	pareidolia	of	agency,	a	cognitive	inference	over-detecting	agency	in	natural	phenomena	which	can	play	out	as	religious	and	supernatural	belief	–	dispositional	characteristics	styled	by	Justin	Barrett	as	“hyperactive	agency	detection	devices”	in	his	book	Why	Would	Anyone	
Believe	in	God?	However,	it	is	not	just	irrational	fears	that	we	deal	with	in	horror	narrative.	We	also	observe	people	who	live	with	violence	in	their	everyday	lives	attending	more	horror	films,	leading	back	to	the	hypothesis	of	a	coping	method	(see	Boyanowski	et	al.;	Goldstein	
Aggression;	and	Williams	“When	Horror	Hits	Home”).	In	any	case,	it	seems	that	horror	is	used	
in	attempts	to	process,	test	and	potentially	move	past	oppressive	fears	of	aggression	and	victimisation,	and	that	this	impulse	can	equally	be	exploited	through	narrative,	possibly	to	produce	the	reverse	effect.		
																																																								51	One	example	of	fear	regulation	might	be	located	in	the	post-atomic	horror	cinema	of	Japan,	through	which	notions	of	complicity	and	victimhood	are	thrashed	out	and	extricated,	but	not	necessarily	expelled.		
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Sometimes	we	engage	with	narrative	specifically	to	feel	angry,	or	for	a	space	to	feel	that	our	anger,	despair	and	confusion	in	the	face	of	a	bafflingly	cruel	world	is	shared.	So	we	
also	use	horror	to	experience	existential	oneness	and	shared	anger.	Horror	demographics,	while	not	exclusively,	still	retain	a	spike	of	younger	people	in	their	audience	(Val	Morgan	Cinema	Network	np),	and	it	may	be	an	important	developmental	activity	to	bond	through	the	particular	anger	of	discovering	the	extent	of	injustices	we	face	in	the	world	we	are	being	inducted	into;	this	bonding	can	last	later	into	life.	Following	Harvey	Whitehouse’s	hypothesis	that	dysphoric	rituals	promote	not	just	group	identification,	but	identity	fusion,	especially	where	routinized	and	activating	an	assumed	collective	memory	(284-285),	horror	may	also	be	a	way	to	relate	to	and	feel	closer	to	peers,	as	well	as	others	undergoing	the	experience	simultaneously,	through	a	simulation	of	shared	traumatic	experience.	This	could	equally	apply	to	sad	stories	and	other	genre	film,	and	can	actively	be	seen	in	our	desire	to	be	together	while	we	witness	dramatic	storytelling,	from	the	darkened	theatre	full	of	bodies	to	the	pyjama	party	movie	night,	from	the	campfire	singalong	to	the	intimate	folk	gig.	However,	well-orchestrated	terror	holds	a	special	place	in	the	simulation	of	shared	dysphoric	experience.	Neurocinematic	researchers	found	that	Hitchcock’s	Bang!	You’re	Dead	“was	able	to	orchestrate	the	responses	of	so	many	different	brain	regions	…	turning	them	on	and	off	at	the	same	time	across	all	viewers”	(Hasson	et	al.	16),	much	more	so	than	other	(non-frightening)	media	studied.	This	would	also	seem	to	give	credence	to	the	notion	that	horror	is	reliant	on	an	intensified	level	of	empathetic	response,	if	we	define	affective	empathy	as	feeling	what	another	feels	(feeling	with	as	opposed	to	feeling	for).	However,	if	we	value	subtlety,	subjective	viewer	agency,	moral	and	political	attention	and	questioning,	or	the	capacity	of	films	to	inspire	a	range	of	different	reactions	and	thought,	such	manipulations	via	screen	could	prove	problematic.	Social	research	also	shows	us	that	films	offering	extreme	arousal,	such	as	horror	cinema,	can	have	the	effect	of	generating	increases	in	attraction	and	behaviours	such	as	talking	and	touching	(Cohen	et	al.	“At	the	Movies”).	This	could	explain	the	enduring	convention	of	horror	movies	used	as	date	movies	(Oliver	and	Sanders	248),	perhaps	even	generating	unity	through	the	emotional	contagion	of	alarm	pheromones	(Mujica-Parodi	et	al.).	This	feeling	of	oneness	–	a	presumption	of	shared	experience	that	binds	us,	the	sense	of	a	kind	of	social	monism	–	amounts	to	a	storied	method	of	social	bonding.	In	social	psychology,	this	is	also	referred	to	as	“self-other	overlap.”	Social	psychologists	have	identified	the	emergence	of	this	sensation	in	varying	contexts,	from	the	intimate	“feeling	of	‘oneness’	or	merged	identity	with	relationship	partners”	(Clark	and	Lemay	Jr.	920)	to	feelings	of	oneness	
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with	strangers	(Maner	et	al.),	both	of	which	are	predictors	of	prosocial	and	helping	behaviours	toward	those	we	feel	“at	one”	with.		As	an	example,	consider	the	recent	popular	zombie	fad,	emergent	about	half	a	century	after	Night	of	the	Living	Dead	(George	A.	Romero,	1968)	established	the	contemporary	zombie’s	lasting	iteration.	Perhaps,	as	many	popular	horror	creators	including	Stephen	King	have	suggested	(Tamborini	and	Stiff	433),	horror	provides	a	safe	outlet	for	anger	at	our	fellows,	and	the	kind	of	human-on-human	graphic	violence	which	is	the	hallmark	of	the	zombie	genre	would	seem	to	support	this	(of	course,	another	component	of	the	zombie	genre’s	endurance	is	the	application	of	its	central	metaphor	of	contagious	human	malignancy	across	social	and	political	contexts).	This	could	be	the	explanation	of	Tamborini	and	Stiff’s	finding	that	“the	graphic	portrayal	of	destruction”	is	yet	another	motivation	for	viewing	horror	movies	(ibid.	432-433).52	By	way	of	personal	anecdote,	not	long	ago	I	asked	a	friend	how	he	feels	at	the	end	of	a	story	in	which	zombies	have	obliterated	the	living	world,	and	he	replied,	“calm	and	cleansed.”	The	increase	in	morbid	conclusions	of	the	apocalyptic	variety	across	the	zombie	genre,	and	the	spectator’s	pleasure	in	such	ends,	presents	a	challenge	to	Zillman’s	insistence	on	moral	monitoring	and	the	euphoric	deliverance	of	justice	as	the	primary	motivator	for	audiences	of	violent	fiction,	contingent	upon	a	built-up	excitation	transfer	over	the	period	of	a	narrative.	This	destruction	delivers	no	justice	(although	perhaps	it	may	for	those	totalising	misanthropes	among	us),	but	in	fact	obliterates	the	need	for	justice.	Perhaps	if	we	dispositionally	(or	have	reason	to)	experience	generalised	anger	at	humans	but	cannot	express	our	misanthrophy	another	way,	apocalyptic	horror	is	a	harmless	way	to	bond	and	experience	oneness	through	such	a	frustration,	recover	some	faith	in	fellows	who	share	our	ire	and	know	that	someone	else	also	fantasises	about	total	destruction.	Perhaps	this	is	sharing	a	kind	of	totalised	justice	acknowledged	as	a	fantasy.	Like	voicing	one’s	innermost	anxieties	to	a	trusted	friend,	we	might	begin	knowing	that	our	anxieties	are	overwrought	and	are	not	reliable	reflections	on	the	world,	but	still	have	trouble	minimising	them;	after	vocalising	and	externalising	them,	the	feelings	seem	to	have	less	dominance	over	us	through	their	mutuality	–	the	mystery	and	potential	shame	of	these	feelings	is	expelled.	This	is	not	quite	the	individual	catharsis	envisaged	by	King,	but	rather	a	social	catharsis	of	implied	affective	mutuality.	The	theory	points	again	to	Booth’s	thesis	of	fiction	as	friendship.	Although	perhaps	providing	friendship	is	not	so	much	the	function	of	narrative	here	(as	a	real-life																																																									52	So	too	is	the	ordinary	or	reluctant	hero	in	apocalyptic	fiction.	Mass	elimination	of	other	heroic	candidates	allows	an	easy	way	to	imagine	oneself	into	the	scenario.		
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corporeal	companion	entails	many	other	qualities	not	accessible	by	fiction);	the	feelings	of	relationality	in	our	shared	destructive	horror	fantasies	might	again	distance	us	from	our	oblivion,	or	the	weight	of	our	daily	worries,	or	the	shame	of	feeling	defective	in	one’s	negative	affect,	merely	by	having	these	things	voiced.			
The	Connectedness	of	Fiction		Experiencing	oneness	or	closeness	to	others	is	not	restricted	to	horror	or	other	violent	narrative,	of	course.	We	also	explore	multiple	affects	and	avenues	for	achieving	a	sense	of	
connectedness	through	narrative,	as	stories	facilitate	foundational	intimacy.	Dissanayake	has	pointed	out	that	stories	do	not	merely	encourage	intimacy	–	they	can	be	our	means	for	learning	how	to	be	intimate	with	our	family	members	and	peers.	She	uses	the	complexities	of	baby	talk	and	protoconversations	as	a	primary	example	(29).	Dissanayake	identifies	love	as	the	experience	of	mutuality,	and	the	arts	as	its	elaboration	(ibid.	11),	which	is	a	pancultural	phenomenon	(c.f.	Murdock	“The	Common	Denominator	of	Cultures”);	again,	she	sees	these	qualities	as	fundamental	to	our	selective	fitness,	yet	our	understanding	of	these	narratival	utilities	and	our	societal	integration	of	their	benefits	can	fluctuate.	Even	disagreements	around	narrative	can	bring	people	closer:	consider	the	prevalence	of	book	clubs	in	which	we	come	together	to	air	conflicting	readings,	or	the	way	that	when	we	discuss	favourite	songs	and	bands	we	really	discuss	minutiae	and	differences	of	opinion	that	we	take	pleasure	in,	and	that	often	feel	binding	despite	their	disparities,	simultaneously	representing	that	which	makes	us	different	and	the	same.	Greenwood	and	Long	found	that	individuals	high	in	the	“Need	To	Belong”	(NTB)	personality	trait	scale:		may	be	particularly	likely	to	feel	lonely	when	not	in	the	presence	of	others	and/or	use	their	time	alone	to	reflect	on	missed	or	lost	loved	ones.	Engaging	more	intensely	with	media	may	be	one	way	that	individuals	high	in	social	inclusion	needs	attempt	to	cope	with	loneliness.	Media	programs	are	after	all,	inherently	social	(indeed,	even	nature	programs	feature	compelling	narrators	or	experts),	and	may	offer	individuals	with	increased	belongingness	needs	a	soothing	if	temporary	replacement	for	genuine	social	interaction.	Moreover,	recent	research	finds	that	individuals	high	in	the	NTB	are	also	more	empathically	attuned	to	and	accurate	at	interpreting	others’	emotions	(Pickett,	Gardner	&	Knowles,	2004).	This	social	and	emotional	vigilance	may	enhance	the	
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gratifications	associated	with	transporting	into	media	narratives,	as	well	as	identifying	with	and	feeling	imagined	kinship	with	media	characters.		(“Psychological	Predictors	of	Media	Involvement”	640)		So	NTB	is	a	predictor	of	cognitive	and	affective	empathy,	which	might	predispose	some	toward	the	gratifications	of	narrative	transportation.	The	intimacy	of	the	storytelling	act	–	whether	we	call	it	connection,	love,	or	empathy	–	challenges	boundaries	in	a	globalised	context,	in	which	stories	may	travel	at	the	lightning	speed	of	a	social	media	feed.	Story’s	potential	for	intimacy	at	a	distance	is,	therefore,	an	integral	tool	in	the	cosmopolitanisation	of	our	social	structures.	This	should	be	kept	in	mind	while	exploring	related	functions	of	fiction.		 Intimacy	and	connectedness	lead	us	again	back	to	the	capacity	of	narrative	to	provide	something	akin	to	friendship,	and	in	Greenwood	and	Long’s	case	above,	to	combat	
loneliness.	This	is	hardly	a	contentious	claim,	yet	what	Greenwood	and	Long	suggest	is	that	media	programs	may	be	effective	in	assuaging	our	loneliness	in	some	circumstances.	Clearly	there	are	select	cases	when	media	practices	such	as	television	use,	online	social	gaming,	cinephilia,	or	celebrity	obsession	come	to	replace	more	effective	means	to	fulfil	social	needs,	but	we	can	use	media	to	temporarily	replace	such	activities.	Often	there	is	good	reason	that	we	cannot	be	closer	to	other	people	(including	geographic	isolation),	and	so	we	use	absent	or	imagined	others	in	narrative	instead;	not	just	fictive	characters,	but	we	might	imagine	a	connection	to	fellow	audience	members,	narrative	producers,	or	use	more	interactive	modes	of	engagement	(talking	to	a	screen,	gaming	or	roleplaying)	that	rely	less	upon	a	notion	of	any	precise	other	behind	the	narrative.	We	can	again	consider	the	shared	attention	that	is	part	of	narrative	(Boyd	On	the	Origin	of	Stories	101),	such	as	consuming	media	together	or	the	particular	pleasure	of	being	read	to.	Sometimes	we	need	to	simulate	this	sense	of	unity	when	more	direct	options	are	not	available.		The	desire	to	feel	closer	to	one	another	via	narrative	can	be	identified	widely:	through	common	knowledge	of	television	characters	and	celebrities	we	can	potentially	discuss	even	with	strangers,53	the	common	experience	of	being	in	a	theatre	and	reacting	as	one,	affinity																																																									53	Perhaps	television	has	been	a	necessary	development	in	the	face	of	the	threatening	anonymity	of	mass	urbanisation,	providing	strangers	a	mutual	knowledge	to	share	perspectives	on,	although	David	Boyle	sees	this	function	of	television	as	diminished	with	the	proliferation	of	channels	(or	streaming	services)	and	superficial	choice	(125).		
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with	the	ontic	assumptions	or	insights	a	story	presents	or	relies	on,	our	familiarity	with	the	conventions	and	culture	around	an	arts	practice	or	storytelling	community,	and	so	on.	These	experiences	help	us	feel	closer	to	others	and	build	communities,	and	in	some	cases	can	reinforce	pack	mentality	or	establish	ingroups	through	common	language.	Common	language	and	discursive	shorthand	are	necessary	of	course.	A	plumber,	for	example,	has	a	list	of	terms	she	will	not	need	to	explain	to	others	who	are	not	plumbers	–	the	language	necessarily	establishes	a	community	for	ease	of	communication.	But	sometimes	the	process	isn’t	merely	about	facilitating	ease	of	communication,	it	is	also	about	demonstrating	closeness	to	others	through	shared	communicative	codes,	or	challenging	thoughts	and	ideas	of	outgroups	using	lingual	exclusion.	Consider	that	this	happens	in	literary	and	media	theory	too:	we	erect	boundaries	of	acceptable	language	use	(and	in	hermeneutics,	acceptable	readings,	often	opposed	to	a	disfavoured	group’s	methodologies).	A	good	example	can	be	found	in	Terry	Eagleton’s	inductive	instruction	for	aspiring	academics	in	Literary	Theory:		 Nobody	is	especially	concerned	about	what	you	say,	with	what	extreme,	moderate,	radical	or	conservative	positions	you	adopt,	provided	they	are	compatible	with,	and	can	be	articulated	within,	a	specific	form	of	discourse	…	Those	employed	to	teach	you	this	discourse	will	remember	whether	or	not	you	were	able	to	speak	it	proficiently	long	after	they	have	forgotten	what	you	said.	Literary	theorists,	critics	and	teachers,	then,	are	not	so	much	purveyors	of	doctrine	as	custodians	of	a	discourse.	Their	task	is	to	preserve	this	discourse,	extend	and	elaborate	it	as	necessary,	defend	it	from	other	forms	of	discourse,	initiate	newcomers	into	it	and	determine	whether	or	not	they	have	successfully	mastered	it.		(175)		This	dismally	nihilistic	example	is	apt	as	it	robs	scholarly	communication	of	all	other	purpose	than	its	use	in	defining	an	ingroup.		 The	phenomenon	can	readily	be	explained	by	communication	accommodation	theory:	the	way	we	adjust	all	manner	of	language,	including	“pronunciation,	pause	and	utterance	lengths,	vocal	intensities,	non	verbal	behaviors,	and	intimacy	of	self	disclosures”	(Giles	and	Smith	46),	depending	on	whom	we	are	speaking	to.	Communication	accommodation	extends	to	language	selection	(Giles	and	Smith	also	study	how	people	select	which	language	to	use	in	bilingual	encounters),	as	well	as	more	abstract	language	use,	such	as	mediated	storytelling.	Thus	stories	can	establish	ingroups	through	a	common	language	as	can	everyday	
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conversation	and	jargon	use.	When	a	film	diverges	from	classical	Hollywood	formula,	for	example,	and	calls	into	question	the	conventions	of	a	film	language	we	have	absorbed	in	order	to	comprehend	these	stories,	we	become	excited	because	it	is	marked	for	us,	for	intellectuals	and	cinephiles.	Noël	Burch	in	particular	has	carried	forward	the	notion	of	classical	narrative	style	in	cinema	as	hegemonic	rather	than	pragmatic	language	negotiation,	and	the	disparagement	is	a	common	one	across	popular	film	theory.	On	the	other	hand,	neither	“natural”	nor	arbitrarily	constructed,	Bordwell	sees	that	shot-reverse-shot	conventions	developed	like	any	language	to	be	“enormously	flexible”	(“Convention,	Construction,	and	Vision”	99),	emphasising	psychological	causality	(which	we	see	clearly	in	the	much-vaunted	Kuleshov	Effect)	because	of	its	primacy	in	narrative	interest.	In	James	Chandler’s	account	of	D.W.	Griffith’s	initial	forays	into	eyeline	shooting,	the	new	film	language	promoted	a	mutual	sympathy	derived	from	attempts	to	access	the	kind	of	direct	facial	interaction	modern	canonical	literature	was	able	to	describe,	in	particular	the	sympathetic	closeness	and	face-to-faceness	of	Dickensian	sentimental	and	melodramatic	modes	(np).	Attendance	to	the	direction	of	another’s	gaze	is,	after	all,	a	foundational	form	of	empathy	developed	from	infancy	(Repacholi	“Infants’	use	of	attentional	cues”).	Mar	and	Oatley	elaborate:		 By	turning	our	gaze	toward	another’s	target	of	attention,	we	are	automatically	engaging	in	a	shared	experience	with	another,	and	from	this	point	we	can	choose	to	proceed	with	more	complicated	inferences	such	as	understanding	that	person’s	mental	state,	whether	it	involves	a	goal	(e.g.,	is	she	looking	covetously	at	my	chocolate	cake?)	or	an	emotion	(e.g.,	why	is	she	looking	fearfully	over	my	shoulder?).		(176)		Classical	narrative	techniques	may	synchronise	responses	between	character	and	audience	member,	or	between	multiple	spectators,	to	generate	a	sense	of	cohesion,	but	alternative	filmmaking	similarly	uses	language	that	antagonises	against	norms	to	create	its	own	sense	of	group	fealty.		 The	languages	used	to	achieve	a	narratival	ingroup	can	be	auditory	as	well	as	visual.	Consider	Michel	Chion’s	concept	of	“emanation	speech”,	dismissed	by	Sarah	Kozloff	on	humanistic	grounds:		
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Chion	regrets	the	dominance	of	intelligibility;	he	prefers	what	he	calls	‘emanation	speech’	(what	I	term	‘verbal	wallpaper’)	–	speech	that	may	be	inaudible,	decentred,	and	that	serves	no	narrative	function.	I	find	his	argument	misanthropic.		(120)		In	effect,	Chion	and	many	others	in	his	wake	have	told	us	that	our	fascination	with	fellow	humans	is	somehow	intellectually	inferior.	The	idea	that	unintelligibility	of	voices	would	more	truthfully	represent	the	“cacophony”	of	“the	sounds	of	the	world	reproduced	naturalistically	in	cinema”	(Tarkovsky	159)	is	also	wildly	inaccurate	–	the	human	ear	has,	in	part,	co-developed	with	the	larynx	and	vocal	folds	to	privilege	the	frequencies	on	which	the	human	voice	projects	its	vibrations,	and	single	them	out	for	special	attention.	Once	sounds	are	recorded	(via	the	artifice	of	microphone	selection),	there	is	no	ideal	or	more	“natural”	amplification	of	those	sounds.	Differences	in	mixing	decisions	may	speak	to	different	audiences	and	in	some	cases	mark	themselves	as	being	for	certain	audiences,	as	is	the	case	with	Chion’s	emanation	speech.	Substantial	numbers	of	filmgoers	enjoy	and	find	much	value	in	words	and	dialogue	as	a	primary	means	to	comprehend	film;	they	are	not	wrong	to	enjoy	this,	and	no	one	inroad	into	film	appreciation	is	superior.	Film	theory,	unfortunately,	is	littered	with	these	false	lingual	binaries	and	battle	lines,	which	are	ready	to	be	revealed	as	ingroup	establishments.	While	ingroups	are	necessary,	they	need	not	be	generated	in	such	direct	opposition	to	others	(they	can	be	practical	more	so	than	punitive),	and	where	this	is	the	case,	we	must	be	careful	we	are	not	engaging	in	bigotry.		 Ingroup	establishment	and	pack	loyalty	must	be	seen	as	evolutionarily	purposeful	human	behaviours	without	diminishing	our	ability	to	problematise	them,	and	we	must	acknowledge	that	these	behaviours	carry	a	lot	of	meaning	for	participants:	most	of	us	have	familial	loyalty,	for	example,	offering	clear	survival	and	fitness	benefits,	which	are	pleasurably	reinforced	through	storytelling	and	language	codes	specific	to	the	family	(Barnier	and	Van	Bergen;	Fivush	et	al.	“Personal	and	Intergenerational	Narratives”),	although	like	any	fealty	it	is	contestable	on	cosmopolitan	grounds.	Yet	extending	the	inclusivity	of	lingual	group	formation	can	be	problematic	too.	Marketers	of	popular	commercial	narratives	can	attempt	to	offer	the	experience	of	being	inducted	into	a	community,	a	“family”	of	fans	or	a	world	of	related	stories	connected	to	a	pivotal	narrative	experience,	which	serve	as	socially	gratifying	acceptance	into	a	unique	discursive	space	with	its	own	language	and	social	codes.	We	can	
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consider	fandom	or	alternate	reality	gaming	as	different	examples	of	this	process.54	Jargon	and	specialised	language	are	uniquely	powerful	in	promoting	group	cohesion	–	for	example,	new	nurses	bond	by	adopting	jargon	(Wolf	“Learning	the	Professional	Jargon	of	Nursing”).	However,	this	discursive	induction	can	be	wielded	as	a	commercial	tool	with	great	potency.	Social	media	marketers	can	disguise	themselves	as	disinterested	members	of	the	public,	and	moreover	mimic	the	language	used	by	audiences	to	create	a	sense	of	group	solidarity.	This	means	that	they	have	an	interest	in	making	neophytes	feel	special	when	they	are	granted	access	to	a	new	vocabulary	with	which	to	broadcast	their	allegiance.	Ingroup	language	facilitates	community	generation,	but	we	cannot	demonise	or	romanticise	the	process,	as	it	is	equally	an	innate	component	of	our	sociality,	and	our	attempts	to	manipulate	social	behaviours	to	exploit	others.			
Social	Elevation	and	Fiction		 Relatedly,	stories	can	also	quite	clearly	help	us	to	feel	intelligent	or	equipped	with	
special	knowledge,	not	just	by	presenting	as	“intelligent”,	such	as,	in	cinema,	the	puzzle	film	or	smart-wave,	but	also	in	our	rejection	of	perceived	falsehoods	or	ineptitudes	propagated	through	other	stories.	Recently,	for	example,	we	have	seen	the	extension	of	B-film	appreciation	to	vast	fan	cultures	built	around	inept	cinema	such	as	The	Room	(Tommy	Wiseau,	2003)	or	Troll	2	(Claudio	Fragasso,	1990).55	We	construct	identities	around	a	self-congratulatory	cultural	recognition.	At	times	this	function	of	story	can	take	a	turn	for	the	haughty	or	downright	degrading.	Internet	microstory	phenomena,	including	viral	Youtube	videos,	have	introduced	us	to	many	new	ways	to	scorn	others,	and	can	turn	psychosis	or	other	mental	illness	into	objects	of	ridicule.	On	the	other	hand,	dramatic	readings	of	illiterate	missives	such	as	“How	is	Babby	Formed”	or	“Dot	Dot	Dot”	can	reveal	both	a	sense	of	superiority	against	clear	signs	of	dyslexia,	or	a	developing	use	of	English,	and	at	the	same	time	joy	in	appreciating	its	resultant	peculiarity	of	expression	and	detachment	from	familiar	language	use.	This	particular	phenomenon	can	seem	new,	but	it	is	far	from	being	unique	to																																																									54	Alternate	reality	gaming	has	been	used	as	a	method	to	create	communities	in	which	to	sell	other	products.	For	example,	42	Entertainment	created	an	alternate	reality	game	to	generate	a	community	around	The	Dark	Knight	(Christopher	Nolan,	2008)	prior	to	its	release;	Warner	Bros.	subsequently	had	marketing	access	to	this	community.		55	Or	“so	bad	it’s	good”	or	“badfilm”	apropos	Jeffrey	Sconce’s	“Trashing	the	Academy.”		
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contemporary	media.	In	A	Midsummer	Night’s	Dream,	a	play	acutely	concerned	with	our	responses	to	outwardly	bad,	tasteless	or	inappropriate	storytelling,	Theseus	requests	his	fellow	audience	members	receive	The	Mechanicals’	play	with	a	particular	kind	of	generosity:		The	kinder	we,	to	give	them	thanks	for	nothing.	Our	sport	shall	be	to	take	what	they	mistake:	And	what	poor	duty	cannot	do,	noble	respect	Takes	it	in	might,	not	merit.		(5.1.89-92)		Theseus	appeals	not	only	for	his	fellow	audience	members	to	acknowledge	the	effort	put	into	work	that	is	not	one’s	proficiency,	effectively	claiming	that	value	can	be	found	in	processes	and	gestures	rather	than	the	merit	of	a	finished	product,56	but	he	also	models	a	method	for	enjoying	the	creativity	of	those	who	misunderstand	social	cues	and	language	that	we	may	find	instinctive:	in	observing	misunderstandings,	savvy	audiences	have	to	explain	to	themselves	precisely	what	was	misunderstood.	There	exists	a	re-evaluative	tension	when	we	must	reconcile	a	potential	violation	in	the	compromise	of	meaning	(similarly	to	puns)	and	erosion	of	social	norms,	benign	as	they	are	refracted	through	the	safe	interposition	of	fiction.	In	our	attempts	to	explain	lingual	or	narratival	norms,	how	they	operate	and	how	they	have	been	mishandled,	they	become	no	longer	instinctual	and	reveal	their	tacitly	assumed	codes.	This	too	is	“our	sport”	when	we	watch	The	Room	or	“How	is	Babby	Formed”,	and	a	new	kind	of	attentiveness	is	produced.	What	this	makes	an	audience	do	is	question	what	exactly	we	were	laughing	at,	as	per	the	ensuing	interferences	of	Theseus	and	the	lovers	(with	Hippolyta	in	turn	questioning	their	response).		 We	have	historically	used	all	manner	of	narrative	acts	to	single	out	the	ways	in	which	we	are	different,	and	sometimes	intellectually	superior,	to	others.	By	the	same	token,	we	also	use	narrative	to	consolidate	or	reify	opinions	–	which	may	well	be	prosocial	–	by	mere	virtue	of	their	collective	production.	When	a	product	is	formalised	in	the	marketplace,	such	as	the	collective	effort	of	a	publishing	house	mass-producing	a	novel,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	it	is	legitimated	by	the	amount	of	people	involved	in	its	production	and	distribution.	This	draws	from	our	presumption	of	the	validity	of	group	thinking	over	individual	thinking,	which	is	contradicted	by	phenomena	such	as	“group	polarisation”,	whereby	groups	tend	to	make	more																																																									56	Theseus	later	references	their	position	as	poor	labourers	to	draw	attention	to	theatre	as	a	rare	space	of	direct	contact	with	authority	figures.	
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extreme	decisions	than	individuals	(Myers	and	Lamm),	collaborative	inhibitions,	in	which	working	together	in	certain	conditions	can	produce	less	favourable	results	for	tasks	requiring	memory,	and	groupthink.	Legitimation	of	a	narrative	in	this	way	hinges	on	four	qualities:	more	than	one	worker,	using	a	substantial	amount	of	resources,	working	through	established	procedures	to	reach	us,	with	a	greater	audience	share	implying	greater	validity.	Film	studios,	for	example,	play	on	these	presumptions	with	grandiose	title	sequences.	The	Universal	or	20th	Century	Fox	logos	connote	the	toil	of	many	workers	reaching	many	spectators	working	from	reputably	proven	traditions	at	great	expense.	Narrative	formalised	through	the	norms	of	engagement	with	a	medium	can	be	very	powerful	in	reinforcing	the	impression	that	our	opinions	are	shared	by	important	others,	and	therefore	valuable.	There	can	be	some	self-congratulation	involved	when	we	presume	our	artistic	predilection	is	shared	by	a	vast	sum	of	others.		This	can	clearly	be	related	to	the	function	of	story	to	flatter	oneself	and	others,	and	
thereby	concoct	hierarchies	of	personal	attributes.	Most	narratives	contain	messages	of	congratulations	to	their	audience	for	merely	engaging	with	them	–	in	fact	some	have	positioned	the	inherent	flattery	of	all	media,	in	that	it	so	consistently	treats	our	attention	as	a	prizeworthy	goal	and	is	designed	to	please	us,	as	the	primary	gauge	of	a	mediated	epoch	(Zengotita	Mediated).	There	are	many	clear	objects	of	flattery	available	to	a	storyteller	(for	the	venerable	Baron	Munchausen,	his	own	valour,	extraordinary	undertakings	and	conquests	are	prime),	but	for	now	I	will	continue	to	focus	on	intelligence,	which	is	one	of	the	primary	objects	of	storied	flattery.	Media	presuming	a	certain	level	of	audience	acumen	can	become	used	as	an	apparatus	to	determine	intelligence	hierarchies,	which	in	some	cases	eclipses	other	meanings	suggested	by	the	content.	Thomas	Elsaesser,	writing	on	the	puzzle	movie,	points	out	that	some	popular	film	scholars	conflate	cinema	with	“doing	philosophy”	in	order	to	elevate	the	gravitas	of	their	concerns	when	viewing	film	(36).	Similarly,	D.A.	Miller	describes	his	concept	of	“Too	Close	Reading”	through	the	prism	of	the	nested	metatexutal	puzzles	in	Strangers	on	a	
Train	(Alfred	Hitchcock,	1951).	While	he	keeps	returning	to	the	seeming	“pointlessness”	(125)	of	the	pursuit,	and	in	so	doing	makes	a	case	for	narrative	reading	as	a	kind	of	autotelic	fun,	he	also	reveals	the	self-congratulation	that	such	fun	is	grounded	in.	After	a	fleeting	reference	to	“our	swollen	heads,”	he	backhandedly	offers	the	following	regarding	Hitchcock’s	appearances	in	the	film:	“One	would	also	suppose	that	many	people	in	the	audience,	less	clever	than	ourselves,	fail	to	notice	his	appearance,	even	though	(barring	infants	and	aliens)	such	ignorant	spectators	are	hard	to	come	by”	(ibid.	107).	Later,	he	becomes	enthralled	by	
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measuring	his	intelligence	against	the	director’s:	“We’d	thought	we	were	patronizing	Hitchcock	when	all	along	it	was	he	who	was	patronizing	us;	in	smugly	discerning	him,	we	were	only	being	his	dupes”	(ibid.	113).	Essentially	what	this	demonstrates	is	that	Hitchcock’s	works	flatter	us,	and	that	we	respond	with	expressions	of	our	own	self-flattery	in	re-narrating	them,	but	then	if	we	look	closer,	good	stories	can	also	offer	opportunities	to	dismantle	that	flattery.	Miller,	in	his	facetiously	camp	style,	suggests	interpretive,	scholarly	or	hermeneutic	one-upmanship	as	part	of	the	narrative	itself;	the	problem	is	that	he	sadly	does	not	push	himself	to	imagine	anything	beyond	the	gameplay.	For	Miller,	the	appeal	of	narrative	readings	and	hermeneutics	is,	at	least	in	part,	about	separating	out	who	is	intelligent,	and	who	is	less	so.	When	we	posit	the	hierarchic	politics	of	flattery,	cajoling,	intelligence	and	superiority	in	art	as	a	grander	narrative	beyond	the	text,	this	function	of	fiction	can	come	to	transcend	any	relevant	meaning	making	provided	by	the	text	itself.	In	this	way,	any	text	can	become	a	redundant	cipher	for	our	own	smartness,	or	allow	us	to	order	people,	real	and	imagined,	into	hierarchies	of	traits	including	intelligence	(or	moral	hierarchies,	or	aesthetic	hierarchies,	given	the	right	narrative).	Texts	can	flatter	the	reader,	the	author(s),	and	the	communities	they	share	by	virtue	of	having	engaged	with	the	same	text,	and	by	distribution	of	the	values	associated	with	that	text.	Conversely,	we	should	also	acknowledge	the	capacity	for	mental	work	performed	by	audiences	following	a	narrative	–	from	puzzle	films	to	their	crime	fiction	predecessors	–	as	potentially	exercising	and	developing	mental	feats	which	have	pragmatic	use	in	our	daily	lives,	including	social	problem-solving.	Stories	can	probably	both	make	us	more	intelligent,	and	make	us	feel	more	intelligent.		Another	curious	narrative	experience	that	allows	us	to	feel	clever	is	the	prediction	of	correct	ways	to	respond	to	a	given	text,	often	positively	reinforced	by	setups	and	payoffs.	For	example,	we	have	probably	all	experienced	being	seated	in	the	cinema	next	to	someone	who	laughs	outrageously,	forecasts	oncoming	events	from	blatant	signposts,	or	names	the	affect	associated	with	a	sequence	–	“isn’t	that	sad”	–	demonstrating	that	they	know	the	correct	way	to	respond	to	a	narrative’s	cues.	This	is	a	version	of	the	mere-exposure	effect,	first	documented	by	Gustav	Fechner	in	1876,	and	comprehensively	researched	by	Robert	Zajonc	in	the	1960s:		 People	seem	to	misattribute	their	increased	perceptual	fluency	–	their	improved	ability	to	process	the	triangle	or	the	picture	or	the	melody	–	not	to	the	prior	experience,	but	to	some	quality	of	the	object	itself.	Instead	of	thinking:	“I’ve	seen	that	triangle	before,	that’s	
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why	I	know	it,”	they	seem	to	think:	“Gee,	I	like	that	triangle.	It	makes	me	feel	clever.”		(Margulis	np)		Elizabeth	Hellmuth	Margulis	asserts	that	this	is	why	we	enjoy	repetition	in	music,	and	also	that	“repetition	serves	as	a	handprint	of	human	intent”	(np).	Reacting	in	the	way	a	narrative	elicits	–	and	in	some	cases	demonstrating	affect	contrary	to	that	which	a	narrative	attempts	to	invoke	–	can	make	us	feel	intelligent,	socially	included,	comforted	by	the	“flow”	of	ingrained	readership	practices	(in	the	Csíkszentmihályi	sense),	satisfied	with	one’s	own	performance	as	reader	or	spectator,	reassured	by	the	corroboration	of	recognised	rules,	traditions	and	symbols,	and	perhaps	satisfied	that	we	can	trust	the	narrator.	Thus	we	also	use	story	to	
engage	in	ritual.	Story	can	be	seen	as	having	a	function	like	innumerable	other	rituals	performed	with	others:	it	can	comfort	or	reinscribe	values	with	procedural	scripts	and	provides	social	cohesion.	It	solaces	by	allowing	us	not	to	have	to	worry	about	what	to	do	in	a	given	circumstance	–	we	know	how	to	proceed	through	a	narrative,	just	as	we	know	the	expected	procedures	at	a	funeral,	not	necessarily	because	they	have	inherent	meaning,	but	because	they	provide	a	succouring	script	which	circumnavigates	the	discomfort	of	having	to	manage	both	one’s	independent	actions	and	grief	simultaneously.		 In	Whitehouse’s	distinction	between	imagistic	and	doctrinal	modes	of	group	cohesion,	ritualised	story	behaviours	may	be	an	imagistic	method	to	make	us	feel	fused	with	others	undergoing	the	same	narrative	experience:	“The	impression	of	sharing	subtle	or	hidden	meanings	of	the	ritual	experience	is	thought	to	contribute	to	high	levels	of	identity	fusion	among	participants.	We	call	this	the	‘imagistic	mode’	of	group	cohesion”	(284-285).	This	could	apply	where	we	perceive	that	we	share	special	access	to	the	particulars	of	a	text,	from	collective	knowledge	of	genre	tropes	or	broadly	applied	media	knowledge	(such	as	cultural	references),	to	identification	of	small	innovations	or	deviations	within	a	text,	and	subtle	reactive	behaviours	the	reader	of	the	text	may	exhibit	to	their	fellows	during	engagement.	However,	people	use	ritualised	narrative	in	different	ways:	one	cinemagoer	may	attend	twice	a	year,	another	may	routinize	their	participation	to	a	weekly	event	or	an	appreciation	society.	As	narrative	appreciation	involves	procedural	scripts	–	ways	we	are	supposed	to	respond	and	act	–	participation,	in	this	case,	also	involves	some	doctrinally	ritualistic	qualities.	It	is	not	surprising	that	the	more	we	participate	in	a	ritual	(such	as	attendance	at	a	regular	event,	a	reading	group,	a	songwriting	club,	or	cheap	cinema	Tuesdays),	the	more	trust	and	cooperation	will	be	generated	with	people	we	see	undergoing	the	same	experience.	
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	However,	the	ritual	aspect	of	story	offers	more	than	a	Durkheimian	social	organisation	or	reinforcement.	In	Victor	Turner’s	interpretation,	story	is	a	liminoid	experience	that	depicts	and	mimics	liminal	experience,	and	is	perhaps	proliferating	in	the	post-industrial	world	(our	story	addiction	again)	as	a	means	to	make	up	for	a	lack	of	liminal	ritual	in	our	lives.	He	argues	that	genres	in	entertainment	and	theatre	can	be:		historically	continuous	with	ritual,	and	possess	something	of	the	sacred	seriousness,	even	the	“rites	de	passage”	structure	of	their	antecedents.	Nevertheless,	crucial	differences	separate	the	structure,	function,	style,	scope,	and	symbology	of	the	liminal	in	“tribal	and	agrarian	ritual	and	myth”	from	what	we	may	perhaps	call	the	“liminoid,”	or	leisure	genres,	of	symbolic	forms	and	action	in	complex,	industrial	societies.		(“Liminal	to	Liminoid”	72)		Turner	has	analogised	ritual	at	all	levels	of	society	with	theatre,	noting	the	social	drama	characterising	both:	breach,	schism,	redress	and	reintegration	(From	Ritual	to	Theatre).	Redress	is	a	critical	moment	of	possibility	emulating	the	space	before	and	after	a	ritualised	experience,	whereby	the	individual	is	put	into	a	kind	of	crisis,	becomes	no	longer	whole,	unresolved,	and	must	move	through	the	upheaval	to	find	a	new	resolved	self.57	Stories	are	the	“play”	or	“leisure”	or	“non-serious”	version	of	such	a	crisis,	thus	liminoid.	Returning	to	our	exemplary	loud	audience	member	introduced	above,	the	demonstrative	and	performative	acts	within	a	theatre	audience	reveal	a	presumption	of	communitas	at	the	time	of	engagement:	the	supposed	equality	of	spectators	during	their	common	experience	in	proceeding	through	a	narrative	together	seems	to	permit	acknowledgement	of	the	common	experience,	and	perhaps	a	desire	to	resolve	its	inherent	upset	(or	“drama”)	socially.	The	process	of	acknowledging	an	affective-procedural	unity	chimes	with	both	Whitehouse’s	cohesive	and	Turner’s	antagonising	conceptions	of	ritual.	Thereafter,	narratives	can	offer	us	an	apparent	way	to	resolve	the	crisis,	tools	to	resolve	it,	or	leave	us	hanging	within	the	liminal	emulation	–	all	have	their	place.																																																									57	Redress	recalls	the	vulnerability	and	humility	of	humanism	covered	in	the	first	chapter.	Another	means	of	communication	that	might	provoke	a	similar	affective	openness	is	the	“deep	and	meaningful”	conversation	(colloquially	abbreviated	as	D&M).	A	film	like	Richard	Linklater’s	Before	Sunrise	(1995)	attempts	to	demonstrate	the	similarities	between	the	liminoid	space	of	a	story	and	these	exploratory,	risk-taking	conversations,	in	which	the	world	seems	alive	with	philosophical	possibility	while	one	is	unbound.	Before	Sunrise	maps	the	experience	of	a	D&M	onto	a	film	narrative.	
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	 A	particular	kind	of	ritual	outlined	above	deserves	special	recognition:	story	as	rite	of	
passage	introduces	a	subsequent	bartering	of	control	via	access	to	narrative.	Arnold	van	Gennep’s	early	musings	on	the	rite	of	passage	ritual	inspired	Turner	to	expand	on	the	liminal	in	broader	ritualised	settings,	yet	what	is	of	interest	to	us	here	is	what	happens	around	this	particular	ritual	rather	than	its	actual	procedure.	Stories,	where	constructed	as	rites	of	passage,	are	negotiated	as	maturity	markers.	For	example,	parents	often	withhold	certain	media	from	their	children	until	they	reach	a	certain	age.	This	can	be	regulated	at	a	political	level	through	governmentally	recognised	ratings	systems	and	enforced	by	retailers	or	admissions	staff.	The	rite	of	passage	may	then	be	used	as	a	tool	to	haggle	power	and	identity	formation:	some	children,	for	example,	will	attempt	to	see	films	containing	content	their	parents	do	not	want	them	to	witness	before	permission	is	granted,	thus	the	story	becomes	a	device	for	parent,	child	and	state	to	negotiate	the	development	of	the	child’s	agency.			
Character	and	Identity		The	relationship	between	ritual	and	identity	suggests	another	major	inroad	to	narrative	pleasure	for	a	majority	of	audiences:	character	identification.	We	articulate	our	
identities	through	character	comparisons,	often	subliminally	throughout	a	lifetime’s	absorption	of	reiterated	identity	handles	across	media;	and	simultaneously	we	enter	the	very	familiar	ground	of	identity	politics.	Media	theorists	such	as	bell	hooks	and	Douglas	Kellner	have	attempted	to	demonstrate	just	how	far	the	pedagogical	function	of	cultural	artefacts,	such	as	film,	extends.	Perhaps,	they	suggest,	identity	options	gleaned	from	media	narratives	are	more	ingrained	than	any	attempted	complication	of	such	narratives	in	formalised	education.	Hooks	presumes	a	primacy	of	media	content	above	other	means	for	identity	formation:	“my	students	learned	more	about	race,	sex,	and	class	from	movies	than	from	all	the	theoretical	literature	I	was	urging	them	to	read”	(Reel	to	Real	3).	One	question	that	can	be	asked	about	these	identity	politics,	however,	is	how	much	an	individual	film	or	product	is	able	to	tell	us	about	identity	formation.	That	is,	close	readings	of	texts	can	neglect	the	influence	of	media	saturation	or	cultivation,	and	likewise	the	values	that	percolate	in	peer	groups	and	at	home,	the	influence	of	which	could	explain	more	about	our	lives	and	behaviour	than	the	content	of	the	texts	themselves;	this	casts	some	doubt	over	a	more	traditional	text-based	
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hermeneutics.	For	now,	we	should	keep	these	contextual	considerations	in	mind	when	we	approach	identity	politics.		If,	as	hooks	suggests,	we	choose	to	identify	with	fictional	characters	before	we	identify	with	the	moral	dialogue	the	characters	spur,	then	media	fictions	have	powerful	ethical	agency.	But	there	are	other	possibilities:	audiences	can	also	be	more	conversant	with	rather	than	receptive	of	identity	markers.	Theodor	Adorno,	for	instance,	sees	all	forms	of	identification	as	reductive	constructs	and	therefore	focuses	instead	on	what	he	calls	non-identities	in	Negative	
Dialectics.	Once	established,	we	tend	to	be	drawn	to	question	the	efficaciousness	and	validity	of	apparent	identity	reductions	such	as,	for	example,	our	blackness	or	whiteness,	maleness	or	femaleness;	these	discussions	of	validity	are	subsumed	into	the	ethical	dialogue	identity	handles	introduce.	This	tension	is	recognised	by	writers	as	diverse	as	Murray	Smith,	in	
Engaging	Characters,	and	Jane	Stadler,	who	submits	the	possibility	of	a	more	reflexive	“ethical	gaze”	(211,	215)	and	a	film’s	ethical	“afterlife”	(2):	the	effects	of	our	ethical	attention	to	character	may	echo	in	a	Riceourian	fashion	beyond	our	conscious	investment	in	the	story	itself	at	the	time	of	engagement.	For	Charles	Taylor,	identity	is	a	story	about	our	moral	orientation	and	its	mutability,	“similar	to	orientation	in	physical	space”	(Sources	of	the	Self	48).	Constructs,	reductions	to	conceptual	scripts,	and	the	ease	of	ethical	determination	and	action	these	scripts	provide	must	have	some	utility	to	be	in	such	widespread	use.	Identity	may	be	a	helpful	reasoning	shortcut	to	avoid	decision	paralysis	if	we	had	to	weigh	every	decision	based	on	ideals	of	the	self	and	the	other	constructed	in	each	instance.	Martha	Nussbaum,	in	fact,	sees	the	identification	process	as	essential	to	theory	of	mind,	reason	and	empathy:		The	narrative	imagination	is	not	uncritical:	for	we	always	bring	ourselves	and	our	own	judgments	to	the	encounter	with	another,	and	when	we	identify	with	a	character	in	a	novel,	or	a	distant	person	whose	life	story	we	imagine,	we	inevitably	will	not	merely	identify,	we	will	also	judge	that	story	in	the	light	of	our	own	goals	and	aspirations.	But	the	ﬁrst	step	of	understanding	the	world	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	other	is	essential	to	any	responsible	act	of	judgment.		(“Education	for	Citizenship”	299)		The	reductive	nature	of	identity	description	promotes	coherence	by	which	we	then	have	a	tangible	other	to	identify	and	empathise	with,	but	this	also	means	we	have	to	decide	when	identity	handles	become	too	reductive,	or	“typified”	beyond	reason,	and	when	they	misinform	us	about	human	complexity	and	otherness.	This	is	a	debate	reaching	all	parts	of	our	lives.	Its	
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foundational	presumptions	and	complication	may	occur	in	our	homes	and	amongst	family	and	peers	as	much	as	it	does	in	media.	It	will	have	sociobiological	and	dispositional	components.	Consumers	also	talk	back	to	media	producers	when	they	foreground	certain	identity	handles	at	the	expense	of	others.	Some	scholarship	presumes	that	audiences	do	not	have	awareness	of	the	character	types	our	media	trades	in,	but	a	sexist,	for	example,	may	be	acutely	aware	of	reductive	or	essentialised	notions	of	a	male	and	female	type,	and	yet	still	subscribe	to	those	notions,	being	less	aware	of	precisely	how	their	thinking	about	those	types	produces	biases.	Humanistic	narrative,	cultural	scholarship	(like	that	of	hooks),	and	narrativised	methods	for	mapping	the	experience	of	others	(like	phenomenological	ethnography)	are	not	just	an	exercise	in	promoting	awareness	of	the	types	we	use,	they	instead	extend	to	awareness	of	our	biases	around	those	types.	A	narrative’s	trajectory	can	reveal	the	biases	evident	in	both	our	view	of	others	and	our	self-schemas.		 As	well	as	ordering	and	informing	our	own	personality	and	aspirations,	sometimes	having	characters	we	identify	with	onscreen	can	make	us	feel	like	the	person	we	are	is	okay,	as	our	pre-existing	self-concepts	are	recognised;	through	representation,	we	are	implicitly	accepted	by	an	external	party	(and	in	this	way,	we	identify	too	with	a	presumed	author).	When	we	read	a	book	and	identify	with	the	protagonist,	for	instance,	we	might	feel	comforted	that	the	values	that	make	up	our	self-schema	are	shared.	We	might	also	broadcast	our	self-
schemas	using	the	stories	we	like.	For	instance,	the	books	on	our	bookshelf	introduce	other	people	to	our	chosen	identities	–	even	books	we	have	not	read	can	sit	on	our	shelves	to	tell	a	grander	story	about	our	own	self-schema.		None	of	this	is	to	suggest	that	it	does	not	matter	who	we	identify	with,	or	that	the	moral	dialogue	and	cohesion	available	in	character	identification	should	be	seen	as	an	ethical	end	in	itself.	John	H.	Lichter	and	David	W.	Johnson’s	seminal	1969	research	showing	prejudice	reduction	in	children	exposed	to	multiethnic	story	characters	was	corroborated	by	Phyllis	A.	Katz	and	Sue	R.	Zalk	in	1978,	who	went	on	to	show	that	exposure	to	a	15-minute	story	featuring	African-American	characters	was	possibly	more	effective	at	reducing	bias	than	superordinate	goals,	and	the	effects	were	still	observable	four	months	after	the	exposure.	If	this	is	what	storytellers	are	capable	of,	there	is,	then,	an	ethical	imperative	to	expand	the	bounds	of	representation	past	those	known	handles	an	audience	may	ordinarily	choose	to	identify	with.	The	humanist	storyteller	might	strive	to	circumnavigate	the	demand-driven	marketplace	for	stories	already	known	to	the	audience,	with	easy	identification	handles,	and	
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wherever	possible	represent	multiple	others	their	audience	is	less	likely	to	have	contact	with	(so	especially	minorities).	In	summary,	identity	is	a	series	of	reductions	by	which	our	moral	selves	and	choices	are	made	comprehensible,	electable,	and	governable,	yet	their	inherently	reductive	nature	introduces	moral	debate	and	a	humanistic	imperative	not	just	to	complicate	types,	but	the	complex	processes	by	which	we	attach	to	biases	around	those	types.	This	will	include	representation	of	a	range	of	characters	of	varied	backgrounds	in	fiction.		While	on	the	subject	of	perspective	taking,	we	also	use	narrative	to	vicariously	
roleplay.	In	addition	to	character	identification,	we	live	through	characters’	experiences	of	events	that	we	would	never	be	party	to,	and	observe	behaviours	we	ourselves	would	never	perform.	To	witness	someone	else	perform	an	exciting	other	life	is	a	pleasure	that	can	be	different	from	mere	identification,	as	it	does	not	necessarily	rely	on	us	feeling	like	–	or	even	wanting	to	be	like	–	a	protagonist.	This	principle	can	be	extended	to	personality	traits	we	do	not	covet,	but	enjoy	imagining	what	it	might	be	like	to	live	with:	most	of	us	do	not	want	to	be	as	bloodthirsty	or	ill-tempered	as	an	action	hero,	for	example,	but	still	enjoy	the	simulation	of	someone	else’s	experience	of	these	traits.	If	a	function	of	fiction	is	to	play	out	alternate	realities,	courses	of	action	and	moral	responses,	then	there	may	be	a	particular	kind	of	pleasure	in	adopting	the	perspective	of	a	character	who	leads	us	somewhere	new,	simply	as	they	behave	in	ways	we	would	never	condone;	such	a	simulation	could	reinforce	the	reasonableness	of	our	own	moral	actions	by	showing	us	the	consequences	of	poorer	alternatives,	for	instance.	That	this	is	somewhat	a	vicarious	version	of	roleplay,	without	attendant	fantasies	of	real-life	imitation,	complicates	notions	of	pure	identification	or	mimesis.	Any	line	between	observing	values	in	fiction	and	absorbing	those	values	needs	to	be	very	carefully	drawn.	We	also	cannot	forget	the	pleasure	the	actor	can	take	in	playing	a	role,	or	that	a	nonactor	may	take	when	playfully	adopting	a	storied	role	among	friends	(think	of	a	
How	to	Host	a	Murder	Party	game),	or	indeed	any	kind	of	performative	gesture	we	enjoy	with	others,	however	fleeting.		This	points	to	the	experience	of	video	gamers,	as	roleplaying	a	character	or	avatar	is	a	convention	most	games	rely	upon.	Fears	of	the	loss	of	human	identity	or	posthuman	claims	of	an	identity	fusion	between	consumer	and	medium	have	followed	past	media	developments,	right	back	to	the	notion	of	the	camera	apparatus	stealing	one’s	soul,	and	Charlie	Chaplin	becoming	one	with	the	machinery	of	Modern	Times	(Charlie	Chaplin,	1936).	These	qualms	continue	to	shift	focus	to	new	media	as	it	arrives,	such	as	video	gaming	today	(see	the	essays	
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in	Jahn-Sudmann	and	Stockmann	Computer	Games	as	a	Sociocultural	Phenomenon),	and	similar	horrors	of	posthuman	identity	fusion	with	machines	are	played	out	in	films	like	
eXistenZ	(David	Cronenberg,	1999)	and	television	series	such	as	Black	Mirror.	But	in	order	to	take	seriously	these	fears	of	a	loss	of	identity,	we	need	to	ignore	the	vicarious	nature	of	storied	roleplay,	in	that	it	is	still	a	social	storied	act,	an	authored	world	created	for	others	to	consume	with	parameters	that	delineate	the	extent	of	the	possibilities	for	an	avatar’s	action,	and	therefore	restrain	free	identification.	Histrionics	centred	on	the	boundaries	of	the	human	under	threat	prevent	us	from	being	specific	about	the	changing	nature	of	cognitive	engagement	in	new	media	forms,	and	the	narrative	relationship	between	developers	and	their	audiences.		On	the	other	hand,	we	still	seek	stories	that	affirm	ideological	positions	to	justify	
our	own	lives	and	beliefs.	Instead	of	engaging	in	narrative	to	explore	different	moral	identities,	attitudes	or	outcomes,	it	has	long	been	noted	that	we	seek	out	stories	that	flatter	or	justify	pre-existing	dispositions	(producing	effects	such	as	confirmation	bias).	When	we	discuss	fiction’s	relative	ability	to	change	hearts	and	minds,	this	is	the	question	that	is	often	silently	addressed:	whether	or	not	one’s	self-schema	is	able	to	be	touched,	and	whether	or	not	our	purposeful	engagement	with	fiction	as	self-flattery	diminishes	its	power	to	reach	us.	However,	surely	fiction	is	capable	of	both	reifying	prior	beliefs	as	well	as	sowing	the	seeds	of	doubt,	if	not	subverting	our	ideologies	unhindered.58	In	an	observation	of	Leon	Trotsky’s	(120),	which	subsequently	became	a	popular	maxim	of	early	documentary	filmmaker	and	theorist	John	Grierson	(qtd.	in	Ellis	236),	art	is	not	a	mirror	but	a	hammer.	Not	only	can	it	be	used	to	“shape	society”	as	such,	it	is	by	repetition	and	reiteration	that	the	values	imparted	in	the	narrative	arts	are	absorbed.	Especially	in	experimental	media	studies,	we	often	run	the	risk	of	privileging	singular	fictional	engagement	above	the	longitudinal	study	of	repetition	in	storied	cultures.	Perhaps	single	narratives	tell	us	less	than	trends.	On	the	other	hand,	I	am	certain	that	most	can	recall	a	number	of	powerful	moments	in	narratives	that	have	left	them	shaken,	and	opened	a	liminal	space	where	they	were	at	least	able	to	question	their	ideologies;	some	may	seek	this	narrative	experience	more	than	others.	It	remains,	however,	that	much	of	the	time	we	seek	narratives	that	will	complement	our	prevailing	belief	systems.		
																																																								58	For	more	on	the	moral	functions	of	fiction,	see	below	under	Symbolic	Memory,	Social	Roles	
and	Ethics.	
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The	ability	of	stories	to	reinforce	self-schemas	also	points	toward	narrative’s	
function	as	status	marker.	For	some,	engagement	with	a	particular	narrative	artform	–	for	example	opera	or	ballet	–	will	also	be	used	to	broadcast	their	social	standing.	This	is	not	to	dispute	enjoyment	of	that	art,	but	merely	to	point	out	that	the	narratives	we	choose	can	be	a	status	marker	like	any	other	accoutrement	we	use	to	display	our	social	class,	our	allegiance	to	and	even	solidarity	with	that	class.	From	Thorstein	Veblen’s	recognition	of	the	wilfully	“conspicuous”	or	performative	nature	of	consumption	in	1899’s	Theory	of	the	Leisure	Class	to	Quentin	Bell’s	On	Human	Finery	in	1947,	many	have	noted	that	fashion	tells	a	story	of	one’s	class,	and	likewise	so	do	story	choices.	It	is	not	just	the	medium	or	form	itself	that	speaks	of	our	status,	but	particular	narratives	within	a	medium	too	–	we	might	want	people	to	know	that	we	enjoy	arthouse	movies	because	they	tell	of	our	access	to	education,	or	Adam	Sandler	movies	because	they	tell	of	our	solidarity	with	another	class	of	presumed	audience	members.	These	underlying	narrative	engagement	signifiers	introduce	a	subtextual	level	of	communication	that	becomes	evident	when	we	analyse	the	symbolism	associated	with	various	media.	I	now	turn	to	address	the	utility	of	such	symbols.			
Proximity	and	Refraction	
	Character	and	identity	clearly	entail	an	interpretive	push	and	pull	for	the	audience,	the	examination	of	which	reveals	a	close	and	often	overlapping	relationship	between	literal	and	symbolic	representations	of	humanness;	in	turn	we	might	ask	what	function	the	abstraction	of	symbolism	performs	for	us	in	narrative.	In	symbolic	representation,	we	can	displace	
discursive	candour	to	a	safer	allegorical	realm	when	dealing	with	sensitive	interpersonal	matters.	Writer/director	John	Sayles’s	1999	film	Limbo	reconsiders	all	manner	of	storytelling	activities,	including	his	own	role	as	a	filmmaker,	through	a	matrix	of	inconclusive	narratives:	not	only	does	his	own	film	end	in	the	middle	of	a	survival	crisis,	the	conclusion	of	which	would	have	told	us	the	correct	response	to	the	situation,	the	film	features	multiple	nested	stories,	many	ethically	stimulating,	which	reach	no	conclusion	–	a	challenge	to	our	need	for	ethical	closure	and	certitude.	Moreover,	many	of	the	characters	use	open-ended	stories	to	talk	about	their	lives	analogically,	rather	than	directly.	A	primary	example	is	the	fiction	Noelle	(Vanessa	Martínez)	crafts	in	an	attempt	to	convey	her	emotional	problems	to	mother	Donna	(Mary	Elizabeth	Mastrantonio).	Says	Sayles:	“Sometimes	the	storytelling	just	takes	her	and	sometimes	she	looks	at	her	mother	and	just	lays	it	out,	especially	the	angry	parts.	She	could	
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not	have	those	literal	conversations	with	her	mother,	but	she	can	tell	those	stories”	(West	and	West	30).	In	this	realm	of	vague	allegory,	it	is	possible	to	hurt	others,	but	it	is	also	possible	to	avoid	hurting	them	too	much	with	directness	or	candour	–	and	perhaps	the	ambiguity	of	the	act	opens	the	possibility	of	finding	new	answers	to	our	personal	problems.59	Sonya	Dal	Cin	et	al.,	for	example,	argue	in	“Narrative	Persuasion	and	Overcoming	Resistance”	that	fictional	stories	may	be	especially	persuasive	for	those	who	hold	strong	countervailing	attitudes,	not	only	because	the	ideas	embedded	in	a	story	are	implied	rather	than	explicitly	stated,	but	because	the	simulation	demanded	by	stories	leaves	few	resources	for	counterarguing.	Perhaps	this	rhetorical	technique	could	be	extended	to	a	pedagogical	function,	too.	One	might	teach	fictionalised	versions	of	events	in	films	like	Capote	(Bennett	Miller,	2005)	or	
Frost/Nixon	(Ron	Howard,	2008)	to	journalism	or	history	students,	or	use	the	teaching	of	humanistic	literature	and	cinema	to	convey	prosocial	notions	without	having	to	state	them	so	directly	that	students	may	balk	or	be	otherwise	put	off	(one	foundational	premise	in	educational	English	studies	from	the	19th	century	onwards).	To	be	told	explicitly	of	these	things	outside	of	narrative	might	be	less	appealing,	and	even	be	received	as	a	kind	of	condescension.	It	is	also	a	way	to	reach	those	students	who	are	more	predisposed	toward	narrative	transportation	(Dal	Cin	et	al.	186)	in	addition	to	those	who	value	a	more	directly	discursive	learning.	In	a	way,	the	discursive	refraction	of	narrative	can	actively	hide	persuasive	and	informative	intent	if	an	audience	is	primed	against	these	functions;	so	stories	provide	a	way	to	reach	people	through	allegory	or	other	refractive	devices,	who	may	not	be	as	receptive	to	direct	communication.		Katz	and	Zalk’s	research	(“Modification	of	Children’s	Racial	Attitudes”)	suggests	that	perhaps	the	psychological	distance	and	sense	of	control	afforded	by	mediated	perspective	taking	may	in	some	cases	be	more	beneficial	for	empathy	production	than	working	cooperatively	with	outgroup	members	or	superordinate	goals	(Mar	and	Oatley	181).	So	
generating	emotional	distance	by	which	social	relationships	seem	more	manageable	may	be	another	function	of	storytelling,	which	in	turn	may	generate	empathy.	If	this	is	the																																																									59	Narratives	can	provide	an	affective	distance,	in	that	we	notice	the	emotions	a	narrative	incites	but	we	are	removed	from	them	because	of	their	fictive	quality,	and	so	we	are	provided	an	opportunity	to	reflect	on	rather	than	react	to	negative	affect	such	as	fear	or	grief;	this	may	bear	similarity	to	the	benefits	of	mindfulness.	Narrative	arts	can	provide	relief	by	expressing	emotional	subtleties	we	are	unable	to	communicate	ourselves,	providing	a	sense	of	stability,	control,	and	unity	that	may	make	us	feel	more	equipped	to	approach	our	own	problems	anew.	The	paradox	is	that	when	we	feel	emotionally	proximate	to	others	(the	storyteller,	other	audience	members,	or	a	broader	presumption	of	human	unity	the	text	inspires)	we	may	feel	more	distance	from	–	or	less	captivated	or	dictated	by	–	our	own	emotions.	
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case,	perhaps	through	stories	we	rehearse	care	responses	to	others	in	a	controllable	
fictive	environment,	so	rather	than	relying	on	a	spontaneous	direct	empathy	when	encountering	another,	we	may	be	ready	with	a	procedural	empathic	script	to	reach	for,	based	upon	identity	handles	gleaned	from	media	or	story.	Consider	the	case	of	sentimental,	sensational	or	Romantic	story	modes,	as	well	as	Peter	Brooks	and	Ben	Singer’s	works	on	the	complexities	of	the	melodrama:	the	emotional	excesses	on	show	(and	the	intended	audience’s	mirroring	of	characters’	internal	states)	could	be	a	rehearsal	of	care	responses	to	others.	Rehearsing	responses,	which	occur	in	the	safe	space	of	narrative,	not	only	primes	empathy,	but	its	increased	familiarity	could	make	us	feel	more	in	control	of,	and	less	threatened	by,	our	responses	to	unfamiliar	others	or	the	inherent	vulnerability	required	to	navigate	human	differences	in	a	social	world.		On	the	other	hand,	explicatory	accounts	of	a	fictive	character’s	psychology	and	identity	allow	us	to	simulate	a	direct	access	to	mental	states.	The	kind	of	private	information	we	are	afforded	to	a	fictive	character	moves	far	beyond	that	which	we	would	have	in	life.	We	use	such	insight	into	inner	worlds	to	make	inferences	about	how	people	operate.	As	emphasised	by	Mar	and	Oatley	throughout	“The	Function	of	Fiction	is	the	Abstraction	and	Simulation	of	Social	Experience”,	this	is	story	as	practical	shorthand	for	describing	social	fabrics.	Proximity	to	a	character’s	thoughts	and	the	social	fabric	it	describes,	however,	need	not	be	opposed	to	allegorical	refraction:	we	can	tell	an	internal	narrative	with	expository	prose	that	both	describes	a	thought	process	and	still	entertains	symbolist	readings	(Moss-Wellington	“Affecting	Profundity”	53-57).		Similarly,	stories	can	offer	a	simulated	experience	of	authenticity	or	direct	access	
to	a	truth	that	is	not	internal	or	personal.	In	Authenticity:	Brands,	Fakes,	Spin	and	the	Lust	for	
Real	Life,	alternative	economist	David	Boyle	contradicts	writers	like	Thomas	de	Zengotita	(Mediated)	in	claiming	that,	despite	the	march	of	pervasive	mediation	and	exposure	to	artifice	across	an	increasingly	virtualised	globe,	there	is	a	strong,	collective	and	instinctive	pull	in	the	opposite	direction	toward	a	principle	we	may	feel	necessary,	even	while	we	cannot	quite	define	its	precise	nature	or	its	value	to	ourselves:	this	is	authenticity.	He	writes:	“Despite	the	possibilities	of	cosmetic	pharmacology,	despite	the	conveniences	of	virtual	communities	or	the	demands	of	the	market,	the	possibility	of	inconveniently	human	relationships	with	real	people	won’t	somehow	slip	unnoticed	out	of	our	lives”	(Boyle	202-203).	The	concept	of	an	unmediated	real	is	the	site	of	resistance	to	conglomerates	masquerading	as	individuals,	
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embedding	advertorial	narratives	in	news	media,	product	placement	in	entertainment	media,	or	even	concocting	creative	fictions	of	their	own	that	sit	unnoticed	alongside	non-commercially	motivated	arts,	like	a	Disney	mural	comingling	with	the	work	of	a	local	graffiti	or	street	artist.	These	paranarratives	goad	us	to	think	of	and	respond	to	their	originary	institutions	as	acquaintances	and	friends,	often	using	social	media	to	blur	the	lines	between	friendship	and	information	exchange	on	the	one	hand,	and	public	relations,	advertorial,	personalised	commodification,	and	brand	enthrallment	on	the	other.	While	Boyle	focuses	on	the	way	in	which	businesses	motivate	ideals	of	purer	humanness	–	and	even	the	symbols	of	counter-culture	and	rebellion	become	owned	by	a	handful	of	companies	(ibid.	122)	–	we	can	also	look	at	story	as	a	linked	component:	neither	stories	nor	businesses	are	corporeal	entities	capable	of	registering	pleasure	or	pain,	but	they	both	attempt	to	connect	with	us	in	a	way	that	feels	like	real	human	connection.		So	if	we	do	need	to	assess	the	authenticity	value	of	narratives,	how	can	this	be	achieved?	In	making	such	assessments	we	begin	with	a	definitional	problem,	in	that	different	notions	of	authenticity	are	applied	to	different	entities.	Take	food	production,	for	example.	The	food	that	reaches	us	has	gone	through	a	variety	of	human	mediations:	planting,	tending,	harvesting,	packaging,	and	transportation,	all	of	which	can	be	subject	to	analysis	of	relative	artificiality.	Evaluating	authenticity	in	food	production,	then,	has	more	to	do	with	the	amount	of	processes	the	food	has	been	through	and	how	synthesised	they	are	(for	example,	the	chemical	compounds	involved	in	each	process),	and	in	some	cases,	the	newness	of	these	procedures	stands	in	for	our	evaluation	of	how	artificial	they	are.	This	has	been	the	case	from	the	publication	of	Carlo	Petrini’s	Slow	Food	Manifesto	in	1989	right	up	to	today’s	Palaeolithic	Diet.	Thus	food	authenticity	standards,	and	the	narratives	of	purity	they	rely	on,	are	different	from	the	standards	by	which	we	evaluate	a	business	or	a	story	or	even	an	individual.	The	authenticity	of	an	individual,	for	example,	usually	describes	how	beholden	they	are	to	inauthentic	culture	(divisive	claims	of	this	kind	have	been	made	by	philosophers	including	Kierkegaard,	Heidegger,	Sartre	and	Nietzsche).	Contrariwise,	the	authenticity	of	a	business	is	often	motivated	by	claims	about	its	size,	locality	and	processes.	Following	from	this	conceptualisation	of	corporate	authenticity,	the	extent	of	collaboration	on	a	product	can,	perhaps	unfairly,	be	used	to	assess	its	legitimacy	–	and	this	is	true	of	stories,	too.	In	film	studies,	auteur	theory	bridges	the	authenticity	claims	between	business	and	story,	as	figures	such	as	Andrew	Sarris	emphasise	the	quality	of	directorial	“dominance”	(246).	Sarris	suggests	that	in	any	filmmaking	context	the	authoritative	ideas	of	a	singular	individual	will	be	more	
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valuable	than	ideas	developed	and	expressed	by	an	egalitarian	group	without	“dominance.”	The	absurdity	of	the	claim	is	revealed	when	we	apply	the	same	concept	to	any	other	field	outside	of	the	arts:	we	may	ask	whether	such	a	dominance	by	one	figure	in	the	family,	in	a	government,	or	indeed	a	business,	reduces	or	expands	the	quantity	and	quality	–	or	the	authentic	legitimacy	–	of	ideas	and	output.	Our	notions	of	authenticity,	then,	are	often	contradictory	and	mutable	depending	on	the	object	of	evaluation,	providing	uneasy	foundations	from	which	to	ask	how	we	assess	the	legitimacy	of	a	given	narrative.			 That	said,	the	longing	for	authenticity	is	completely	understandable	as	the	“strategic	responsiveness”	(Brants	24)	of	tailored	content	becomes	more	prevalent	(c.f.	Davies	Flat	
Earth	News),	media	becomes	redundantly	fawning	(c.f.	Zengotita	Mediated)	in	order	to	get	to	the	real	business	of	selling	us	a	product,	and	media	engagement	becomes	ubiquitous	and	inescapable	across	our	daily	routines.	We	want	to	have	trust	in	storytellers,	our	facilitators	of	social	dialogue,	with	good	reason:	not	only	is	higher	social	trust	linked	to	health	outcomes	(Barefoot	et	al.;	Subramanian	et	al.),	as	Richard	Wilkinson	and	Kate	Pickett	point	out,	“Trust	is	of	course	an	important	ingredient	in	any	society,	but	it	becomes	essential	in	modern	developed	societies	with	a	high	degree	of	interdependence”	(214).	This	is	why	stories	can	embed	a	claim	on	authenticity	to	comfort	an	audience,	to	affect	trustworthiness.	Yet	trust	is	not	uncomplicated,	either.	Mistrust	can	be	both	a	healthy	and	reasoned	component	in	our	interactions	with	the	media,	and	those	interests	the	media	selectively	represents	(Schudson	“Would	Journalism	Please	Hold	Still”).	It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	erosion	of	perceived	trustworthiness	in	authority	figures	and	their	channels	of	representation	(Peters	and	Broersma	passim)	is	correlated	with	an	increase	in	elite	wealth	concentration	and	inequality	across	the	globe	(Wilkinson	and	Pickett	passim);	as	power	is	consolidated,	we	have	good	reason	for	a	generalised	media	scepticism.	But	this	does	not	mean	that	mistrust	will	always	be	directed	toward	the	most	harmful	storytellers	or	institutions	(the	Trump	phenomenon	is	a	disastrous	case	in	point).	Some	see	the	genesis	of	prejudice	as	a	historical	biological	imperative	to	mistrust	strangers	and	outsiders,	a	heritable	trait	that	helped	our	ancestors	protect	against	pathogens	and	parasites	within	the	village	community	(Schaller	“Parasites,	Behavioral	Defenses”).60	In	a	largely	urbanised	globe,	traits	once	adaptive	in	the	village	community	are	gradually,	collectively	reassessed	through	cultural	mediation.	Perhaps	this	is																																																									60	A	meta-analysis	of	24	studies	examining	the	association	between	the	behavioural	immune	system	(including	an	amplified	response	to	stimuli	provoking	disgust,	for	some	translating	as	sociomoral	disgust)	and	social	conservatism	confirmed	a	correlation	(Terrizzi	et	al.	“The	Behavioral	Immune	System	and	Social	Conservatism”).	
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an	important	part	of	the	re-evaluative	process	we	are	addressing	through	narrative:	reassessment	of	the	conditions	of	a	reasonable	trust	in	others	is	part	of	our	cultural	evolution.	Kees	Brants	wrote	ominously	of	journalistic	media,	“If	trust	is	the	glue	of	social	relations	and	the	medicine	for	restoring	or	establishing	cohesion	in	a	society	in	a	midlife	crisis,	then	we	are	slightly	in	trouble.	Trust	is	a	necessity	for	the	contribution	of	politics	and	media	to	a	well-functioning	and	legitimate	democracy”	(26).	In	emphasising	the	value	of	critical	inquiry,	perhaps	scholars	can	overlook	its	complication	–	scepticism	and	scrutiny	must	be	balanced	with	the	human	need	for	public	trust,	a	comfort	that	authenticity	narratives	provide,	in	journalism	as	in	fiction.		 Despite	all	this,	it	is	sobering	to	remember	that	at	times	we	genuinely	need	media	to	represent	the	real.	Our	daily	choices	have	international	consequences,	and	we	require	information	sources	at	least	attempting	objectivity	and	an	enlightened	perspective	on	the	information	to	know	how	to	behave,	considering	the	frightening	array	of	ethical	decisions	we	now	confront	in	the	developed	world.	So	we	rely	on	shortcuts	of	reasoning	to	assess	believability	and	reliability	of	sources	and	information,	which	is	reasonable,	as	we	cannot	spend	our	whole	lives	researching	each	source.	That	is,	breeding	more	critical	thought,	which	might	be	seen	as	a	key	pedagogical	goal	within	the	humanities,	does	not	solve	the	problem	of	our	inherent	need	for	information	and	stories	to	trust.	Stressing	the	political	efficacy	of	public	trust	in	media,	Stephen	Coleman	et	al.	admit,	“we	need	to	be	able	to	rely	upon	the	reputation	of	the	reporter	without	having	to	check	and	recheck	every	single	account	that	is	given	to	us”	(4).	The	falsification	problem	of	proliferated	informational	sources	online	breeds	its	own	makeshift	solutions.	Many	of	the	shortcuts	we	might	take	to	trusting	a	source	are	aesthetic,	which	is	a	great	contemporary	dilemma:	the	creators	best	at	understanding	the	politics	of	representing	reality	need	not	have	a	premium	on	authenticity	or	truth.	For	example,	as	Monroe	Lefkowitz	et	al.	demonstrated,	we	appear	to	place	greater	trust	in	people	wearing	suits	(“Status	Factors	in	Pedestrian	Violation	of	Traffic	Signals”);	perhaps	likewise	with	handheld	camerawork,	exploiting	our	recollection	of	documentary	footage,	or	an	internet	site	with	a	minimum	of	design	errors	(Bierhoff	49).	In	fact,	it	is	quite	likely	the	only	difference	between	these	creators	is	that	the	credible-appearing	source	could	afford	the	means	to	affect	more	expensive	representations	of	truthfulness	–	that	is,	they	purchased	credibility.	This	is	a	worry.	Increasingly,	one	of	the	moral-societal	dilemmas	of	the	information	revolution	appears	to	be	how	we	will	choose	to	trust	representations	of	reality.	Knowledge	of	this	problem	is	naturally	going	to	make	us	suspicious	of	anything	that	appears	to	buy	our	trust	by	emulating	
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reality.	Affecting	outsider	status	through	carefully	constructed	aesthetic	“error”	may	connote	a	reaction	against	this	problem,	but	it	does	not	solve	the	twin	dilemmas	of	authenticity	and	the	need	for	public	trust.		Any	humanist	hermeneutics,	then,	must	take	into	account	a	human	social	need	for	public	trust,	iterated	in	authenticity	narratives,	whenever	we	stress	a	generalised	benefit	to	some	manner	of	sceptical	or	media-critical	thought;	yet	such	readings	must	also	acknowledge	how	these	needs	are	exploitable	through	narrative.	We	might	even	use	this	understanding	to	reclaim	hermeneutic	interest	in	the	functional	intent	of	authors	and	conglomerates,	rather	than	omit	motivation	entirely	from	our	readings	to	elude	intentional	fallacy.			
Manipulation	and	Power	Relations		Authenticity	and	trust	in	particular	encapsulate	some	key	concerns	regarding	narrative’s	use	in	power	relations	and	governance.	So	we	can	use	story	both	to	trade	in	
manipulations,	and	derive	comfort	from	our	trust	in	storytellers	and	their	
manipulations.	I	could	easily	have	said	that	we	use	story	to	manipulate	others	here,	but	that	does	not	tell	the	whole	story.	As	we	have	already	covered,	there	is	a	certain	comfort	in	merely	knowing	how	to	react	to	a	narrative	–	to	respond	in	the	ways	the	narrative	asks	us	to.	We	are	willing	participants	in	the	manipulations	endemic	to	all	storytelling,	and	the	security	we	derive	from	responding	to	a	story	in	the	manner	the	story	elicits	must	be	recognised.	This	is	a	kind	of	trust,	and	is	closely	related	to	feelings	of	“oneness”	or	closeness	to	others	when	we	come	closer	to	responding	as	one.	When,	as	an	adult,	we	watch	the	latest	computer	animated	family	film	from	a	major	studio	such	as	Pixar,	we	are	familiar	with	the	conventions	that	manipulate	us	and	want	to,	in	some	way,	give	ourselves	over	to	them	–	a	thoughtful	family	weepy	like	Inside	Out	(Peter	Docter,	2015)	would	not	work	without	such	complicity.	When	one	browses	a	beauty	magazine,	one	can	be	aware	of	the	ways	in	which	they	are	being	manipulated,	and	yet	still	enjoy	the	process	of	responding	to	manipulative	(and	photographically	manipulated)	images	with	exactly	the	kind	of	receptivity	prompted	by	its	marketers.	Evidence	abounds	for	the	cross-cultural	absorption	of	unrealistic	body	image	norms	(Yan	and	Bissell	“The	Globalization	of	Beauty”;	Jung	and	Lee	“Cross-Cultural	Examination	of	Women’s	Fashion	and	Beauty	Magazine	Advertisements”)	and	contradictory	messages	(Duncan	and	Klos	“Paradoxes	of	the	Flesh”)	in	beauty	and	fashion	journalism;	these	
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magazines	are	not	without	harm,	but	perhaps	we	should	still	comprehend	the	reader-viewer	as	an	agent	that	is	more	conversant	with	the	material.	The	reader-viewer	can	either	wilfully	overlook	the	manipulation	in	order	to	reach	a	neuroaesthetic	relationship	with	the	images	unburdened	by	consumer	consciousness,	or	keep	the	psychological	damage	of	airbrushed	figures	always	in	mind	while	appreciating	a	particular	fantasy	of	heavily	mediated	beauty	attainable	through	advertised	products.	In	any	case,	fashion	and	beauty	magazines	contain	aesthetic	and	storied	manipulation	that	is	desired,	sought	out	and	paid	for.		The	uses	of	story	for	manipulative	purposes	are	so	multifaceted	that	I	cannot	cover	them	all	here,	and	on	this	much	has	already	been	written	–	dissecting	power	relations	is	the	purview	of	countless	scholarly	disciplines.	However	I	do	want	to	illuminate	one	important	concept	for	humanist	studies,	as	I	believe	it	is	an	important	concept	to	remember,	and	that	is	debt	manipulation.	Many	manipulative	acts	depend	on	erection	of	a	psychical	debt	(consider	the	flow	of	gifts	from	public	relations	agencies	to	media	outlets	or	the	bartering	of	physical	and	verbal	affection	between	parent	and	child),	and	similarly,	an	unarticulated	debt	can	be	erected	through	a	range	of	narrative	acts.	Thus	the	inherent	antagonism	of	storytelling	–	in	
that	it	seeks	to	provoke	–	is	a	kind	of	gift,	and	as	such	involves	a	fundamental	reciprocity	(sometimes	even	a	price	of	admission).	In	fact,	at	times	we	purchase	or	create	stories	for	one	another	as	gifts.	Thus	the	act	of	storytelling	bears	striking	resemblance	to	many	power	dynamics	present	in	gift	giving,	elaborated	in	The	Question	of	the	Gift,	a	2002	cross-disciplinary	volume	edited	by	Mark	Osteen.	Barry	Schwartz’s	summary	of	such	power	dynamics	in	“The	Social	Psychology	of	the	Gift”	can	also	be	extended	to	story	as	gift.	He	considers	the	gift	as	imposing	identity	on	recipients,	broadcasting	a	giver’s	identity,	using	this	identity	mediation	as	a	method	to	control	others,	generating	the	debt	of	gratitude,	establishing	group	boundaries	and	social	rank,	and	guilt	atonement	or	abatement	for	the	giver;	all	of	these	functions,	including	the	coercive	functions,	can	contribute	to	tacit	social	contracts	that	help	us	relate,	but	can	also	be	abused.		Not	only	are	stories	and	their	perspectives	gifts	in	themselves,	stories	can	work	to	create	a	sense	of	indebtedness	to	others	within	their	diegesis.	Even	when	presenting,	say,	a	piece	of	social	realism	which	encourages	us	to	consider	the	lives	of	those	less	fortunate,	the	authors	and	distributors	of	the	work	have	attempted	to	provoke	the	idea	that	we	owe	something	to	another.	I	call	this	“unarticulated”	debt,	as	any	exact	parameters	concerning	what	is	expected	of	us	in	correcting	the	balance	sheet	of	inter-responsibility	are	not	defined	
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within	the	narrative,	and	debt	manipulation	can	be	much	more	powerful	this	way.	In	some	films,	too,	desired	audience	actions	are	clearly	articulated,	prescribing	a	moral	course	of	action,	as	with	more	directly	political	cinema.	Consider	the	conclusion	of	a	film	like	Fair	Game	(Doug	Liman,	2010)	in	which	Joseph	C.	Wilson	(Sean	Penn)	lectures	an	audience	about	democratic	participation	and	the	responsibility	of	all	citizens	to	question	powerful	interests.61	When	we	speak	of	generating	care	or	consideration	for	the	other,	we	should	always	keep	this	idea	of	debt	manipulation	in	mind	in	order	to	understand	how	stories	may	operate	in	shifting	our	perspective	and	hopefully	our	behaviour.	I	am	also	using	this	concept	to	reveal	that	there	are	varieties	of	manipulation	we	achieve	through	story	that	are	socially	acceptable,	mutually	performed,	ethically	dynamic	and	even	desirable.		Stories	are	undoubtedly	commoditised	using	such	power	dynamics,	but	there	may	be	danger	in	assuming	there	is	no	alternative	to	the	storied	gift	as	coercion	and	control.	Despite	popular	theorists	such	as	Jacques	Derrida	and	Pierre	Bourdieu	advising	“that	giving	gifts	involves	bad	faith,	that	we	lie	to	ourselves	by	choosing	to	ignore	or	forget	our	calculation	of	self-interest”	(Osteen	16)	and	imploring	us	to	focus	exclusively	on	their	power	dynamics,	it	must	be	noted	that	Marcel	Mauss	himself	(author	of	the	inciting	1925	work	The	Gift)	conjectured	that	gifts	could	also	include	genuinely	altruistic	motivation	in	a	matrix	of	impetuses,	calculated	and	otherwise.	As	Jonathan	Parry	put	it,	“Mauss	repeatedly	stresses	a	combination	of	interest	and	disinterest,	of	freedom	and	constraint,	in	the	gift”	(456).	There	is	also	no	reason	we	cannot	see	many	instances	of	gifted	story	within	the	framework	of	David	Graeber’s	everyday	communism,	or	the	economy	of	reciprocity	underlying	many	of	our	most	basic	transactions,	“small	courtesies”	transferring	particularised	skills,	knowledge	and	objects,	or	even	responding	to	the	extreme	need	of	a	stranger,	to	which	no	debt	is	attached	(Graeber	97).	So	while	we	remain	aware	of	the	ways	in	which	the	storied	gift	is	used	to	generate	indebtedness	and	activate	control	mechanisms,	we	can	also	admit	the	prospect	of																																																									61	This	kind	of	polemic	in	narrative	is	in	disrepute,	perhaps	unfairly	–	fiction	workers	are	often	chided	for	telling	an	audience	explicitly	what	to	do	or	think.	Some	writers,	however,	have	explicitly	lambasted	the	“show	don’t	tell”	rule	espoused	by	screenwriting	gurus	like	Robert	McKee	and	Syd	Field	(Mesce	“Myth	#5:	Show	Don’t	Tell”).	Similarly,	Claudia	Puig’s	review	of	Lions	for	Lambs	demonstrates	the	shifting	priorities	of	film	journalism,	which	decrees	politics	a	lesser	function	to	“entertainment”:	“the	film	feels	preachy	and	falls	flat	as	entertainment”	(np)	she	says.	Perhaps,	on	occasion,	narratives	suggesting	a	course	of	action	can	be	more	helpful	than	the	generation	of	unarticulated	psychical	debt,	provided	the	action	is	reasonable	and	thought-through.	Expository	dialogue	or	politicised	direct	address	point	to	another	usage	of	such	narratives:	the	exegetic	work	of	fiction.		
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those	circumstances	where	one	may	be	motivated	to	unconditionally	“gift”	a	story	out	of	care	for	the	recipient	or	interest	in	their	wellbeing,	even	where	the	storyteller	experiences	secondary	benefits	such	as	the	pleasure	of	performativity.		Unarticulated	debt	and	the	power	dynamics	of	gift	giving	point	to	story’s	function	as	
a	regulatory	tool	and	a	mediator	of	group	behaviours	–	yet	also	story’s	simultaneous	
ability	to	demonstrate	transgression	against	mediation.	The	development	of	more	complex	moral	codes	seems	to	coincide	with	a	gradual	increase	in	the	size	of	local	and	extended	communities	throughout	human	history.	Larger	group	sizes	required	greater	social	coordination,	which	meant	enforcement	of	codes	and	social	norms	to	maintain	group	cohesion	(to	borrow	the	terms	from	Durkheim’s	Division	of	Labour	in	Society,	this	is	a	transition	from	mechanical	to	organic	solidarity).	As	Prinz	puts	it,	moral	“rules	are	as	varied	as	the	problems”	(405)	and	so	increases	in	population	density	produce	an	increase	in	social	problems	to	be	managed,	which	in	turn	produces	greater	complexity	of	moral	codes	for	dispute	management,	whether	enforced	by	custom	or	governance.	By	the	time	of	global	urbanism,	proximate	populations	are	so	diverse	and	interactive	that	they	no	longer	extensively	agree	on	many	of	these	moral	codes.62	So	at	first,	stories	may	provide	avenues	for	moral	regulation,	such	as	cautionary	tales,	but	they	also	accumulate	use	in	transgressing	against	and	questioning	prevailing	moral	codes	as	population	density	increases.	The	prevalence	of	fictive	story	in	contemporary	urban	routines	may	be	explained	by	an	amplified	need	for	discussion	and	mediation	of	mutual	morality	and	governance	as	social	problems	change.	From	the	private	sermon	of	yesteryear	to	the	broadcast	evangelism	of	today,	stories,	then,	are	often	intended	to	influence	the	way	a	group	behaves.	Many	hope	for	influence	or	ideological	contagion	spreading	far	beyond	the	initial,	listening	audience.	Along	with	story’s	clear	utility	as	a	regulator	and	mediator	of	group	behaviours,	other	storytellers	have	found	a	way	to	use	the	same	function	as	a	rebellion	against	such	mediation.	Trash	cinema,	such	as	the	work	of	John	Waters,	is	one	such	example,	along	with	other	avant-gardists	and	counter-cultural	icons	across	media,	from	Alfred	Jarry	to	Frank	Zappa.	At	the	same	time	these	artists	demonstrate	another	kind	of	rebellion	in	the	face	of	serious,	moral	and	proscriptive	narrative:	story’s	function	as	play.																																																											62	C.f.	Hans-Peter	Müller’s	disruption	of	Durkheim’s	somewhat	utopian	notions	of	advanced	moral	cooperation	in	“Social	Differentiation	and	Organic	Solidarity.”		
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Fantasy,	Imagination	and	Play		Imaginative	capacities	have	thus	far	been	a	recurring	theme,	connecting	as	they	do	to	our	ability	to	concoct	fictions.	As	imagination	appears	key	to	so	many	other	narrative	functions,	I	now	turn	to	the	use	of	story	to	flex	our	imagination,	and	to	play.	Murray	Smith	considers	that	fiction	may	have	developed	as	an	evolutionary	by-product	of	learning	to	imagine.	He	writes:		 to	imagine:	one	thing	that	sets	us	apart	from	other	species	is	our	ability	to	simulate,	in	our	minds,	circumstances	which	we	might	encounter,	or	indeed	which	we	have	encountered	in	the	past.	And	in	doing	so,	we	are	able	to	rehearse	how	things	might	go	in	circumstances	we	have	not	actually	experienced.	The	imagination,	in	other	words,	enhances	our	foresight	and	supercharges	our	ability	to	plan;	and	it	is	not	hard	to	see	how	this	improves	our	fitness	in	the	environment	of	human	action.		(“Darwin	and	the	Directors”	259)		Thus	imagination	is	a	pivotal	part	of	the	storytelling	act	from	which	many	other	functions	may	arise.	One	of	these	is	the	intrinsic	drive	to	the	cognitive	developments	afforded	by	play,	as	Boyd	suggests	in	On	the	Origin	of	Stories	(passim).63	Subsequently,	there	is	also	a	direct	application	of	the	imagination	to	find	solutions	to	environmental	challenges.	The	imaginative	expansion	offered	by	play	crucially	also	guides	moral	development,	and	is	therefore	relevant	to	pedagogical	theory.	Introducing	a	narrative-focussed	edition	of	the	Journal	of	Moral	
Education,	Carol	Witherell	notes	the	concomitance	of	education,	imagination,	morality	and	narrative:	“To	educate	in	the	moral	realm	is	to	enter	the	world	of	imagination	as	well	as	judgement”	(239).	Understanding	when	developmental	imaginative	acts	should	be	free	and	explorative	(as	in	noninterventionist	play)	and	when	they	should	be	guided	(as	in	moral	education)	relies	on	a	concept	of	imaginative	reciprocity.	Sometimes	when	elders	extend	themselves	into	the	imaginative	openness	of	the	child’s	world	of	play,	we	can	see	a	reciprocal																																																									63	Theorists	including	Boyd	and	Joseph	D.	Anderson	insist	on	story	as	a	kind	of	play	that	extends	beyond	sensorimotor	development	and	into	further	cognitive	feats,	adult	activity	and	lifelong	engagement	with	narrative;	their	arguments	find	support	in	the	earlier	work	of	Jean	Piaget	(Play,	Dreams	and	Imitation	in	Childhood),	as	well	as	Sue	Taylor	Parker	and	Michael	L.	McKinney	(Origins	of	Intelligence).	Since	Johan	Huizinga’s	formative	text	Homo	Ludens,	theorists	from	Boyd	to	Roger	Caillois	have	advanced	notions	of	play	as	the	foundations	of	human	culture.		
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connection	that	yields	surprisingly	gratifying	results:	think	of	the	innovation	on	themes	of	childhood	development	and	play	in	computer-animated	films	from	Toy	Story	(John	Lasseter,	1995)	to	Shrek	(Andrew	Adamson	and	Vicky	Jenson,	2001),	and	Despicable	Me	(Pierre	Coffin	and	Chris	Renaud,	2010)	to	Inside	Out.	Part	of	what	is	affecting	about	these	films	is	the	imaginative	“reaching	out”	between	intergenerational	worlds,	our	concept	of	the	film’s	workers	admitting	that	imaginative	and	moral	development	are	never	over,	and	thus	they	find	surprising	new	ways	to	tell	stories.	The	construction	of	digitised	characters	that	feel	so	well	rounded,	for	example,	is	a	feat	of	the	human	imagination	–	an	imagination	centred	on	the	recognition	of	many	social	components	working	together.64		 Moral	development’s	dependence	on	imagination	does	not	end	when	we	reach	a	certain	age.	Metaphysical	wordsmith,	songwriter	and	cartoonist	Peter	Blegvad	writes	in	his	song	“King	Strut”:	“Imagination,	like	a	muscle,	will	increase	with	exercise	/	King	Strut	developed	his	by	having	dreams	and	telling	lies.”	The	titular	character’s	capacity	for	playfully	imaginative	storytelling	eventually	leads	him	to	concoct	effective	political	solutions	to	social	ills.	One	of	his	many	examples	of	the	power	of	story	as	play,	Blegvad	uses	both	cartoons	and	songs	as	metaphysical	games,	the	fun	of	which	can	provide	stimulating	uplift	and	potentially	challenge	the	boundaries	between	imaginative	acts	and	their	real-life	applications.	He	once	said	of	his	incompatibility	with	more	“serious”	songwriters:	“People	who	take	themselves	very	seriously	make	me	giggle;	it’s	a	problem	of	mine.	Of	course,	if	they’re	pointing	a	weapon	at	me	or	my	loved	ones,	I	don't	giggle.	That’s	why	I	giggle	when	they’re	not,	because	I	expect	that’s	the	sort	of	person	who	one	day	will.	So	before	they're	armed,	I	get	my	giggle	in”	(Blegvad	np).	Even	Blegvad’s	defence	of	a	playful	disposition	deconstructs	itself	playfully,	and	points	to	a	mortal	counterpoint	his	sense	of	play	grapples	with.	His	works	are	unabashedly	metaphysical	in	theme	(akin	to	puzzle	films	in	songform),	yet	his	singular	refusal	to	take	the	metaphysical	storytelling	act	too	seriously	may	work	to	the	advantage	of	imaginative	capacities,	and	its	proximity	to	mortal	goals	at	the	same	time	points	to	what	we	call	“the	seriousness	of	play”	(Turner	From	Ritual	to	Theatre:	The	Human	Seriousness	of	Play;	Levell	The	
Seriousness	of	Play).																																																									64	There	is,	of	course,	a	difference	between	imaginativeness,	as	a	quality	that	describes	creativity	and	originality,	and	imaging,	which	is	the	use	of	our	imagination	“to	entertain,	in	the	mind,	some	make-believe	series	of	events,	or	to	think	of	possibilities	–	possible	creatures,	episodes,	or	the	like	–	which	are	not	part	of	the	actual	world”	(Taylor	“Imagination	and	Information”	206),	although	imaginativeness	is	clearly	an	extension	of	our	capacity	for	imaging.	Ergo,	our	creativity	depends	upon	the	development	of	this	fundamental	psychological	trait.	
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	Imagination’s	foundational	importance	in	moral	development	is	often	linked	to	the	maturation	of	our	empathic	competences.	As	Daniel	B.	Johnson	suggests	in	“Altruistic	Behavior	and	the	Development	of	the	Self	in	Infants”,	mirror	self-recognition	and	cognitive	empathy	appear	co-emergent	in	infants	and	other	animals,	which	suggests	the	dependence	of	altruism	on	self-awareness;	this	complex	understanding	of	the	self	provides	a	foundation	from	which	to	imagine	the	experience	of	another.	Early	childhood	games	often	incorporate	roleplay.	The	child	concocts	scenarios	in	which	they	imaginatively	adopt	the	experience	of	others	–	from	ordinary	domestic	situations	to	an	astronaut	in	extraordinary	circumstances.	They	may	also	perform	roleplay	in	conjunction	with	others,	and	imaginatively	exchange	between	them	a	world	for	those	characters	to	exist	within.	More	formalised	versions	of	this	exchange	may	be	employed	later	in	life,	for	example	performing	as	an	actor	in	a	film	or	play	with	others,	or	roleplaying	games	like	Dungeons	&	Dragons.	Play	is	a	place	where	identities	become	open	and	negotiable,	which	is	why	it	is	ripe	for	regulation	by	authorities,	as	with	child	labour	(a	play	deprivation)	and	the	strict	artistic	standards	enforced	by	many	dictatorial	states.	Regulated	environments	produce	narratives	of	resistance	that	often	incorporate	elements	of	playfulness,	indicating	that	imaginative	or	noninterventionist	play	(play	without	guidance)	is	likely	a	fundamental	human	need.	This	is	true	of	the	regulation	of	women’s	identities	in	storytelling	media	(de	Lauretis	“Rethinking	Women’s	Cinema”):	for	example,	the	playfulness	of	the	young	women	pranksters	in	1966	Czechoslovak	New	Wave	film	Daisies	(Věra	Chytilová)	outraged	authorities,	who	banned	the	picture	and	prevented	Chytilová	from	working	in	the	(centrally	controlled)	Czech	national	film	industry	again	until	1975.	The	Czech	authorities	famously	clamped	down	on	its	depiction	of	the	“wanton”	or	sense	of	play	unbefitting	of	its	leads,	and	cited	food	wastage	as	a	reason	for	the	film’s	suppression.		On	one	hand,	the	physical,	cognitive,	and	social	developments	associated	with	these	activities	and	their	interactive	demands	should	be	clear;	play	deprivation	has	been	linked	to	the	perpetration	of	violent	crime	(Frost	and	Jacobs	“Play	Deprivation”),	for	example.	However	maintenance	of	a	play	world	is	complex.	Incongruity	in	the	particularities	of	the	imagined	world	and	each	player’s	motivations	within	and	outside	of	it	are	in	need	of	constant	revision.	We	could	equally	consider	the	very	fine	line	between	the	seriousness	and	the	frivolity	of	play:	one	moment	two	children	are	playing	happily	together,	and	then	for	one	of	them	the	game’s	implications	become	serious.	The	concern	they	exhibit	(for	example,	crying)	disrupts	or	potentially	dispels	the	imaginative	world	between	them.	Play	is	fragile,	as	is	agreeing	on	what	
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constitutes	play.	The	tacitly	negotiable	overlap	between	serious	and	nonserious	play	remains	an	important	component	in	our	dealings	with	art	and	narrative	later	in	life,	and	it	is	precisely	what	makes	play	in	art	so	difficult	to	define.	We	might	be	able	to	identify	perceived	playfulness	in	the	performing	arts,	but	it	is	much	harder	to	describe	what	distinguishes	it	from	the	non-playful.	For	example,	some	playful	elements	might	be	motivated	in	service	of	a	seriously	rebellious	goal.	Consider	Jarry’s	Ubu	plays,	or	Lindsay	Anderson’s	“Mick	Travis”	films,	in	which	absurdist	elements	are	playfully	motivated	to	make	severe	political	statements.	Much	avant	cinema	employs	playful	and	explorative	methods	toward	serious	ends.	Should	we,	then,	carefully	distinguish	the	ludic	and	the	explorative?	Should	we	define	playfulness	in	the	narrative	arts	as	that	which	is	autotelic,	or	has	no	purpose	other	than	its	own	internal	fulfilment,	rather	than	pointing	to	another	utility,	or	is	playfulness	expressed	when	the	outcome	of	a	storied	expression	simply	matters	less	than	the	pleasure	of	its	execution?	Hans-Georg	Gadimer	recognised	many	of	these	contradictions	in	art	and	play:	it	is	a	form	of	both	restraint	(in	the	mutual	rules	we	construct	around	storied	play)	and	freedom	(in	our	mutual	ownership	of	those	rules),	and	its	indivisibility	from	our	lives	confirms	its	highest	seriousness	at	the	same	time	as	it	flaunts	exuberant	abandon	(130).	In	this	case,	there	may	be	no	straight	answer	to	the	definitional	questions	of	play	in	narrative,	although	we	can	see	the	importance	of	imaginative	play	extending	throughout	our	lives,	and	story	is	a	primary	mechanism	for	its	exercise.		There	are	other	benefits	to	interactive	play.	For	example,	Sayles’s	interest	in	places	where	those	who	would	not	usually	come	into	contact	interact	(Godfrey	101)	such	as	the	American	high	school,	which	he	calls	“the	last	bastion	of	American	democracy”	(Osborne	36),	recognises	the	inverse	relationship	between	contact	and	prejudice	(Pettigrew	and	Tropp	“A	meta-analytic	test	of	intergroup	contact	theory”).	When	disparate	communities	are	forced	to	work	together,	adopting	superordinate	goals	(Sherif	In	Common	Predicament	passim),	racism,	for	example,	is	inhibited	and	we	extend	our	field	of	ethical	inclusion.	Yet	here’s	the	rub:	recent	studies	suggest	that	merely	imagining	working	with	the	other	could	have	positive	results	(Crisp	and	Turner	“Imagining	intergroup	contact	reduces	implicit	prejudice”).	I	contend	that	this	could	point	to	an	imaginative	complicity	that	comes	from	adopting	not	only	the	perspective	of	a	fictive	other,	but	also	the	goals	bound	to	that	perspective.	We	might	have	direct	contact	with	others	through	early	play,	but	we	also	need	imaginatively	projected	contact	with	others	to	extend	throughout	our	lives	if	we	are	to	continue	to	expand	our	field	of	inclusivity.	This	is	just	one	of	the	narrative	functions	a	figure	like	Sayles	intends	to	provide.	
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	When	we	talk	of	the	seriousness	of	play,	we	do	tend	to	emphasise	it	as	“working”	under-acknowledged	cognitive	functions.	However,	in	play,	stories	can	also	offer	relief	from	
purposeful	cognitive	work.	Quite	simply,	engagement	with	narrative	can	offer	us	downtime	from	the	daily	strains	of	achievement,	a	space	for	our	other	tasks	and	concerns	to	recede	while	we	are	absorbed	in	an	observational	practice	that	has	no	end	in	mind.	This	relief,	like	the	experience	of	boredom,	can	“kill	time”	(Misek	779)	in	ways	that	can	be	reflective,	like	mindfulness,	or	just	a	more	simple	relief,	releasing	load	from	the	hippocampal	translation	of	mood	to	actions,	and	transferring	our	problem-solving	skills	to	an	interpretable	object	which	will	require	no	further	action.		As	with	roleplay,	fantasy	can	be	an	integral	component	in	play.	So	we	use	story	to	
fantasise,	and	to	separate	fantasy	from	what	we	can	mutually	hold	to	be	real,	and	to	
escape,	by	which	we	can	comparatively	appreciate	the	real.	The	challenge	in	a	Darwinian	account	of	fantastical	storytelling	is	that	the	problems	faced	by	its	protagonists	are	far	removed	from	the	structural	fitness	challenges	of	our	actual	environment.	At	the	same	time,	these	narratives	clearly	replicate	many	familiar	challenges	from	our	past	and	present:	evading	beasts,	identifying	and	struggling	with	those	who	mean	us	harm,	reputation	management,	and	so	on.	Mar	and	Oatley	maintain	that	fantasy	still	“strives	for	realism	in	the	most	important	aspects	of	human	experience:	the	psychological	and	the	social”	(185).	However,	we	can	ask	what	leads	us	to	entertain	fantastical	allegory	in	lieu	of	attempts	at	verisimilitude	or	direct	realist	representation.	Grodal	thinks	that	the	appeal	of	these	narratives	may	have	something	to	do	with	a	cognitive	call	to	attention	whenever	events	unexpectedly	deviate	from	our	usual	causal	pattern	recognition,	and	regarding	supernatural	or	fantastical	themes,	that	this	is	most	evident	in	our	concept	of	physics	and	the	natural:	“Changes,	deviations,	and	novelty	attract	our	interest.	As	soon	as	events	are	slotted	into	familiar	and	well-explained	patterns,	they	lose	their	salience,	unless	they	prompt	us	to	further	action”	(98).	He	sees	film	as	unique	in	stoking	this	particular	kind	of	cognition	(ibid.	100).	This	concept	of	genre	development	appears	to	fit	neatly	with	Pinker’s	view	of	narrative	development	as	superstimulus	or	spandrel,	a	pleasurable	activation	of	cognitive	processes	adapted	for	other	purposes.	However,	given	that	disbelief	requires	more	cognitive	effort	than	belief	(Gilbert	et	al.	“Unbelieving	the	Unbelievable”),	belief	being	our	initial	subconscious	position,	perhaps	we	should	look	to	the	work	of	decoupling	cognition	to	explain	fantasy’s	utility.	Fantasy	in	narrative	locates	negotiable	crossovers	between	the	fact	and	fiction	it	presents,	and	as	we	become	attuned	to	
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those	crossovers,	it	provides	a	place	to	discuss	the	nature	of	reality	by	comparing	the	simulated	world	with	the	real	one.	Lest	this	appears	absurd	given	the	conspicuousness	of	fictions	concocted	across	fantasy	genres,	we	should	recall	how	prominently	superstitions	and	attributions	of	nature’s	intent	retain	a	place	in	political	and	group	decision-making	across	the	globe.	Moreover,	Grodal	points	out	that	superstition	and	supernature	are	integral	concepts	in	art	cinema	–	consider	Bergman,	Tarkovsky,	Wenders,	Kieslowski,	Lynch,	and	Trier	(106).	Not	only	does	such	cinema	point	to	the	very	contested	nature	of	objective	externalities,	reminding	us	of	the	breadth	of	phenomena	unchartered	by	our	sciences,	but	in	calling	attention	to	dissonances	between	our	experience	of	the	world	and	the	diegesis	described,	it	may	also	exercise	our	ability	to	locate	(and	probably	create)	hidden	textual	meanings	–	to	identify	and	question	the	relations	between	artifice	and	intention	in	storied	communication.	What	may	be	contested	is	how	much	more	of	this	discrepancy	identification	a	fantasy	viewer	may	need,	whether	it	diverts	from	other	mental	tasks,	and	whether	the	experience	of	flow	in	fantastical	discrepancy	identification	becomes	self-fulfilling	and	hardwired	to	the	specifics	of	the	genre	itself.	The	question	remains	whether	contemporary	fantasy	adventure	stories	reveal	more	or	indulge	more	of	these	misconceptions.		There	are	other	clear	excitations	we	undergo	specifically	in	the	“high”	or	“heroic”	adventure	fantasy	genre:	many	have	focused	on	wish	fulfilment	(reaching	back	to	Freud’s	
wunscherfüllung	in	The	Interpretation	of	Dreams),	and	especially	fantasies	of	supernatural	power,	strength,	and	control.	But	these	worlds	are	equally	filled	with	near	uncontrollable	dangers	and	matches	of	strength	against	strength,	good	against	evil,	and	horrors,	so	unparalleled	power	is	not	a	holistic	explanation.	How,	then,	would	we	explain	the	emotionally	moving	powerlessness	of	the	characters	populating	literature	such	as	Mervyn	Peake’s	Titus	trilogy?	Grodal	believes	that,	like	religious	narratives,	“The	fantastic	makes	life	more	complicated,	more	colorful,	and	more	uncertain,	because	it	increases	both	poison	and	antidote”	(104).	However,	more	often	than	not,	it	seems	these	worlds	provide	a	kind	of	gratifyingly	idealistic	reductionism	as	the	supernatural	laws	fantasy	worlds	introduce	make	the	poison	and	antidote	knowable	or	known.	Good	and	evil	are	very	often	clearly	demarked	(morality	manifests	overtly	and	materially	through	supernature),	as	are	free	will	and	an	“agency	of	the	spirit”	made	material	(ibid.	109-111);	human	power	and	ability	progress	in	a	linear	fashion;	ordinarily	motiveless	natural	objects,	such	as	trees	or	weather	events,	are	given	comprehensible	intention;	and	a	vast	world	is	reduced	to	an	index	of	important	places,	events,	and	characters	defined	by	the	author.	That	is,	the	world	is	manageably	reduced.	Think	
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of	the	title	sequence	to	the	television	adaptation	of	Game	of	Thrones,	the	comforting	familiarity	and	self-satisfaction	felt	when	we	know	the	map’s	most	important	places.	In	many	stories	(especially	those	featuring	ghosts)	disembodied	mental	activity	is	also	provided	a	material	form	and	objective	after	death,	solving	another	worrying	problem	by	projecting	realisation	of	an	afterlife.	At	the	same	time	many	of	these	narratives	are	journeys	of	discovery,	but	the	conditions	of	discovery,	the	reasons	for	discovery,	and	the	manner	in	which	discovery	should	happen	are	all	customarily	laid	out	in	an	initial	quest,	if	not	discovered	along	the	way.	The	fantasy	in	fantasy	genres,	therefore,	can	be	seen	as	reductive:	applying	a	myth	of	purpose,	our	great	desire	to	have	clear	goals	and	know	what	to	do	in	life,	and	to	separate	clearly	ever	confounding	artificial	constructs	like	right	and	wrong.		This	all	puts	fantasy	in	a	unique	position:	the	cognitive	excitation	of	the	uncanny	or	physical	dissonance	between	a	diegesis	and	our	own	world	seems	open	to	possibility,	discovery,	and	negotiability,	while	the	fantasies	of	verifiable	purpose,	intent	and	salient,	encompassing	world-knowledge	seem	closed.	Fantasy	can	clearly	offer	both	of	these	experiences,	but	in	any	case	we	witness	in	these	works	the	relief	stories	can	offer	by	
reducing	our	world	to	an	index	of	its	salient	properties,	and	the	reprieve	we	can	find	in	
comparing	fantasy	worlds	back	to	the	complexity	of	life.	Perhaps	one	reason	we	enjoy	fantasy	in	narrative	so	much	–	and	especially	its	reductive	element	–	is	that	we	can	comparatively	appreciate	the	real.	This	is	evident	in	the	counter-relief	we	might	feel	on,	say,	walking	out	of	a	cinema	even	after	we	enjoyed	a	film.	Although	we	all	have	different	thresholds	for	how	much	story	we	can	take,	at	some	point	we	always	feel	a	little	bit	glad	to	return	to	real	life.	Escapism	tends	to	allow	us	to	appreciate	the	real	and	the	complexity	of	life	by	making	us	think	comparatively	about	our	fantasies.		Wonder,	sensory	stimulation	and	fantasy	coalesce	and	augment	one	another	when	we	use	story	to	ogle	at	human	invention.	Nonverbal	storytelling	techniques	are	able	to	provoke	impressions	of	human	achievement	and	advancement;	filmic	special	effects	are	an	obvious	example	here.	Neuroaesthetics	may	help	explain	foundational	responses	to	spectacular	stimulus,	attention	and	appreciation,	yet	we	still	craft	narratives	from	our	initial	reaction.	We	integrate	our	sensory	response	into	a	comprehension	of	the	fiction	and	its	eudaimonic	meaning,	and	we	construct	for	ourselves	a	story	of	human	achievement	to	explain	the	pleasure	of	engagement.	We	consistently	feel	the	need	to	rationalise	sensory	pleasure	using	a	narrative	of	technical	progression,	and	our	own	comprehension	of	effects	innovation.	The	
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resounding	sentiment	is,	just	as	with	any	spectacle	involving	skilled	manufacture	or	virtuosic	artifice:	look	what	humans	are	capable	of.	Special	effects	and	spectacle	are,	at	least	in	part,	a	pat	on	the	back	for	being	us.		Tom	Gunning’s	cinema	of	attractions	fixated	on	qualities	that	move	beyond	diegetic	immersion	and	therefore	beyond	narratival	concerns.	I	contend	that	spectacle	focuses	us	on	a	different	story,	however:	that	which	we	construct	for	ourselves	about	our	interest	in	film	art	and	spectacle,	or	about	appreciation	of	the	achievements	of	artists	we	admire,	and	their	innovations	as	representing	human	potential	per	se.	Writers	such	as	Michele	Pierson	have	moved	forward	from	Gunning’s	notions	of	cinema	language	development	to	look	at	the	various	narratives	of	technocentric	progression	fostered	by	special	effects	connoisseurs	(now	a	mainstream	sport).	See,	for	example,	the	phenomenon	of	Gravity	(Alfonso	Cuarón,	2013),	a	film	sold	on	its	special	effects	prodigiousness	and	innovation.	Removed	from	the	publicity	narrative,	the	film	itself	is	a	skeletal	classical	narrative	structure	strung	together	along	some	familiar	images	of	space,	and	earth	as	seen	from	space.	It	quite	clearly	relies	on	a	very	busy	soundtrack	to	retain	audience	interest.	Audio	tomfoolery	abounds,	along	with	epic	and	sentimental	scoring,	musical	and	sound	cues	transacting	between	incidental	and	diegetic,	the	familiar	voices	of	Sandra	Bullock	and	George	Clooney	along	with	their	ultra-compressed	heartbeats,	and	aurally	overwhelming,	frequency	mashing	techniques	to	affect	a	sense	of	profundity.	Behind	these	auditory	techniques,	we	are	for	the	most	part	just	watching	more	space	images,	which	fail	to	develop	considerably	throughout	the	feature	no	matter	what	advanced	motion	capture	or	digital	editing	technique	was	employed.	Yet	the	publicity	narrative	stressed	visual	effects	as	the	greater	meaning-making	device.	Bruce	Isaacs	hinted	at	two	central	experiential	qualities	to	Gravity	in	a	largely	phenomenological	August	2014	presentation:	first	was	the	experience	of	boredom	which	lurked	behind	the	visual	repetition,	and	second,	that	his	preliminary	background	reading	on	Gravity’s	digital	capture	and	suture	processes	in	magazines	such	as	American	Cinematographer	brought	him	to	the	theatre	in	the	first,	and	thus	somewhat	directed	his	engagement	with	the	feature	(np).	Despite	reliance	on	these	publicity	narratives	–	or	perhaps	because	of	them	–	the	film	was	hailed	a	success.	It	garnered	awards	recognition	and	$716	million	worldwide	in	box	office	receipts	(Box	Office	Mojo).	No	matter	how	we	evaluate	the	film,	however,	the	story	behind	the	experience,	which	has	to	do	with	the	human	achievement	of	special	effects	innovation,	remains	as	an	integral	guiding	factor	in	our	understanding	of	the	spectatorial	experience,	and	it	blends	with	the	
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narrative	of	human	technical	achievement	that	marks	the	space	crisis	movie,	from	Apollo	13	(Ron	Howard,	1995)	to	The	Martian	(Ridley	Scott,	2015).		Thus	the	stimulus	that	promotes	wonderment	goes	on	to	be	incorporated	and	understood	as	part	of	a	narrative	of	the	self	–	this	is	human	achievement,	and	recognising	technical	progress	in	skilled	human	actions	is	another	way	we	imagine	ourselves	as	akin	to	others.	There	are	innumerable	examples:	much	musical	theatre	creates	a	recognisable,	delimited	spectacle	focusing	us	on	the	genius	of	its	singers,	dancers	and	technicians	that	impresses	by	its	very	immensity,	and	the	narrative	around	art	games	often	focuses	on	the	design	genius	of	its	creators,	appealing	to	notions	of	sophisticated	medium-specific	comprehension	in	discerning	video	gamers.	Even	if	our	primary	concern	is	how	a	movie	pleased	the	eye,	or	how	a	piece	of	music	moved	us	through	an	emotive	soundscape,	or	how	it	felt	to	be	in	the	theatre	during	a	particular	performance,	we	are	still	asking	questions	about	what	these	experiences	mean	to	us,	and	so	therefore	what	they	say	about	the	experience	of	being	human.		The	oeuvre	of	writer/director	Terry	Gilliam	offers	the	perfect	demonstrative	union	of	all	these	concepts:	artistic	playfulness,	fantasy	and	the	appreciation	of	human	invention.	His	more	frivolous	works	explore	the	boundaries	of	the	fantasy	adventure	genre,	upset	polar	nodes	of	genre	comprehension	we	rely	on,	question	what	story	means	to	us,	and	always	suggest	excess	beyond	the	knowable	by	cluttering	his	frames	with	all	manner	of	visual	detail	that	cannot	be	clearly	made	out.	We	have	to	become	used	to	the	kind	of	cognitive-perceptual	mess	of	highly	composed	visual	clutter	to	enjoy	his	films;	we	are	always	aware	we	are	missing	details,	and	this	is	key	to	Gilliam’s	sense	of	play.	This	impulse	has	been	with	him	from	early	films	like	Jabberwocky	(1977).	Gilliam	upset	laws	of	physics	by	making	them	contingent	to	superstition,	raconteurism,	consumerist	and	religious	fantasy	in	Time	Bandits	(1981)	and	The	
Adventures	of	Baron	Munchausen	(1988);	he	upset	recognisable	genre	forms	in	The	Brothers	
Grimm	(2005),	wherein	we	are	as	confused	as	the	eponymous	brothers	whether	we	are	engaged	in	horror	or	family	adventure,	a	world	of	real	dangers	or	a	world	of	make-believe	dangers;	and	he	upset	the	very	moral	binaries	fantasy	relies	on	in	The	Imaginarium	of	Doctor	
Parnassus	(2009),	especially	as	the	Devil	(Tom	Waits)	is	robbed	of	any	sense	of	moral	certitude	toward	the	end	of	the	film	(he	is	more	interested	in	the	gameplay	of	“evil”	than	its	actualisation).	As	Peter	Marks	points	out	in	his	analysis	of	the	more	sombre	12	Monkeys	(1995),	Gilliam’s	most	popularly	enduring	studio	picture	upsets	notions	of	interpretation	and	
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perceptual	reliability	we	find	ourselves	navigating	on	the	precipice	of	the	information	age	(161).	The	complication	of	sensory	information	is	a	common	theme	in	accounts	of	film	history	and	technical	achievement	(see,	for	example,	Fraigneau	“Dialogues	with	Cocteau”).65	Vertigo	(Alfred	Hitchcock,	1958)	in	particular	is	a	recurrent	reference,	and	one	that	12	Monkeys	addresses	to	call	attention	to	its	conversation	with	film	history.	Using	time	travel	as	a	device	to	challenge	telicity,	12	Monkeys	like	its	predecessor	La	Jetée	(Chris	Marker,	1962)	upsets	concepts	of	cultural	chronology	and	cinema	development,	too:	12	Monkeys	features	the	re-purposing	of	old	motion	capture	and	projection	technologies	to	nefarious	ends,	despotic	interrogation	and	surveillance.	Similarly,	technologies	like	plastic	are	re-purposed	and	become	unstuck	in	time	–	the	time	travel	device	is	flimsy,	unreliable	and	patched	together	like	all	of	our	technologies,	including	film	effects	and	their	manipulation	of	perceptive	faculties,	which	we	might	deploy	while	never	quite	wholly	understanding	their	operative	principles.	Despite	being	cobbled	together	and	exploitable	these	human	inventions	still	inspire	wonder,	from	the	filmed	image	to	a	time	machine	made	of	plastic.		Gilliam’s	work	is	also,	much	of	the	time,	imaginatively	comedic	–	another	variety	of	play.	We	tell	stories	to	laugh,	to	account	for,	to	explore	and	perhaps	deflate	our	concerns	
and	anxieties	in	comedy.	The	subject	of	mountains	of	theory,	often	asserting	one	particular	cause	or	effect	of	humour	as	foundational,	comedy	is	a	substantial	component	in	narrative	with	human	and	social	functions	that	may	be	as	multitudinous	as	those	of	storytelling	itself.	It	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	a	breadth	of	storytelling	styles,	including	those	operating	outside	of	strictly	comic	genres,	use	humour	as	a	narrative	device.	Humour	has	been	demonstrated	as	particularly	effective	in	establishing	reciprocally	enjoyable	connections	between	strangers	(Treger	et	al.	“Laughing	and	Liking”),	which	may	help	to	develop	a	bond	of	trust	between	storytellers	and	their	audience.	Humour	also	mitigates	stress	in	favour	of	feelings	of	wellbeing	(Crawford	and	Caltabiano	“Promoting	emotional	well-being”),	which	could	countervail	the	agitating	influence	of	the	conflicts	on	which	stories	rely.	A	recent	theory	put	forward	by	Peter	McGraw	and	Joel	Warner,	however,	has	been	advanced	from	Thomas	C.																																																									65	Gilliam	points	to	a	complication	of	technical	achievement	even	while	he	goes	about	trying	to	emulate	the	beauty	and	power	of	his	favourite	oil	paintings	within	the	film	frame:	“I	wanted	it	to	be	painterly,”	Gilliam	said	of	Doctor	Parnassus.	“I	didn't	want	it	to	feel	like	anything	naturalistic	or	even	crude	and	cut-out.	There	were	models,	too,	and	photographs	of	real	things	stuck	in.	It's	still	a	mess,	the	way	I	work”	(Covert	np).	Thus	Gilliam’s	integration	of	digital	effects	functions	in	a	similar	way	to	his	cut-out	animations	from	Monty	Python	and	his	convoluted	art	direction:	although	vibrant	and	neuroaesthetically	appealing,	his	effects	disturb	by	putting	ease	of	perception	just	out	of	reach,	clouded	as	they	are	by	proximate	and	often	anachronistic	technologies.	
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Veatch’s	1998	work	“A	Theory	of	Humor”:	benign	violation	theory	(styled	as	BVT)	carries	great	analytic	potential	and	synthesises	a	breadth	of	historic	theories	of	laughter	and	the	comic	into	a	comprehensible	phenomenon.	A	violation	is	defined	as	the	perception	“when	something	seems	wrong,	unsettling	or	threatening”	and	it	is	benign	when	“it	seems	okay,	acceptable,	or	safe”	(The	Humor	Code	10).	The	website	for	their	Humor	Research	Lab	offers	a	succinct	elucidation:		 humor	occurs	when	and	only	when	three	conditions	are	satisfied:	(1)	a	situation	is	a	violation,	(2)	the	situation	is	benign,	and	(3)	both	perceptions	occur	simultaneously.	For	example,	play	fighting	and	tickling,	which	produce	laughter	in	humans	(and	other	primates),	are	benign	violations	because	they	are	physically	threatening	but	harmless	attacks.		(np)		I	would	add	that	it	is	possible	our	swift	cognitive	transition	through	perception	of	violation	to	down-regulated	status	of	an	event	as	benign	could	also	explain	such	phenomena	as	laughter	
following	a	surprise	or	shock;	the	perceptions	may	or	may	not	occur	strictly	simultaneously,	but	they	are	definitely	in	conflict.	This	concept	of	humour	chimes	with	incongruity	theory,	whereby	“some	thing	or	event	we	perceive	or	think	about	violates	our	normal	mental	patterns	and	normal	expectations”	(Morreall	11),	but	it	both	identifies	the	specifics	of	the	incongruity	required	to	produce	humour	(cognitive	dissonance	can	equally	produce	discomfort),	and	suggests	a	practical	social	reason	for	our	humour	needs.			 In	fact,	BVT	specifies	the	humour	value	in	the	three	major	pillars	of	humour	theory,	each	of	which	seem	to	identify	only	one	aspect	of	humour:	superiority,	relief	and	incongruity.	From	the	vantage	of	BVT	many	of	the	hitherto	surveyed	functions	of	laughter	seem	understandable:	the	conditions	of	ambiguity	and	incongruity	are	specified;	Freud’s	emphasis	on	repression	of	unacceptable	thoughts	and	behaviours	clearly	explores	potential	social	violations	(usually	benign	as	they	are	only	thoughts,	not	actions	and	so	reveal	no	consequences);	our	ability	to	cope	with	the	potential	impingements	of	grotesquery	and	chaos	also	lie	at	the	intersection	of	the	threatening	and	safe;	schadenfreude	and	Aristotelian	superiority	cover	the	area	where	we	recognise	a	threat	but	it	is	benign	because	it	is	not	our	own;	conflicts	in	our	perceptive	faculties	may	present	a	threat	in	surprise	and	confusion,	a	brief	experience	of	cognitive	dissonance,	sensory	perplexity	or	mistaken	reasoning,	resolved	swiftly	as	we	move	through	a	gag	or	point	of	humour	in	narrative,	cognitively	consigned	to	the	
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benign;	this	same	principle	of	brisk	dissonance	applies	to	recognition	of	the	unreality	of	our	mechanised	regulation	of	nature	and	life,	apropos	Bergson’s	famed	Laughter	essay,	or	the	deceptive	dehumanising	of	a	person	represented	as	a	material	thing;	and	the	relief	offered	by	relegating	mortal	violations	to	a	more	benign	status	could	be	explained	by	the	need	for	a	self-aware	mind	to	navigate	the	threat	of	existential	terror.	The	latter	explanation	of	the	integral	nature	of	death	and	attention	to	impermanence	in	humour	is	bolstered	by	research	performed	by	Long	and	Greenwood	in	2013,	who	found	that	priming	subjects	with	subliminal	thoughts	of	death	aided	humour	production,	potentially	as	a	defensive	mechanism,66	promoting	resilience	against	existential	anxieties,	and	also	possibly	allowing	for	enhanced	creativity	and	open-mindedness.	Bergson	reminded	us	that	humour	is	a	social	phenomenon	–	often	the	effects	are	amplified	when	experienced	alongside	others.	Following	Bergson’s	defence	of	a	social	corrective	or	moral	function	of	humour,	and	its	synthesis	in	BVT,	we	can	look	to	humour	as	a	political	tool	by	which	we	mediate	amongst	ourselves	what	is	a	threat	worthy	of	our	attention	and	what	anxieties	are	unfounded	or	unneeded.	Exploring	these	zones	in	narrative	may	allow	us	to	be	more	specific	about	the	aspects	of	social	problems	that	are	genuinely	worrying,	or	that	are	distracting	us	from	matters	of	genuine	concern.	The	consequent	politics	of	laughter	could	inform	both	humanistic	storytellers,	and	a	humanist	hermeneutics.	For	this	reason,	I	will	turn	to	BVT	when	discussing	narrative	humour	in	the	remainder	of	this	thesis.		 Hovering	somewhere	nearby	comedic	narrative,	forever	treading	a	line	between	the	benign	and	the	violating,	is	story’s	function	as	titillation.	Much	mainstream	pornography	still	constructs	a	cursory	narrative	as	some	kind	of	anchor	to	sexual	display;	arousal	appears	to	depend	upon	a	narrative	context,	a	path	into	comprehending	the	action	as	something	more	than	just	body	parts	on	a	screen,	to	merge	with	a	viewer’s	internal	fantasies.67	In	“Generic	Pleasures,”	Linda	Williams	notes	genres	that	feature	similar	extents	of	affective	and	stylistic	repetition	centred	on	heterosexual	unions	–	in	particular	Hollywood	musicals	–	and																																																									66	C.f.	George	Eman	Vaillant	Ego	Mechanisms	of	Defense.		67	Alan	McKee	wrote	about	the	narrativity	of	pornography	in	“Pornography	as	Entertainment,”	in	which	he	finds	that	adult	entertainment	fulfills	many	of	the	same	goals	as	other	narrative	entertainment	or	“audience-centred”	(548)	media.	One	of	these	goals	might	concern	the	nature	of	pleasure	audiences	find	in	the	representation	of	and	identification	with	fictional	characters:	the	characters	that	populate	pornographic	media	are	schematic	–	quite	clearly	constructed	and	typified	–	yet	somehow	still	produce	real	longing	and	real	arousal	in	the	viewer	(Frow	“Avatar,	Identification,	Pornography”).		
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disciplines	that	similarly	construct	sex	as	a	“problem”	that	needs	to	be	solved	with	more	knowledge	and	accommodation	of	desire,	and	proximity	to	the	gendered	other,	like	sexology.	The	foundation	of	a	problem	that	needs	solving	is	ubiquitous	in	narrative.	It	should	not,	then,	come	as	any	surprise	that	titillating	media	requires	some	groundwork	of	narrative	structure	to	develop	arousal	or	viewer	interest.	That	dramatic	conflict,	in	pornography,	is	an	absence	of	sexual	accord,	which	is	“solved”	by	an	extreme	level	of	sexual	accommodation.			 Sex	and	sexuality	need	not	be	so	cursory,	however.	Story	is	also	used	in	courtship	and	
mateship	displays,	mate	selection,	and	even	friend	and	acquaintance	selection.	This	can	be	a	much	more	extended	process,	especially	in	the	display	of	desirable	skills	and	traits	associated	with	narrative	construction	and	artistry.	During	the	height	of	the	feminist	sex	wars,	a	range	of	writers	including	Gayle	Rubin	and	Pat	Califia	adopted	the	term	“sex	positivity”	to	connote	the	philosophy	of	acceptance	of	consensual	sexuality	in	all	its	different	and	difficult	iterations,	and	a	deflation	of	the	shame	and	stigma	around	diverse	expressions	of	sexuality,	like	sadomasochism.	In	narrative	theory,	a	sex	positive	theory	could	attempt	to	find	ways	to	portray	the	difficulties	we	have	in	sexual	relations	in	a	light	that	demonstrates	the	normality	and	ubiquity	of	interpersonal	sexual	problems,	and	thereby	makes	them	easier	to	deal	with.	In	interviews	about	her	performance	in	The	Sessions	(Ben	Lewin,	2012),	actor	Helen	Hunt,	playing	a	sex	surrogate	for	a	disabled	man,	described	how	she	wanted	to	be	part	of	a	story	that	demonstrated	what	she	termed	“sex	positivity”:		 Sex	is	never	perfectly	elegant:	The	light	isn’t	just	right,	and	the	underwear	doesn’t	fall	on	the	floor	perfectly,	and	the	hands	don’t	clutch,	and	you	don’t	come	at	the	same	time—it’s	all	bullshit,	basically	…	And	the	disability	of	this	character	renders	all	of	that	impossible,	so	you’re	left	with	something	much	more	like	your	own	experience	as	a	nondisabled	person,	which	is	that	you’re	human	and	that	it’s	good	and	it’s	bad	and	it’s	weird	that	it’s	silly,	and	it’s	embarrassing	that	it’s	scary,	so	I	think	that	the	disability	is	just	a	way	to	get	to	what	it’s	actually	like.		(Zakarin	np)		The	dimensional	complexity	of	sexual	and	bodily	shame	in	cinema,	which	Hunt	refers	to,	can	be	represented	as	a	natural	problem	to	productively	work	with,	or	sexual	fears	can	instead	be	leveraged	to	heighten	the	drama	of	a	narrative	in	a	way	that	amplifies	rather	than	questions	sexual	stigma,	as	in	films	like	Shame	(Steve	McQueen,	2011)	or	Happiness	(Todd	Solondz,	1998).	These	films	conduct	the	audience’s	pre-existing	sexual	fears	to	an	emotionally	intense	
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and	dramatic	rather	than	a	deflating	and	diagnostic	effect,	leaving	less	room	between	the	spectator	and	their	reactive	sexual	shame,	and	thereby,	I	would	argue,	less	room	for	the	kind	of	reflective	analysis	prompted	by	Hunt	and	Lewin.	Other	films	that	attempt	a	deflating	or	diagnostic	effect	include	Bedrooms	and	Hallways	(Rose	Troche,	1998),	Shortbus	(John	Cameron	Mitchell,	2006),	Women	in	Trouble	(Sebastian	Gutierrez,	2009)	and	the	works	of	a	figure	like	Pedro	Almodóvar.	A	humanist	critic	might	therefore	ask:	does	this	story	provoke	or	question	our	established	sexual	stigma?		 Of	course,	we	can	also	create	narratives	and	exhibit	story	preferences	that	aid	in	other	kinds	of	social	choices	beyond	sexual	selection	–	for	example,	a	music	scene	that	generates	friendship	circles	of	likeminded	people,	or	communities	of	niche	genre	enthusiasts.	Chamorro-Premuzic	et	al.	write	that,	“movie	preferences	are	an	important	ingredient	of	interpersonal	etiquette,	providing	a	topic	of	conversation,	as	well	as	a	vehicle	for	assessing	others’	attitudes	and	interpersonal	compatibility.	For	instance,	people	discuss	film	preferences	in	social	networking	and	online	dating	sites	to	decide	whether	their	views	are	shared	by	others”	(111-112).	The	etiquette	of	exhibiting	story	preferences	acts	as	a	display	to	both	potential	friends	and	romantic	partners;	sex,	mateship	display	and	selection	are	all	so	intimately	entwined	with	storytelling	practices	that	they	cannot	be	ignored.	Like	all	of	the	functions	of	narrative	art	explored	in	social	narratology,	“The	sexual	display	and	socialization	accounts	can	peaceably	sit	side	by	side	as	long	as	one	does	not	try	to	frame	either	explanation	as	all-encompassing”	(Taberham	221).	Likewise	a	synergy	of	these	approaches	could	offer	a	more	holistic	picture	of	our	complex	motives	for	story	engagement;	these	motives	should	not	be	seen	as	separate	from	one	another,	as	we	can	derive	a	variety	of	gratifying	experiences	from	a	single	narrative,	sometimes	which	appear	contradictory.	For	example,	a	film	can	both	titillate	and	moralise	about	titillation	at	the	same	time.	I	agree	with	the	sex	positivists	that	we	need	to	accept	all	of	these	functions	of	story	as	productive	in	their	own	ways	–	theories	of	sex	positivity	could	help	us	achieve	better	tools	to	discuss	sexual	fear,	timidity	and	shame	in	story	with	less	fear,	timidity	and	shame	around	the	subject	itself.		All	of	these	imaginative	and	ludic	narrative	functions,	from	the	autotelic	to	the	seriousness	of	play,	from	fantasy	to	narrativised	sexual	play,	regularly	sit	alongside	our	more	serious	concerns	rather	than	being	separated	out	into	singularly	affective	narratives.	I	now	move	to	look	closer	at	the	correlate	mental	work	of	fiction,	and	how	it	might	produce	pleasure	or	rewards	in	cognitions	that	are	germane	to	our	flourishing	in	the	world.	
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Mental	Work,	Memory	and	Need	for	Cognition		As	we	have	established,	different	people	have	different	appetites	for	the	various	cognitive	processes	fiction	guides	us	through.	An	appetite	for	open-endedly	effortful	cognitive	tasks	is	measured	by	the	“need	for	cognition”	personality	variable	(c.f.	Cacioppo	et	al.).	As	these	needs	change	from	person	to	person,	writers	like	myself	who	value	stories	that	offer	difficult	cognitive	tasks	–	narrative	puzzles,	challenges	to	reason	and	opportunities	for	elaboration	–	should	not	universalise	this	disposition,	or	presume	that	an	appetite	for	the	interpretive	work	of	avant	or	other	experimental	fictions	is	somehow	superior.	Nonetheless,	we	can	still	point	to	some	of	the	positive	functions	of	narrativised	mental	work,	and	its	results.	In	particular,	we	can	use	stories	to	exercise	advanced	pattern	recognition,	explore	
the	limits	of	our	cognition,	hypothesise,	perform	mental	experiments	and	guide	our	
comprehension	of	abstruse	concepts.	Pattern	seeking	has	long	had	survival	benefits,	from	the	physical	to	the	social	(Boyd	On	the	Origin	of	Stories	88),	and	story	remains	a	place	to	exercise	advantageous	pattern	recognition,	or	what	Boyd	calls	“cognitive	play	with	pattern”	(ibid.	14).	But	stories	can	exercise	cognitive	processes	that	are	not	directly	social	or	moral,	and	that	move	beyond	appeals	to	naïve	physics:	we	can	make	complex	scientific	and	mathematical	problems	easier	to	grasp,	for	example,	by	procedurally	laying	out	their	terms	in	an	analogous	narrative.	Further	to	Boyd’s	work	on	cognitive	play	and	its	relation	to	pattern	recognition,	Peter	Swirski	has	written	extensively	about	all	manner	of	thought	experiments	in	
Of	Literature	and	Knowledge.	Swirski	notes	multiple	intrinsic	links	between	science	and	story;	each	framework	for	understanding	the	world,	and	its	associated	cognitions,	opens	up	new	tools	to	explore	the	other.	The	exploration	of	science	through	story	can	have	a	pedagogical	element	–	consider	Raymond	Smullyan’s	use	of	logic	puzzles	to	teach	mathematical	concepts	in	a	popular	book	such	as	The	Lady	or	the	Tiger?	–	as	well	as	being	a	process	of	discovery	for	both	storyteller	and	audience.	For	example,	one	can	find	a	solution	to	a	problem	by	crafting	a	narrative	around	it,	or	alter	existing	narratives	to	meet	the	demands	of	their	own	particular	problem.		Rationalising	the	appeal	of	avant-garde	film,	Taberham	writes	that	avant	narratives	stretch	our	discernment	of	meaningful	patterns	to	a	radical	degree:	“On	occasion,	the	more	indiscernible	the	patterns	are,	the	more	rewarding	their	identification	may	be”	(225).	Considering	the	relatively	recent	emergence	of	modernist	art	in	human	history	and	its	
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concurrence	with	globalising	technologies	such	as	electronic-telegraphic	transmission,	auto	and	air	travel,	it	may	be	that	our	skills	at	recognising	more	complex	patterns	in	social	products	like	stories	and	artworks	were	in	fact	advantageous	as	our	social	context	expanded	and	became	more	complex.	We	needed	new	complex	stories	to	understand	new	social	patterns	that	made	up	the	globally	connected	world	we	describe,	and	social	comprehension	can	confer	a	survival	advantage.	However,	some	levels	of	creative	inference	working	from	abstractions	(especially	graphical	or	non-semantic	abstraction)	are	so	removed	from	description	of	a	specific	context	that	they	can	be	hard	to	explain.	Taberham	echoes	many	cognitivist-evolutionary	theorists	in	postulating	the	function	of	avant	art	as	a	mental	work	that	is	pleasing	as	a	pattern-recognition	superstimulus,	although,	he	is	at	pains	to	point	out,	it	is	not	adaptive,	offering	no	survival	benefit	of	itself	(ibid.	226-227),	and	its	marginal	appeal	makes	it	“inefficient”	as	a	sexual	display	(ibid.	221).	This	assumes	that	traits	are	only	adaptive	if	they	have	pancultural	appeal,	or	make	us	attractive	to	all	potential	human	mates,	but	traits	can	also	be	selected	for	and	passed	on	within	niche	communities,	and	this	heritability	is	still	part	of	human	evolution.	Once	removed	from	broad	appeal,	according	to	the	universalisms	of	such	evolutionary	psychology,	a	trait	can	no	longer	be	considered	part	of	the	selection	process.	Yet	the	technical	skills	in	arts	production	that	we	identify	as	mateship	or	fitness	display	are	very	often	culture-specific,	and	they	will	speak	to	niche	communities	and	become	adaptive	within	those	environments.	That	virtuosic	behaviour	may	demonstrate	one’s	intellectual	skills	as	much	as	their	technical	skills.	Punk	music	may	not	demonstrate	virtuosic	technical	ability,	but	it	demonstrates	a	raft	of	intellectual	and	creative	values	that	speak	to	the	social	needs	of	a	specific	community	and	will	thus	be	attractive	traits	within	that	community.	This	is	similar	to	avant	art,	a	creative	expression	of	intellectual	prowess	and	invention	that	will	be	selected	for	in	communities	that	place	value	on	the	social	skills	it	signals,	and	thereby	be	a	heritable	trait	(perhaps	intellectual	passion	in	the	case	of	punk,	and	intellectual	restraint	in	the	case	of	an	avant	cinema	phenomenon	like	the	slow	film).	Deterministic	flattening	of	the	myriad	contexts	in	which	humans	have	thrived	produces	unitary	explanations,	and	it	is	an	example	of	how	evolutionary	psychology	can	limit	itself	to	a	narrow	or	ad	hoc	notion	of	environmental	fitness	that	neglects	the	complexities	of	culture	–	we	adapt	to	the	cultures	we	create,	and	can	become	“fit”	for	an	environment	that	includes	intellectual	values	apt	for	the	circumstances	they	emerge	within.	This	includes	all	sorts	of	cognitive	feats	that	are	demonstrated	in	narrative	that	have	unclear	practical	applications,	yet	demonstrate	a	mental	ability	or	disposition	that	is	valued	by	peers.		
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Of	course,	there	are	also	complex	concepts	and	cognitive	feats	in	narrative	that	have	clear	utility.	For	example,	reminiscence	is	a	complex	task	of	tying	together	multiple	cognitions	into	a	coherent	narrative;	so	story	can	also	be	used	as	a	memory	exercise.	Shared	reminiscence	–	when	memories	are	externalised	and	negotiated	–	is	a	directly	communal	storied	activity	with	all	manner	of	social	utilities	(Alea	and	Bluck	“Why	Are	You	Telling	Me	That?”)	and	benefits.	Sharing	family	stories,	for	instance,	can	aid	children’s	socioemotional	knowledge	development	(Van	Bergen	et	al.	“The	Effects	of	Mother	Training	in	Emotion-Rich,	Elaborative	Reminiscing”),	cognitive	developmental	processes	and	wellbeing	outcomes	(Fivush	et	al.	“Elaborating	on	Elaborations”),	and	collaborative	recall	can	have	benefits	lasting	our	whole	lifetime,	including	in	aged	cognitive	decline	(Barnier	et	al.	“Reaping	What	They	Sow”);	the	foundation	of	memory	and	identity	is	the	crafting	of	a	story	of	social	causality.68	Maurice	Halbwachs	noted	in	1950	that	the	individual’s	recollection	was	inseparable	from	group	memory	(The	Collective	Memory),	and	psychologists	now	recognise	that	memories	are	equally	inseparable	from	their	expression	or	externalisation	(Hirst	et	al.	“Putting	the	Social	Back	Into	Human	Memory”).	Autobiographical	memories	are	one	place	where	social	storytelling	practices	and	the	construction	of	internal	stories	are	aligned	–	and	they	all	contain	traces	of	fiction	(our	memories	are	all	somehow	reconstituted	and	fabricated).	As	William	Hirst	et	al.	put	it,	“Remembering	is,	if	you	like,	communicating”	(275).	Additionally,	the	transactive	nature	of	story	can	act	as	a	socially	distributed	cognition	or	extended	mind	(Sutton	et	al.	“The	Psychology	of	Memory”):	we	accumulate	collective	information	in	stories,	and	so	they	do	some	of	the	work	of	remembering	that	an	individual	themselves	might	be	unable	to	perform.		Family	reminiscence,	including	the	prompting	of	open-ended	questions	of	narrative	construction	and	context,	is	also	important	in	the	development	of	literacy,	and	thereby	comprehension	of	fictions	(Peterson	et	al.	“Encouraging	narratives	in	pre-schoolers”).	It	may	be	apparent	how	autobiographical	memories	are	storied,	and	therefore	how	distributing	and	negotiating	memories	as	nonfictional	narratives	can	have	benefits	in	social	cognition,	although	we	might	equally	inquire	how	fiction	in	turn	helps	us	craft	causal	narratives	that	connect	meaningfully	to	our	lives.	Various	scholars	have	queried	the	experience	of	rewatching	or	re-engaging	in	narratives	we	have	already	completed	(Bentley	and	Murray;	Weispfenning).																																																									68	On	another	level,	the	unity	of	storytelling	and	memory	is	much	simpler:	observe	the	saying-is-believing	effect.	In	vocalising	or	externalising	a	thought	we	ourselves	come	to	believe	it	(Higgins	and	Rholes	“Saying	is	Believing”).	So	even	more	fundamentally,	we	use	story	to	reinforce	and	attach	to	our	own	memories.	
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Why	are	we	able	to	experience	the	affect	of	a	familiar	narrative	more	than	once,	and	how	does	it	change	on	multiple	readings	or	viewings?	Some	sports	viewers,	for	example,	are	able	to	enjoy	revisiting	favourite	matches	despite	knowing	the	outcome.	This	experience	points	to	a	particular	kind	of	investment	in	the	players,	be	they	sportspeople	or	characters	that	we	reclaim	a	proximity	to.	We	want	to	empathically	walk	in	their	shoes	again,	but	how	does	their	fate	provoke	us	if	we	already	know	the	events	and	emotions	that	will	follow?	Rewatching	is	a	particular	kind	of	dramatic	irony	–	one	that	encompasses	the	whole	piece.	Bentley	and	Murray’s	research	qualifies	participants’	self-reported	goals	of	re-watching:	social	rewatching	(such	as	showing	a	friend),	mood	management	or	regulation	(although	this	is	not	particular	to	the	rewatching	experience,	knowing	a	narrative	makes	its	emotive	content	more	dependable)	and	nostalgia;	they	also	note	that	fans	of	specific	content	will	rewatch	to	gain	mastery	of	complex	storyworlds	and	thus	build	a	“social	connoisseurship”	(np).69	This	self-reportage	points	to	a	simple	answer	to	the	question	of	a	familiar	narrative’s	ability	to	provoke	emotional	responses	we	have	already	been	through:	we	might	remember	the	thrust	of	a	narrative	and	those	few	points	impressed	upon	us,	but	we	are	liable	to	forget	or	overlook	its	cadences	and	nuances.	We	rediscover	the	affective	path	it	leads	us	through	upon	rewatching	–	the	emotional	variation	from	one	instance	to	the	next,	its	affective	causality.	John	Weispfenning	theorised	that	television	reruns	provide	the	comfort	of	generational	narratives,	making	sense	of	our	shared	history	especially	in	times	of	social	change	(172).	In	rereading,	there	is	cause	for	reflection	on	a	story’s	emotional	causality	afforded	by	distance	from	any	suspenseful	immersion,	and	a	subsequent	feeling	of	mastery	provides	comfort.	Again,	we	should	keep	in	mind	personality	variation:	different	viewers	with	different	memories	and	different	tastes	for	drama	will	exhibit	a	range	of	desires,	and	some	do	not	like	to	rewatch	a	narrative	at	all.		In	Patricia	Meyer	Spacks’s	On	Rereading,	returning	to	favoured	novels	aids	a	reflective	self-narrative	construction:	we	monitor	our	reactions	to	a	familiar	story,	and	so	the	story	provides	a	benchmark	for	the	way	we	have	changed	over	time.	We	can	even	use	such	stories	to	critique	the	views	of	our	former	self,	and	in	this	way	clarify	lessons	learned,	and	also	compare	our	own	social	development	with	the	development	of	historical	events	in	the	world.	There	are,	thus,	two	types	of	memory	being	exercised	here:	the	memory	of	narrative	events,	words,	images	and	our	response	to	them,	as	well	as	the	memory	of	who	we	were	at	that	time	
																																																								69	In	nostalgia,	the	memory	exercise	of	narrative	engagement	overlaps	with	more	hedonic	motives	for	media	use.		
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that	may	have	led	to	these	interpretations.70	This	chimes	with	literature	on	the	bidirectional	link	between	memory	and	identity	(Wilson	and	Ross	“The	Identity	Function	of	Autobiographical	Memory”)	and	similarly	points	to	story’s	nostalgic	potentialities	as	being	part	of	the	process	of	attaching	to	a	causal	narrative	of	the	self	and	our	development.		At	the	same	time,	we	use	stories	to	forget:	not	just	to	forget	our	daily	trials,	or	forgetting	as	aversive	mood	regulation,	but	in	order	to	replace	memories	with	new	versions	of	events,	or	reduce	the	importance	of	painful	and	inconvenient	memories.	This	has	benefits	in	the	creation	of	new	identities	(Connerton	62),	or	even	just	as	a	way	to	prioritise	information	(ibid.	64).	Paul	Connerton’s	work	also	points	out	many	of	the	more	socially	imposed	narratives	that	attempt	to	inspire	forgetting	in	a	populace:	to	erase	criminal	conduct	or	painful	cultural	memories	(ibid.	60-62)	or	to	sell	new	products	by	diminishing	remembered	attachments	to	the	old	(ibid.	66).	We	also	protect	our	self-concept	and	social	status	by	forgetting	people	(ibid.	64)	and	events	(ibid.	67)	that	humiliate	or	do	not	reflect	favourably	on	ourselves.	Without	these	mechanisms,	we	can	end	up	deeply	unhappy	(Price	and	Davis	The	
Woman	Who	Can’t	Forget).71	Perhaps,	more	speculatively,	even	phenomena	like	collaborative	inhibition	–	when	groups	working	together	recall	fewer	unique	events	or	less	information	–	may	have	some	social	utility,	too,	in	paving	the	way	for	an	empathic	connection	between	mutual	narratives	of	reminiscence.		Finally,	I	will	connect	all	of	the	narrative	experiences	explicated	so	far	to	our	ethical	considerations:	how	do	we	use	narratives	to	derive	prescriptive	meaning	from	our	observation	of	the	world,	and	from	our	understanding	of	nature,	when	neither	our	phenomenology	nor	our	scientific	reasoning	can	ever	offer	us	reliable	instruction	for	acting	in																																																									70	As	well	as	these	two	types	of	memory,	one	might	conclude	here	that	there	are	four	levels	of	autobiography	worked	through	in	narrative:	when	we	first	respond	to	a	story	we	explain	our	sense	of	self	through	its	evaluation	(deeming	it	good	or	bad,	for	example,	tells	us	more	about	ourselves);	if	we	return	to	the	narrative,	it	might	become	entrenched	in	a	grander	history	of	the	self,	or	a	personal	corpus;	where	that	corpus	is	shared	or	a	particular	work	becomes	canonised,	it	can	tell	of	a	shared	history	with	specific	others	(for	example	generational	identity);	and	finally,	if	that	story	is	distant	enough	(for	example	a	narrative	belonging	to	another	time,	centuries	or	millennia	ago),	it	might	speak	to	a	shared	history	with	general	others,	even	all	of	humanity.		71	Kurt	Vonnegut’s	Slaughterhouse-Five	grapples	with	these	questions:	the	use	of	fantastical	fiction	as	a	site	of	transaction	with	our	traumatic	memories,	what	we	need	to	forget	and	what	we	choose	to	remember.		
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the	world?	This	discussion	first	requires	an	understanding	of	how	memory	cognition	supports	our	ability	to	read	narrative	symbols	that	contain	ethical	information.			
Symbolic	Memory,	Social	Roles	and	Ethics		 A	lot	of	the	symbolic	functions	of	narrative	we	have	already	covered	connect	symbolism	to	social	roles	and	our	co-construction	of	communal	ethics.	All	of	these	functions	of	narrative	in	some	way	acknowledge	the	value	of	symbols	in	storytelling	–	narratives	tend	to	codify	their	meanings,	and	most	narrative	events	in	fiction	point	abstractly	or	symbolically	to	their	utility	in	our	real	lives.	But	we	also	use	story	to	sort	out	what	we	need	to	know	and	
what	symbols	we	need	to	privilege	in	memory	and	consciousness.	In	fact,	Eva	Jablonka	and	Marion	J.	Lamb	list	symbolic	inheritance	as	one	of	the	four	components	of	human	heredity	in	their	book	Evolution	in	Four	Dimensions	(the	others	are	genetic,	epigenetic	and	behavioural).	Symbolic	inheritance	is	different	from	behavioural	learning	or	transmission	as	symbols	(including	language	and	fiction)	can	provide	latent	(202),	translatable	(203),	and	infinitely	variable	information	in	a	rule-governed,	self-referential	system	(199),	which	is	part	of	the	heritability	that	will	shape	who	we	are.72	Pre-existing	symbols	allow	for	human	cultural	evolution.	Thus	we	are	constantly	metonymically	linking	together	cultural	handles	and	iconography,	and	fusing	memory	connections	to	swiftly	access	the	cultural	shorthand	language	we	need	to	communicate,	and	indeed	to	comfort	one	another	with	mutual	understandings.	When	engaged	with	media,	we	are	always	negotiating	what	is	culturally	expedient	for	use	in	our	own	communiqué.	This	might	be	a	primary	social	usage	of	television	and	celebrity:	“the	discussion	of,	for	example,	stars	of	film	and	sport,	produces	a	basis	on	which	people	transitorily	associated	can	find	something	personal	to	talk	about”	(Gluckman	315).	In	a	globalised	context,	mobile	populations	need	ways	to	swiftly	access	mutuality	with	the	vast	number	of	strangers	they	meet;	the	comfort	we	receive	from	knowing	the	same	stories	and	characters	on	television	is	one	example	of	this	function	of	narrative,	as	are	rock-pop	classics	that	anyone	can	sing	along	to	at	a	karaoke	bar.		
																																																								72	We	should	keep	in	mind	that	biology,	like	all	sciences	at	their	vanguard,	is	an	open	debate	rather	than	a	holistic	or	closed	explanation,	and	so	these	Lamarckian	notions	of	“soft	inheritance”	are	still	in	question	(Dickins	and	Rahman	2916).		
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For	Zengotita	in	Mediated,	a	pervasively	ironic	reflexivity	has	crept	into	popular	(in	particular	televised)	media,	which	fulfils	this	function	of	enforcing	a	comforting	sameness,	simultaneously	serving	to	pacify	(63)	and	ignite	feelings	of	business,	work	or	achievement	(191).	We	feed	the	story	addiction	and	feel	like	we	are	working,	purposeful,	when	we	learn,	discuss	and	endlessly	reappropriate	cultural	symbols.	Likewise,	when	we	debate	musical	acts	and	bands	we	like	and	do	not	like,	another	level	of	tacit	conversation	may	be	occurring	as	we	discuss	how	similar	we	are	merely	via	common	knowledge	of	the	music,	the	stories	around	the	music,	and	acknowledgement	of	the	music	and	its	related	stories	as	important	–	a	narcissism	of	small	differences.73	This	is	another	way	of	experiencing	oneness,	but	it	is	ordered	by	our	recognition	of	cultural	symbology,	which	we	learn	through	narrative,	and	which	also	privileges	assumptions	of	importance	or	status:	an	image	of	Popeye,	for	example,	might	be	identified	as	more	important	to	commit	to	memory	than	an	image	of	an	obscure	cartoon	figure	from	a	non-American	country,	simply	because	we	may	need	to	refer	to	Popeye	later	amongst	peers.	The	implications	of	this	process	in	asserting	dominance	point	to	the	sale	of	symbols	as	a	transnational	imperialist	device,	and	reinforces	why	culturally	hegemonic	practices	remain	a	constant	field	of	study.	It	would	do	some	good	to	recall,	however,	the	socially-derived	utility	such	processes	rely	upon:	it	is	impossible	to	operate	as	a	social	being	now	without	being	complicit	in	privileging	such	symbols	in	memory	and	consciousness,	or	we	risk	a	lack	of	connection	with	others.	Chamorro-Premuzic	et	al.’s	etiquette	of	film	preference	exhibition	is	dependent	upon	mutually	known	narratives	–	their	mutuality	is	potentially	an	even	more	important	predictor	of	friendship	potential,	partner	selection,	and	ingroup	statuses	than	the	way	we	feel	about	those	narratives.	Dominant	cultural	symbols	become	part	of	our	deepest	social	spheres,	with	direct	utility	in	our	sense	of	connectivity	with	others.	Even	if	we	wanted	to	reject	them,	we	cannot	do	without	them.	This	genuine	need	is	what	is	being	exploited	in	all	forms	of	cultural	imperialism.		Clearly	the	process	of	negotiating	what	cultural	handles	are	pertinent	to	commit	to	memory	also	extends	to	a	familiar	cultural-ethical	discussion,	concerning	who	we	would	like	to	be	together:	we	use	stories	to	discuss	what	our	togetherness	should	be,	and	what	values	it	should	be	based	upon.	Deciding	which	symbols	we	will	use	and	interpret	in	this	task	plays	an																																																									73	This	term	has	been	reclaimed	by	figures	like	Glen	Owens	Gabbard	to	demonstrate	its	prevalence	in	loving	relationships	(“On	Hate	in	Love	Relationships”).	Gabbard’s	narcissism	of	small	differences	might	provide	a	model	for	understanding	this	narrative	function	among	friends	and	acquaintances,	too.		
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important	role	in	the	process.	It	also	points	to	the	way	stories	reinforce	and	demonstrate	
adherence	to	social	roles,	or	reflexively	prompt	social	role	renegotiation.	Examples	include	gendered	reactions	to	scary	films,	in	which	women	are	more	often	required	to	demonstrate	empathic	fear	and	men	fear	mastery,	providing	comfort	for	female	viewers	(Zillman	“The	Psychology	of	the	Appeal	of	Portrayals	of	Violence”	197-198),	or	diegetically,	those	same	films	can	demonstrate	comparable	social	roles	in	their	narrative	events,	such	as	the	reprehensible	trope	of	the	hapless	woman	twisting	her	ankle	and	the	enterprising	male	saviour	coming	to	her	rescue.	Both	offer	demonstration,	adherence	to	and	reinforcement	of	social	roles.	This	aspect	of	narrative	has	often	been	portrayed	as	a	one-way	mass	media	social	control	mechanism	rather	than	a	dialogous	relationship	between	audience	and	storyteller,	although	this	view	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	we	exhibit	genre	and	story	preferences	that	tailor	to	pre-existing	self-schemas	(Chamorro-Premuzic	et	al.	“What	Type	of	Movie	Person	are	You”).	It	is	very	difficult	to	change	attitudes	with	story,	rather	than	fortify	existing	dispositions.	However,	the	net	effect	of	a	mass	media	appealing	to	the	same	social	roles	is	clearly	part	of	a	process	that	normalises	identities	as	universal,	natural	types	–	as	with	gender	essentialism	or	heteronormativity	–	whether	or	not	we	see	media	norms	as	a	genesis	or	a	symptom.	We	could	refer	to	this	as	the	“echo	chamber”	effect:	if	the	film	market	appeals	to	prevailing	social	roles	in	order	to	sell	products,	it	leaves	little	room	for	the	potential	function	of	narrative	to	reassess	social	roles	that	go	out	of	date	as	our	cultural	environment	changes.	Yet	there	always	remain	storytellers	whose	conscience	outweighs	the	need	for	wider	distribution,	more	than	willing	to	circumnavigate	market	demands	and	tell	a	story	they	are	passionate	about.	These	stories	can	often	involve	a	direct	engagement	with,	and	renegotiation	of,	prevailing	social	roles.		Exclusive	focus	on	mass	media,	too,	can	lead	us	to	neglect	quotidian	experiences	that	contribute,	in	some	respects	much	more	substantially,	to	our	self-schema	or	concept	of	our	social	selves.	Many	of	these	are	storied.	One	of	our	primary	storied	means	for	the	reinforcement	and	performative	demonstration	of	social	roles	is	gossip;	so	story	can	be	a	
form	of	gossip.	Volumes	of	literature	on	the	subject	of	gossip	have	been	published	since	early	anthropological	accounts	by	figures	including	Paul	Radin	(in	1927’s	Primitive	Man	As	
Philosopher),	Melville	J.	Herskovits	(in	various	works	across	the	1930s	and	40s)	and	Elizabeth	Colson	(in	1953’s	The	Makah	Indians),	propagating	later	reflection	on	those	works	(Gluckman	307).	Gossip	can	be	understood	both	in	non-fictive	terms	(peer	group	gossip,	as	we	traditionally	know	it),	and	in	the	use	of	certain	narratives	as	objects	of	gossip,	such	as	
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discussion	around	the	events	of	a	television	show	to	demonstrate	an	epistemic	mutuality.	Celebrity	gossip	also	blurs	apparent	boundaries	between	the	fictive	and	non-fictive	–	readers	of	gossip	magazines	can	be	aware	of	the	highly	dubious	nature	of	the	claims	made,	and	yet	still	enjoy	entertaining	the	notion	of	its	stories	as	actualities	(McDonnell	86).	Gossip	itself	is	always	a	storied	act,	but	fictions	can	also	mimic	gossip,	appealing	to	the	same	discursive	formula	that	peer	group	gossip	exists	within:	discussions	around	soap	operas	are	able	to	somewhat	seamlessly	fit	into	the	same	kind	of	conversational	mores	as	peer	group	gossip,	for	instance.	High	production	television	serials	like	Game	of	Thrones	offer	a	similar	utility	–	the	questions	that	circulate	after	the	release	of	new	episodes	still	gravitate	around	who	did	what	to	whom,	and	the	morality	of	their	actions.	There	can	be	differences,	though,	in	the	levels	of	moral	relativity	or	fortifying	certitude	about	transgressions	that	such	shows	exhibit	or	incite.		Gossip	clearly	has	similarities	with	a	foundational	function	of	story:	spreading	secondhand	information	between	peer	networks,	so	that	information	gathering	did	not	have	to	be	direct.	However	gossip	is	clearly	more	complex	than	that,	as	it	spreads	information	specifically	focussed	upon	the	social	behaviours	of	others,	and	human	conflicts	of	interest	render	this	kind	of	information	particularly	unreliable.	In	fact,	theorists	like	Robin	Dunbar	have	posited	gossip	needs,	emerging	initially	as	a	form	of	allogrooming,	to	be	the	adaptive	genesis	of	storytelling	behaviours	and	thereby	language	development	itself	(Grooming,	Gossip	
and	the	Evolution	of	Language).	Gossip	is	a	kind	of	hyper-attentiveness	to	social	interactions,	the	storied	nature	of	which	elevates	its	impact	and	sense	of	purpose.	As	the	mutuality	of	attentional	focus	in	narrative	audiences	can	build	feelings	of	rapport	with	other	observers,	so	too	can	the	alignment	of	information,	interests,	salient	personalities,	reactions	and	emotions	in	gossip	generate	ingroup	cohesion,	perhaps	with	even	more	efficacy	than	other	storied	activities.	Although	not	exclusively	so,	the	primary	knowledge	communicated	through	stories	is	social	in	nature	(Mar	and	Oatley	182);	the	information	provided	in	gossip	is	both	assiduously,	directly	social	(gossip	leaves	out	narrative	events	that	do	not	speak	directly	to	moral	interactivity)	and	personally	relevant.	This	makes	it	a	very	powerful	social	tool,	especially	when	identifying	indiscretions	that	may	lead	to	ostracism.	Gossip	does	not	just	ask	us	to	be	hyper-attentive	to	social	events,	but	in	particular	singles	out	negative	appraisals	of	players	within	those	events	(Anderson	et	al.	“The	Visual	Impact	of	Gossip”),	aggressors	and	antagonists	we	might	avoid.	We	should	naturally	be	wary,	then,	when	fiction	enters	the	realm	of	gossip:	identifying	aggressors	and	negative	traits	of	real-life	figures	(in	biopics	for	instance),	or	those	that	allegorically	summarise	a	maligned	group	(from	German	or	Russian	
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“bad	guys”	in	Hollywood	cinema	to	the	current	portrayal	of	Islamic	antagonists).	These	narratives	have	gossip	value	while	remaining	unspecific	about	a	particular	individual;	they	can	similarly	generate	aversive	responses	to	those	perceived	as	transgressors,	which	is	also	a	primary	function	of	gossip	(ibid.).		Conflicts	within	stories	open	a	space	where	we	can	imagine	possibilities	for	change,	and	in	particular	change	as	a	response	to	social	and	ethical	dilemmas	(even	if	the	efficacy	of	human	agency	is	later	defeated	or	revealed	to	be	inconsequential	to	larger	forces	at	work).	Mar	and	Oatley	describe	the	reader’s	process	of	comprehending	character	thusly:		 the	psychological	effects	of	character	include	the	pleasing	surprise	of	recognition,	the	satisfaction	of	being	able	to	understand	visible	behavior	in	terms	of	deeper	principles,	the	insight	of	seeing	both	others	and	ourselves	in	terms	of	human	attributes	that	are	both	valuable	and	also	problematic,	as	well	as	the	possibility	of	some	movement	in	our	mental	makeup.		(182)		This	means	that	our	conception	of	and	reaction	to	character,	the	information	it	communicates,	and	its	abstraction	to	social	principles	is	an	entrée	to	ethical	discussion,	especially	given	a	narrative	that	stresses	our	capacity	for	psychological	change.	As	well	as	provoking	character	evaluations,	we	can	play	out	responses	to	ethical	problems	in	narrative.	Stories	offer	us	ways	to	imagine	the	consequences	of	actions,	even	actions	that	are	impossible	to	take	(like	superhuman	feats).	The	consequences	we	explore	reflect	moral	reasoning.	Charles	Taylor’s	storytelling	as	moral	identity	extends	to	a	projection	by	which	we	can	imagine	future	moral	identities.	Locating	oneself	within	a	framework	of	moral	goodness,	“requires	a	narrative	understanding	of	my	life,	a	sense	of	what	I	have	become	which	can	only	be	given	in	a	story.	And	as	I	project	my	life	forward	and	endorse	the	existing	direction	or	give	it	a	new	one,	I	project	a	future	story,	not	just	a	state	of	the	momentary	future	but	a	bent	for	my	whole	life	to	come”	(Sources	of	the	Self	48).	This	conceptual	view	of	story	as	a	projection	with	which	to	explore	possible	ethical	direction	is	made	politically	palpable	by	Augusto	Boal,	who	used	“legislative	theatre”	in	Brazilian	parliament	to	invite	voters	to	act	out	solutions	to	a	social	dilemma	to	see	where	it	took	them.74	Video	games	can	similarly	focus	their	narrative	interactivity	on	moral	causality:	the	entire	interface	of	The	Walking	Dead	(Telltale	Games,																																																									74	This	is	similar	to	the	way	Mette	Hjort	invites	us	to	extend	cinema	hermeneutics	to	address	real	social	needs	(“Community	Engagement	and	Film”).	
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2012)	video	game,	for	example,	is	the	making	of	moral	and	social	decisions,	primarily	in	conversation.	After	their	consequences	are	revealed,	the	game	focuses	upon	retrospectively	explaining	one’s	decisions	and	ethical	positions	(which	usually	stress	the	pressures	and	limitations	in	which	those	decisions	are	made,	and	question	how	we	can	“own”	our	ethics	when	they	are	so	mutable	given	differing	circumstances).	Here	again	we	can	see	the	potential	value	of	play	in	moral	development:	storied	play	can	be	focussed	not	only	on	imagining	ethical	consequences,	but	the	work	of	explaining	subsequent	responses	to	ourselves	and	others.	Mar	and	Oatley	also	go	on	to	clarify	how	the	act	of	projecting	feelings	is	connected	to	the	imagining	of	consequences:	“narratives	allow	us	to	try	out	solutions	to	emotional	and	social	difficulties	through	the	simulation	of	these	experiences”	(183).	So	we	imagine	an	aversive	scenario	that	calls	for	change,	project	possibilities	for	intervention,	and	imagine	consequential	emotions	and	meanings	by	trialling	out	potential	actions	in	narrative.	The	consequences	portrayed	are	a	moral	reasoning	–	this	is	how	the	end	of	a	story	can	come	to	matter	to	us	so	much.	Endings	point	to	consequences	that	will	not	be	further	questioned,	and	are	therefore	one	of	the	best	suggestions	of	an	ethic	stories	can	provide,	even	where	the	story	might	explore	many	other	quandaries,	responses,	causes	and	effects	along	the	way.		 So	finally	we	use	story	to	ask	ethical	questions:	how	we	ought	to	live.	These	questions,	and	story’s	remit	to	answer	them,	also	introduce	the	possibility	of	“imposing	social	control	and,	hence	…	achieving	power”	through	moralistic	narrative	(Sugiyama	241).	It	might	seem	obvious	that	one	function	of	narrative	can	be	to	demonstratively	articulate	and	offer	perspectives	on	particular	ethical	problems,	but	we	might	also	consider	the	possibility	that	ethics	are	imbedded	in	all	narrative	and	drama	involving	one	or	more	living	things.	As	Martin	Price	puts	it	in	Forms	of	Life,	all	novels	and	the	characters	that	populate	them	are	forms	of	life	that	we	imagine,	and	because	they	live,	they	have	a	moral	dimension;	this	interior	moral	dimension	is	in	itself	another	entirely	necessary	“form	of	life”	(50-51).	As	soon	as	a	living	thing	is	present	in	a	narrative,	an	ethical	tension	exists,	as	we	read	its	purpose	and	consistently	ask	what	we	would	hope	to	happen	next	and	how	it	is	achievable	through	agency,	the	many	pathways	of	which	translate	to	an	ought	question.	It	is	very	difficult	to	come	up	with	a	plot	point	that	does	not	spur	an	ethical	question	about	how	we	should	behave;	it	is	the	implicit	internal	examination	undergone	whenever	something	happens	involving	a	living	entity.	According	to	Booth,	narrative	ethics	are	a	universal	subject	because	story	is	at	the	genesis	of	the	human	and	the	means	by	which	humans	reinvent	themselves,	and	now	the	“daily	barrage	of	narrative	to	which	we	are	subjected”	heightens	the	need	for	ethical	criticism	
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(39).	If	it	is	clear	how	ethics	are	inextricable	from	narrative	(even	those	that	purposefully	frustrate	ethical	intelligibility	or	minimise	ethical	evaluations	within	the	diegesis),	and	if	we	accept	that	our	quotidian	engagements	with	story	media	are	proliferating,	then	it	also	makes	sense	to	ask	how	we	should	value	the	relative	ethical	strategies	employed	by	various	contemporary	narratives,	and	what	we	want	from	narrative	ethics.	In	relation	to	the	contemporary	philosophy	of	cinema,	Robert	Sinnerbrink	says,	“despite	the	evident	concern	with	the	‘unethical’	aspects	of	cinema	throughout	the	history	of	film	theory,	it	is	striking	how	few	theorists	have	attempted	to	explore	the	positive	ethical	potential	of	the	medium”	(28).	Narrative	humanism,	with	its	emphasis	on	articulating	positive	ethical	potentials,	can	perform	this	exploration.		We	have	established	that	storytelling	is	a	kind	of	ethical	thought,	and	one	that	may	rehearse	responses	to	problems	arising	in	the	world.	However,	this	points	to	some	problems	in	the	relation	of	ethical	thought	to	ethical	action	as	we	also	might	have	rehearsed	ideologies	that	we	fail	to	act	upon	–	when	we	act,	we	can	fail	to	meet	our	own	moral	standards,	or	choose	to	ignore	or	overlook	ethical	discernments	previously	abstracted	from	and	rehearsed	in	fiction.	We	might	read	a	book	detailing	the	plight	of	sweatshop	workers,	for	example,	but	still	knowingly	buy	textiles	that	support	the	industry.	It	remains	difficult	to	politicise	our	thoughts	rather	than	our	actions:	one	can	spend	a	lifetime	studying	complex	ethics	and	still	behave	reprehensibly	toward	others	(not	me	though,	I	swear).	This	means	we	have	a	need	for	stories	that	can	make	clear	the	precise	relation	between	complex	moral	thought,	and	potential	moral	action.		To	briefly	recap,	humanist	storytelling	emphasises	difficult,	multifaceted	ethics	and	complicates	intuitive	responses	to	familiar	problems,	especially	punitive	responses	–	it	challenges	the	comfort	of	seeing	justice	prevail,	threats	brought	under	control,	and	order	occurring	independently	of	our	personal	efforts,	brought	by	a	hero,	heroes,	or	nature.	It	asks	us	to	think	twice	about	our	closely	held	principles;	in	short,	it	promotes	a	sharper	view	of	one’s	convictions,	in	order	to	improve	our	understanding	of	one	another.	In	humanist	story	ethics,	we	have	to	be	challenged	to	refine	what	we	think	about	a	human	problem	–	if	a	conclusion	is	easily	drawn	from	the	narrative	without	articulation	of	its	contingent	complications,	it	is	potentially	reductive,	failing	to	encourage	deeper	thought	about	the	human.	Stories	can	entertain	pre-existing	moral	predilection,	or	seek	to	complicate	the	ease	of	our	moral	responses,	considering	a	quandary	from	multiple	perspectives,	with	due	
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compassion	for	the	lives	of	all	involved,	and	“humanism	holds	that	the	tool	of	compassion	is	not	by	nature	apologist	or	lacking	in	attention	to	culpability	and	pragmatic	response	to	culpability”	(“Humanist	Ethics	in	John	Sayles’s	Casa”	107).75	Yet	any	questions	that	lead	us	to	evaluate	an	individual’s	moral	worth	are	decentred	in	humanist	narrative,	as	we	are	focussed	upon	social	interaction	and	the	collective	forces	that	drive	behaviour,	not	the	punishment	of	bad	behaviour.	As	humanism	does	not	totalise	human	identities	into	moral	categories	in	order	to	dole	out	reward	and	punishment	to	the	deserved,	its	ethics	are	emphatically	consequentialist.		It	is	tempting	to	conclude,	after	all	this,	that	what	we	need	is	simply	more	moral	doubt	–	complications	of	our	ethical	solutions.	But	what	happens	when	we	need	to	conclude	on	a	course	of	action?	As	Kwame	Anthony	Appiah	points	out,	shared	moral	language	and	mutual	values	are	essential	components	in	reciprocally	beneficial	outcomes:		Folktales,	drama,	opera,	novels,	short	stories;	biographies,	histories,	ethnographies;	fiction	or	nonfiction;	painting,	music,	sculpture,	and	dance:	every	human	civilization	has	ways	to	reveal	to	us	values	we	had	not	previously	recognized	or	undermine	our	commitment	to	values	that	we	had	settled	into.	Armed	with	these	terms,	fortified	with	a	shared	language	of	value,	we	can	often	guide	one	another,	in	the	cosmopolitan	spirit,	to	shared	responses.		(30)		The	best	stories	can	do,	I	submit,	is	to	provide	a	space	to	test	our	convictions	and	our	hypothetical,	narrativised	moral	responses	against	both	simplicity	and	validity,	an	arena	by	which	courses	of	action	can	subsequently	be	confirmed	or	denied	against	these	principles.	The	arts	unite	phenomenological	and	moral	knowledge	through	striving,	giving	rise	to	moral	
possibilities	rather	than	actualities	(Soper	Humanism	and	Anti-Humanism);	their	completion	is	up	to	the	individual	after	the	narrative	closes	and	we	are	once	again	called	upon	to	act	in	the	world.	We	may	consequently,	at	the	very	least,	be	primed	for	more	complex	eventualities,	and	ready	to	face	the	difficulty	of	sticking	to	our	convictions	when	self-interest	intervenes.																																																									75	There	exists	an	attendant	fear	of	the	loss	of	culpability,	especially	in	legal	settings,	when	we	admit	biological	explanations.	But	if	we	see	our	genes	and	environments	as	co-dependent	and	their	effects	as	indivisible,	this	makes	little	sense.	Understanding	criminal	or	unethical	behaviour	as	a	product	of	both	our	sociobiology	and	the	world	it	is	expressed	within	should	lead	us	to	a	consequentialist	rather	than	a	retributivist	ethic.	We	can	identify	culpability	and	still	explain	its	emergence	without	resorting	to	punitive	rather	than	pragmatic	measures.		
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Conclusion		 So	again,	we	arrive	at	an	ethic	of	striving	rather	than	perfection.	The	development	of	moral	language	requires	striving	and	mental	work;	as	a	case	in	point,	Darcia	Narvaez’s	research	finds	that	children	apply	pre-existing,	context	contingent	moral	schemas	to	literary	narratives	(as	do	adults),	yet	they	rarely	comprehend	morals	the	author	intended	to	convey.	To	my	mind,	this	points	to	the	complex	sociality	of	storytelling,	in	that	we	use	narrative	to	develop	a	moral	language	in	concert	with	others;	again,	stories	are	a	springboard	into	discussion	not	only	about	the	actual,	but	also	about	possible	morals	arising	from	the	story,	and	a	child	is	probably	much	more	likely	to	receive	moral	instruction	from	a	parent	or	guardian	than	an	interpreted	narrative.	Caregivers	and	children	instead	might	use	the	narrative	together	in	conversation	as	a	point	of	reference	for	emergent	moral	knowledge;	the	story	itself	may	not	be	the	primary	conveyor	of	information,	so	much	as	the	effort	put	into	discussion	around	the	story,	and	that	effort	breeds	a	familiarity	with	moral	conversations	that	will	help	the	child	navigate	more	complex	social	interactions	as	they	gain	independence.	While	it	may	be	unsurprising	that	a	brief	intervention	teaching	reading	skills	fails	to	surmount	children’s	moral	misreadings	(ibid.	166),	these	skills	should	be	thought	of	as	developing	over	many	years,	with	effort.	When	we	read	a	picture	book	to	children,	for	example,	we	may	discuss	the	story	with	them	to	clarify	alternative	interpretations,	yet	this	does	not	mean	they	will	have	an	immaculate	comprehension	of	moral	storytelling	within	six	weeks.	Narvaez	speculates:	“There	may	be	moral	developmental	hurdles	that	prevent	a	young	child	from	comprehending	an	author’s	theme	until	sufficient	developmental	structures	are	in	place”	(ibid.	166-167),	however	these	developments	will	need	a	context	in	which	to	flourish,	a	reason	for	their	development.	Stories	provide	a	safe	context	for	such	developments.	Comprehension	of	intent	may	become	easier	over	time,	although	we	still	interpret	and	discuss	our	interpretations	with	others,	a	learned	advanced	sociality.		We	are	thus	returned	to	a	primary	humanist	value:	the	striving	and	effort	of	complex	understanding	is	more	important	than	moral	perfectionism,	and	emphasising	ongoing	development	keeps	us	open	and	adaptable	to	human	difference	and	change.	This	connects	the	mental	work	of	fiction	to	its	potential	for	a	complex	empathy:	it	takes	effortful	care	to	remain	alive	to	how	other	people’s	stories	are	alive	(c.f.	Price	Forms	of	Life),	adapting	and	changing	as	they	confront	new	environments	in	which	new	stories	will	be	relevant.	The	primary	ethical	
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appeal	of	the	narrative	humanist,	then,	is	that	we	should	never	allow	our	conception	of	one	another	to	become	complete,	to	reach	an	end	in	which	we	think	of	another	lifeworld	or	culture	as	static;	we	achieve	this	through	stories,	those	mutating	transactions	that	speak	of	incessant	mutation,	that	diverge	and	require	a	comparison	back	to	those	moments	we	diverged	from.		There	will	doubtless	be	objections	to	this	taxonomy:	story	functions	I	have	or	have	not	included,	that	I	have	made	too	much	of,	or	not	enough	of,	or	those	that	seem	too	indistinct	to	be	separated	into	more	than	one	function.	These	are	all	the	problems	of	taxonomy,	and	I	should	reiterate	before	closing	that	I	do	not	expect	this	first	attempt	at	a	social	narratology	to	be	in	any	way	comprehensive.	I	expect	it	to	be	extensive	enough	to	inspire	imagination,	however,	and	to	lay	the	groundwork	of	untotalisable	unknowing	at	the	same	time	as	offering	space	for	new	descriptive	insights,	the	openness	to	discovery	that	humanism	relies	upon.	In	the	spirit	of	humanism,	it	invites	complication	and	extension.76	I	hope	to	retain	this	sense	of	open	wonderment,	but	also	prompt	attention	to	many	of	these	uses	of	narrative	in	practice,	as	I	address	a	case	study	of	the	human	drama	on	film:	the	remainder	of	this	thesis	concerns	the	millennial	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	as	an	example	of	humanist	narrative	practice.	Where	I	have	so	far	only	described	the	theory	of	humanism,	I	turn	now	to	demonstrate	its	application	at	two	levels:	an	expansive	cinematic	genre	reading,	followed	by	a	close	reading	of	a	single	film.	 	
																																																								76	Literary	scholars	have	been	famously	hostile	toward	quantitative	or	otherwise	systematic	approaches	to	narratological	inquiry	(like	functionalism),	and	I	hope	that	I	have	demonstrated	too	that	these	approaches	just	offer	some	new	vantage	–	they	do	not	ordinarily	totalise	their	findings	as	the	summation	of	narrative’s	meaning	in	our	lives	–	and	that	they	will	not	obliterate,	and	indeed	can	be	harmonious	with,	traditional	hermeneutics.		
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THE	SUBURBAN	ENSEMBLE	DRAMEDY:	
History,	Taxonomy	and	Discussions			 The	suburban	ensemble	film	had	been	hinted	at	prior	to	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	yet	only	really	began	to	coalesce	into	a	recognisable	cinematic	mode	or	genre	with	identifiable	conventions	as	the	1990s	drew	to	a	close.	Some	of	the	more	successful	titles	include	The	Kids	
Are	All	Right	(Lisa	Cholodenko,	2010),	Little	Miss	Sunshine	(Jonathan	Dayton	and	Valerie	Faris,	2006)	and	what	is	arguably	the	inciting	feature	in	a	wave	of	such	films	entering	production,	
American	Beauty	(Sam	Mendes,	1999).	Although	seldom	recognised	as	a	genre	in	its	own	right,	beyond	being	identified	by	critics	as	“humanistic	drama”	as	we	will	see,	the	conventions	are	familiar:	a	cross-section	of	an	American	neighbourhood	with	concerns	equalised	across	a	transgenerational	multi-character	cast,	contrasting	personality	types,	gender,	sexual,	ethnic,	ideological	and	other	differences.	The	shift	in	independent	filmmaking	–	to	ensemble	cast	family	and	domestic	studies	with	a	focus	on	performance	rather	than	perceptible	or	ostentatious	technique	–	was	not	impulsive	or	abrupt,	or	without	precedent,	but	a	gradual	development	is	observable	throughout	the	2000s,	possibly	as	film	investors	began	to	recognise	the	potential	for	return	on	films	experimenting	with	the	inexpensive	yet	high-profile	American	Beauty	formula.	The	film	grossed	$356	million	worldwide	against	a	$15	million	production	budget	(Box	Office	Mojo)	and	won	the	Academy	Award	for	Best	Picture.	A	pioneering	example	of	the	influence,	prestige	and	financial	success	possible	in	studio-independent	hybrid	modes	of	production,	DreamWorks	borrowed	practices	“from	the	indie/specialty	realm,	from	budget	to	handling	to	textual	qualities”	(King	Indiewood	195).	
American	Beauty	emerged	from	a	major	studio,	yet	spearheaded	a	trend	that	would	traverse	modes	of	independent	and	Indiewood	production,	gathering	momentum	throughout	the	2000s.			 Along	with	a	realist	or	representational	mode	of	expression	and	suburban	context,	characteristics	of	the	genre	include	ensemble	casts	often	featuring	no	distinguishable	protagonist;	concentration	on	the	ways	in	which	families	mediate	dysfunction	and	ultimately	get	by	after	traumatic	events	force	reconciliation;	a	feature-length	transition	from	sardonic	displays	of	familial	conflict	to	sentiment;	a	converse	upsetting	of	sentimentality	with	humour;	admission	of	painful	or	repellent	desires	and	taboos,	usually	followed	by	a	deflation	of	the	shame	they	incite;	recurrent	themes	of	adultery	and	ephebophilia;	comparative	fusion	of	
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coming-of-age	and	midlife	crisis	drama;	observational,	performance-based	comedy	of	manners,	coupled	with	politically	aware	satire;	coverage	which	concentrates	the	viewer’s	attention	on	character	and	performance;	interventions	of	the	real	in	comical	situations,	whereupon	we	are	called	to	imagine	the	characters’	broader	lives	outside	of	the	comedic	diegesis;	a	critique	of	consumer	culture	obedience,	aspiration,	status	and	class	anxiety	in	the	suburbs;	a	concurrent	attempt	to	understand	the	roots	of	narcissism	and	promote	humility;	anatomisation	of	ennui,	depression	and	“affluenza”	(c.f.	Harmon)	in	the	suburban	malaise;	and	communally	prompted	redemption,	resulting	in	a	new	political	awareness	and	liberalised	care.	Being	a	low-cost	domestic	mode,	the	suburban	ensemble	film	also	features	a	predominance	of	early	career	and	first	time	filmmakers	working	on	limited	budgets.		 In	1999	three	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	films	were	released:	Election	(Alexander	Payne)	in	April,	followed	by	American	Beauty	and	Mumford	(Lawrence	Kasdan),	both	in	September.	Although	American	Beauty	was	by	far	the	most	successful	of	the	three	films	and	can	claim	the	clearest	lasting	impact	on	future	productions,	both	Election	and	Mumford	are	important	in	the	development	of	suburban	cinema	in	their	own	ways.	The	first	half	of	the	decade	saw	the	release	of	a	diverse	range	of	films	from	Rose	Troche’s	The	Safety	of	Objects	in	2001	to	Mike	Binder’s	The	Upside	of	Anger	in	2005.	2006	was	the	second	watershed	year,	with	the	much	darker	Little	Children	(Todd	Field)	and	ensemble	dramedy-road	movie	splice	Little	
Miss	Sunshine	both	receiving	awards	attention.	Films	like	Lymelife	(Derick	Martini,	2008)	cast	a	critical	eye	over	early	influential	texts,	referencing	American	Beauty	in	particular	and	revisiting	some	of	its	questionable	gender	politics	(Beuka	242;	Karlyn	passim)	and	haughty	spirituality	(Hentzi	49).	By	the	middle	of	the	decade,	the	genre	was	recognizable	enough	for	its	own	conventions	to	be	satirized	in	works	like	The	Chumscrubber	(Arie	Posin,	2005)	and	A	
Serious	Man	(Joel	Coen	and	Ethan	Coen,	2009).	Latter	works	include	The	Kids	Are	All	Right	and	
The	Oranges	(Julian	Farino,	2012).			 There	were	predecessors.	Although	American	Beauty	could	be	considered	the	watershed	moment,	an	earlier	breakthrough	is	evident	in	the	release	of	Parenthood	(Ron	Howard,	1989)	a	decade	prior,	then	an	unconventional	script	both	in	its	narrative	structure	and	resolve	to	scrutinise	the	inherent	drama	in	our	everyday	familial	relations	that	other	films	overlooked	or	sidelined	(I	will	take	a	closer	look	at	Parenthood	in	the	ensuing	chapter).	These	multi-character	family	dramedies	were	for	a	long	time	isolated	examples,	however.	For	now,	I	will	trace	some	of	the	more	generic	predecessors,	as	the	suburban	ensemble	film	has	
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amalgamated	conventions	from	a	number	of	filmic	traditions,	including	coming-of-age	and	teen	films,	infidelity	dramas,	televisual	family	sitcoms,	the	family	crisis	drama,	generational	reunion	pictures,	and	some	of	the	pioneering	post-Production	Code	ensemble	works	of	the	New	Hollywood	era.	Following	from	an	introductory	history	and	taxonomy	of	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy’s	influences,	this	chapter	looks	at	the	politics	of	suburban	representation	on	film,	discussions	around	its	affective	formula,	in	particular	the	implications	of	sentimentality	and	satire’s	interdependence,	and	finally	the	political	context	from	which	this	particular	ensemble	form	emerged	at	the	dawn	of	the	new	millennium.	First,	however,	as	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy’s	polyphonic	storytelling	presents	something	of	a	narrative	fusion	of	genre	forms	spanning	the	preceding	century,	I	turn	to	an	archaeology	of	some	thematic	elements	it	juxtaposes	and	revises,	including	various	iterations	of	domestic	melodrama	and	comedic	genres.	The	following	proliferation	of	genres	and	styles	suggests	from	the	outset	the	filmic	histories	millennial	suburban	ensembles	are	steeped	within,	and	in	many	cases	talk	back	to;	this	taxonomy	should	then	place	the	suburban	ensemble	in	a	historical	context,	providing	the	grounds	for	further	discussion	of	its	politics.			
The	Thematic	and	Generic	Heritage	of	the	Millennial	Suburban	Ensemble	Film		 A	number	of	dramatic	ensemble	film	forms	were	popular	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the	millennium:	the	episodic	family	genealogy	film,	often	emphasising	romance	or	theistic	identity,	such	as	István	Szabó’s	Sunshine	(1999),	released	the	same	year	as	American	Beauty;	the	social	issue	ensemble	drama,	such	as	Traffic	(Steven	Soderbergh)	in	2000,	or	what	Hsuan	L.	Hsu	describes	collectively	as	the	“Los	Angeles	ensemble	film”	(“Racial	Privacy”	134-143);77	and	Alejandro	González	Iñárritu’s	butterfly	effect	cinema	sustained	throughout	the	2000s,	a	popular	version	of	the	“network	narrative”	(Silvey),	“fractal”	(Everett)	or	“hyperlink”	(Quart	“Networked”)	cinema,	in	which	seemingly	disparate	people	are	revealed	to	share	causal	connections.	In	an	overwhelming	majority	of	these	films,	the	tragic	or	melodramatic	modes	far	outweighed	the	comedic,	and	suburbia	was	rarely	a	primary	consideration	(urban	spaces	are	much	more	prominent	in	the	above	examples).	These	phenomena	were	continuous	with	a	trend	of	proliferating	multi-protagonist	films	throughout	the	rapidly	globalising	1980s	(Azcona	The	Multi-Protagonist	Film),	and	of	course	with	countless	multi-focalised	literary	and																																																									77	Hsu	describes	these	films	as	categorically	melodramatic,	sociopolitically	mysticising	and	principally	urban.	Hsu’s	principal	example	is	Crash	(Paul	Haggis,	2004).		
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theatrical	traditions	before	that.	Nonetheless,	surveying	all	of	these	ensemble	forms,	it	does	appear	that	the	turn	of	the	millennium	initiated	special	interest	in	our	connectivity	and	shared	meaning.	This	is	perhaps	unsurprising	considering	plentiful	evidence	that	temporal	landmarks,	no	matter	how	apparently	arbitrary,	spur	searches	for	meaning	(Dai	et	al.;	Alter	and	Hershfield),	and	this	phenomenon	could	also	help	explain	the	high	volume	of	influential	film	productions	released	in	1999,	a	year	Geoff	King	positions	as	the	coming-of-age	of	Indiewood	filmmaking	(Indiewood	191-192).	Other	ensemble	pictures	became	popular	in	the	millennium’s	first	decade:	the	seasonal,	such	as	Love	Actually	(Richard	Curtis,	2003)	or	The	
Family	Stone	(Thomas	Bezucha,	2005);	the	thriller,	including	Quentin	Tarantino’s	works	and	
Rashomon-influenced	(Akira	Kurosawa,	1950)	polyphonic	perspectival	films	like	Vantage	
Point	(Pete	Travis,	2008)	or	Elephant	(Gus	Van	Sant,	2003);	musical	adaptations;	Rodrigo	García’s	women-centric	hyperlink	vignettes;	political	history	revision	narratives,	often	humanising	peripheral	characters,	such	as	Bobby	(Emilio	Estevez,	2006),	Battle	in	Seattle	(Stuart	Townsend,	2007)	or	Lions	for	Lambs	(Robert	Redford,	2007);	and	one-off	experiments	like	Timecode	(Mike	Figgis,	2000).	Nor	can	the	popularity	of	ensemble	filmmaking	be	considered	an	exclusively	American	phenomenon.	Notions	of	global	connectivity	in	popular	films	such	as	The	Edge	of	Heaven	(Fatih	Akin,	2007),	Michael	Haneke’s	Code	Unknown	(2000)	and	Susan	Biel’s	cinema	vivify	transnational	causality	and	thus	present	a	broader	political	reach.	Finally,	the	success	of	Paul	Thomas	Anderson’s	Los	Angeles	ensemble	Magnolia	(1999)	also	paved	the	way	for	a	number	of	connectivity	films	throughout	the	following	decade,	often	employing	a	similar	romantic	irony	and	narrativised	reflexivity	with	abstruse	purpose,	such	as	Happy	Endings	(Don	Roos,	2005),	The	Rules	of	Attraction	(Roger	Avary,	2002),	or	Thirteen	
Conversations	About	One	Thing	(Jill	Sprecher,	2001),	all	of	which	present	as	some	manner	of	temporal-causal	puzzle.		There	were	two	suburban	period	pieces	prefacing	the	ensemble	dramedy	genre	in	the	years	prior	to	American	Beauty:	The	Ice	Storm	(Ang	Lee,	1997),	a	parable	of	child	neglect	during	the	sexual	revolution,	and	Pleasantville	(Gary	Ross,	1998),	somewhat	more	facetiously	taking	aim	at	mediatised	ideals	of	1950s	suburbia.	These	were	both	accounts	of	mid-century	suburbia,	the	lasting	images	of	which	are,	as	Steven	Mintz	(353),	Stephanie	Coontz	(The	Way	
We	Never	Were)	and	Arlene	S.	Skolnick	(Embattled	Paradise)	all	assert,	inaccurate	representations	of	the	breadth	of	family	living	arrangements	across	America	at	the	time.	The	white	picket	nuclear	family	was	never	the	standard,	and	is	thus	a	case	of	ersatz	nostalgia,	or	“nostalgia	without	lived	experience	or	collective	historical	memory”	(Appadurai	78).	Drawing	
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on	ideas	from	historiographer	David	Lownethal,	suburban	media	narrative	theorist	David	R.	Coon	agrees:	despite	the	imprecision	of	so	many	of	our	presumptions	of	postwar	suburban	demography,	nostalgic	visions	of	the	suburban	archetype	are	still	motivated	to	create	demand	for	neotraditional	development	and	related	policy	goals,	as	well	as	to	criticize	these	goals	(30-68).78	The	archetype	–	or	suburban	façade	–	remains	a	fabrication	we	continue	to	discuss	as	if	it	were	a	real	rather	than	psychical	space,	or	“symbolic	ecology”	(Hunter	“The	Symbolic	Ecology	of	Suburbia”	199),	yet	Coon	suggests	that	in	1998,	Pleasantville	and	The	Truman	Show	(Peter	Weir)	anticipated	a	trend	in	self-reflexivity	around	suburban	image	construction.79	Understanding	suburbia	in	these	early	examples	of	the	genre	meant	understanding	homogeneity	–	whiteness,	family	standards	and	upper-middleness,	for	example,	were	tied	to	the	geographic	imaginary	of	extant	postwar	sociospatial	iterations,	even	if	the	reality	was	increasingly	divergent.		It	is	arguable,	though,	how	much	the	late	1990s	suburban	films	reveal	an	unacknowledged	psychical	construction	of	suburbia,	or	merely	extend	popular	fantasies	founded	on	a	suburban	stereotype.	Robert	Beuka	claims,	“these	films	also	represent	a	perpetuation	of	the	two-dimensional	view	of	suburban	life	that	has	characterized	the	dominant	perception	of	suburbia”	(14),	displaying	both	affection	for	and	chastising	attitudes	toward	the	fantasy	of	a	postwar	uniform	suburbia.	Pleasantville	and	The	Ice	Storm,	for	example,	in	different	ways	cautioned	against	idealising	a	sexually	confused	past,	both	emphasising	their	suburban	settings	as	nodes	in	the	history	of	sexual	repression.	David	E.	Wilt	points	out	that	The	Ice	Storm	riffs	on	themes	of	suburban	sexual	dissatisfaction	explored	in	1960s	exploitation	cinema	such	as	Sin	in	the	Suburbs	(Joe	Sarno,	1964)	and	Suburban	Roulette	(Herschell	Gordon	Lewis,	1968)	(484).	However,	again,	our	image	of	sexual	unknowing	in	these	eras	is	exaggerated	(perhaps	compounded	by	the	Production	Code’s	distortion	of	thematic	candour):	early	multi-character	coming-of-age	melodramas	such	as	Peyton	Place																																																									78	To	borrow	Svetlana	Boym’s	terms,	it	is	possible	to	have	reflective	rather	than	restorative	nostalgia;	that	is,	a	nostalgia	that	has	no	need	to	retrieve	a	version	of	the	past,	but	rather	remains	responsive	to	transience	(The	Future	of	Nostalgia).		79	In	fact,	the	Pleasantville,	Truman	Show	and	American	Beauty	trio	of	late	1990s	films	have	become	somewhat	of	a	benchmark	for	recent	scholarly	discussions	of	suburbia	on	screen	in	America	(Smicek	American	Dreams,	Suburban	Nightmares).	It	is	interesting	that	we	continue	to	return	to	this	trio	of	pictures	as	exemplary;	American	Beauty	appears	to	me	the	only	one	of	these	texts	whose	influence	can	be	clearly	charted	across	the	many	suburban	films	in	the	decade	to	follow.	It	is	also	notable	that	they	prevail	as	objects	of	critical	reading	on	many	high	school	curricula.		
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(Mark	Robson)	in	1957	and	Splendor	in	the	Grass	(Elia	Kazan)	in	1961	tackle	sexual	repression	lucidly,	as	well	as	providing	another	humanistic	suburban	ensemble	template.		Between	renewed	interest	in	the	family	unit	under	strain	in	the	1960s-70s,	surprisingly	giving	rise	to	“some	of	Hollywood’s	most	searching	explorations	of	family	life”	(Mintz	359),80	and	its	resurgence	after	1999,	American	cinema	often	reimagined	the	US	suburban	context	within	the	canon	of	popular	genre	film.	Examples	include	the	much-discussed	family-	and	home-under-threat	in	post-1960s	horror	and	suburban	Gothic,81	through	to	the	more	pointed	suburban	gender	politics	in	hostage/siege	dramas	such	as	Roger	Donaldson’s	Cadillac	Man	and	Michael	Cimino’s	Desperate	Hours	remake	(both	in	1990),	or	the	less	observed	gender	role	redefinition	of	comedy	features	such	as	Mr.	Mom	(Stan	Dragoti,	1983),	in	which	the	climax	sees	both	parents	(played	by	Teri	Garr	and	Michael	Keaton)	hastily	patching	together	a	deal	to	co-work	and	co-childrear,	out	of	necessity	to	mitigate	the	slapstick	chaos	unfolding	around	them	(the	settlement	comically	coincides	with	a	sudden	end	to	their	suburban	entropy).	The	generational	studies	of	reunion	films	The	Big	Chill	(Lawrence	Kasdan,	1983)	and	The	Return	of	the	Secaucus	Seven	(John	Sayles,	1979),	as	well	as	Barry	Levinson’s	“Baltimore	Films”	and	later,	Whit	Stillman’s	“Yuppie	Trilogy”,	all	provided	another	blueprint	for	ensemble	works	that	emphasised	social	inquiry.	Sayles’s	influence	in	particular	should	be	noted:	a	pioneer	of	creative	funding	methods	for	American	independent	filmmakers	of	the	1980s	and	1990s,	Sayles	was	already	known	for	his	various	experimentations	in	ensemble	cinema.	After	exploring	the	urban	ensemble	drama	with	City	of	Hope	in	1991,	Sayles	wrote	and	directed	a	number	of	fascinating	and	highly	political	hybrid	films:	he	crossed	the	small	town	ensemble	with	a	Frontera	Western	mystery	in	1996’s	Lone	Star,	and	with	the	survival	film	in	1999’s	Limbo,	before	reaching	perhaps	the	closest	he	would	come	to	a	purist	suburban	ensemble	with	2002’s	Sunshine	State,	a	look	at	development	politics	in	Florida,	and	then	returning	to	the	small	town	ensemble	detective	story	with	2004’s	Silver	City.	Although	his	works	never	quite	mimicked	a	recognisable	genre	form,	as	his	recognition	of	human	hybridity	in	all	its	forms	permeated	not	just	his	casting	and	dialogue	but	his	approach	to	genre	also,	it	is																																																									80	These	include	suburban	dramedy	precursors	such	as	the	domestic	humanism	of	ensemble	melodramas	like	Robert	Ellis	Miller’s	1968	adaptation	of	The	Heart	Is	A	Lonely	Hunter,	or	the	use	of	familial	estrangement	narratives	to	open	a	dialogue	with	emergent	antisuburbanism	in	
The	Gypsy	Moths	(John	Frankenheimer,	1969).		81	See	in	particular	Robin	Wood	“The	American	Family	Comedy:	From	Meet	Me	in	St.	Louis	to	
The	Texas	Chainsaw	Massacre.”		
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clear	that	Sayles’s	filmmaking	throughout	the	1990s	provided	another	model	for	the	millennial	suburban	ensemble	dramedy.	There	is	a	discernible	hope	for	developing	global	fairness	in	Sayles’s	reiteration	of	inevitable	hybridity	in	such	a	variety	of	narrative	spaces	(Moss-Wellington	“Humanist	Ethics	in	Casa”	199),	which	may	be	carried	from	Sayles’s	influential	ensemble	templates	to	later	suburban	pictures,	too.		Reaching	back	further,	there	are	clear	precedents	in	the	early	work	of	John	Cassavetes,	Mike	Nichols	–	particularly	in	the	care	displayed	for	all	characters,	malcontent	and	otherwise,	in	The	Graduate	(1967)	–	Peter	Bogdanovich’s	The	Last	Picture	Show	(1971),	Martin	Scorsese’s	Alice	Doesn’t	Live	Here	Anymore	(1974)	and	other	New	Hollywood	films	including	the	pioneering	ensemble	dramedies	of	Robert	Altman,	along	with	some	experiments	in	a	new	magic	realist	aesthetic	such	as	The	King	of	Marvin	Gardens	(Bob	Rafelson,	1972),	which	prompts	consideration	of	the	ambiguities	of	familial	responsibility.	The	voluntary	ratings	system	that	succeeded	the	Hays	Code	in	1968	clearly	opened	the	door	for	New	Hollywood	maturity,	capable	of	more	candid	representations	of	domestic	politics.	Altman	in	particular	experimented	with	(monogenerational,	non-suburban)	fusions	of	comedy	and	drama	across	an	ensemble	cast	with	MASH	(1970)	and	Nashville	(1975).	Before	this,	we	can	trace	the	humanising	of	suburban	lives	to	figures	including	Frank	Capra,	particularly	in	the	enormously	influential	It’s	a	Wonderful	Life	(1946).	We	can	also	trace	family	and	drawing	room	drama	on	the	stage	from	Henrik	Ibsen	and	Eugene	O’Neill	to	Tracy	Letts	today,	whose	August:	Osage	
County	was	adapted	into	a	suburban	ensemble	film	by	John	Wells	in	2013.	Although	all	of	these	works	contain	elements	that	would	turn	up	in	later	American	indie	cinema,	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	as	genre,	with	sustained	conventions	of	its	own,	did	not	cohere	until	the	turn	of	the	millennium.		Perhaps	one	of	the	clearest	generic	threads	prefacing	the	suburban	dramedy	cinematic	form	can	be	witnessed	across	family	crisis	dramas,	from	the	affecting	narrative	efficiency	of	
Kramer	vs.	Kramer	(Robert	Benton,	1979)	to	Ordinary	People	(Robert	Redford,	1980)	and	palliative	dramas	like	Dad	(Gary	David	Goldberg,	1989),	right	up	to	One	True	Thing	(Carl	Franklin)	and	Stepmom	(Chris	Columbus)	in	1998.	Of	course,	these	films	tend	away	from	comedic	relief,	lean	to	melodrama,	and	mostly	fixate	on	parental	concerns	rather	than	equalising	our	sympathies	across	generations	or	neighbourhoods.	They	also	may	have	got	it	wrong:	in	the	crisis	drama,	we	often	we	see	family	trauma	(particularly	the	loss	of	a	child)	tearing	families	apart,	where	research	demonstrates	that	shared	dysphoric	experience	is	
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actually	more	likely	to	bind	communities	through	identity	fusion	(Whitehouse	284)	and	promote	cooperation	(Bastian	et	al.	2014).82	Many	films	of	this	ilk,	however,	do	take	gender	role	definition	as	a	springboard	for	drama	–	in	particular	Kramer	vs.	Kramer	and	One	True	
Thing83	–	and	this	remains	a	key	component	in	most	millennial	suburban	ensemble	works.	Later,	Alexander	Payne	fused	the	family	crisis	drama	with	ensemble	dramedy	conventions	in	both	The	Descendants	(2011)	and	Nebraska	(2013).	The	latter,	perhaps	less	humanistic	than	many	of	Payne’s	works,	exemplifies	an	in-vogue	fantasy	of	small	town	and	semi-rural	suburban	existentialism,	permeating	films	as	diverse	as	Fargo	(Joel	Coen	and	Ethan	Coen,	1996)	and	The	Good	Girl	(Miguel	Arteta,	2002).	Each	offers	discriminatory	visions	of	a	mundane	world	the	very	provincialism	of	which	diminishes	human	worth	and	potential	–	a	barren	aesthetic	and	moral	landscape,	and	its	parallel	physical	and	human	geography,	generates	parochial	ennui.		Sexual	politics	play	a	substantial	part	in	many	of	the	millennial	suburban	dramedies,	in	particular	infidelity,	and	deconstruction	of	a	contemporary	confusion	around	young	sexuality	and	pubescence.	Therefore	another	precedent	can	be	witnessed	across	infidelity	dramas,	from	
Brief	Encounter	(David	Lean,	1945)	to	Strangers	When	We	Meet	(Richard	Quine,	1960),	both	considering	the	context	in	which	the	infidelity	takes	place,	and	of	course	Lolita	(Stanley	Kubrick,	1962).	There	is	also	a	subgenre	honing	in	on	the	inextricability	of	gender,	class	and	sexual	politics,	in	which	well-to-do	families	invite	a	young	prostitute	to	stay	with	them	as	part	of	a	saviour	fantasy;	they	usually	end	up	parting	ways	with	the	young	woman’s	life	relatively	unchanged,	and	the	upper	suburbanites	having	an	epiphany	which	allows	them	to	move	past	a	roadblock	in	their	lives.	Examples	include	Afternoon	Delight	(Jill	Soloway,	2013),	unpleasantly	concluding	with	the	lead	character’s	relationship	satisfaction	after	an	opaque	sexual-philosophical	breakthrough	she	has	used	and	dumped	a	young	sex	worker	to	obtain,																																																									82	Sara	Albuquerque	et	al.	found	that	“a	child’s	death	can	cause	cohesive	as	well	as	detrimental	effects	on	a	couple’s	relationship”	(30)	and	Astri	Syse	et	al.	found	no	general	association	between	childhood	cancer	and	risk	of	parental	divorce	(“Does	Childhood	Cancer	Affect	Parental	Divorce	Rates?”).		83	While	the	former	documents	the	recompense	of	renewed	familial	fulfilment	following	the	inherent	drama	of	gender	identities	in	flux	(making	the	case	for	reciprocal	gain	when	sex	roles	become	unbound),	the	latter	recognises	and	elegantly	magnifies	casual	sexism	underscoring	the	family	lives	of	a	New	York	cultural	elite;	however	it	doesn’t	use	the	recognition	of	gender	roles	to	dismiss	or	discredit	the	lives	of	those	participating	in	them	–	the	film	is,	in	part,	about	honouring	the	lives	of	those	we	don’t	necessarily	agree	with,	including	those	who	have	absorbed	archaic	gender	roles.		
 138	
and	the	more	palatable	Welcome	to	the	Rileys	(Jake	Scott,	2010),	at	least	allowing	some	conciliatory	discourse	to	take	place	as	we	return	to	a	more	comforting	normality	of	separation	between	classes.	In	these	films,	our	identification	and	ultimately	our	sympathies	are	aligned	with	the	normalised	upper-middle	families;	their	exoneration	becomes	more	important	than	the	lives	of	their	protégés.	It	is	also	worth	noting	a	contemporaneous	spike	in	four-hander	adultery	and	spouse-swapping	films	including	Fourplay	(Mike	Binder,	2001),	We	Don't	Live	
Here	Anymore	(John	Curran,	2004),	Closer	(Mike	Nichols,	2004)	and	Married	Life	(Ira	Sachs,	2007),	and	some	earlier,	lesser-known	ensemble	pictures	dealing	with	monogamy	such	as	
Denial	(Adam	Riffkin,	1998).		Recent	melodramas	may	seem	to	be	a	useful	reference	here,	from	the	knowingly	ham-fisted	excesses	of	Todd	Haynes’s	didactic	suburban	critiques,	including	Douglas	Sirk	homage	
Far	from	Heaven	in	2002	and	1995’s	Safe,	to	the	outrageously	popular	high	production	soaps	of	HBO.	The	emotional	arc	of	a	majority	of	suburban	dramedy	films	seems	derived	in	no	small	way	from	television,	perhaps	as	television	provided	an	early	model	for	the	family	ensemble,	across	which	further	structural	influences	were	carried.	Indeed,	feminist	media	theorist	Lynn	Spigel	has	underscored	just	how	much	of	our	historic	presumptions	of	suburbia	were	carried	through	television	in	Welcome	to	the	Dreamhouse.	However,	as	the	millennial	suburban	dramedies	resist	melodrama	in	favour	of	diverse	attempts	at	realism,	and	a	pathos	tempered	by	humour,	I	see	more	in	common	with	family	sitcoms	such	as	Roseanne	and	socially	conscious	predecessors	such	as	The	Mary	Tyler	Moore	Show,	All	in	the	Family,	Diff’rent	Strokes	or	Good	Times	than	TV	serials	such	as	ABC’s	Desperate	Housewives	or	Big	Love,	both	of	which	attempt	to	“transcend”	geographic	specificity	in	suburban	depiction	(Coon	223),	and	thus	wind	up	as	hyperbolic	misrepresentation.84	Roseanne	pioneered	a	kind	of	dramedy	in	the	family	sitcom	format	that	has	clear	threads	to	this	day:	the	gags	are	often	cruel,	the	characters	overtly	aggressive	toward	one	another,	but	when	they	are	faced	with	the	complex	ethical	dimensions	of	a	particular	social	dilemma	and	struggle	to	devise	their	own	resolution,	each	short	story	concludes	with	opportunities	for	sentiment,	as	each	character’s	attempts	to	do	the	best	they	can	demonstrates	a	genuine	care	for	one	another.	The	format	was	carried	through	cartoons	such	as	The	Simpsons	to	today’s	Modern	Family,	albeit	gathering	excess	ironic																																																									84	Similarly,	the	American	soap	opera	presents	another	domestic	ensemble	template,	yet	a	sustained	melodramatic	singularity	and	internal	moral	concerns’	preclusion	of	broader	socio-political	reflexivity	distance	soap	conventions	from	the	suburban	dramedy.	Perhaps	again,	the	sitcom	Soap	could	be	seen	as	a	more	influential	text	than	any	purely	dramatic	televisual	narratives.		
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address	along	the	way,	which	by	the	time	of	Modern	Family	would	overwhelm	and	undermine	any	social	critique	or	sincerity.	Of	course,	the	difference	remains	that	Roseanne	admitted	class	and	regularly	foregrounded	financial	concerns.	These	influences	are,	sadly,	now	dwindling	in	related	sitcoms;	where	they	are	apparent,	class	too	often	becomes	farce,	as	with	a	series	like	
Raising	Hope.	Equivalent	contemporary	programmes	are	drained	of	sentimentality	until	only	the	humour	remains,	as	in	the	pathos-hostile	Family	Guy;	these	productions	demonstrate	a	tendency	to	bigotry,	complicating	the	notion	of	sentimentality	as	conservative	praxis,	which	I	will	assess	later	in	the	chapter.85		As	coming-of-age	and	teen	films	involve	a	liberal	dose	of	family	relations,	many	of	the	conventions	also	have	crossover	with	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy.	Some	films,	such	as	
Juno	(Jason	Reitman,	2007),	Dirty	Girl	(Abe	Sylvia,	2010)	or	The	Way	Way	Back	(Nat	Faxon	and	Jim	Rash,	2013)	straddle	the	border	between	the	suburban	dramedy	and	coming-of-age	film.	These	pictures	have	absorbed	a	progression	in	teen	revolt	dramas	from	Rebel	Without	a	
Cause	(Nicholas	Ray,	1955),	and	of	course	Peyton	Place	and	Splendor	in	the	Grass,	along	with	milder	coming-of-age	ensemble	features	like	American	Graffiti	(George	Lucas,	1973),	through	rebellion	hysteria	pictures	Suburbia	(Penelope	Spheeris,	1984)	and	Over	the	Edge	(Jonathan	Kaplan,	1979),	in	which	the	youths’	disgruntlement	explicitly	stems	from	the	town	planning	self-interest	of	their	parents.	This	was	followed	by	Francis	Ford	Coppola’s	S.E.	Hinton	adaptations,	then	via	John	Hughes	and	the	“brat	pack”	to	Richard	Linklater’s	more	sober	reflections	on	youth	rites	of	passage.	Concurrently	to	Linklater’s	early	youth	studies,	films	such	as	House	Party	(Reginald	Hudlin,	1990)	began	to	chart	changes	in	racial	and	spatial	mobility,	as	racially	mixed	characters	“traverse	a	landscape	that	runs	the	gamut	from	inner-city	‘projects’	through	lower-	and	middle-class	suburban	fringe	neighbourhoods	to	the	upper-middle-class	suburbs”	(Beuka	216-217),	and	Lasse	Hallström	extended	his	own	rite	of	passage	filmmaking	to	variations	on	a	multi-character	suburban	perspective	for	the	humanistic	features	Once	Around	in	1991,	What’s	Eating	Gilbert	Grape	in	1993	and	the	more	episodic	bildungsroman	The	Cider	House	Rules	in	1999.	Hallström’s	later	films,	however,	waned	in	humanist	subject	matter.		Post-Hughes	studio	teen	pictures	too,	such	as	Easy	A	(Will	Gluck,	2010),	now	include	more	screen	time	and	consideration	of	parents,	teachers	and	other	adults	in	the	lead	teen’s																																																									85	See	under	“Drama	in	the	Comedy:	The	Problem	of	Sentiment	and	the	Possibility	of	Affective	Equilibrium”	below.		
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life,	which	indicates	a	trade	in	genre	conventions	has	begun	to	take	place	(perhaps	also	taking	cues	from	the	broader	suburban	critique	of	independent	predecessors,	such	as	Hal	Hartley’s	teen	romance	films).	On	the	other	hand,	films	like	The	Kids	Are	All	Right	and	Enough	Said	(Nicole	Holofcener,	2013)	take	a	dramatic	moment	in	teenagers’	lives	(moving	out	of	home	to	college)	and	focus	on	the	way	in	which	the	parents	displace	their	anxiety	around	the	lifestyle	shift	to	relationships	with	their	partners	and	peers.	The	latter	splices	the	kids-going-to-college	movie	with	romantic	comedy	conventions.	The	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	does	not	necessarily	require	inclusion	of	family:	some	films,	such	as	What	Goes	Up	(Jonathan	Glatzer,	2009)	and	Best	Man	Down	(Ted	Koland,	2013),	include	very	little	to	no	family	relations,	focusing	on	the	relationship	between	children	and	adults	who	are	related	by	extra-familial	acquaintance.	What	Goes	Up,	like	Election,	could	be	seen	as	representative	of	another	movement	in	this	cinema:	the	focus	on	adults	in	high	school	contexts.	Some	include	a	breadth	of	young	people	and	their	teachers,	and	some,	such	as	Juno	or	Butter,	examine	how	a	central	character	relates	to	a	breadth	of	adults	and	peers	around	them.	Others	again,	such	as	Mumford	or	The	Station	Agent	(Thomas	McCarthy,	2003),	include	little	or	no	lead	child	or	teen	roles.	Many	of	these	films	test	the	boundaries	of	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy,	which	is,	like	all	genres,	permeable.	In	summary,	coming	of	age	cinema	could	be	seen	as	symbiotic	with	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	(often	sharing	a	suburban	context	and	considering	the	meaning	of	family):	early	teen	cinema	could	be	seen	as	inspiring	a	suburban	ensemble	formula	of	humour	and	pathos,	and	in	turn	teen	films	have	featured	larger	ensembles	with	a	greater	breadth	of	character	types	receiving	attention	alongside	young	protagonists.	For	now,	though,	I	will	stick	to	analysis	of	those	films	that	work	squarely	within	the	confines	of	the	suburban	ensemble	rather	than	bildungsroman	or	teen	cinemas	that	have	incorporated	suburban	ensemble	influences.		So	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	presents	an	amalgamation	of	several	genres,	both	antecedent	and	concomitant.	It	borrows	their	conventions	and	fuses	them	into	something	comparative	and	new.	Wilt	compellingly	identifies	the	longstanding	influence	of	another	convention	in	exaggeration	of	the	relatively	mundane	activity	of	home	maintenance	and	renovation,	extrapolated	to	a	(usually	comedic)	nightmare	(482):	examples	include	1948’s	Mr.	
Blandings	Builds	His	Dream	House	to	1986’s	The	Money	Pit.	Aspirational-conformist	suburban	aesthetic	gags	were	once	the	bread	and	butter	of	satirical	fantasy	filmmakers	in	the	suburban	Gothic	tradition,	too:	Tim	Burton	opening	Beetlejuice	(1988)	with	a	spider	crawling	over	a	model	dream	home,	for	instance,	and	Edward	Scissorhands	(1990)	with	cookie-cutter	
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suburban	rooftops	of	alluring	toybox	colours.	The	“imaginative	construction	of	suburbia	as	uniformly	dull	or	relentlessly	gaudy”	(Millard	186)	endures	as	a	fantasy	of	cultural	specificity	and	diversity	of	taste	lacking	in	the	suburban	populace.	Neighbors	(John	G.	Avildsen,	1981),	
Parents	(Bob	Balaban,	1989)	and	Serial	Mom	(John	Waters,	1994)	also	reach	for	a	cynical	fantasy	show	of	suburban	horrors	via	camp	hyperbole.	Joe	Dante	draws	attention	to	the	inherent	solipsism	of	these	images	in	The	‘Burbs	(1989)	when,	in	one	of	the	most	underrated	film	openings	in	cinema,	we	zoom	in	from	the	Universal	logo	(aspiring	to	considerations	of	the	global)	right	into	a	darkened,	pristinely	art	directed	film	set	of	a	suburban	cul-de-sac	(parochial	considerations	are	now	inescapable),	where	a	hilariously	extrinsic	trophy	home	cum	Gothic	mansion	looms	over	the	street.	Composer	Jerry	Goldsmith’s	disconcerting,	alien	percussion	blends	into	ominous	string	arrangement	clichés	recognisable	from	recent	thriller	films,	culminating	in	the	classic,	over-the-top	Gothic	organ	to	craft	a	truly	unique	experience	projecting	the	viewer	into	the	suburban	uncanny.86	These	hyperbolic	images	of	material	conformity,	once	a	dark	gag	exposing	absurdity	in	the	media	fantasy	of	the	suburban	façade,	were	imported	right	into	the	realist	dramedy	in	1999	with	American	Beauty.		Finally,	the	concept	of	the	façade	in	suburban	representation	is	a	long-standing	cliché	of	particular	interest	to	these	filmmakers,	many	of	whom	challenge	its	summary	of	suburbia	as	a	front	for	depravity	or	vice,	while	others,	such	as	writer/director	Derrick	Borte	in	The	
Joneses	(2009),	uncritically	replicate	it.	The	imagery	associated	with	the	suburban	façade	has	also	been	increasingly	loaded	with	irony,	revealing	a	growing	discomfort	with	its	uncomplicated	deployment.	Despite	enduring	appeals	to	“look	closer”,	as	in	American	Beauty’s	publicity	campaign,	or	strip	back	appearances	to	“shatter	the	illusion”	and	expose	“what	is	hidden	underneath”	(Coon	18-19),	we	are	already	familiar	with	what	is	hidden	underneath.	The	discourse	and	tropes	of	an	intellectual	“special	access”	cajole	us	into	thinking	we	are	being	granted	an	exceptional	vision	of	deeper	truth,	when	all	we	are	witnessing	is	dog-eared	manipulation	of	fantastical	socio-spatial	iconography	masquerading	as	truth,	repeating	the	viewer’s	preconceptions:	“look	closer”	assumes	the	on-screen	suburbs	are	a	reality	hiding	a	truer	reality.	A	central	tenet	of	both	Pleasantville	and	The	Truman	Show	is	that	there	is	a	real	world	outside	of	the	suburban	ideal	or	utopia,	and	the	notion	has	extended	in	American	
																																																								86	This	musical	pastiche	was,	in	some	ways,	an	experimental	self-parody	of	more	serious-minded	genre	scoring	conventions	that	Goldsmith	himself	had	employed	across	previous	features	(Clemmensen	np).		
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antisuburban	cinema	since	their	release	in	1998.87	Coon	admits	these	spaces	are	as	bogus	as	the	West	of	the	Western,	or	the	crime-addled	urbanity	of	a	noir	thriller	(19-20),	or	what	Beuka	refers	to	as	a	suburban	“imagined	environment,	a	landscape	of	the	mind”	(229).	“Despite	the	range	of	options	available,”	Coon	says,	“storytellers	tend	to	return	to	one	particular	vision	of	suburbia	more	than	any	other.	As	a	result,	the	image	of	the	suburb	as	a	middle-class	bedroom	community	continues	to	dominate	our	cultural	imagination,	even	as	the	reality	of	suburban	life	becomes	increasingly	difficult	to	define”	(222).	Reliance	on	some	veracity	of	the	suburban	façade	as	a	real-world	phenomenon	in	a	film	like	The	Joneses	lays	bare	the	didactic	and	cynical	elitism	of	its	reductive	fantasy,	totalising	all	suburban	lives	as	unfulfilling,	vapid	and	concealing	corruption,	duplicity,	or	human	ill.	New	York	Times	journalist	Stephen	G.	Freedman	uses	the	films	of	Todd	Solondz	to	point	out	how	this	antisuburban	cinema	implicitly	frames	its	concerns	as	polarised,	ideological	war	between	those	who	struggle	in	the	confines	of	suburbia,	and	those	who	epitomise	it:		 Solondz,	a	native	of	New	Jersey	who	calls	his	production	company	Suburban	Pictures,	means	to	speak	for	the	misfits	in	a	monochromatic	world	…	Such	compassion,	though,	relies	on	cheap	shots	against	whatever	or	whomever	represents	the	suburban	status	quo.	The	white-collar	father	in	“Happiness,”	a	Cheeveresque	figure	with	his	car	phone	and	rep	tie,	cannot	simply	be	unmasked	as	a	hypocrite	or	a	souse;	no,	he	turns	out	to	be	a	pederast	who	rapes	his	son’s	playmates.	When	Mr.	Solondz’s	camera	in	“Dollhouse”	surveys	a	suburban	home,	it	lingers	over	a	veritable	catalogue	of	bad	taste	–	gaudy	afghans,	mismatched	paneling,	green	shag	carpet,	cabinets	stuffed	with	Yodels	and	Ring	Dings.	This	kind	of	satire,	far	from	seeking	to	jar	an	audience	out	of	its	complacency,	sneers	along	with	it	from	a	superior	distance.		(1)		After	the	millennium	however,	a	new	breed	of	films,	largely	independently	produced,	have	taken	the	time	to	reclaim	and	explore	humanising	character	possibilities	within	the	suburban	cinematic	context.																																																										87	Another	formal	difference	is	that	films	like	The	Truman	Show	and	Pleasantville	begin	with	a	falsely	idyllic	absence	of	conflict	and	then	incrementally	reveal	schisms	undergirding	their	suburban	context	–	in	this	way	they	“reveal”	suburbia	as	fraught.	Later	suburban	cinema,	from	
American	Beauty	onward,	begins	from	the	assumption	of	suburban	friction	and	increasingly	works	inversely	from	conflicts	toward	their	resolution,	shifting	the	narrative	focus	substantially.		
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None	of	this	is	to	suggest	a	complete	expulsion	of	antihumanism	from	suburban	depiction	in	cinema	after	1999.	On	one	hand,	filmmakers	like	Derek	Cianfrance	with	Blue	
Valentine	(2010)	and	Mendes	with	Revolutionary	Road	(2008)	extended	“yet	another	presentation	of	the	suburban	world	as	a	hopeless	trap	for	clueless	people	who	had	wanted	more	out	of	life	than	marriage”	(Basinger	353).	The	image	of	suburbia	as	prison	sustains.	Across	the	history	of	suburban	cinema,	a	number	of	films,	unpleasantly	asserting	their	misogyny	as	comedy,	also	reveal	an	impulse	to	blame,	punish	or	deride	women	(at	worst	offering	their	simulated	abuse	as	nihilistic	catharsis)	for	a	perceived	awfulness	seething	under	the	suburban	façade:	from	Blue	Velvet	(David	Lynch,	1986)	to	American	Beauty,	and	to	an	extent	The	Stepford	Wives	(Bryan	Forbes,	1975),	these	films	identified	the	suburban	malaise	as	a	female	problem,	the	regressive	mores	and	routines	particular	to	women’s	domesticity	(The	Stepford	Wives)	and	women	internalising	or	sustaining	the	worst	of	American	competitive	exceptionalism	(American	Beauty);	these	films	often	went	on	to	scorn	and	degrade	their	female	characters	for	such	crimes	(Blue	Velvet).	They	are	part	of	an	ongoing	suppressive	characterisation	of	women’s	domesticity	as	operating	outside	of	real	labour,	productivity	and	political	relevance	(McHugh	193).	Susan	Saegert	critiques	this	sustaining	misconception	of	the	suburban,	private	and	parochial	as	feminine	and	the	urban,	public	and	productive	as	masculine	in	“Masculine	Cities	and	Feminine	Suburbs.”		
American	Beauty’s	inclusion	of	elements	of	aesthetic	fantasy	also	reveals	a	key	development	unfolding	throughout	the	ensemble	dramedies	of	the	2000s:	the	gradual	relinquishing	of	extra-realist	style	(a	realism	occasionally	interrupted	by	presentational	flourishes,	dreamlike	sequences	or	editing	bombast,	particularly	evident	in	the	early	works	of	Alexander	Payne).	Concurrently,	we	see	a	movement	away	from	the	distancing	irony	associated	with	filmmakers	like	Wes	Anderson	and	Solondz,	through	a	more	romantic	irony	and	eventually	to	a	clear	reaction	against	postmodern	ironic	distance.88	As	the	suburban	ensemble	developed	as	a	recognisable	cinematic	mode,	it	would	eschew	the	ironic	and	metafictive	address	still	lingering	in	American	Beauty	and	Election,	supplanting	remaining																																																									88	Figures	including	Anderson,	Solondz,	Noah	Baumbach,	David	O.	Russell,	their	contemporaries	and	their	independent	predecessors,	like	Hal	Hartley	–	variously	labelled	the	directors	of	“smart	cinema”	(Sconce	“Irony,	Nihilism”;	Perkins	132-156)	and	members	of	an	ironically	named	New	Sincerity	(Hancock	np;	Olsen	17)	–	have	worked	with	ensemble	family	casts,	yet	they	tend	to	operate	outside	of	realist	modes	and	emphasise	the	inventiveness	of	their	artifice,	and	as	Kim	Wilkins	suggests,	many	present	an	amplification	of	meticulously	orchestrated	eccentricities,	disclosed	through	“hyper-dialogue”	or	evasive,	perhaps	pop-ironic	verbosity,	behind	which	lies	an	ongoing	existential	meditation	(413).		
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distancing	techniques	with	a	much	more	prominent	sincere	realism,	proximity	to	and	care	for	character.	King	notes	that	in	Little	Miss	Sunshine	and	Juno,	“Ironic	distance	and	foregrounding	of	quirks	tends	to	give	way	to	a	more	direct	appeal	on	this	ground	that	seems	to	be	intended	seriously	and	unironically”	(Indie	2.0	42).	Some	films	–	perhaps	most	markedly	Juno	–	chart	this	course	within	their	own	structure:	beginning	with	overt	quirky	irony,	having	the	irony	challenged	with	interventions	of	the	real,	moving	through	sincerity	in	order	to	deal	responsibly	with	the	awakened	drama,	and	ending	with	a	kind	of	mediated	irony,	a	kinder	self-awareness	that	does	not	permit	dismissal	of	human	frailty	or	the	manner	of	irreverence	postmodern	irony	appears	to	invite.89	The	difference,	then,	is	that	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	is	a	predominantly	realist	mode:	the	object	of	our	attention	is	the	narrative’s	ethics	rather	than	its	construction,	or	the	pleasure	of	identifying	the	hand	of	a	cinematic	auteur	like	Solondz	or	Anderson	in	the	aesthetics	of	a	film	world.		This	realist	tradition	is	also	what	differentiates	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	from	millennial	hyperlink	cinema	such	as	Happy	Endings	or	Thirteen	Conversations	About	One	
Thing,	perhaps	its	closest	ensemble	relative	unfolding	on	a	similar	timeframe.	In	these	pictures,	the	hermeneutic	confusion	propelled	by	ironic	devices	–	such	as	“register	alteration,	exaggeration	or	understatement,	contradiction	or	incongruity,	literalization	or	simplification,	and	repetition	or	echoic	mention”	(Hutcheon	152)	–	becomes	a	metaphor	for	contemporary	identity	confusion,	whereby	we	must	likewise	make	meaning	from	complex,	splintered	communities	with	ambiguous	interpersonal	cause-effect	structures.	In	this	way,	they	wield	the	techniques	of	narrative	irony	(fudging	intentionality	to	explore	open-endedly	interpretive	spaces)	to	represent	an	existentialism	particular	to	the	encroaching	digital	era’s	splintered	causal	relationships.	The	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	consequently	sought	to	answer	the	questions	of	shared	meaning	making	raised	by	the	ironic	connectivity	narrative,	and	by	earlier	examples	of	the	suburban	ensemble	form.	This	left	two	very	different	forms:	the	suburban	dramedy’s	focus	on	human	drama	and	earnest	approach	to	quotidian	moral	predicaments,	with	smart	and	connectivity	cinema	tethered	to	ironic,	presentational	or	
																																																								89	In	fact,	at	times	the	clichés	of	the	American	“smart	film”	are	antithetical	to	the	humanistic	ambitions	of	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy:	“In	each	film,	the	suburb	is	rendered	as	a	veritable	totalitarian	state	that	denies	individuality	and	represses	freedom	through	its	institutions	of	work,	school	and	family.	Limited	detail	is	given	on	the	particulars	of	any	character’s	job:	all	are	sketched	in	broad,	cartoonish	terms	of	boredom	and	surveillance”	(Perkins	141).		
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otherwise	aestheticized	modes	of	address,	along	with	the	films	of	cult	drawcard	directors	like	Anderson	and	Solondz.90		There	is	a	sense	in	which	the	films	I	am	concerned	with	could	be	designated	domestic	ensemble	dramedies	rather	than	suburban.	However	it	is	important	to	note	that	even	those	that	particularise	their	locations	are	working	with	and	against	visions	of	suburbia	inherited	from	previous	works	(rather	than	the	everysuburbia	of	films	like	Little	Children	and	The	
Oranges).	Their	geographic	particularity	upsets	notions	of	uniformity	across	the	medium	density	living	arrangements	broadly	designated	as	“suburban”	–	for	example	the	small	town	or	semi-rural	suburbia	of	Mumford	or	Junebug,	or	the	different	versions	of	suburbia	within	greater	Los	Angeles	that	are	presented	in	The	Kids	Are	All	Right	(Horn	and	Cholodenko	2).91	Later	films	increasingly	talk	back	to	a	notion	of	suburban	homogeneity	resurrected	and	propagated	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	so	in	their	geographic	specificity	they	are	still	engaged	with	a	critique	of	suburban	media.	Lymelife	is	emphatically	set	in	Syosset,	Nassau	County,	yet	references	the	everybusurbia	of	earlier	films	including	The	Safety	of	Objects	in	its	model	houses,	materialist	symbolism	and	dark	aesthetic,	and	American	Beauty	in	its	synonymous	narrative	structure;	Little	Miss	Sunshine	takes	place	mostly	on	the	road,	but	still	works	within	the	template	inherited	from	these	earlier	suburban	films.	As	the	suburban	critique	retains	such	a	primacy	across	all	of	these	works,	I	prefer	suburban	ensemble	to	domestic	ensemble.	In	this	case,	however,	I	leave	out	urban	ensembles	such	as	the	work	of	Holofcener	and	Kenneth	Lonergan’s	Margaret	(2011).	The	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	is	effectively	one	kind	of	domestic	ensemble	that	emerged	in	the	millennium.		Historicising	a	mode	of	filmmaking	or	cinematic	genre	is,	of	course,	not	without	definitional	problems.	As	many	philosophers	have	pointed	out,	the	nature	of	genre	is,	like	all	categorisations	of	human	activity,	and	like	the	human	itself,	porous.	Considering	the																																																									90	María	del	Mar	Azcona	treats	the	“multi-protagonist	film”	as	genre,	however	excepting	a	passing	reference	to	Little	Miss	Sunshine	(121)	the	suburban	ensembles	do	not	feature	as	examples	in	her	otherwise	comprehensive	book.	Azcona’s	multi-protagonist	film	seems	again	more	closely	tied	to	the	network,	fractal	or	connectivity	film,	as	is	her	thesis	of	globalisation	popularising	the	genre	(128,	135-137).		91	“Suburban”	does	not	simply	mean	the	outskirts	of	the	urban,	it	is	an	arrangement	of	housing	density	that	produces	changes	to	the	geographies	it	is	iterated	within;	this	is	why	I	include	small	town	suburban	ensemble	works	like	Mumford	or	Junebug.	Human	geographers,	of	course,	continue	to	point	to	the	instability	of	all	of	these	terms	(Brenner	and	Schmid	749-752).		
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seemingly	infinite	ways	we	can	group	texts	–	by	form,	ideology,	use	or	purpose,	for	example	–	any	categorisation	will	always	be	vulnerable	to	alternate	classifications.92	But	nominal	problems	never	completely	invalidate	the	use	of	problematic	terminology	in	scrutinising	cultural	adaptation	or	change;	despite	the	challenges,	it	still	behoves	us	to	take	note	of	commonalities	and	chart	patterns	in	ever-changing	cultural	formulae,	as	the	narrative	that	genre	language	directs	us	to	is	one	of	human	adaptation	and	transformation.	As	John	Frow	puts	it,	succinctly:	“Instead	of	being	‘in’	a	genre,	texts	are	transformative	instantiations	of	genres,”	and	so	genres	introduce	a	range	of	discursive	tools	around	cultural	transformation	(“Reproducibles”	1633).	Genre	identification	is	an	act	of	historicism	and	can	potentially	reflect	the	complexities	of	cultural	shift,	involving	multi-causal	interactions	which	can	be	economic,	symbolic,	socially	direct,	or	reciprocally	influential:	“a	genre	develops	according	to	social	conditions;	transformations	in	genre	and	texts	can	influence	and	reinforce	social	conditions”	(Thwaites	et	al.,	100).	As	Daniel	Chandler	puts	it:	“An	interpretative	emphasis	on	genre	as	opposed	to	individual	texts	can	help	to	remind	us	of	the	social	nature	of	the	production	and	interpretation	of	texts”	(5).	That	is,	genre	identifications	are	yet	another	kind	of	storytelling	focused	on	the	complexities	of	social	interaction	(and	are	thus	subject	to	the	same	responsibilities	as	any	other	narrative	act).		While	the	genre	anatomy	detailed	so	far	points	to	some	of	the	interactions	between	the	suburban	ensemble	film	and	other,	related	filmmaking	tropes,	there	remains	a	distinct	subgenre	of	humanist	filmmaking,	or	a	mode	of	creation	bringing	together	humanistic	ideological	traits	(respecting	our	struggles	to	get	along)	within	a	particular	format	(suburban;	multi-focalised;	shifting	affect),	which	is	recognisable	even	with	its	permeable	boundaries.	After	Janet	Staiger	(“Film	Noir	as	Male	Melodrama”;	“Hybrid	or	Inbred”),	genre	identification	is	in	itself	a	political	act,	and	we	can	probably	learn	more	about	the	development	of	narrative	conventions	and	related	psychology	if	we	avoid	extrapolating	from	perceived	patterns	into	alleged	purity	in	genre	labelling,	and	perhaps	by	privileging	an	examination	of	the	ways	filmic	works	resist	presupposed	generic	boundaries.	We	do	not	want	to	rob	filmmaking	of	its	explorative	nature	by	anachronistically	applying	categorical	intent	to	each	motion	picture,	thus	it	is	important	to	identify	problem	works	and	canonical	in-betweens.	Some	of	the	films	I	look	at	significantly	overlap	with	other	genres,	such	as	Election	(the	high	school	or	teen	film)	and	Little	Miss	Sunshine	(the	road	movie),	and	others	innovate	subtly	within	more																																																									92	See	in	particular	Daniel	Chandler’s	broad-reaching	attempts	at	a	typology	in	“An	Introduction	to	Genre	Theory.”		
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recognisable	genre	confines,	for	example	The	Oranges	and	Lymelife.	All,	however,	ask	where	we	might	take	film	next,	to	remain	relevant	and	intriguing.	In	a	Darwinian	sense,	hybridity	is	life	–	mutation,	trial	and	error,	mixing	components.	Genre	hybridity	is	a	story	of	human	hybridity,	of	cultural	evolution	and	changing	interests.	These	texts	began	as	an	experimental	mix	not	only	of	genres,	but	of	the	disparate	characters,	plots	and	themes	associated	with	genres,	and	so	they	continue	to	scout	future	imagined	landscapes;	domestic,	reformative,	emotional,	cerebral	and	visceral.		Taking	a	cue	from	the	exploratory	spirit	of	these	filmmakers,	my	approach	to	genre	articulation	takes	joy	in	the	very	instability	of	the	suburban	framework	it	proposes.	This	heuristic	method	of	genre	archaeology	nonetheless	calls	attention	to	the	way	narratives	of	human	movement	are	encapsulated	within	modes	of	filmmaking	that	align	momentarily,	broadcasting	a	unity	of	interest	among	storytellers	perhaps	just	for	a	decade,	before	stemming	to	explore	emergent	concerns	arising	in	emergent	contexts.		The	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	split	into	four	focal	points:	considering	the	class	politics	of	suburban	cinema	against	the	history	of	suburbanisation	in	America;	a	look	at	the	nature	of	sentimentality	and	related	dramatic	affects	in	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy;	analysis	of	the	tandem	sources	of	humour	in	these	films;	and	finally,	a	consideration	of	the	millennial	political	context	this	emergent	ensemble	filmmaking	mode	responded	to.			
Class	Politics	and	Suburban	Polymorphism	in	the	Ensemble	Dramedy		I	have	already	begun	to	chart	how	the	heterogeneities	of	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	contradict	notions	of	an	insidious	suburban	unanimity	familiar	in	popular	media.	Suburbia,	in	reality,	is	many	things	to	many	people.	The	suburban	ensemble	intervenes	in	the	treatment	of	suburbia	as	merely	a	symbol	of	dystopia,	lifelessness	and	corrupt	ideals,	rather	than	a	place	where	people	live.	I	now	turn	to	a	comparison	between	the	literature	and	public	debates	around	suburbia,	the	interpolations	the	suburban	ensemble	film	makes	within	antisuburban	discourse,	and	the	ways	in	which	these	films	reflect	polymorphic	shifts	in	suburban	geography	after	the	postwar	era.	This	in	turn	reveals	the	class	politics	that	cluster	around	suburban	discourses;	suburban	settings	are	a	good	place	to	look	for	some	of	the	enduring	issues	of	class	that	recur	in	American	cinema.	
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	Scholars	from	Elaine	Tyler	May	to	Robert	A.	Beauregard	and	Kenneth	T.	Jackson	write	of	suburbia	as	the	locus	of	American	exceptionalism,	and	either	symptomatic	of	or	propelling	America’s	worst	divisive	economic	behaviours.	Robert	Fishman,	for	example,	inflammatorily	labels	the	suburbs	Bourgeois	Utopias.	This	reading	is	not	new:	Coon	and	Beuka	summarise	a	wave	of	literature	from	the	1950s	onward	indicting	suburbia	as	homogeneous	and	oppressive	(Coon	9;	Beuka	6),	which	they	both	suggest	influenced	the	cinema	of	suburban	critique	in	ensuing	decades,	starting	from	pictures	such	as	No	Down	Payment	(Martin	Ritt,	1957)	and	carrying	through	New	Hollywood	dramas	such	as	The	Swimmer	(Frank	Perry,	1968).	I	would	add	slightly	less	hysterical,	more	understated	and	humanistic	works	dealing	with	similar	politics	of	suburban	development	and	transition,	from	small	town	drama	Some	Came	Running	(Vincente	Minnelli,	1958)	to	Rachel,	Rachel	(Paul	Newman,	1968),	and	the	mid-century	films	of	Douglas	Sirk.	Critics	have	traditionally	drawn	from	histories	of	postwar	suburbia	to	inculpate	suburbia	today.	Many	of	the	contemporary	antisuburban	arguments,	where	they	similarly	treat	suburbia	as	a	metaphor	to	stand	against	rather	than	a	dynamic	social	phenomenon	to	understand,	conceptualise	the	move	to	majority	suburban	living	as	concurrent	with	conservative	values	perceived	to	be	burgeoning	across	America,	in	lieu	of	any	compelling	causal	account	–	with	the	exception,	perhaps,	of	Jackson’s	views	on	suburban	inefficiency.93	Fishman,	for	example,	historicises	suburbia	as	a	zone	of	exclusion	(4),	and	many	other	suburban	critics	focus	on	examples	of	blatant	postwar	exclusion	in	planned	communities,	such	as	the	discriminatory	socioeconomic	experiment	of	Levittown,	New	York,	which	comes	to	stand	for	all	iterations	of	suburbia	thereafter.94	The	application	of	an	all-encompassing	motive	for	suburbanisation,	however,	should	be	challenged.	The	initial	postwar	boom	provided:		a	practical	alternative	to	[economic]	hardships	in	the	city.	A	severe	housing	shortage	in	urban	centers	was	soothed	by	Federal	Housing	Administration	(FHA)	construction	loans	and	low	interest	mortgages	provided	through	the	GI	Bill.		(Spigel	110)																																																									93	Jackson’s	history	of	American	suburbanization	is	slightly	less	moralistic	than	others,	and	his	critiques	focus	on	the	energy	waste	of	sprawl.		94	Levittown	was	a	planned	postwar	suburb,	built	1947-1951,	the	developers	of	which	explicitly	advertised	its	exclusion	of	black	residents.	The	resultant	controversy	bolstered	its	advertising	appeal	and	status,	spawning	imitators.	Levittown	became	a	symbol	of	suburban	homogeneity,	which	is	at	times	more	liberally	applied	to	contemporary	suburbia,	or	suburbia	in	general.	
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	Such	policies	were	driven	by	a	need	to	accommodate	growing	populations	outside	of	cramped	and	increasingly	unaffordable	cities,	but	were	explicitly	segregationist.	Accounts	like	these	complicate	visions	of	the	postwar	suburb	as	economically	elite	utopia	(perhaps	that	title	should	belong	to	those	who	could	continue	to	afford	city	dwellings	in	wealthier	localities),	yet	at	the	same	time	provide	cases	of	consciously	administered	exclusion	and	homogeneity.		 Although	the	phenomenon	of	suburbanisation	has	been	an	indicator	of	developing	affluence	in	many	countries	(Jackson	303),	this	does	not	mean	that	excessive	wealth	has	been	concentrated	within	the	suburbs,	or	that	segregation	has	remained	static	rather	than	changing	shape.	The	isolated	postwar	examples	we	continue	to	draw	on	tell	only	a	small	part	of	the	story	of	American	suburbanisation	in	the	second	half	of	the	century,	so	we	cannot	speak	of	current	iterations	of	suburbia	as	if	they	are	the	same	thing.95	A	myopic	focus	on	postwar	suburbia	leaves	us	powerless	to	explain	how	the	ethnic	makeup	of	the	suburbs	has	since	begun	to	balance	(Coon	8)	despite	a	history	of	explicitly	discriminatory	housing	policies	(Lamb	Housing	Segregation	in	Suburban	America),	especially	throughout	the	1980s	and	1990s	(Palen	132)	as	the	invasion-succession	model	of	black	American	suburbanisation	reversed	(Lee	and	Wood	“Is	Neighborhood	Racial	Segregation	Place	Specific?”).	Nor	how	narratives	of	inclusion	and	superordinate	goals	in	suburbia	may	have	worked	to	challenge	historic	geographic	segregation	initially	for	European	and	Hispanic	immigrants	in	the	1970s	(Massey	and	Denton	“Trends	in	Residential	Segregation”),	followed	by	black	Americans	in	southern	states	throughout	the	1980s	(Stearns	and	Logan	“Racial	Structuring	of	the	Housing	Market”),	and	in	northern	states	thereafter	so	that	in	1995	“the	all-black	suburbs	…	tend	to	be	not	poor	but	middle-class	or	even	affluent	communities”	(Palen	133),	and	at	the	same	time	extreme	wealth	(and	its	opposite),	from	which	ethnic	groups	are	largely	excluded,	was	consolidated	in	
urban	centres	(Conzen	“Making	Urban	Wealth”).	Nor	can	it	explain	how	narratives	reinscribing	essential	differences	worked	to	resegregate	ethnic	communities	across	both																																																									95	Contemporary	antisuburban	literature	also	appears	to	echo	the	anachronism	of	recent	story	media:	J.	Hoberman	noted	in	1987	Hollywood’s	“superimposition	of	the	‘50s	over	the	‘80s”	(np).	He	asked,	“could	the	region	AmeriKitsch	evokes	be	less	a	place	than	a	time?	Attempts	to	revive	the	Summer	of	Love	notwithstanding,	the	‘50s	remain	our	favorite	theme	park”	(ibid.).	And	so	they	have	remained:	audiovisual	references	to	an	imagined	geographic	and	moral	landscape	of	1950s	America	were,	surprisingly,	sustained	seemingly	unamended	from	their	late	1980s	resurgence	into	the	early	years	of	the	millennium,	perhaps	because	the	moral	substance	of	this	retrospective,	“unhyphenated	American”	landscape	is	easier	to	deal	with	than	the	amorphously	confounding	new	–	suburban	diversification.		
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suburban	and	urban	spaces	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the	subprime	loan	crisis	(Wells	et	al.	128).	Migration	patterns	inverted:	“white	flight	is	reversing	course,	moving	toward	central	cities,	where	black	population	is	declining”	(Freilich	et	al.	9),	and	America’s	momentum	of	spatial	hybridisation	reversed	along	with	it.	We	should	recall,	too,	that	the	mortgage	crisis	disproportionately	affected	inner-suburban	(Ekers	et	al.	36-37)	and	exurban	homes	(Freilich	et	al.	10),	driving	further	disparity	between	high-income,	predominantly	white	urban	dwellers	and	the	rest	of	the	nation	–	a	trend	beginning	long	before	the	crisis	(Leinberger	71).		Some	of	America’s	most	impoverished	constituents	now	live	in	various	suburban	arrangements	on	the	outskirts	of	larger	cities,	and	as	Beuka	notes,	African-American	identification	in	media	narrative	has	struggled	to	move	out	from	urban	centres	(and	the	often	violent	dramas	associated	with	them),	and	so	now	appear	inconsistent	with	these	demographic	changes	(215-216).	In	1999,	Freedman	cited	rap	music	as	an	example,	and	in	particular	the	urban	crime	narratives	of	the	suburban-raised	Ice	Cube.	Freedman	says:		suburbia	has	evolved	in	startling	ways,	becoming	ever	more	varied	by	race,	class	and	ethnicity	and	eluding	the	grasp	of	all	but	a	handful	of	perceptive	artists	and	entertainers	…		The	counterbalance	to	the	successful	movement	of	immigrants	and	minorities	into	suburbia,	though,	is	the	deterioration	of	inner-ring	suburbs.	These	communities,	clinging	to	the	borders	of	cities,	have	been	growing	poorer,	more	segregated	and	more	troubled	for	decades,	losing	population	nearly	as	rapidly	in	some	cases	as	urban	ghettoes.	Several	years	ago,	the	Federal	Government	surrounded	its	own	office	complex	in	Suitland,	Md.,	a	suburb	just	outside	Washington,	with	a	chain-link	fence	topped	by	razor	wire.		(1)		He	goes	on	to	stress	the	diversity	of	these	new	suburbias	in	the	face	of	continued	homogenising	media	images.	Black	identity	mobility	is	revealed	as	compromised	both	by	nostalgia	for	a	time	when	people	knew	their	place,	and	the	particular	comfort	of	knowing	how	to	identify	the	“other.”	If	ethnicity	onscreen	can	only	signify	a	preselected	range	of	spatial	identities,	agency	of	selfhood	is	curtailed	for	the	comfort	of	those	who	may	feel	threatened	by	nonstatic	and	dynamic	humanness	afforded	to	ethnic	others	who	might	surprise	us	by	not	acting	in	the	ways	designated	by	screen	cultures,	or	those	who	feel	safe	in	the	sense	of	historic	antagonism	these	recurring	images	of	racial	polarity	provide.		
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	 In	suburban	ensemble	cinema	we	begin	to	see	a	move	away	from	the	exclusionary	dystopian	archetype	that	characterises	American	Beauty	and	suburban	works	from	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	with	black	American	examples	of	the	genre	such	as	The	Cookout	(Lance	Rivera,	2004),	often	presenting	more	as	comedy	than	dramedy,	Sayles’s	ethnically	hybrid	features	such	as	Sunshine	State,	and	films	explicitly	scrutinising	the	process	of	a	developing	inclusivity	in	the	suburbs,	the	political	forces	that	work	to	keep	ethnic	marginalisation	alive,	or	the	ways	we	might	rally	against	such	forces	by	stressing	a	better	nature,	such	as	Butter	(Jim	Field	Smith,	2011).	These	films	can	also	be	connected	to	early	ensemble	examinations	of	integration	politics	and	racism	in	American	suburbia,	such	as	The	Intruder	(Roger	Corman,	1962).	To	an	extent	they	chart	the	progress	of,	and	resistance	against,	spatial	mobility	and	equality	in	the	United	States,	and	the	difficulties	of	sustaining	a	narrative	of	positive	hybridisation	while	essentialist	separatism	moves	in	and	out	of	vogue.96	Earlier	domestic	ensemble	experiments	depicting	black	social	class	and	identity	heterogeneity,	such	as	the	Chicago-set	family	ensemble	melodrama	Soul	Food	(George	Tillman	Jr.,	1997),	remain	pegged	to	predominantly	urban	locales.		 Unfortunately,	however,	all	of	these	works	tend	to	be	the	less	famous	examples	of	the	genre,	revealing	both	an	industry-wide	problem	of	racism	by	subtle	omission,	as	well	as	American	audiences’	presumed	reluctance	to	move	past	visions	of	the	suburbs	as	wholly	white.	Reiterating	the	postwar	fantasy	of	an	all-white	suburbia	could	probably	be	conceived	as	a	method	for	Hollywood	filmmakers	to	excuse	themselves	from	maintaining	a	standard	of	all-white	casting,	indulging	homogeneity	under	the	pretence	of	critiquing	homogeneity.	However,	increasingly	in	noted	examples	of	the	genre,	race-consciousness	is	not	only	evident	but	key	to	comprehending	these	films:	for	example,	in	The	Kids	Are	All	Right	we	are	invited	to	complicate	our	identification	with	the	lead	characters	when	they	vilify	a	Mexican	gardener,	and	their	petty	racism	is	contrasted	with	their	children’s	open-mindedness	–	the	generational	disjunct	here	may	be	a	suggestion	of	some	kind	of	progress.	Although	the	lead	characters	remain	white	in	popular	films	such	as	The	Kids	Are	All	Right,	racial	complications	are	not	ignored:	the	suburban	façade	archetype	as	white	exclusive	utopia	is	slowly	being	abandoned.	Despite	the	suburban	dramedy	genre’s	decline	in	recent	years,	isolated	examples	such	as	
Black	or	White	(Mike	Binder,	2015)	now	tend	to	focus	on	ethnicity	and	spatial	politics.	As	reviewer	Nathanael	Hood	wrote:																																																									96	For	a	humanistic	look	at	the	difficulty	in	maintaining	narratives	of	desegregation’s	benefits,	see	Glass	“The	Problem	We	All	Live	With.”	
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	 I	cannot	remember	the	last	time	I	saw	such	a	wide	variety	of	American	blackness	represented	onscreen:	blacks	living	below	the	poverty	line,	affluent	blacks,	upwardly	mobile	blacks	…	black	criminals,	black	judges,	black	lawyers,	black	musicians,	black	mothers,	black	fathers,	black	children.	Rowena	herself	is	a	self-made	businesswoman	who	operates	six	businesses	from	her	garage	in	South	Central	and	supports	upwards	of	a	dozen	relatives	living	in	her	home.	But	in	a	grim	touch	of	economic	realism,	they	live	just	across	the	street	from	a	crack-house.		(np)		It	may	have	taken	some	time	for	American	filmmakers	to	cultivate	sensitivity	to	these	demographic	changes,	but	perhaps	media	representations	of	black	suburbia	have	now	begun	to	reflect	the	diversification	of	identity	we	originally	struggled	to	admit	for	white	residents.	Of	course,	there	are	other	ethnic	groups	in	America	with	even	less	onscreen	visibility:	indigenous	Americans	and	Arabic	Americans	would	count	among	these	omitted	groups.		 At	times,	this	increasingly	outdated	narrative	of	suburban	exclusion	is	also	taken	to	encapsulate	a	problem	of	“The	West”	in	general,	as	a	contemporaneous	suburbanisation	occurred	in	various	iterations	across	Western	nations	over	the	globe.	As	with	so	many	American	cultural	exports,	the	clichés	of	America-specific	suburban	development	have	become	a	benchmark	for	the	self-analysis	of	other	English-speaking	nations.	Suburban	narratives	and	images	in	Australia,	for	example,	“point	to	the	influence	of	an	American	suburban	imaginary	when	thinking	through	our	own	geographic	context”	(Moss-Wellington	“Our	Suburban	Contempt”	np).	Suburban	desegregation	occurred	in	different	trends,	and	at	different	speeds	with	a	varied	level	of	permanency	in	different	countries,	yet	the	American	cultural	discourse	of	suburban	homogeneity	was	often	imported	uncritically	as	a	parallel	narrative	across	Western	nations.	Iconography	such	as	the	suburban	façade	proliferated	in	global	histories	and	narratives	of	municipal	development,	despite	local	contingencies	and	challenges	presenting	as	enormously	diverse.	Historian	Mark	Peel	explained	the	cultural	myth	of	suburban	homogeneity	in	Australia	with	a	vivid	personal	anecdote:		 We	were	puzzled	when	people	talked	about	“monocultural”	outer	suburbs.	Most	of	our	neighbours	were	migrants	or	the	children	and	grandchildren	of	migrants.	In	our	part	of	the	estate,	Koreans,	Filipinos,	Greeks,	Indians,	English,	Dutch,	Samoans	and	New	Zealanders	were	mixing	as	neighbours,	partners	and	friends.	It	was	post-multicultural,	
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in	a	way.	And	rather	than	abstract	tolerance,	it	meant	managing	the	concrete	problems	and	opportunities	that	came	from	living	with	different	people.	It	was	farmers'	children	moving	in	from	Gippsland	who	lived	next	door	to	the	grown-up	children	of	Vietnamese	refugees	moving	out	from	Springvale	and	Clayton.		(np)		This	is	the	very	source	of	the	contradiction	much	suburban	cinema	now	attempts	to	unravel,	with	perhaps	a	little	less	distanced	censoriousness	than	aforementioned	literature.	While	the	green	living	and	efficiency	arguments	may	have	merit,	they	are	expounded	into	hyperbolic,	incendiary	and	unjustified	value	judgments	by	figures	including	the	dogmatically	outspoken	star	interviewee	of	feature	documentary	The	End	of	Suburbia	(Gregory	Greene,	2004),	James	Howard	Kunstler,	and	at	worst	are	generalised	again	to	the	alleged	retrogression	of	suburban	inhabitants,	their	parochialism	and	their	lack	of	intellectual	capability	(a	familiar	and	recurring	stereotype,	as	identified	by	Coon	and	Felperin).	Kunstler’s	speech	on	“The	Ghastly	Tragedy	of	the	Suburbs”	is	an	example	of	how	this	dialogue	has	permeated	the	mainstream.	After	cherry-picking	some	of	the	worst	examples	of	brutalist	urban	buildings	(occurring	in	civic	spaces),	he	blurs	a	distinction	between	his	critique	of	suburban	sprawl	and	imposed,	demeaning	public	architecture.	Worse,	he	then	blurs	the	distinction	between	the	homogeneous	lifelessness	of	environment	and	inhabitant,	without	pause	to	reflect	on	the	economic	realities	of	population	increase	and	suburban	growth.	He	instead	leaps	straight	into	classism.	Reflecting	on	an	image	of	a	semi-rural	suburban	home,	he	says:		 This	is	really,	in	fact,	a	television	broadcasting	a	show	24/7	called	“We're	Normal.”	We’re	normal,	we’re	normal,	we’re	normal,	we’re	normal,	we’re	normal.	Please	respect	us,	we’re	normal,	we’re	normal,	we’re	normal.	But	we	know	what’s	going	on	in	these	houses,	you	know.	We	know	that	little	Skippy	is	loading	his	Uzi	down	here,	getting	ready	for	homeroom.	[Laughter]	We	know	that	Heather,	his	sister	Heather,	14	years	old,	is	turning	tricks	up	here	to	support	her	drug	habit.		(np)		This	gobsmacking	conflation	of	identities	with	allegedly	unenlightened	living	arrangements	is	indicative	of	the	way	we	have	come	to	popularly	imagine	suburbia.	Richard	Porton	describes	how	a	more	personalised	antisuburban	rhetoric	infiltrated	the	political	discourse	of	the	American	intellectual	left:	“[New	Left]	students	rightly	perceived	that	suburbia	partially	reflected	a	boring,	bureaucratized	conformism,	but	stupidly	attacked	workers	who	merely	yearned	for	some	of	the	creature	comforts	that	the	much	maligned	‘consumer	society’	
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promised”	(“American	Dreams”	12).	Antisuburban	attacks	on	the	cultural	integrity	of	an	American	working	class	became	an	accepted	part	of	radical	thinking.		 The	lack	of	specificity	in	describing	vastly	divergent	conditions	of	suburbia	internationally	appears	to	lead	us	directly	to	a	process	of	dehumanisation	by	robbing	a	majority	of	identity	specificity.	The	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	makes	the	case	that	suburbia	is	a	majority	experience	(Hayden	3;	Hobbs	and	Stoops	33,	for	demographic	evidence),	and	therefore	entails	human	diversities	not	accessible	by	this	level	of	debate.	Peel	continues	to	expose	the	bigotry	in	Kunstler’s	presumptions:		 There’s	a	difference	between	arguing	that	an	outer-suburban	estate	manifests	something	that	is	wrong	in	our	culture	and	arguing	that	the	people	who	live	in	it	are	causing	what	is	wrong	in	our	culture.	There’s	a	difference	between	criticising	people	for	their	choices	and	criticising	the	context	that	limits	and	defines	their	choices.	There’s	also	a	difference	between	lecturing	people	about	what	they	must	do	-	lower	their	expectations,	accept	less,	sacrifice	more,	be	more	like	us	-	and	talking	about	what	we	all	have	to	do	…	There's	no	doubt	that	what	is	called	“McMansion-land”	has	social	and	environmental	consequences.	There	are	real	costs,	for	the	people	who	live	there	as	well	as	everyone	else.	If	nothing	else,	there	are	long	drives	to	work	on	crowded	freeways.	But	these	problems	are	symptoms	and	examples	of	larger	forces.		(np)		Peel	goes	on	to	anecdotally	suggest	that	people	are	now	driven	to	suburbia	because	they	cannot	afford	access	to	the	more	moral	and	green	urban	alternative	–	the	cost	of	an	environmental	conscience	precludes	many.	So	if	suburbia	is	a	zone	of	exclusion,	then	we	may	ask	who	is	being	excluded.	In	a	way,	these	films	constitute	a	claim	that	suburbia	is	merely	a	backdrop	to	the	drama	of	our	lives:	it	may	be	a	problematic	backdrop,	but	the	norms	of	suburban	living	and	the	way	environments	project	a	homogeneous	lifestyle	are	not	what	matters.	Scratch	beneath	that	surface	and	you	will	find	that	people	are	not	homogeneous,	and	that	they	matter	to	other	people	more	than	their	houses	matter	to	them.		 The	point	is	not	that	all	suburban	residents	are	compromised	at	the	hands	of	urban	elites;	it	is	that	it	does	not	quite	make	sense	to	talk	of	the	suburban	life	as	a	discrete	and	unchanging	phenomenon,	and	so	metaphorising	the	lives	of	those	living	in	suburban	arrangements,	as	do	many	of	the	early	suburban	dystopian	works,	is	inherently	problematic,	
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and	at	worst	a	class	violence.	Terry	Eagleton	once	disparaged	humanism	as	“a	suburban	moral	ideology”	(207).	Eagleton	meant	that	focussing	on	what	he	calls	“largely	interpersonal	matters”	(ibid.)	prohibits	us	from	focussing	on	the	larger	political	forces	that	shape	lives,	and	shape	privilege.	In	a	sense,	he	was	merely	offering	yet	another	suburban	slight:	humanism	is	politically	impotent,	and	the	suburbs	are	somehow	humanistic,	therefore	suburbanites	are	also	impotent.	Yet	in	synonymising	humanism	and	individualism,	Eagleton	suggests	that	our	understanding	of	one	another’s	daily	circumstances	necessitates	lenience	toward	their	self-interest.	This	antihumanism	is	the	strategy	by	which	theorists	might	excuse	themselves	from	curiosity,	investigation	and	articulation	of	one	another’s	lives,	and	instead	treat	them	as	abstract	phenomena	calling	for	distanced	evaluation,	such	as	the	suburb-as-metaphor;	it	is	a	claim	that	invalidates	local	and	situated	knowledge	(and	at	the	same	time,	an	interest	in	human	narratives	also	provides	us	with	a	stake	in	the	welfare	of	others	who	are	affected	by	the	political	systems	we	study,	so	that	our	political	ideals	and	theories	do	not	become	too	divorced	from	their	lived	impact).	It	also	invalidates	entire	disciplines	seeking	to	document	such	knowledge	like	anthropology,	and	suburban	ethnographies	like	the	work	of	M.P.	Baumgartner,	all	of	which	use	immersion	in	the	personal	to	specify	how	larger	social	and	political	forces	might	play	out	in	our	lives,	with	a	degree	of	care	and	nuance,	an	understanding	that	suburbia	is	more	than	just	a	metaphor	and	contains	many	iterations	of	group	interaction.	At	this	level	of	theory,	humanism	and	suburbia	are	reduced	to	symbolic	sketches	and	lose	their	specificity	as	any	lived	practice,	contrived	into	a	mundane	whole	to	rally	against.	For	example,	Greg	Dickinson	reduces	the	suburbs	to	a	“rhetorical	spatiality”	rather	than	a	lived	experience,	and	refers	to	its	“topos”	to	deliver	abstract	backhanders	at	emotionally	inferior	residents,	chiding	them	for	wanting	a	“good	life”	(c.f.	Berlant	Cruel	Optimism).	There	is	a	kind	of	affective	classism	in	Dickinson’s	claim	that,	“the	enforced	normality	of	the	suburbs	distances,	abstracts,	even	makes	impossible	access	to	true	feelings,	deep	emotions,	or	passionate	experiences”	(Suburban	Dreams	49).	Similarly,	a	volume	like	Visions	of	Suburbia	features	multiple	chapters	in	which	humanism	and	suburbia	are	fused	into	a	repugnantly	facile	museum	feature,	far	distant	from	the	real	work	of	tut-tutting	global	political	abstractions	(Silverstone	175,	190).	Suburban	residents	are	still	depicted	as	homogeneous	in	order	to	maintain	elite	theories	of	governed	identity,	robbing	a	majority	of	any	sovereignty	of	meaning	in	their	own	world,	their	own	place.	This	looks	a	lot	like	an	intellectual	colonisation	–	the	very	crime	literary	humanism	has	long	been	admonished	for.	It	is	bad	spatial	analysis	when	a	standardised	geography	can	be	presumed	to	delete	the	human	complexity	of	its	inhabitants.	Thus,	metaphorising	people’s	lives	can	be	a	kind	of	class	violence.	
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	So	how,	then,	do	suburban	ensemble	films	circumvent	this	trend?	Coon	argues	that	“viewing	suburbia	as	a	cultural	construct	helps	to	reveal	the	individual	ideals	and	values	that	define	it,	and	which	are	less	apparent	when	suburbs	are	viewed	as	merely	physical	spaces”	(10),	but	the	millennial	suburban	ensemble	insists	that	there	are	no	individual	ideals	and	values	that	define	it	–	at	least	not	anymore.	It	is	now	evident	that	from	this	position	we	can	displace	blame	for	America’s	political	ills	to	the	symbology	of	suburbia,	which	is	bracingly	generalised,	remains	historically	fixed	despite	rapid,	profound	human	spatial-psychological	mobility,	permits	ignorance	of	immeasurable	human	detail,	and	is	thus	inaccurate.	Focus	on	suburbia	strictly	as	cultural	construct	allows	us	to	turn	away	from	the	reality	of	its	diverse	iterations	and	peoples,	and	perpetuate	the	same	inadequate	cultural	analysis	extended	from	the	postwar	era.	Coon	insists	upon	polar,	perpetually	at-war	representations	of	the	suburbs	as	utopian	or	dystopian,	even	after	admitting	their	complication	(15).	This	is	typical	of	scholarship	on	suburban	depiction	in	recent	cinema.97	Yet	in	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy,	the	suburbs	are	neither	utopian	imposed	custodial	community,	nor	dystopian	exclusionary	zones,	as	the	multi-character	casts	emphasise	a	momentum	of	inclusivity,	challenging	one	another	to	include	and	accept	a	greater	field	of	others.	This	new	cinema	explores	the	middle	ground,	where	so	many	of	us	live;	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	paves	a	way	to	move	beyond	the	binarism	of	utopian/dystopian	analysis,	which	has	dominated	and	framed	the	debate	on	suburban	media	for	so	long.98	Freedman	pointed	to	this	inadequacy	as	early	as	1999	in	his	piece	“Suburbia	Outgrows	Its	Image	in	the	Arts”,	and	following	Freedman,	Beuka	does	at	least	suggest	some	ways	we	might	move	past	“didactic	essays	on	the	dystopian	aspects	of	suburbia”	(15):	humanistic	geography,	with	its	emphasis	on	the	lived	landscape	rather	than	the	physical	land,	or	Foucault’s	concept	of	heterotopia	in	“Of	Other	Spaces.”99		So	suburbia	changes,	but	its	popular	image	remains	largely	static:	it	becomes	a	kind	of	summary	of	our	anxieties	of	negative	social	change.	Beuka	synopsises	these	anxieties	as	“cold																																																									97	For	example,	Claire	Perkins	fixates	on	utopias	in	her	chapter	on	the	suburban	smart	film	(132-156).		98	See	Coon,	Beuka,	Perkins,	Fishman,	Smicek,	Joanna	Wilson	for	examples.		99	However	the	latter	may	be	misguided,	as	Foucault’s	oblique	description	of	space	as	cultural	mirror	stresses	the	influence	of	excessive	regulation	(27),	which	anthropologist	M.P.	Baumgartner	avows	is	an	untrue	characterisation	of	legal	process	and	law	enforcement	in	the	suburbs,	where	moral	self-regulation	is	a	prevailing	standard	(134).		
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war-era	fears	over	mounting	social	conformity”	(234)	and	Wayne	Brekhus	similarly	describes	the	projection	of	majority	“averageness”	(6)	serviced	by	the	suburban	stereotype,	the	everyfamily	or	everycommunity.100	But	to	ignore	the	shifting	topography	of	the	suburbs	means	we	are	missing	the	most	salient	point:	the	fascinating	mutability	of	human	life	and	culture,	the	ways	in	which	we	adapt	environments	to	suit	our	needs	and	in	turn	adapt	to	them.	The	ensemble	dramedy	represents	an	awakening	to	polymorphism	in	suburban	media	depiction.		Suburbia	may	be	the	setting,	but	the	commentary	in	these	films	is	on	personal	and	political	relations	at	large;	our	quotidian	suburban	experiences	are	an	appropriate	zone	of	conflict	as	this	is	precisely	where	so	many	of	us	will	feel	the	impact	of,	and	perhaps	impact	upon,	sociopolitical	phenomena	of	the	day.	Where	these	films	raise	similar	geographical	issues	to	suburban	critics	–	to	what	extent	suburban	living	directs	regressive	behaviours	or	values	–	they	are	not	as	quick	to	reach	a	verdict,	or	indeed	conclude	that	the	suburban	turn	is	so	dire.	The	question	of	whether	or	not	suburbanisation	is	a	good	thing	is	decentred	from	these	narratives;	rather,	what	is	in	question	is	how	we	make	meaning	in	our	lives	given	a	sociopolitical	climate	in	the	suburbs.	The	location	that	comes	to	matter	is	the	community	and	the	family	–	the	heart	is	where	the	home	is	–	not	the	figuratively	conjured	suburbs.	In	this	way,	suburbia	can	never	be	reduced	to	a	mere	metaphor	that	in	turn	summarises	the	lives	of	suburbanites.	The	community,	family,	and	domestic	spheres	are	never	an	uncomplicated	site	of	privilege,	as	they	are	forced	to	be	in	any	utopian/dystopian	reduction	to	an	idyllic	suburbia	or	its	opposite.	In	his	conclusion,	Coon	is	willing	to	admit	that	texts	such	as	The	Kids	Are	All	
Right	represent	a	new	breed	of	suburban	depiction,	circumnavigating	the	familiar	typification:		 Instead	of	focusing	on	the	particular	behaviors,	mores,	and	values	generally	associated	with	suburbia,	these	texts	emphasise	the	tense	conflicts	and	humorous	predicaments	that	their	characters	face,	with	suburbia	serving	as	a	largely	unremarkable	background	…	Although	these	texts	do	not	draw	attention	to	suburban	norms	by	making	them	the	focus	of	their	stories,	each	of	them	quietly	challenges	assumptions	about	the	social	identities	and	family	structures	of	suburban	residents.		(222)		
																																																								100	We	might	even	catch	a	whiff	here	of	that	particularly	American	paradox:	a	fear	of	perceived	economic	threats	to	individual	liberty	that	in	turn	obliterate	liberties	(the	phobic	language	of	which	peppered	neoliberal	campaigns	against	Obamacare,	for	instance).	
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Considering	how	often	the	drama	documents	lives	in	transition	through	conservative	values	to	a	more	cosmopolitan	position	–	consider	self-help	author	Richard	Hoover’s	(Greg	Kinnear)	character	arc	in	Little	Miss	Sunshine	–	we	could	also	derive	the	idea	from	these	films	that	the	current	political	and	psychical	manifestation	of	American	suburban	living	is	transitory	(c.f.	the	awakening	of	responsibility	to	various	others	in	American	Beauty,	The	Safety	of	Objects,	Little	
Children,	Smart	People,	What	Goes	Up	and	all	of	Thomas	McCarthy’s	films,	as	well	as	the	destroy-and-rebuild	values	arc	of	Alexander	Payne’s	cinema).	They	suggest	another	dominant	political	ethic	is	possible	within	a	majority	suburban	context;	speculatively,	this	could	then	be	a	force	for	spatial-architectural	change	if	enough	people	no	longer	saw	the	suburbs	as	suitable	to	their	needs.	During	the	final	reels	of	many	narratives	–	Junebug	(Phil	Morrison,	2005),	City	
Island	(Raymond	De	Felitta,	2009)	and	The	Oranges	for	example	–	suburban	living	is	revealed	as	appropriate	for	some	and	not	for	others,	as	some	characters	flee	the	suburbs	(to	the	city	in	
Junebug,	to	university	in	City	Island	and	to	participate	in	overseas	development	programs	in	
The	Oranges)	and	some	stay;	these	films	accept	that	people’s	appetites	can	change	as	much	as	the	places	they	inhabit.	In	fact,	they	emphasise	a	capacity	for	lifestyle	change	associated	with	ideological	shift,	so	the	suburbs,	whilst	not	demonised,	are	neither	valorised	nor	assumed	as	immovable	norm.	It	is	a	hope	akin	to	Dolores	Hayden’s	imaginative	suggestions	for	working	with	existing	suburban	potentialities	and	spaces,	closing	her	historical	work	Building	
Suburbia,	or	the	public	policy	suggestions	in	Wim	Wiewel	and	Joseph	J.	Persky’s	volume	on	
Suburban	Sprawl.	Rather	than	indicting	the	old,	they	look	to	the	new.	They	also	demonstrate	that	versions	of	suburban	life	are	not	suitable	for	everyone;	this	is	not	a	new	utopianism,	just	a	call	to	work	with	what	we	have.	Changing	needs	built	the	suburbs,	and	changing	needs	will	lead	to	further	geographic	change.		 Almost	all	suburban	ensemble	dramedies	are,	at	least	to	some	extent,	about	trying	to	find	a	mutually	beneficial	way	through	social	dilemmas	arising	from	context-driven	behaviours	(although	the	instructive	context	is	presented	as	more	social	than	spatial,	without	making	absurd	distinctions	between	the	two).	On	one	hand,	it	is	refreshing	to	see	films	dealing	with	moral	situations	isomorphic	to	everyday	experience,	that	a	majority	audience	can	presumably	recognise	and	apply	to	their	own	lives;	this	can	validate	our	lived	experience	rather	than	providing	an	impression	that	real	life	is	happening	somewhere	else,	that	we	are	somehow	secondary.	On	the	other	hand,	this	validity	can	still	be	questioned	if	the	lives	we	are	leading	are	by	their	nature	globally	exploitative,	and	remain	exploitative	–	so	one	can	ask	whether	the	constituents	of	middle-class	America	really	need	any	more	of	our	sympathy	than	
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they	already	command.	Filmmakers	such	as	Kenneth	Lonergan,	especially	with	Margaret	(2011),	and	Glatzer	with	What	Goes	Up	are	actively	raising	these	issues,	as	we	will	see.		There	are	more	troublesome	characteristics	thrown	up	by	realist	ambitions	coupled	with	a	fantastical	view	of	middle-class	living	arrangements.	Much	more	has	been	written	on	the	aesthetics	of	aspiration,	and	how	American	cinematic	conventions	might	compel	a	competitive	individualism	or	normalise	the	unattainable.	Noël	Burch,	for	example,	presents	classical	Hollywood	editing	norms	as	hegemony,	but	I	believe	the	more	obvious	example	is	pertinent:	production	design	standards	in	which	the	alleged	Everyfamily	is	placed	in	upper-class	environs.101	Wilt	points	out	that	as	early	as	the	1960s:		 the	suburban	state	of	mind	was	by	now	so	ingrained	that	many	films	were	set	in	suburbia	without	comment.	As	with	television,	the	norm	was	now	a	detached	house	in	suburbia,	often	larger	and	somewhat	more	luxurious	than	those	in	which	the	audience	lived.		(484)		Demographic	shifts	offer	a	partial	explanation:	“from	1940	onward	suburbs	accounted	for	more	population	growth	than	central	cities”	and	“in	1960,	the	proportions	were	nearly	even”	(Coon	8).	Reviewer	Leslie	Felperin	describes	how	this	phenomenon	of	“suburbia	without	comment”	means	that	suburban	cinematic	depiction	“is	seldom	allowed	to	convey	the	character,	specificity	and	local	identity	that	cinema	allows	cities	and	countryside	alike”	(15).102	A	number	of	volumes	have	attempted	to	wrestle	back	the	diverse	iterations	of	suburbia	from	media	stereotyping	and	draw	a	more	complete	picture	of	geographic	variation	from	the	first	suburbs	of	early	19th	century	Boston	(Binford	passim)	to	now;	these	include	
Expanding	Suburbia	in	2000,	edited	by	Roger	Webster,	and	publications	associated	with	new	bodies	dedicated	to	mapping	urban	morphology,	such	as	the	International	Seminar	on	Urban	Form	(ISUF).	We	still	must	remain	careful	not	to	homogenise	American	suburbia:	films	from	
City	Island	to	Lymelife,	Junebug	and	Mumford	emphasise	the	particularity	of	suburbia	in	their	differing	locales	(often	these	films	stress	isolation	as	an	incubator	for	drama).	While	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	attempts	to	remedy	such	discriminatory	universalising	with																																																									101	Here	is	where	Heather	Love’s	flat	reading	may	be	useful.		102	Catherine	Jurca	has	made	a	similar	point	of	suburban	literature	in	her	work	White	
Diaspora:	The	Suburb	and	the	Twentieth-Century	American	Novel,	and	urban	cinematic	counterparts	have	been	much	discussed	by	figures	including	Pamela	Robertson	Wojcik,	Steve	Macek,	Mark	Shiel,	Tony	Fitzmaurice	and	Merrill	Schleier.	
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focus	on	exactly	this	specificity	and	human	diversity,	the	form	rarely	provides	an	exception	to	the	rule	of	production	design	identified	by	Wilt,	and	many	are	equally	guilty	of	propagating	unreasonable	aspirational	norms	as	any	other	Hollywood	genre	cinema.			 This	is	not	true	across	the	board,	however.	In	1998,	at	the	beginning	of	the	suburban	cinema	renaissance,	Tamara	Jenkins	suggested	an	alternative	vision	of	suburban	habitation	with	The	Slums	of	Beverly	Hills,	a	picture	some	of	the	ensuing	ensemble	dramedies	more	closely	resemble:		 After	shooting	the	interiors	of	the	apartments,	people	got	concerned	it	looked	too	depressing.	It	was	like,	“Oh,	all	the	walls	are	so	bare.	Can’t	we	put	some	color	in	there?”	I’d	told	the	production	designer	that	these	apartments	are	bare	except	for	what	the	previous	tenant	left	behind.	They	said,	“But	it’s	a	comedy.”	I	said,	“You	read	the	script;	poverty	is	not	funny.”		(Freedman	1)		Jenkins’s	experience	points	to	two	primary	factors	influencing	production	design	standards	in	American	cinema:	foremost,	we	often	forget	the	career	interests	of	the	majority	of	film	workers	beyond	the	director.	The	entire	art	department	may	be	looking	to	develop	their	reel	with	attractive	designs,	advance	recognition	of	their	work,	and	use	any	notoriety	to	access	further	employment	opportunities	(in	part	the	product	of	a	casualised	workforce	moving	between	contracts).	It	might,	thus,	not	only	be	within	the	publicity	interests	of	art	department	workers	and	production	designers	to	build	what	they	feel	to	be	appealing	–	often	an	inflated	view	of	the	living	standards	one	might	expect	to	find	the	characters	in	–	but	these	interests	can	also	chime	with	the	concerns	of	studios,	production	houses	and	film	investors.	The	high	publicity	value	Housesitter	(Frank	Oz,	1992)	variety	of	design	decadence	may	also	attract	awards	consideration.	Secondly,	Jenkins’s	experience	could	reveal	more	about	how,	and	from	which	social	echelon,	the	industry	drafts	its	employees	rather	than	how	it	fashions	them.	The	living	standards	depicted	may	accurately	represent	the	high	salaries	of	film	departmental	heads,	and	therefore	appear	to	its	makers	as	realistic	–	the	segregation	of	Hollywood	film	workers	from	a	majority	American	experience	is	clearly	going	to	have	an	impact	on	the	kinds	of	stories	told.	These	are	all	undesirable,	although	far	from	unique,	effects	of	American	income	inequality.	Unfortunately	these	conditions	may	keep	many	filmmakers	from	realising	a	truly	class-critical	vision;	however,	there	are	plenty	of	exceptions	within	the	suburban	dramedy	
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cannon.103	As	most	suburban	ensemble	dramedies	also	permit	specificity	of	place	in	lieu	of	an	imagined	or	purely	symbolic	geography,	it	is	also	harder	to	accuse	them	of	generalisation.	These	filmmakers	may	not	indulge	the	pretence	of	speaking	for	all	of	America,	but	they	still	choose	predominantly	upper-middle	contexts	to	analyse.	Although	fixation	on	elite	classes	in	the	dramatic	arts	is	certainly	not	new,	it	remains	problematic.		 Some	films	share	these	qualities,	however	are	set	in	recognisably	urban	locales,	usually	looking	at	upper-middle	family	relations	and	class	anxieties,	such	as	Every	Day	(Richard	Levine,	2010),	or	the	films	of	Nicole	Holofcener.	Holofcener’s	cinema	is	excellent	at	unearthing	our	discomfort	with	the	invisibility	of	status	markers,	and	they	draw	compelling	lines	between	status	and	gender	inequality.	The	dénouements	in	her	scripts,	however,	often	worryingly	dismiss	these	concerns	in	favour	of	a	return	to	the	improvident,	inward-looking	norm	of	consumerist	guilt	annihilation,	building	and	protecting	one’s	pack	and	possessions	–	see	Friends	with	Money	(2006)	and	especially	Please	Give	(2010)	for	examples.	Nevertheless,	these	films	do	assert	urban	dwellings	as	the	grounds	of	the	upper-middle	class,	which	is	consistent	with	global	socio-spatial	class	divisions	(Coon	5),	rather	than	the	conventional	depiction	of	a	suburban	fringe	as	the	locus	of	“bourgeois	utopia.”			 Many	of	the	suburban	narratives	I	am	looking	at	foreground	class	relations,	questioning	our	responsibilities	to	one	another	while	avoiding	moralistic	blame	or	vitriol,	such	as	Phil	Morrison’s	release	Junebug	in	2005.	Junebug’s	outsider	art	dealer,	Madeleine	(Embeth	Davidtz),	is	confronted	with	the	disjunct	between	her	idealism	of	southern	suburban	eccentricity	and	the	reality	of	the	ordinary	nuance	of	lives	within	the	communities	her	gallery	selectively	represents	(in	turn,	these	communities	read	her	own	Chicagoan	intellectual	elite	mores	and	behaviours	as	equally	eccentric).	Madeleine’s	contract	negotiation	with	the	outsider	artist	(Frank	Hoyt	Taylor)	recalls	Julia	S.	Ardery’s	commentary	on	the	industry’s	economic	anomalies	and	duplicities:	“folk	art’s	popular	success	and	institutionalization	throughout	the	1970s	and	1980s	have	continually	depended	upon	barring	folk	artists	themselves	from	substantial	gain,	and	on	locating	and	nominating	to	folk	artist	status	creators	ever	more	socially	disadvantaged	and	personally	frail	[sic]”	(331).	The	loser	must	remain	the	loser	for	the	reductive	narrative	of	marginal	authenticity	to	perpetuate.	Madeleine’s	version	of	acceptance	of	the	semi-rural	suburban,	Christian	working	class	communities	she	engages																																																									103	I	look	at	City	Island	and	Junebug	as	examples	of	such	class-consciousness	at	the	end	of	this	section.		
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with	is	dependent	upon	the	safe	spectre	of	maverick	psychosis,	a	reduction	via	which	she	can	overlook	the	complex	humanity	of	the	majority.	While	visiting	both	a	potential	client	and	her	newlywed	husband	George’s	(Alessandro	Nivola)	family	in	North	Carolina,	she	comes	to	realise	the	meaning	of	her	class	in	tense	relations	with	the	community,	especially	George’s	brother	(Ben	McKenzie)	and	mother	(Celia	Weston).	Madeleine	privileges	her	relationship	with	the	artist	she	is	attempting	to	woo	and	sign	to	her	gallery	over	the	unfolding	of	a	genuine	family	event	–	her	sister-in-law	(Amy	Adams)	gives	birth	to	a	stillborn	child.	This,	however,	comes	after	the	family	rejects	Madeleine	by	not	driving	her	to	the	hospital,	so	the	undertone	of	classism	is	reciprocal.	Likewise,	the	film	contrasts	communication	of	intent	through	words	and	actions;	Madeleine	finds	words	easy	to	manipulate,	for	example,	while	the	southern	community	demonstrates	care	through	deed.	Madeleine	says,	“I	love	you”	to	her	employees	on	the	phone	in	loveless	situations	while	George’s	father	(Scott	Wilson)	speaks	little,	and	yet	still	manages	to	transmit	love	for	his	family	(for	example,	using	wood	carvings	as	gifts).	In	
Junebug,	demonstrative	and	highly	codified	verbal	communiqué	are	synchronised	with	working	and	upper	classes	respectively.	George’s	brother	Johnny	finds	all	of	these	communications	difficult,	thus	not	allowing	us	to	elevate	either	as	uncomplicated	social	intercourse.	Johnny	misreads	Madeleine’s	clumsy	attempts	at	ingratiation	via	sexualised	kinetic	overcompensation	as	a	genuine	advance,	and	also	in	one	of	the	film’s	most	affective	scenes	(with	strings	fading	in	softly	in	the	background),	attempts	a	demonstration	of	care	by	taping	a	documentary	on	meerkats	for	his	wife,	but	fails	and	ends	up	taking	out	his	frustration	by	yelling	at	her.	The	true	outsider	of	the	film	may	be	George,	however,	who	straddles	an	uncomfortable	border	between	classes,	living	with	tension	from	his	envious	brother	and	a	community	that	feels	he	should	come	home,	and	his	own	sense	of	belonging	in	a	culture	and	class	within	Chicago	that	he	has	no	roots	in.	He	is	curiously	and	unexpectedly	absent	for	much	of	the	narrative,	which	focuses	instead	on	relations	between	Madeleine	and	George’s	family.	An	example	of	what	reviewer	Mark	Bourne	calls	“the	faith	[Junebug]	shows	in	handing	us	small	puzzles”	(np),	George	appears	to	vacillate	between	his	stringent	family	values,	and	expressing	relief	when	he	escapes	from	them	–	a	recognisable	ambivalence,	no	doubt,	for	many	viewers.	His	position	never	crystalizes,	but	instead	changes	each	time	we	see	him,	an	expression	of	the	divisive	convolutions	of	American	class	culture.			 In	Raymond	De	Felitta’s	City	Island,	another	film	foregrounding	class	concerns,	a	family’s-worth	of	characters	perform	a	secretive	dance	around	one	another,	and	all	of	their	duplicities	are	variously	related	to	status	anxiety	or	class-bound	pride.	Vince	Rizzo	(Andy	
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Garcia)	takes	acting	classes	at	night,	but	would	rather	his	family	believe	that	he	is	engaged	in	another,	more	class-appropriate	vice,	such	as	gambling.	He	also	conceals	details	of	his	illegitimate	son	Tony	(Steven	Strait),	primarily	because	his	association	with	Tony’s	unreliable	mother	reveals	background	in	a	class	he	has	struggled	to	distance	himself	from.	Thus	Vince	is	stuck	between	a	tall	poppy	syndrome	(embarrassment	in	the	presumption	of	educational	and	cultural	mobility),	and	the	humiliation	he	sees	as	inherent	in	his	working	class	background,	a	“hidden	injury	of	class”	(c.f.	Sennett	and	Cobb)	that	undermines	self-confidence.	The	identity	contradiction	manifests	in	familial	conflict.	Daughter	Vivian	(Dominik	Garcia-Lorido)	will	not	tell	her	parents	she	works	at	a	strip	club	to	pay	her	university	fees,	as	she	lost	her	scholarship	due	to	marijuana	use;	the	implication	is	that	she	struggles	with	the	family’s	hopes	for	her	to	move	beyond	their	working	class	roots.	Family	tensions	regularly	focus	on	access	to	education	and	whether	or	not	one	is	“smart.”	In	fact,	the	only	character	whose	problems	turn	out	to	be	relatively	unproblematic	is	Vinnie	(Ezra	Miller),	a	teenager	whose	fat	fetishism	is	presented	as	somewhat	more	detached	from	class	anxieties,	making	the	shame	easier	to	deflate.	The	characters’	uncertainty	around	their	place	in	the	social	strata	of	America	at	large	is	contrasted	with	a	relatively	fixed	identity	in	their	locality:	the	Bronx’s	City	Island.104	As	in	many	of	these	films,	the	real	home	(or	valuable	mutuality)	is	revealed	to	be	family	at	the	explicative	conclusion.	The	tensions	and	guilt	they	have	experienced	exist	in	a	shared	context,	spatial	and	familial,	and	are	therefore	familiar	and	understandable	to	all	involved.	They	have	a	mutual	language	to	resolve	these	issues.	When	contrasted	with	the	power	of	familial	and	community	care,	class	shame	ceases	to	have	such	power	over	their	lives.	The	picture	closes	with	bonding	through	shared	sentimentality.			 So	class	issues	in	millennial	suburban	cinema	rarely	remain	uncomplicated:	the	suburban	façade	can	normalise	upper-middle	living	arrangements	in	some	cases,	but	in	the	ensemble	feature	is	more	often	used	to	reveal	prejudice	and	class	tensions	in	a	variety	of	specific	zones	we	problematically	generalise	as	American	suburbia.	Along	with	films	like	
Junebug	and	City	Island,	hybrid	pictures	including	The	Slums	of	Beverly	Hills	and	Duane	
Hopwood	(Matt	Mulhern,	2005)	also	interrogate	our	assumptions	of	class	indicators	in	suburban	spaces.	However,	as	sentiment	is	taken	to	be	synonymous	with	class	unconsciousness	for	many	theorists	–	especially	in	the	apparent	sentimental	celebration	of																																																									104	City	Island	can	also	be	seen	as	part	of	De	Felitta’s	continuing	documentation	of	the	Italian	American	experience	in	New	York	and	New	Jersey	in	films	such	as	Two	Family	House	(2000)	and	documentaries	like	‘Tis	Autumn:	The	Search	for	Jackie	Paris	(2006).		
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familial	norms	(Loukides	97)	–	the	following	section	deconstructs	the	use	of	sentimentality	in	the	suburban	ensemble	film.	
	
	
Drama	in	the	Comedy:	The	Problem	of	Sentiment	and	the	Possibility	of	Affective	
Equilibrium105		 Sentimentality	has	a	long	history	in	literary	theory,	and	more	recently	writers	including	Lauren	Berlant	have	extended	its	reach	to	media	and	film	critique.	Famously	summarised	by	James	Baldwin	in	1955	as	“the	mask	of	cruelty”	(14),	the	experience	of	sentimentality	has	earned	a	particularly	poor	reputation	as	being	synonymous	with	bigotry.	The	philosophical	underpinnings	of	sentiment	–	seeking	higher	truth	in	the	internal,	the	bodily	and	meta-physiological,	sensation	and	feeling	–	translated	to	a	literary	tradition	that,	to	critics	such	as	Baldwin	and	Berlant,	has	appeared	to	value	self-congratulatory	and	self-justifying	emotional	excess,	a	means	by	which	a	privileged	few	were	attributed	the	humanity	of	higher	feeling	(a	more	profound	interiority,	and	connectedness	through	superior	affect)	at	the	expense	of	others.	Berlant	reinforces	a	contemporary	conflation	of	humanism	and	sentimentality,	using	both	as	bywords	for	prejudice:	“the	critical	literature	on	sentimentality	has	now	long	refused	the	appearance	of	apoliticism	brandished	by	sentimental	humanism,	connecting	it	to	racist,	imperial,	and	exploitative	alibis	for	control”	(The	Female	Complaint	282).	 	On	the	other	hand,	in	a	1999	article	June	Howard	points	up	the	shedding	of	sentiment’s	philosophical	heritage	of	mutual	empathy	and	emotional	imagination:		 In	postbellum	America,	the	literary	was	often	defined	against	sentimentality	and	the	domestic	culture	of	letters.	Prestigious	writing	gradually	and	unevenly	became	less	openly	emotional	and	more	ambitiously	intellectual,	less	directly	didactic	and	more	conspicuously	masculine.	Antisentimentalism	is	an	important	part	of	that	story,	especially	for	literary	studies.		(73-74)		
																																																								105	A	version	of	the	following	first	appeared	as	“Sentimentality	in	the	Suburban	Ensemble	Dramedy:	A	Response	to	Berlant’s	Optimism-Realism	Binary”	in	Forum	20	(Spring	2015).		
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In	its	translation	from	philosophical	doctrine	to	literary	form,	Howard	argues	that	sentimentality	was	conflated	with	domesticity	and	the	feminine.106	Any	principled	opposition	to	such	a	form	then	had	to	propose	alternative	authentic	emotional	states	that	sentiment	could	not	reach;	thus	antisentimental	analysts	are	still	imposing	hierarchies	of	acceptable	affect.		 A	contemporaneous	reappraisal	of	antisentimentalism	can	be	witnessed	in	another	unlikely	source:	by	constantly	shifting	focalisation	and	thus	representing	a	range	of	mental	states,	ensemble	dramedies	move	us	between	satiric,	realist	and	sentimental	filmmaking	modes,	asking	us	to	consider	a	greater	range	of	affective	possibilities	in	tension	and	in	flux.	Of	these	kaleidoscopic	affects,	sentimentality	stands	out	as	a	significant	place	of	transition	–	we	move	through	sentimentality,	and	it	has	purpose	in	both	fortifying	and	broadening	our	field	of	community	identification,	responsibility	and	sympathy.	The	suburban	ensemble	film	stands	as	a	counterpoint	to	Berlant’s	generalisations	about	sentimentality,	and	related	ideals.	These	include	the	underlying	assumption	of	a	binary	between	optimism	and	realism,	which	much	of	Berlant’s	work	relies	on;	her	appropriation	of	terms	from	psychology,	such	as	depressive	realism;	the	elite	third	person	effect	of	notions	such	as	“the	good	life”	and	her	lack	of	specificity	regarding	alternatives	to	the	sentimental	or	cruelly	optimistic,	including	the	conditions	of	complicating	one’s	identity	in	politically	acceptable	ways.107		Baldwin	and	Berlant	voice	a	prevalent	assumption	in	suggesting	that	sentimentality	is	somehow	a	defective	response	concealing	conservative	values	or	identity	boundaries;	however,	the	proposition	only	remains	true	if	we	focus	singularly	on	those	stories	which	do	reach	conservative	conclusions	and	ask	us	to	bask	uncritically	in	them.	Indeed	such	films	are	not	hard	to	find,	and	Berlant	has	extended	the	literary	critique	of	sentimentality	to	cinema	adapted	from	novels	including	Uncle	Tom’s	Cabin	and	Show	Boat,	and	the	output	of	celebrities	such	as	Shirley	Temple.	In	The	Female	Complaint,	Berlant	analyses	sentiment’s	social	orderings	and	anatomises	the	conservative	values	that	reinforce	gender	and	class	norms	and																																																									106	Carl	Plantinga	goes	a	step	further:	“The	wholesale	denigration	of	sentimental	emotions	is	an	expression	of	masculine	bravado	at	best	and	of	rampant	sexism	at	worst.	To	denigrate	the	emotions	caused	by	sentiment’s	concerns	is	to	denigrate	the	concerns	themselves”	(Plantinga	193).	The	claim	finds	support	in	the	work	of	Flo	Liebowitz	(“Apt	Feelings”)	and	Molly	Haskell	(From	Reverence	to	Rape).		107	I	refer	to	this	notion	as	“identity	upset”	hereafter.		
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protect	privilege;	it	is	also	true,	however,	that	for	every	Shirley	Temple	movie,	there	are	examples	of	films	encouraging	a	relational	mutuality	founded	on	respecting	difference	and	striving	for	equality.	Stoking	sentiment,	as	we	will	see,	is	a	means,	a	tool,	not	an	end	in	itself.	Surely	it	matters	what	the	object	of	sentimentality	is,	what	we	are	sentimental	about.	Berlant,	however,	suggests	that	even	the	most	radical	of	these	humanist	narratives,	upon	reaching	for	sentimentality,	allow	us	to	relax	into	apoliticism	and	dismiss	critiques	of	structural	disadvantage,	as	the	sense	of	relation	and	belonging	they	provide	is	rarefied	and	protected	–	blinding,	even.		The	development	of	a	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	mode	in	American	filmmaking	after	American	Beauty	provides	an	interesting	case	study	in	the	use	of	cinematic	sentimentality	for	progressive	thought:	in	such	films	the	audience	is	rarely	allowed	to	feel	sentiment	until	a	progressive	conclusion	is	reached.	Sentiment	may	allow	us	to	feel	comforted	by	a	conviction,	but	if	this	conviction	is	that	sometimes	life	is	hard	and	surprises	us,	yet	we	can	turn	to	our	families	and	communities	and	look	after	one	another	for	consolation	or	that	we	need	to	think	generously	about	one	another’s	misdemeanours	and	a	breadth	of	different	humanness,	then	is	such	an	apparent	pause	in	reflexivity	doing	anyone	any	damage?108	Could	we	not	instead	call	this	kind	of	sharing	“consolidation”	or	“solidarity”?	It	is	impossible	to	live	in	a	state	of	constant	reflexivity,	so	if	we	are	to	share	conviction	through	sentiment,	which	in	effect	asks	us	to	relax	into	a	mutual	value	(or	what	we	imagine	to	be	a	mutual	value	in	order	to	reinforce	it),	then	the	value	itself	should	be	assessed,	not	the	notion	that	we	may	respond	with	sentiment	in	the	first	place.		Berlant	assumes	a	binary	between	the	idealism	she	locates	in	sentimentality	and	a	depressive	realism,	which,	she	says,	“in	contrast,	[is]	more	accurate”	(McCabe	and	Berlant	np).	This	is	a	dubious	fortification	of	a	negative	bias,	extrapolating	favourable	self-diagnosis	of	a	controversial	psychological	effect	to	generalised	cultural	theory,	from	which	any	pessimistic	sociopolitical	prognosis	could	be	asserted	as	being	“more	accurate.”109	One	may	exhibit	depressive	realism,	but	one	cannot	be	a	depressive	realist	any	more	than	a	cultural	theory	can	be	buttressed	as	such.	Further,	Berlant	continues	to	embody	a	tension	between	personally																																																									108	This	is	a	behaviour,	not	a	relation	with	an	“imagined”	or	“imagined	intimate”	public,	as	Berlant	argues,	referring	to	Benedict	Anderson’s	concept	of	the	“imagined	community.”		109	See	Moore	and	Fresco	for	a	meta-analysis.	
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affected	self-searching	in	works	such	as	“Affect	is	the	New	Trauma,”	and	her	foundational	condescension,	particularly	throughout	Cruel	Optimism:	the	latter	in	fact	seems	to	imply	that	everyone	except	Berlant	is	trapped	in	a	relational	nightmare,	not	clever	enough	to	recognise	that	their	imaginary	connections	to	people	and	things	are	at	the	same	time	aspirational-neoliberal	fantasies	of	“the	good	life”,	and	thus	we	are	all	engaged	in	some	form	of	self-harm	when	we	relate.	The	hostility	toward	coherent	self-narratives	as	representative	of	normalisation,	political	certitude	and	lack	of	reflexivity	locks	us	into	a	self-defeating	lack	of	specificity	about	the	structuring	of	our	identities.110	Yet	since	coherent	self-narratives	are	unavoidable,	valorising	the	state	of	identity	upset	in	and	of	itself	–	ironically	erecting	new	identity	boundaries	–	merely	permits	us	to	be	unclear	about	the	conditions	of	identity	flux	and	politicisation,	about	thoughts,	actions,	causes,	and	the	way	we	transmit	ideas	about	our	selves	through	storied	behaviours.111	What	exactly	is	it,	we	should	ask,	that	we	want	from	identity	upset?	Being	specific	regarding	the	particular	values	we	should	question	is	a	humility	that	remains	vulnerable	and	open	to	discovery,	in	a	way	that	binaristic	admonishments	of	others’	sentimental	optimism	or	masochistic	fantasy	of	the	good	life	cannot	be.	Berlant	challenges	us	only	to	reimagine	ourselves	on	this	restrictive	continuum	–	subject	to	or	not	subject	to	hopeful	political	narratives	–	and	so	I	am	doubtful	Berlant	manages	to	achieve	this	specificity.		The	binary	between	sentimental	idealism	and	depressive	realism	is	imaginary.	Brian	Wilkie	points	out	some	of	the	classist	undertones	in	these	readings	of	the	literary	sentimental	(570-71)	and	spins	a	neat	analogy	for	thinking	about	elitist	antisentimentalism,	or	the	claim	to	an	attitudinally	superior	cognitive	bias	in	cultural	analysis	that	is	allegedly	provided	by	depressive	realism:	“Sugar	is	as	much	a	fact	of	life	as	vomit;	one	is	a	soft	fact	and	one	a	hard	one,	if	you	will,	but	both	are	facts”	(572).	Similarly,	David	Foster	Wallace	uses	expository	passages	in	Infinite	Jest	to	casually	discard	the	discriminatory	binary:	“sentiment	equals	naïveté	on	this	continent”	(694).	He	goes	on	to	facetiously	connect	an	essential	experience	of	being	“really	human”	to	the	“unavoidably	sentimental	and	naive	and	goo-prone”	(694-695),	at	once	sympathising	with	and	satirising	the	presumed	alternative	to	hip	cynicism	as	unthinkingly	sanguine	affective	stasis.	If	such	a	binary	does	exist,	Wallace	muses	that	sentiment	is	preferable	(which	at	least	skirts	anhedonia),	but	this	concept	of	humanness	is																																																									110	At	times	Berlant	self-defensively	refers	to	her	own	social	analysis	as	“incoherent”,	as	in	the	alternatives-that-aren’t-alternatives	in	“A	Properly	Political	Concept	of	Love”	(685-686).		111	Perhaps	this	could	also	be	seen	as	an	extension	of	Jean-François	Lyotard’s	“incredulity	towards	metanarratives”	to	a	livable	ethic. 
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clearly	false	and	limiting.	Note	also	the	humour	sitting	alongside	a	drive	to	earnestness,	honesty	and	realism	in	both	Wilkie	and	Wallace’s	remarks,	as	this	affective	balancing	act	is	an	important	component	in	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	that	I	will	look	at	shortly.	Most	of	the	millennial	suburban	ensemble	dramedies	recognise	that	neither	bias,	focusing	on	one	affective	state	and	not	the	other,	would	be	superior	or	more	realistic	–	instead	they	illustrate	the	possibility	of	affective	balance	or	equilibrium.	Films	such	as	Little	Miss	Sunshine	or	The	
Kids	Are	All	Right	use	such	recognition	to	their	advantage,	yoking	human	insight	from	the	affective	spectrum	they	are	able	to	cover.	Little	Miss	Sunshine	features	a	family	moving	through	rage,	contempt,	grief,	sarcasm,	scepticism,	flippancy,	cheer,	hope,	disappointment,	love	and	sentimentality,	yet	they	are	permitted	all	such	responses,	as	is	the	spectator.	The	Kids	
Are	All	Right	features	reflection	on	the	heredity	of	bias	to	particular	emotional	states,	as	two	children	with	lesbian	mothers	meet	their	biological	father,	prompting	consideration	of	the	unknowable	inheritance	conditions,	genetic	and	cultural,	of	varied	personality	traits	and	coping	mechanisms.		Sentimentality,	then,	is	not	“unearned”,	to	borrow	a	descriptor	popularly	attributed	to	James	Joyce.112	These	films	use	sentiment	to	find	a	place	where	we	do	not	know	exactly	how	to	feel	or	what	to	think,	as	we	could	equally	be	laughing	or	crying,	feeling	shock	or	understanding,	and	embracing	or	rejecting	characters	and	their	actions.	Screenwriters	Lowell	Ganz	and	Babaloo	Mandel	have	demonstrated	this	on	a	number	of	occasions,	especially	in	
Parenthood	and	their	follow-up	film	City	Slickers	(Ron	Underwood,	1991),	which	similarly	portray	sentimentality	and	humour	as	alternating	coping	mechanisms,	their	characters	juggling	negative	and	positive	biases	in	dealing	with	crises	both	existential	and	physical.	We	feel	the	pull	of	emotional	excess	–	sentiment	–	but	it	is	charged	with	conflicting	knowledge																																																									112	As	Payne	once	said,	“Sentimentality	can	work	better	either	in	literature	or	film	if	the	background	is	cold	and	those	moments	feel	earned”	(Nocenti	np);	in	these	discussions	of	“earning”	sentiment	(see	also	Plantinga	193),	we	again	see	sentimentality	used	as	a	tool	and	not	an	end	in	itself.	Narrative	resolution	may	often	be	the	moment	in	which	sentimentality	“earns”	its	bad	name,	yet	ensemble	dramedy	films	offer	opportunities	to	resist	thinking	of	narrative	in	either/or	terms,	like	sentimental	or	realistic.	If	the	conclusion	is	sentimental,	then	it	is	at	least	mediated	by	our	knowledge	of	the	unavoidable	negative	affect	that	preceded	it;	life	will	continue	to	include	these	contrasts.	Payne	also	elaborates	that	sentimentality	should	always	be	about	affective	contrasts:	“I’m	deathly	afraid	of	being	too	sentimental.	But	a	film	should	be	emotional.	There	is	a	letter	from	Chekhov	in	which	a	young	writer	asks	him	for	some	feedback,	and	he’s	kind	enough	to	do	it.	He	writes	the	guy	back	and	says,	basically,	‘It’s	too	damn	sentimental.	If	you	want	emotional	effects,	you	have	to	place	them	against	a	cold	background,	so	they	stand	out	in	relief.’	I	think	that’s	true”	(Talbot	np).		
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and	feeling.	This	delicious	tension,	the	space	where	we	are	not	certain	exactly	what	a	film	is	eliciting	from	us	because,	in	a	kind	of	affective	verisimilitude,	its	dynamism	precipitates	no	correct	response,	is	a	curiously	empowering	place	to	be	–	it	exists	elsewhere	in	cinema	too,	from	the	horror	comedy	to	the	political	romantic	comedy.	Here	we	can	reach	a	zone	of	sanctioned	affect	where	that	affect	is	not	prescriptive,	and	by	stoking	a	lifelike	confusion,	we	can	think	more	generously,	receptively	and	open-heartedly	on	the	subject	at	hand.113		More	specifically,	we	need	to	scrutinise	the	grouping	of	repartee,	oft-unkind	riposte,	and	performance	gags	with	genuine	attempts	at	unpacking	socio-ethical	problems	to	comprehend	the	purposeful	interlacing	of	drama	and	comedy	in	the	suburban	ensemble	film.	This	could	be	seen	as	extended	from	the	fluidity	between	social	commentary,	sarcastic	jibe	and	demonstrations	of	familial	care	in	the	lineage	of	television	sitcoms	from	Roseanne	through	the	The	Simpsons	and	Modern	Family,	as	described	above.	The	tension	between	pathos	and	associated	moments	of	bathos	shows	up	both	our	attempts	to	dismiss	that	which	troubles	us	with	jest,	and	our	impulse	to	become	absorbed	by	our	own	woes.	We	are	permitted	both	states,	but	encouraged	not	to	remain	too	long	with	either	condition,	as	we	are	prompted	to	use	one	to	upset	the	other	–	to	challenge	affective	inertia	–	in	our	search	for	answers	to	difficult	ethical	situations.	The	technique	promotes	a	kind	of	sifting	through	affective	responses	to	find	what	is	appropriate,	yet	none	are	considered	inadequate	or	incorrect,	and	all	emotive	responses	are	potentially	useful	in	finding	a	way	forward.		So	sentimentality	is	not	in	and	of	itself	an	affective	coherence.	We	can	have	an	affective	incoherence	–	an	“incompatibility	between	conceptual	and	embodied	affect”	(Semin	and	Smith	215)	–	in	features	that	engage	sentimentality.	In	fact,	sentimentality	before,	after	and	alongside	other	emotive	responses	may	increase	the	scope	of	the	upset	and	reflexivity																																																									113	In	performative	storytelling,	we	might	draw	the	affectively	experimental	melting	pot	back	to	that	famous	onstage	rule-breaker	Shakespeare,	with	his	seemingly	limitless	tightrope	chartered	between	the	moralistic	and	inquisitive.	G.	Wilson	Knight’s	reading	of	King	Lear	as	horror	comedy	(176),	for	example,	or	Julie	Taymor’s	1999	film	reading	of	Titus	Andronicus,	exploring	politico-ethical	consequences	within	the	horror,	comedy	and	poetic	aestheticisation	of	staging	and	play-acting	chaotic	violence;	and	consider	too	originary	romcoms	such	as	Much	
Ado	About	Nothing,	cementing	the	antagonism-into-romance	trajectory	now	so	familiar,	that	groundbreaking	union	of	politics	and	romance,	Romeo	and	Juliet,	the	ironic-empathic	liberalism-by-surprise	of	both	perspectives	and	identities	in	As	You	Like	It	or	experiments	in	affective	genre	comparison	like	The	Winter’s	Tale.	We	should	be	careful	not	to	pretend	that	such	an	affective	spectrum	belongs	only	to	our	immediate	history,	or	entertain	unilineal	assumptions	of	an	affective	cultural	evolution.		
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available,	potentially	even	leading	to	a	reduced	reliance	on	stereotypes.114	At	the	same	time,	as	George	McFadden	argues,	following	Charles	Mauron,	affective	incoherence	nourishes	laughter	as	the	critical	viewer	wonders	“how	sense	and	nonsense	are	combined	to	make	comedy,	and	what	kind	of	adult	behaviour	correlates	with	the	zany	and	outrageous	activity	on	the	stage”	(156).	Our	affective	experiences	in	narrative,	however,	should	be	recognised	as	separate	from	unmediated	lived	experience	–	we	recognise	a	level	of	intentionality	in	emotional	cues,	so	we	might	refer	to	attempts	to	achieve	the	state	of	affective	incoherence	in	art	by	another	term:	a	challenge	to	affective	inertia,	or	a	call	to	affective	mobility.	Again	we	should	look	at	sentimentality	as	a	tool	or	device	that	can	be	put	to	use	in	this	capacity,	and	not	merely	as	a	generic	code	(which	might	in	any	case	more	accurately	be	called	melodrama).	
	As	just	one	example,	many	of	these	films	demonstrate	how	anger	can	be	a	force	for	positive	change,	as	long	as	we	do	not	indulge	its	permanency.	The	Oranges	stands	out	here,	repositioning	as	redemptive	possibility	the	antagonism	of	people	we	might	otherwise	scorn	as	immoral	–	in	this	case	an	adulterous,	intergenerational	couple	(Leighton	Meester	as	Nina	Ostroff	and	Hugh	Laurie	as	David	Paige)	whose	affair	spurs	family	and	friends	to	reimagine	their	own	lives.	Sentiment	is	just	one	of	the	responses	we	move	through	to	patch	together	our	best	moral	resolution.	The	Oranges	makes	counterintuitive	use	of	a	gentle,	pensive,	acoustic	score	at	moments	of	expected	melodrama	and	audience	disparagement,	and	its	focalisation	shifts	between	characters	of	differing	perspectives;	later	we	learn	how	the	indiscretions	of	some	characters	have	productive	effects	on	others.	The	couple’s	exploration	of	moral	ambiguities	justifiably	enrages	those	implicated,	yet	ultimately	moves	everyone	along	a	continuum	of	affect	–	including	laughter,	attempts	at	deflating	their	torment,	and	sentimentality,	allowing	them	to	access	redefined	communal	attachments	and	potentialities.	Without	moving	through	anger,	they	may	not	desire	change;	without	levity,	they	may	remain	in	depression	or	the	inertia	of	resentment;	without	sentiment,	they	may	refuse	to	work	together	to	revise	relational	responsibilities.115	This	process	allows	them	to	attach	to	a	new	life	less	complacent	and	more	fulfilling	than	before.	The	perspectives	on	anger	offered	by	the																																																									114	As	suggested	by	Jeffrey	R.	Huntsinger’s	2013	research,	“Affective	Incoherence	Reduces	Reliance	on	Activated	Stereotypes.”		115	Clearly,	for	the	spectator,	there	is	an	excitation	transfer	at	work	in	experiencing	these	mixed	emotions	along	with	the	characters.	Our	enjoyment	of	accumulated	mixed	affect	is	not	entirely	hedonic;	we	see	here	that	the	narrative’s	emotional	causality	grants	access	to	questions	about	meaning,	purpose	and	morality	relevant	to	our	lives.		
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suburban	ensemble	dramedy,	though,	are	far	from	homogeneous.	Junebug	and	City	Island,	for	instance,	look	at	anger	arising	from	class	friction,	and	conflicting	demonstrations	of	belonging	required	by	different	communities,	families	and	locales	(semi-rural	suburbia	in	North	Carolina	or	the	Bronx’s	City	Island,	for	example).		Problematic	as	the	community	may	be	in	identity	politics	and	Berlantian	queer	theory,	as	all	community	entails	some	kind	of	exclusion,	Darwinian	humanists	such	as	Ellen	Dissanayake	suggest	that	such	problems	cannot	be	used	to	dismiss	inextricably	human	impulses:		we	evolved	to	need	mutuality	with	other	individuals,	acceptance	by	and	participation	in	a	group,	socially	shared	meanings,	assurance	that	we	understand	and	can	capably	deal	with	the	world,	and	the	opportunity	to	demonstrate	emotional	investment	in	important	objects	and	outcomes	by	acts	and	experiences	of	elaborating.		(168)		In	denying	these	human	needs,	we	risk	devising	an	unworkable	and	self-defeating	ethic	to	live	by,	thereby	proffering	dissatisfaction	and	disappointment.116	We	imagine	ourselves	as	ethically	bound	to	a	community	in	order	to	reach	mutually	inclusive	goals.	This	can	apply	to	a	cosmopolitan	communal	adherence	too.	These	films	position	sentiment	not	just	as	mutuality,	but	as	an	important	part	of	our	communal	governance,	diplomacy	or	decision-making	processes,	which	can	lead	to	outcomes	of	care	for	a	broader	spectrum	of	otherness,	and	certainly	do	not	preclude	ethical	or	political	action	–	this	is	realised	in	philosophy	and	deed	by	all	of	the	protagonists	at	the	conclusion	of	Little	Children,	for	example.117	Vigilante	ex-cop	Larry	Hedges	(Noah	Emmerich)	realises	he	has	a	duty	of	care	to	Ronnie	McGorvey	(Jackie	Earle	Haley)	when	he	discovers	that	Ronnie	has	attempted	self-castration	following	struggles	with	paedophilic	desire,	stigma,	and	the	death	of	his	mother;	and	a	couple	involved	in	an	adulterous	affair,	Brad	Adamson	(Patrick	Wilson)	and	Sarah	Pierce	(Kate	Winslet),	must	confront	the	inherent	self-absorption	of	their	elopement	plans,	stemming	from	a	belief	that	they	have	missed	out	on	earlier	formative	experiences,	to	ultimately	reclaim	a	wider	sense	of	belonging	and	accountability.	Often	the	sentimental	component	of	these	films	is	focused	on	mutual	redemption,	a	political	awakening	into	a	new	communal	care:	the	characters’	comprehension	of	their	interdependence	helps	them	reconstruct	their	identities	to	be	more																																																									116	Of	the	kind	Berlant,	in	Cruel	Optimism,	seeks	to	avoid.		117	C.f.	Bowles	and	Gintis,	“Social	Capital	and	Community	Governance.” 
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broadly	considerate	of	others.	Dan	P.	McAdams’s	research	looks	at	how	narratives	of	redemption	promote	generativity,	or	concern	for	the	welfare	of	future	generations	(c.f.	Erikson	240)	–	in	fact,	McAdams	suggests	such	narratives	are	integral	to	maintaining	generative	values	beyond	the	present	self	(82).	“High	scores	on	generativity	measures,”	he	writes,	“are	positively	associated	with	indexes	of	prosocial	behaviour	and	productive	societal	engagements,”	which	include	“interest	in	political	issues	and	involvement	in	the	political	process”	(84).	The	sentimentality	of	personal	redemption	within	a	community	–	in	which	we	come	to	care	more	about	community	–	may	help	shape	our	behaviour	in	positive	ways,	whether	or	not	it	is	founded	on	a	mythical,	optimistic	or	entirely	imaginary	public.		 Ed	S.H.	Tan	and	Nico	H.	Frijda	argue	that	sentiment	and	crying	are	inherently	submissive,	in	that	they	express	a	giving	up	of	personal	autonomy	to	be	overwhelmed	by	emotion	(“Sentiment	in	Film	Viewing”);	this	could	contribute	to	a	kind	of	idle	acceptance	that	Berlant	sees	as	unconducive	to	political	action	(although	it	remains	unclear	how	emotional	acceptance	necessarily	generalises	to	political	idleness).	Yet	many	narrative	events	can	propel	such	a	feeling,	including	those	related	to	attachment	and	separation	(56),	morals	and	justice	(58),	or	awe-inspiring	stimulus	(62),	and	again	these	emotions	are	transitory.	If	sentiment	and	weeping	are	submissive	in	one	instance,	the	excitation	transfer	from	such	a	state	may	later	be	leveraged	to	more	rousing	ends,	and	those	ends	do	not	necessarily	need	to	be	reinforced	attachment	to	an	imaginary	public	or	exclusive	group.		If	we	reach	a	point	of	sentimentality	in	a	narrative	of	social	inclusion,	however,	we	may	ask	whether	the	imagined	intimate	norm	we	arrive	at,	the	recognisable	conventionality	the	device	relies	on,	and	those	who	are	excluded	by	omission	or	subtle	disassociation,	render	such	a	narrative	ineffectual	in	changing	an	exploitative	status	quo,	or	positions	it	above	and	beyond	more	active	political	concerns.	So	we	must	ask	whether,	as	audiences,	“they”	(Berlant	uses	the	third	person	to	describe	such	audiences)	are	even	allowed	to	feel	closer	to	others	when	they,	as	Berlant	says:		take	emotions	to	express	something	authentic	about	themselves	that	they	think	the	world	should	welcome	and	respect;	a	mode	constituted	by	affective	and	emotional	intelligibility	and	a	kind	of	generosity,	recognition,	and	solidarity	among	strangers.	Another	way	to	say	this	is	that	I	am	interested	in	a	realist	account	of	fantasy,	insofar	as	
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the	political	and	the	social	are	floated	by	complex	and	historically	specific	affective	investments.		(McCabe	and	Berlant	np)		Although	this	is,	on	the	surface,	a	good	description	of	the	relational	experience	of	sentimentality,	it	is	accompanied	by	some	specious	correlational	reasoning	–	that	sharing	values	or	imagining	the	communal	around	those	values	necessarily	constitutes	a	fantasy	(in	the	psychoanalytic	sense),	and	cannot	be	concomitant	with	political	reflexivity.118	Berlant	has	identified	feelings	of	belonging	as	part	of	the	problem	that	sustains	political	imbalance	and	class	unconsciousness,	arguing	that	it	is	concurrent	with	unheeded	exploitation.	However,	belonging	is	part	of	everything	we	do:	it	is	an	intrinsic	condition	of	human	sociality.	Exploitation,	however,	is	different	–	there	are	periods,	places,	thoughts	and	actions	that	have	varying	degrees	of	exploitation,	so	it	must	be	subject	to	change.	The	need	for	belonging	is	everywhere	in	equal	measure,	in	intimate	publics	as	in	cosmopolitan	fealties.	As	Frans	de	Waal	notes:		 Individual	interests	may	be	served	by	partnerships	(e.g.,	marriages,	friendships)	that	create	a	long-lasting	communal	“fitness	interdependence”	mediated	by	mutual	empathy.	Within	these	relationships,	partners	do	not	necessarily	keep	careful	track	of	who	did	what	for	whom	(Clark	&	Mills	1979),	and	derive	psychological	and	health	benefits	not	only	from	receiving	but	also	from	giving	support	(Brown	&	Brown	2006).		(292)		Belonging	is	not	simply	part	of	life;	it	is	also	positively	correlated	with	health	outcomes.		For	Berlant,	the	sentimental	inspires	an	imagined	group	cohesion	which	is	bigoted,	oppressive	or	incorrectly	aspirational,	but	to	sustain	this	view	we	must	resist	recognition	of	the	many	different	ways	we	can	imagine	ourselves	as	akin	to	others:	group	identification	is	different	from	identity	fusion,	which	is	in	turn	different	from	tolerance,	and	surely	there	are	
																																																								118	While	it	is	true	that	compromised	peoples	can	often	vote	seemingly	against	their	own	interests,	propelled	by	a	hard-sell	individualist	ideology	that	benefits	another	social	echelon	entirely,	this	fact	does	not	license	the	theorist	to	downgrade	anyone’s	emotional	lives	as	uninformed	or	inferior,	or	indeed	to	presume	that	such	constituents	are	uniquely	unaware	of	the	emotions	or	fantasies	undergirding	their	political	beliefs.	These	presumptions	require	more	than	anecdotal	evidence	to	be	taken	seriously.		
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many	more	social	glues.119	All	of	these	recognised	varieties	of	communal	identity	construction,	and	the	spaces	in	between	them,	may	be	the	object	of	sentiment,	and	may	drive	compassionate	behaviours.		Harvey	Whitehouse’s	work	makes	an	important	distinction	between	group	identification	and	identity	fusion,	encompassing	different	levels	of	personal	accountability	felt	to	others,	and	different	activations	of	self-identity.	Blending	all	kinds	of	group	cohesion	and	identification	into	a	single	problematic	process	without	scientific	recourse	is	a	dangerous	route	to	simplifying,	and	thereby	dehumanising	the	ways	people	operate	together.	A	spectrum	of	degrees	of	adhesion	to	social	identities	and	fused	groups	should	also	be	recognised	across	local	experience	and	extended	imaginings,	and	shared	ideology	does	not	necessarily	have	to	follow	from	either	cohesion,	especially	with	extended	fusions	(in	Berlant,	imagined	publics).	Whitehouse	writes:		Recall	that	one	of	the	hypothesized	features	of	local	fusion	is	that	personal	experience,	on	which	my	sense	of	self	is	at	least	partly	constructed,	provides	the	main	reference	point	for	sharing	a	common	bond.	So	extended	fusion	would	seem	to	be	a	more	tentative	kind	of	fusion	of	self	and	other.	Since	it	depends	on	external	sources	as	well	as	direct	personal	engagement	(e.g.	testimony	rather	than	experience)	it	carries	less	conviction.		(286)		This	could	also	translate	to	ideological	conviction.	Although	we	see	strong	methods	for	generating	a	fusion	by	which	we	might	favour	peers	in	a	large	anonymous	grouping	–	such	as	routinised	doctrinal	rituals	–	it	does	not	necessarily	follow	that	we	will	all	adopt	the	same	
values	in	any	grouping	(consider	the	breadth	of	dispositions	even	among	one’s	immediate	family),	so	we	may	be	looking	in	the	wrong	place	if	we	are	to	politicise	communities	and	imagined	publics	to	this	extent.	Communities	can	be	established	by	interaction	rather	than	shared	ideology,	which	should	be	seen	as	a	set	of	behaviours	constituting	a	kind	of	community	self-governance	that	crucially	complements	state	and	market,	as	Bowles	and	Gintis	argue;	and	communities	can	exist	even	without	the	perception	of	relationality	or	commonality,	as	Robert	J.	Sampson	explains	(“Collective	Efficacy	Theory”	153).	Although	we	still	see	social	groups	influencing	values	and	neighbourhood	effects	in	ideological	contagion,	it	seems	that	contact																																																									119	For	example,	Lakin	et	al.,	“The	Chameleon	Effect	as	Social	Glue”;	Bastian	et	al.,	“Pain	as	Social	Glue”;	Van	Vugt	and	Hart,	“Social	Identity	as	Social	Glue.”	
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with	peers	is	still	key.	As	in	Nicholas	A.	Christakis’s	“Three	Degrees	of	Influence”	theory	of	social	influence	outlined	in	Connected,	the	attitudinal	and	behavioural	contagion	we	exhibit	is	reduced	with	each	degree	of	separation	from	direct	contact.	No	modelling	of	community	per	se	mandates	shared	values	or	privilege,	so	we	cannot	assume	imagined	communities	control	the	genesis	of	political	attitudes.		 Suggesting	an	excess	beyond	the	detail	of	cohesion	we	have	so	far	been	able	to	gather	data	on,	Whitehouse	also	mentions	that:		While	individuals	are	only	capable	of	fusing	with	a	small	number	of	groups	(typically	two	or	three	at	most),	it	is	possible	to	identify	with	a	great	many	different	groups.	This	means	we	can	build	a	complex	division	of	labour	in	which	we	shift	flexibly	between	roles	as	changing	social	situations	dictate.	There	is	no	limit	on	the	size	of	groups	with	whom	identification	is	possible.		(288)		For	some,	group	cohesion	appears	to	be	the	problem,	but	for	others	with	perhaps	more	faith	in	the	concurrence	of	local	community	fealty	and	political	cosmopolitanism,	a	fair	scientific	deconstruction	of	the	diversity	of	human	group	identification	may	suggest	opportunities	for	reducing	civil	and	global	conflicts,	poverty	and	exclusion.120		 Thus,	even	though	some	community	fealties	may	be	problematic,	this	should	not	mean	that	all	of	our	communal	behaviours	are	–	even	some	exclusionary	social	groupings	are	impossible	to	avoid,	and	some	condoned	ostracism	is	necessary	to	live:	ignoring	strangers	on	public	transport,	for	example,	is	not	without	purpose.	But	this	does	not	mean	we	will	refuse	ethical	responsibilities	to	others	outside	of	our	social	circles.	Tolerance	is	another	kind	of	group	cohesion	in	which	we	neither	identify	with	nor	aggress	against	an	outgroup,	and	thus	encompasses	a	kind	of	communal	responsibility	without	affinity.	The	strictures	on	social	grouping	and	how	we	think	about	our	social	groupings	are	therefore	inadequate	philosophies.	Even	if	Berlant	accepts	a	version	of	communal	belonging,	this	level	of	debate	cannot	tell	us	what	conditions	of	belonging	make	our	relationality	acceptable;	thus	we	are	all	prescribed	a	suspicion	of	our	inherent	and	varied	attachments	to	others.	Sentimentality,	then,	when	it	allows	us	to	feel	comforted	by	feelings	of	connection	to	others	in	our	community,	is	not	the																																																									120	This	is	what	Whitehouse	suggests	in	“Three	Wishes	for	the	World.”		
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problem.	However	we	can	still	ask	if	conceiving	of	oneself	as	“special”	because	of	these	feelings	is	reasonable:	a	number	of	urban	ensemble	dramedies,	such	as	Margaret	and	the	films	of	Nicole	Holofcener,	actively	ask	this	question.121		It	seems	that,	working	within	this	stringency,	no	one	is	allowed	to	feel	comforted	by	any	qualities	they	share	with	others	without	risking	being	immediately	denigrated	as	participating	in	normalisation,	fantasy	or	falsehood.	Anything	we	locate	as	mutual	becomes	conventional	and	thereby	abhorrently	compromising.	I	conclude	that	this	is	an	unfair	condition	to	saddle	viewers	and	readers	with.	The	ethic	proposed	by	Berlant	constitutes,	paradoxically,	another	attempt	to	restrict	parts	of	our	identity	–	in	this	case	our	affective	identity	–	for	ideological	reasons	that	spuriously	relate	to	how	we	actually	treat	one	another.		To	summarise,	we	can	see	sentimentality	as	a	device	rather	than	having	intrinsic	ethical	value.	The	communities	we	may	attach	ourselves	to	via	sentiment	are	not	merely	imaginary;	communities	also	constitute	behaviours	we	exhibit	to	one	another.	The	need	for	belonging	is	a	pancultural	phenomenon	and	cannot	be	realistically	appraised	as	a	surmountable	problem.	Further,	identifying	with	members	of	one’s	community	does	not	necessarily	mean	we	will	not	exhibit	kindness	or	ethical	inclusivity	to	outgroup	members.	The																																																									121	Margaret,	for	instance,	acts	as	an	extended	essay	on	the	privilege	of	affective	indulgence.	Lisa	(Anna	Paquin),	who	witnesses	a	bus	accident	in	which	a	woman	dies	in	her	arms,	leverages	the	ambiguity	of	reasonable	selfishness	after	trauma	to	impose	her	emotional	responses	on	others,	making	certain	she	remains	the	centre	of	dramas	unfolding	around	her	–	she	is	in	turn	indulged	by	those	who	feel	they	must	respect	her	sensitivity.	Lisa	projects	her	deep	feelings	as	having	primacy	over	others’	concerns;	analogously,	when	she	discusses	politics	in	class,	her	self-righteous	depth	of	feeling	overwhelms	debate	and	makes	real	concern	or	political	inquiry	impossible	to	reach.	At	times	Lonergan	will	interrupt	the	action	to	have	the	camera	pan	across	cityscapes	featuring	other	New	Yorkers	going	about	their	lives,	or	mix	the	dialogue	of	extras	on	the	periphery	louder	than	his	characters,	reminding	us	how	easily	we	can	forget	a	world	full	of	other	people	when	we	are	so	absorbed	in	our	tribulations.	It	is	interesting	that	these	narratives	of	affective	indulgence	have	attached	to	the	city,	suggesting	that	solipsism	is	made	more	possible	in	urban	environments	–	quite	the	opposite	of	what	antisuburban	critics	suggest	regarding	the	apoliticism	of	suburban	sentimentality	(Eagleton	207,	in	particular).	However	the	film	makes	an	important	distinction.	It	is	not	depth	of	feeling	in	itself	that	is	the	problem,	and	nor	is	it	an	imagined	mutuality	or	earnest	sharing	of	values	via	emotive	cues;	rather,	it	is	the	use	of	emotion	to	protect	one’s	narcissistic	isolation	from	others’	concerns	that	is	the	problem.	A	kind	of	affective	indulgence	is	real,	but	maybe	relational	sentimentality	is	not	the	most	problematic	experience	of	all.	In	fact,	maybe	it	is	worse	for	us	to	imagine	ourselves	as	affectively	alone	–	perhaps	this	spurs	a	less	communitarian	sense	of	belonging	and	acceptable	behaviour,	and	generates	more	possibilities	to	protect	our	own	privilege.		
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use	of	sentiment	in	stories,	in	acknowledging	a	breadth	of	otherness,	may	also	work	to	extend	our	cosmopolitan	actions	by	humanising	others,	and	encourage	us	to	find	points	of	ethical	identification	with	and	commitment	to	a	broader	range	of	living	entities.	Berlantian	affect	theory	needlessly	restricts	identities	and	attitudes	that	do	not	translate	to	political	or	compromising	actions,	and	can	thus	be	seen	as	arguably	prejudicial.	A	third	person	effect	is	also	discernible:	the	philosophy	applies	to	the	relationality	of	others,	but	not	the	writer’s,	and	is	thus	elitist.		Comprehending	how	the	suburban	ensemble	film	appropriates	sentimental	experience	allows	us	to	access	an	alternative	to	Berlant’s	political-affective	binaries.	The	affective	spectrum	covered	in	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	permits	concurrent	diverse	emotions	in	tension	with	associated	ideas	and	attitudes,	and	opens	up	a	place	to	truly	consider	how	we	might	behave	given	our	troubled	relationships	with	peers.			
Comedy	in	the	Drama:	Humour	and	Benign	Violations	in	the	Suburban	Ensemble	
Dramedy	
	 Having	mounted	a	defence	of	the	politically	and	pragmatically	motivating	role	of	sentimentality	in	these	films,	I	turn	now	to	the	detail	of	their	humour,	how	comic	devices	are	used	to	disquiet	our	expectations	and	explore	alternatives	to	social	anxieties.	Writing	on	Shakespearean	comedy,	Northrop	Frye	says:		 Participation	and	detachment,	sympathy	and	ridicule,	sociability	and	isolation,	are	inseparable	in	the	complex	we	call	comedy,	a	complex	that	is	begotten	by	the	paradox	of	life	itself,	in	which	to	exist	is	both	to	be	a	part	of	something	else	and	yet	never	to	be	a	part	of	it,	and	in	which	all	freedom	and	joy	are	inseparably	a	belonging	and	an	escape.		(104)		As	we	have	seen,	a	similar	matrix	of	ostensibly	conflicting	emotions	is	integral	to	understanding	the	affective	formula,	and	political	upset,	of	the	dramedy	film.122	The	best																																																									122	For	further	humanist	readings,	see	Robin	Headlam	Wells’s	Shakespeare’s	Humanism,	rescuing	the	Renaissance’s	more	subtle,	sensitive	and	self-consciously	hopeful	attempts	to	comprehend	a	human	nature	from	antihumanist	generalisations,	and	Andy	Mousley’s	Re-
Humanising	Shakespeare,	reading	Shakespeare	as,	again,	a	self-consciously	hopeful	way	to	
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comedy,	perhaps,	is	inextricable	from	the	very	real	social	threats	underpinning	its	relevance	to	an	audience.	Working	from	the	benign	violation	model	(BVT)	in	humour	studies	advanced	by	Peter	McGraw	and	Joel	Warner,	we	can	view	comedy	as	an	exploration	of	events,	circumstances,	people	and	things	that	may	or	may	not	pose	a	threat	–	a	process	by	which	we	implicitly	identify	potential	violations	to	the	self	which	might	cause	harm	and	are	simultaneously	afforded	the	opportunity	to	reduce	our	perception	of	such	threats	by	acknowledging	our	relative	circumstantial	safety.	Using	humour	to	evaluate	threats	as	less	serious,	or	more	benign,	can	allow	us	to	make	way	for	other	concerns;	or,	as	Sergei	Eisenstein	wrote	in	“Bolsheviks	Do	Laugh”	(68-72),	humour	can	reinforce	and	remind	us	of	political	threats	to	be	overcome.	Therefore	humour	has	political	resonance	as	a	negotiator	between	the	interpersonal	behaviours,	attitudes	and	events	we	should	and	should	not	assume	as	a	threat,	or	what	we	should	treat	seriously,	without	levity.	Humour	and	its	absence	can	make	a	claim	as	to	the	level	of	violation	entailed	in	certain	situations,	as	well	as	their	social	or	political	contexts.			 Humour	arises	from	multiple	sources	in	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy,	but	chief	among	these	would	appear	to	be	witty	dialogue,	character	eccentricity	or	quirk,	and	the	surprisingly	frank	renegotiation	of	social	mores.	Although	the	films	employ	techniques	familiar	across	cinematic	comedy	genres	–	for	instance	visual	humour,	or	sight	and	sound	gags123	–	these	three	are	the	comedic	and	satiric	elements	we	might	most	readily	associate	with	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy.	Instead	of	locating	every	instance	of	screen	humour	therein,	I	will	focus	more	broadly	on	those	elements	that	seem	integral	to	the	form.			 What	we	read	as	wit	in	these	dialogue-heavy	films	can	be	broken	down	into	three	concomitant	categories	also:	cynical	haughtiness,	epigrammatic	insight,	and	inventive	lingual	play.	These	attributes	make	up	the	comedy	of	repartee	(succinctly	historicised	by	Abrams	and	Harpham	417-419).	The	place	of	cynical	haughtiness,	as	discussed	above	in	relation	to	the	sitcom	heritage	of	the	suburban	dramedy,	must	be	read	with	regard	to	the	films’	structural	trajectory:	after	critical	jibes,	insults	and	unkind	riposte	are	offered,	the	scorn	is	regularly																																																																																																																																																																																									think	through	“how	to	live”	both	ethically	and	practically.	Mousley’s	work	is	typical	of	more	recent	works	in	literary	humanism	that	stress	what	literature	might	have	to	teach	us	about	life	(Harrison),	and	attempt	to	recover	the	epistemic	agency	of	literary	objects	from	which	we	can	derive	valuable	information	about	our	world	(Gaskin).		123	Consider	the	honking,	spluttering	vehicle	of	Little	Miss	Sunshine,	or	editing	that	compounds	the	slapstick	of	its	screen	presence.	
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revealed	to	be	self-defensive	play.	Indeed,	George	Eman	Vaillant	recognised	humour	as	a	defensive	mechanism	(Ego	Mechanisms	of	Defense),	and	here	we	find	one	of	the	most	overt	examples:	distressing	thoughts	vocalised,	dealt	with,	and	made	smaller,	thus	displaced	from	their	threatening	position.	Humour	can	be	an	effective	familial	coping	mechanism,	and	one	that	may	implicitly	request	flexibility	in	family	roles	and	expectations	(Brooks	et	al.	“Therapeutic	Humor	in	the	Family”).	Even	this	oft-cruel	humour	retains	something	of	Bergson’s	corrective	function:	once	again,	we	see	the	characters	move	through	their	cynical	haughtiness	(which	has	some	revelatory	power	in	both	its	candour	and	acknowledgement	of	interpersonal	hardship),	and	then	go	on	to	reveal	their	communal	care	in	various	ways.	We	find	a	new	morality	by	deigning	to	laugh	about,	and	thus	bring	into	the	open,	our	ire	at	one	another.	That	is,	the	very	recognition	of	ire	at	one’s	family	and	peers	can,	when	paired	with	conincident	or	subsequent	acts	of	care,	demonstrate	its	triviality	or	commonness	via	a	humorous	or	witty	construction,	and	signal	a	willingness	to	work	with	rather	than	internalise	anger.	By	bringing	it	into	the	open,	acrimony	resolution	becomes	a	shared	workspace	rather	than	individually	owned;	a	study	by	Elisa	Everts	suggests	that	such	barbs	and	aggressive	humour	styles	may	even	promote	relational	harmony	by	their	very	inclusive	nature	(“Identifying	a	particular	family	humor	style”).	This	humour	recognises	cynicism	about	others	as	another	component	in	the	affective	spectrum	we	cover	when	living	through	a	social	problem:	it	explores	the	space	between	harmless	wit	(without	tendentious	content)	and	tendency	wit	(externalising	repressed	hostility	or	obscenity),	and	collapses	Freud’s	distinction	(in	Wit	and	Its	Relation	to	the	Unconscious)	into	a	more	subtle	human	interaction.	Between	the	binary	is	a	space	of	potential	discovery.	No	one	is	at	fault	for	harsh	feelings	to	others	–	we	move	transitionally	through	them	–	and	these	attitudes	and	behaviours	can	offer	revelation,	then	are	often	mitigated	or	dissolved	upon	exposition	of	superordinate	goals:	the	need	to	work	together	or	remain	miserable.124	The	Upside	of	Anger	may	be	the	poster	film	for	this	manner	of	cruel	comic	address,	with	character	narration	telling	us	that,	“People	don't	know	how	to	love.	They	bite	rather	than	kiss.	They	slap	rather	than	stroke,”	and	Denny	Davies	(Kevin	Costner)	reiterating	across	multiple	monologues	that	the	verbal	displays	of	anger	making	up	a	substantial	part	of	the	film	are	“real	life.”	He	insists	that	the	familial	tensions	within	his	neighbour’s	house,	where	Terry	Wolfmeyer	(Joan	Allen)	lives	with	her	four	daughters,	inspires	his	affection	for	them.	The	title	of	the	film	refers	to	the	person	we	become																																																									124	This	view	also	supports	the	idea	of	benign	violations	as	transitional,	a	cognitive	process	rather	than	cognitive	state.	Humour	appears	at	the	beginning	of	a	progression	through	perception	of	a	potential	violation,	thereafter	down	regulated	as	benign.		
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through	the	liminal	space	of	anger	–	anger	and	humour	are	liminally	aligned.	There	are	other	models,	however,	including	American	Beauty,	which	employ	this	convention	to	different	ends.	In	American	Beauty,	the	cynical	haughtiness	is	corrosive	and	does	not,	at	first,	appear	to	offer	any	relief.	The	sentimentality	of	the	conclusion	is	detached	from	the	characters’	wordplay;	the	film	implies	that	another,	more	spiritual	force	is	at	work	in	bringing	compassion	to	its	subjects.		 Abrams	and	Harpham	interpret	the	surprise	element	of	epigrammatic	wit	as	“usually	the	result	of	a	connection	or	distinction	between	words	or	concepts	which	frustrates	the	listener’s	expectation,	only	to	satisfy	it	in	an	unexpected	way”	(417).	Thus	insight	can	also	be	offered	through	repartee	and	satirical	dialogue,	occasionally	in	tandem	with	scornful	retort	and	banter:	a	character	may	voice	an	imaginative	perspective	on	the	events	of	the	narrative,	causing	us	to	laugh	simultaneously	at	the	sudden	shift	in	our	diegetic	conception	to	accommodate	a	surprising	new	assessment,	the	ingenuity	of	the	screenwriter’s	observation	and	expression	(the	cleverness	of	the	epigram),	the	cleverness	of	the	hypothetical	character,	and	our	own	cleverness	for	recognising	their	wit.	At	this	point	we	may	also	be	surprised	that	scorn	is	capable	of	revelation	(somewhat	of	a	satire-by-surprise).	Once	again,	all	parts	of	the	affective	spectrum	we	move	through	may	have	revelatory	value,	and	a	validation	of	the	breadth	of	emotional	experience	remains	central	to	a	realistically	complex	view	of	human	life.125	This	shows	how	the	use	of	both	humour	and	sentimentality	in	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	puts	the	lie	to	pejorative	and	belittling	assessments	of	family	studies	across	the	history	of	film:		 The	celebration	of	family	movie	is,	in	a	sense,	a	therapeutic	dream	of	the	family	in	which	the	very	real	tensions	and	traumas	of	ordinary	family	life	are	always	resolved	by	love	and	good	intentions.	In	not	a	single	celebration	film	is	any	member	of	the	family	permanently	injured	by	another	member	of	the	clan;	in	the	celebration	of	family	film	parents	do	not	traumatize	their	children,	nor	children	betray	their	parents’	dreams.		(Loukides	98)																																																										125	This	tension	has	occasionally	been	addressed	as	the	“melancomic”	across	a	different	set	of	contemporary	films,	such	as	Deborah	J.	Thomas’s	work	on	Wes	Anderson	(“Framing	the	‘melancomic’”),	yet	the	term	tends	to	refer	to	another	mode	of	ironic	address	that	focuses	us	upon	the	filmmaker’s	artifice:	a	gentle	distancing	effect	that	is	offset	by	sympathy	for	character.	
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In	fact,	the	films	I	have	been	looking	at	both	admit	the	listed	familial	ills,	and	still	celebrate	family	in	its	diverse	affective	structures	–	a	complexity	and	specificity	this	binaristically	constricting	and	discriminatory	discourse	cannot	reach.	See	in	particular	the	latently	injurious	teachings	of	certain	uncontrollable,	internal	family	relations	explored	in	Little	Miss	Sunshine,	which	still	treats	problematic	characters	such	as	the	grandfather,	Alan	Arkin’s	Edwin	Hoover,	with	due	consideration	and	care,	despite	his	clearly	harmful	pedagogy;	harming	and	helping	can	coexist	in	families.	Where	happy	endings	occur,	they	tend	to	emphasise	the	possibility	of	progress	toward	prosociality	within	families	rather	than	obliteration	of	all	of	the	family’s	woes.		 Lingual	jokes,	such	as	puns	and	sarcasm,	offer	violations	from	confusion	in	perception	of	intent,	communication	breakdown	or	invalidation,	as	well	as	disobedience	of	grammatical	and	other	rules	of	communication	we	rely	on	for	perception	of	another’s	intent	(syntactic	and	semantic	violations);	however	the	lingual-intent	chaos	is	resolvable	and	resolved,	thus	benign.	This	suggests	puns	may	be	funnier	to	one	who	conceives	of	rules	such	as	grammar	as	particularly	important	(McGraw	and	Warner	The	Humor	Code	11),	otherwise	there	is	insufficient	perceived	violation	for	the	joke	to	appeal.	Of	course,	as	Sarah	Kozloff	reminds	us,	repartee,	reaching	back	through	Wilde,	Congreve	and	Shakespeare,	requires	performative	skill	to	be	comedically	effective,	and	often	the	source	of	our	laughter	is	as	much	an	imaginative,	off-centre	or	startlingly	counterintuitive	performance	as	it	is	the	cleverly	penned	words	(174-177).	At	this	point,	it	is	worth	asking	why	we	take	humorous	delight	also	in	eccentric	performance	gags	and	characterisations	we	read	as	“quirky.”	Working	from	BVT,	it	is	easy	to	see	how	we	may	receive	abnormal	social	behaviours	as	a	potential	threat,	and	also	how	our	knowledge	of	healthy	diversity	mitigates	this	response	and	places	social	abnormalities	in	the	zone	of	tension	between	safe	and	threatening.	The	surprising	rejection	of	social	norms	that	we	apprehend	as	quirk	may,	then,	encourage	us	to	accept	human	difference	by	pointing	to	ingrained	reactions	to	otherness,	and	potentially	comprise	a	claim	that	such	social	behaviours	–	where	they	harm	no	others	–	should	not	matter	so	much.126	Bergson	explored	our	location	of	and	reinforced	adherence	to	“moral”	behaviours	through	humorous	discussion	of	the	eccentric	or	ludicrous	in	Laughter.	In	convergence	with	BVT,	laughing	at																																																									126	This	might	also	help	explain	the	rising	appeal	of	the	much-discussed	comedy	of	“awkwardness.”	Pansy	Duncan	writes	that	associated	“cringe	comedy”	requires	a	mental	labour	that	contradicts	presumptions	of	comic	media	as	pure	autotelic	relief	or	play	(“Joke	Work”).		
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character	quirks	may	be	a	way	to	defuse	our	prejudicial	impulses,	and	disconnect	personality	features	from	falsely	associated	moral	behaviours	–	that	is,	we	recognise	that	one	can	be	socially	different	without	being	unempathic,	cruel	or	otherwise	threatening.	This	also	specifies	the	source	and	the	reason	for	ironic	distancing	that	McDowell,	updating	Jeffrey	Sconce’s	work	on	irony,	locates	as	part	of	quirky	“tone”	(“Irony,	Nihilism”	11),	connecting	the	linguistic	and	performative	features	of	quirkiness	to	its	broader	generic	characteristics.		Later	suburban	ensembles,	perhaps	influenced	by	the	likes	of	Juno,	experiment	with	methods	to	excise	the	distancing	effect	from	quirk	and	permit	a	fuller	empathy	and	identification	with	idiosyncratic	characters.127	There	remains	the	problem,	however,	that	quirk	seems	to	represent	“slight	shifts	from	the	norm”	(King	Indie	2.0	27)	rather	than	radical	difference	or	even	pathology,	the	“odd,	but	not	too	odd”	(Hirschorn	np)	principle.128	Perhaps	our	recognition	of	the	harmlessness	of	quirk	is	merely	placatory,	and	comes	at	the	expense	of	those	who	exhibit	real	departures	from	social	norms	that	we	must	work	harder	to	accept.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	also	possible	that	quirk	offers	safe	opportunities	to	exercise	our	empathic	reach	and	thus	incrementally	countervail	perceived	threats	of	otherness,	drawing	a	wider	circle	of	compassion	via	systematic	conditioning	and	narrativised	rehearsal	of	friendly	responses	to	human	difference.	It	is	also	true	that	the	quirky	describes	a	substantial	range	of	performance	practices	and	film	conventions	–	not	all	of	them	are	so	“safe”	(King	Indie	2.0	27).	In	fact,	quirk	must	retain	an	element	of	danger	–	the	potential	violation	–	to	remain	funny.	Again,	there	is	a	dark	and	conflicted	notion	of	accountability	present	in	Little	Miss	Sunshine.	The	quirk	of	many	characters	is	all	but	benign	in	the	narratives	they	trade	with	each	other	about	family,	gender	and	political	identity,	as	they	both	harm	and	help	one	another.	When	Edwin	teaches	his	granddaughter	Olive	(Abigail	Breslin)	hyper-sexualised	concepts	of	womanhood,	or	when	Frank	(Steve	Carell)	trades	in	suicidal	nihilism	with	the	impressionably																																																									127	The	kind	of	quirky	performance	value	we	find	here	has	more	unfamiliarity	and	revelatory	uplift	to	be	reduced	to	Sianne	Ngai’s	famous	aesthetic	categories:	it	does	not	match	squarely	with	the	commoditised,	fetishized	powerlessness	of	the	cute,	the	hyperactive	productivity	of	the	zany,	or	focus	on	production	in	lieu	of	substance	when	we	demote	an	artistic	statement	to	the	“merely	interesting,”	or	just	a	cut	above	boredom,	sameness.	There	is	more	going	on	here.		128	Quirk	signifies	a	kind	of	hedging,	as	James	McDowell	points	out,	“for	marketing	purposes	‘quirky’	suggests	a	film	to	be	a	unique,	and	therefore	desirable,	product	–	though	simultaneously	not	so	unique	as	to	discourage	those	who	might	be	repelled”	(1).	McDowell	identifies	quirk	as	a	spectrum	of	stylistic	sensibilities	engaging	some	manner	of	spectatorial	ironic	distance	from	onscreen	eccentricity	–	and	this	includes	a	dramatic	irony,	whereby	audiences	have	a	comprehension	of	diegetic	eccentricity	not	acknowledged	by	the	players	themselves	(Wes	Anderson’s	films	are	a	good	example	of	this).	
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dark	teen	Dwayne	(Paul	Dano),	the	harmlessness	of	quirk	is	a	veneer.	There	must	be	an	ongoing	genuine	social	threat	for	this	manner	of	comedy	to	sustain,	or	else	there	is	nothing	to	laugh	at	–	quirky	comedy	thrives	on	this	sense	of	possible	threat.	When	it	is	gone,	quirk	becomes	too	conventional	and	ergo	comedically	stale,	drained	of	threat	and	ripe	for	criticism	for	its	self-defeating	hypocrisy.	Little	Miss	Sunshine	rises	above	such	a	critique	as	it	retains	this	sense	of	threat	across	its	ensemble,	allowing	the	film	to	consider	circumstances	in	which	our	behaviour	can	have	positive	and	negative	effects	on	loved	ones	at	the	same	time.		The	quirky	label,	now	overused	by	film	publicity	departments,	has	suffered	considerable	backlash.	Where	once	it	referenced	alternatives	to	homogenising	character	construction,	it	now	seems	to	embody	an	essence	of	character	homogeneity,	as	certain	performance	or	aesthetic	choices	presented	as	idiosyncratic	become	cinematic	norms.	King	warns	against	binaristic	thinking	regarding	the	construction	of	the	quirky,	as	it	would	be	a	misrepresentation	of	conceptual	heredity	in	cultural	production	to	draw	a	line	between	authentic	and	fabricated	quirk	(Indie	2.0	25).129	However,	there	is	still	a	very	real	difference	in	the	level	of	innovation	a	film	can	present,	and	as	the	descriptors	“quirky,”	“offbeat”	and	“idiosyncratic”	invite	us	to	read	a	film’s	attempts	at	originality,	we	should	feel	free	to	assess	such	works	on	the	grounds	of	their	uniqueness	in	manipulating	existing	film	conventions	to	draw	new	human	insights	and	present	new	pictures	of	diverse	humanity,	not	to	assess	their	uninfluenced	authenticity.	Ultimately,	the	generic	convention	of	the	quirkiness	is	insufficient;	rather	the	moral	insight	made	available	via	quirkiness	is	both	aesthetically	and	generically	crucial.		The	“quirky-small-town	dramedy”	(Murray,	Rev.	of	What	Goes	Up	np)	places	ensemble	dramedy	conventions	in	semi-rural	suburbia	or	in	provincial	towns	outside	of	the	city.	Examples	include	Mumford,	The	Station	Agent,	Junebug	and	What	Goes	Up.	Many	also	work	from	another	inherited	formula:	a	traumatised	outcast	protagonist	retreats	to	their	hometown,	reconnecting	with	eccentric	locals,	old	relations,	flames	and	playmates.	It	is	interesting	to	note	how	filmic	quirk	has	been	fastened	to	small	town	suburbia,	resulting	from	the	presumed	idiosyncrasies	of	particularised	geography,	while	urban	fringes	are	presented	as	homogeneous	norm,	and	constituents	are	more	likely	to	be	presented	either	as	locale-																																																								129	This	is,	in	fact,	a	primary	example	of	the	Indie	2.0	thesis:	that	narratives	of	authenticity	circulating	indie	cinema	movements	describe	the	investments	made	by	patrons	of	the	indie	discourse	more	than	they	describe	independent	filmmaking	practice.		
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bound	types,	dimensional	characters	resisting	suburban	types,	or	conflicted	personalities	failing	to	live	up	to	those	types.	In	any	case,	the	small	town	is	associated	with	freedom	of	personal	expression	in	a	way	other	locales	are	not.	A	film	like	small	town	ensemble	gay	romcom	Big	Eden	(Thomas	Bezucha,	2001),	for	example,	uses	secondary	character	eccentricity	to	generate	recognition	of	our	typification	of	others.	The	film’s	humour	arises	from	surprising	exposure	of	the	audience’s	own	quiescent	discriminative	presumptions	about	the	values	of	semi-rural	suburbanites	–	we	expect	the	characters	to	be	less	broad-minded	than	they	turn	out	to	be,	and	may	take	delight	in	the	comic	disruption	upon	having	these	expectations	subverted.		Comical	reassessments	of	potentially	threatening	sociality	flow	naturally	into	the	humour	of	surprising	candour,	whereupon	the	arbitration	of	social	norms,	etiquettes	and	traditional	identities	that	we	still	struggle	with	in	political	discourse	are	treated	as	comedy	(for	example,	the	sexualised	dance	routine	in	Little	Miss	Sunshine	or	secondary	characters’	reactions	to	adultery	and	sexual	relations	in	The	Oranges	or	The	Kids	Are	All	Right).	This	works	as	humour	because	we	recognise	the	solemnity	around	a	public	discourse,	but	we	see	people	experiencing	the	identity	conflict	in	a	way	that	fails	to	match	the	gravitas	we	expect.	The	technique	is	similar	to	“shock”	humour:	the	mocking	of	concerns	the	majority	accepts	as	serious.	The	guiding	light	of	the	contemporary	American	shock	genre	may	be	television’s	
Family	Guy.	Although	the	shock	value	of	humour	has	been	a	staple	in	concurrent	American	comedy	films	(many	of	them	suburban	studies	also,	such	as	the	works	of	Judd	Apatow),	the	difference	is	a	subtle	one.	The	source	of	humour	may	be	the	same	–	surprise	at	the	flippancy	with	which	a	serious	subject	is	treated,	destabilising	our	conception	of	broader	societal	threats	by	exploring	the	border	of	what	we	are	permitted	to	consider	benign	–	but	what	is	subsequently	achieved	with	the	humour,	or	what	work	it	is	put	to,	varies	substantially.		Studying	dissimilarities	between	shock	humour	and	frank	social	renegotiation	humour	not	only	explains	the	difference	in	perspective	offered	in	these	films,	it	again	specifies	the	claims	embedded	in	their	gags	about	the	social	issues	that	are	worthy	of	our	attention	and	concern.	The	key	to	explaining	such	a	difference	is	the	mock	value	within	the	shock	value:	once	destabilised,	in	American	satirical	shock	humour	the	potential	social	threat	often	remains	unexplored	as	we	swiftly	move	onto	the	next	shock,	a	version	of	“manic-satire”	(Hughey	and	Muradi	passim)	leaving	us	with	the	impression	that	we	may	have	been	impractically	engaged	with	a	triviality.	Indeed,	one	of	the	interventions	such	works	stage	
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against	the	history	of	shocking	satire,	from	Jonathan	Swift	onward,	is	to	extract	“the	unitary	function	of	satire”	so	that	only	its	rhetoric	remains	(DeRochi	45);	the	means	without	the	associated	ends	of	political	insight	or	social	commentary	satirises	the	purpose	of	satire	itself,	undermining	the	subsequent	possibility	(and	perceived	authority)	of	any	earnest	moralising	or	moral	questioning.	This	is	the	work	of	Family	Guy	and	much	of	the	Seth	Rogen	variety	of	American	gross-out	cinema,	especially	when	it	self-consciously	moves	from	toilets	to	identity	politics.	Hence,	the	point	is	merely	to	somewhat	let	us	off	the	hook,	as	the	joker	has	already	accomplished	by	example,	achieving	a	superior	indifference	by	alleviating	social	concern	(an	affectively	powerful	position	to	be	in).	Once	the	deflation	of	our	anxieties	is	realised	(often	around	a	matter	of	political	correctness),	we	no	longer	need	to	evaluate	their	source,	or	whether	there	is	currency	to	any	related	concerns,	as	true	questioning	would	miss	the	point	that	subversive	frivolity	is	superior	to	anxiety,	perhaps	producing	a	one-upmanship	of	callousness.130	Rarely	does	this	humour	close	with	a	sense	of	dismissive	finality,	however,	as	the	confusion	between	benign	and	real	violation	keeps	the	humour	alive	–	the	reason	we	are	attracted	primarily	to	its	provocations.	Think	of	the	feverish	pace	of	Family	Guy	skits,	often	lasting	seconds	at	a	time	before	rolling	onto	the	next	stereotype	in	the	next	vignette.	Part	of	the	appeal	is	the	lack	of	any	sense	of	finality,	or	any	emergence	into	a	notion	of	what	the	satire	attempts	to	achieve	or	tell	us	about	the	stereotypes	in	employs;	it	thwarts	opportunities	for	moral	reflection	in	order	to	keep	its	violation	alive,	and	its	humour	in	a	state	of	permanent	suspension.	Being	kept	in	this	space	of	generality,	we	cannot	move	to	locate	a	more	specific	set	of	problems,	and	instead	we	remain	at	a	level	of	appeals	to	a	common	social	consensus	on	the	threatening	nature	of	broadly	defined	social	issues	(again,	nervousness	around	political	correctness	stands	as	a	primary	example).			 To	elucidate	an	alternative,	we	should	return	to	the	tension	between	Vaillant’s	conception	of	humour	as	defensive	mechanism,	making	the	unpleasant,	terrifying	or	distressing	overt	but	still	cognitively	displacing	it,	and	Bergson’s	moral	function	of	humour.	Clearly	both	can	coexist,	but	if	we	are	concerned	with	reaching	the	moral	potential	of																																																									130	Matthew	W.	Hughey	and	Sahara	Muradi	find,	for	example,	that	the	hyper-irony	of	such	texts	simultaneously	critiques	and	reinscribes	racial	stereotypes	(“Laughing	Matters”),	and	LaChrystal	D.	Ricke	quantifies	the	use	of	derogatory	speech	in	Family	Guy	specifically,	although	remains	ambivalent	about	the	satirical	use	such	speech	is	put	to,	or	any	generalisability	to	derogatory	perspectives	in	its	audience	(“Funny	or	Harmful?”),	perhaps	because	ambivalence	is	precisely	the	response	these	texts	prompt,	and	the	only	response	possible	when	the	opportunity	for	moral	assessment	is	removed.		
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politicised	shock	humour,	then	what	matters	most	is	what	follows	the	shock	of	deflated	sociopolitical	anxieties.	In	contrast	to	the	politically	disengaged	or	superior	“mocking	shock,”	which	undermines	interrogation	of	the	threat’s	source,	throughout	suburban	ensemble	dramedies	we	see	the	shock	followed	by	an	extrapolation:	the	use	of	jest	to	deflate	generalist	hysteria	about	a	social	problem,	proceeded	by	location	of	specific	related	ethical	values	for	consideration.	Little	Children	is	a	case	in	point.	Various	sexual	indiscretions	and	predicaments	(from	the	concealment	of	pornography	addiction	from	one’s	spouse,	to	adultery,	to	struggles	with	paedophilic	desire)	are	raised	frankly,	producing	uncomfortable	humour,	but	the	film’s	very	structure	homes	in	on	the	source	of	our	discomfort:	the	film	continues	to	present	more	information	about	the	context	of	each	indiscretion,	in	effect	asking	us	to	maintain	attentiveness	and	analyse	specific	aspects	of	that	threat.	The	procedural	conditions	of	realist	narrative	become	a	kind	of	pragmatism	that	can	then	provide	a	less	hysterical	set	of	practical	matters	as	we	follow	the	characters’	attempts	to	resolve	their	interpersonal	dilemmas;	but	crucially,	in	a	film	like	Little	Children,	we	still	do	not	know	how	to	respond.	The	information	provided	in	each	scenario	might	cause	us	to	laugh	again,	to	consider	the	morality	of	the	situation	or	to	simply	recoil,	and	all	responses	seem	reasonable.	The	film	presents	a	tentative	response	to	its	own	questions	in	concluding	with	several	characters’	equally	tentative	attempts	at	mutual	care.	Again,	after	the	humour,	we	see	a	move	to	sentimentality	achieving	reassertion	of	the	centrality	of	social	ethics.	Yet	nothing	is	ever	resolved	completely	with	the	mere	addition	of	sentiment,	so	the	potential	for	humour	remains	alive,	only	changed.	In	essence,	this	change	marks	its	difference	from	pure	shock	humour.	It	is	not	that	frank	social	renegotiation	neuters	comedy,	but	that	it	shifts	the	goal	posts	to	admit	rumination;	it	is	no	longer	the	mere	mention	of	shocking	concepts	that	produces	benign	violations,	it	is	our	problematised	ability	to	find	shared	solutions	to	shared	woes	that	makes	us	laugh,	a	recognition	of	our	own	fallibility	as	mutual	problem-solvers.131		 Also	called	to	our	attention	is	the	ability	that	people	possess	to	work	out	their	problems	in	an	intimate	social	sphere	without	the	magnitude	of	public	debate	or	the	interventions	of	media	content,	which	are	inherently	and	unavoidably	reductive	functions.	We	see	people	negotiating	living	arrangements	and	personal	relationships	on	their	own	terms	out																																																									131	Of	course	some	films,	such	as	the	Judd	Apatow	dramedies,	motivate	both	hyperactive	shock	humour	and	frank	social	renegotiation	humour,	and	so	it	is	possible	to	achieve	both	modes	within	one	production.	The	suburban	ensemble	dramedy,	however,	works	almost	exclusively	within	the	satirical	conventions	of	the	latter.		
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of	necessity,	and	trust	in	them	to	do	so	reciprocally	–	this	does	not	invalidate	public	discourses	so	much	as	remind	us	that	people	are	driven	to	find	mutual	benefit	with	or	without	input	from	theorists,	analysts,	media	professionals	and	lay	media,	and	that	as	longitudinal	social	analysts	we	can	assume	we	know	too	much	of	others’	lives	without	specificity	or	complex	detail.	As	anthropologist	M.P.	Baumgartner	has	pointed	out	in	her	study	on	The	
Moral	Order	of	a	Suburb:		The	pervasive	moral	minimalism	found	in	the	suburbs	contrasts	sharply	with	claims	that	American	society	is	particularly	violent	or	litigious.	However	true	such	characterizations	may	be	for	other	settings,	they	do	not	reflect	suburban	reality	…	When	problems	occur,	most	people	do	not	seriously	consider	recourse	to	legal	officials,	and,	in	fact,	they	generally	act	as	if	law	did	not	exist	at	all.	In	this	sense,	suburbia	is	a	kind	of	limited	anarchy.		(127)132		Across	many	of	the	suburban	ensemble	films,	candid	renegotiation	of	social	roles	is	seen	to	be	occurring	without	explicit	mediated	guidance,	public	attention,	or	reference	to	political	standards.	We	are,	on	the	whole,	driven	to	work	together	to	locate	superior	reciprocity	–	media	discussion,	a	kind	of	communal	ethical	negotiator	if	not	arbiter,	participates	in	this	process	but	crucially	does	not	represent	its	totality.	As	cultural	analysts,	we	can	be	prone	to	forget	this	humility:	the	components	of	a	culture	that	are	visible	to	us	in	recorded	media,	and	that	we	position	as	paramount	in	personal	meaning-making,	may	not	represent	the	sum	of	how	constituents	construct	their	identities.	The	self-governance	of	everyday	sociality	often	remains	invisible	to	the	(non-anthropological,	or	distanced)	analyst.	In	these	varieties	of	humanist	cinema,	we	can	be	shocked	into	reassessing	our	presumptions	of	media	sovereignty.	The	audience	subsequently	asks	how	much	we	should	evaluate	a	film’s	flippancy	around	identity	politics	as	a	substantive	violation.	We	ask:	if	our	grander	socio-political	theories	and	abstract	armchair	convictions	cannot	necessarily	account	for	the	nuance	of	our	quotidian	circumstances,	what,	then,	should	we	take	seriously?																																																											132	Baumgartner’s	findings	have	been	corroborated	by	later	ethnographies	that	look	into	more	specific	areas	in	suburban	life	where	one	might	expect	to	find	violence,	such	as	suburban	drug	dealing	(Jacques	and	Wright	Code	of	the	Suburb),	which	also	displays	the	cultural	hallmarks	of	moral	avoidance,	tolerance	and	peaceful	conflict	management.		
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American	Millennial	Sociopolitics	and	the	Ensemble	Narrative		 Although	propagation	of	the	suburban	motif,	and	visions	of	suburbia	as	quintessentially	American	political	iconography,	reach	back	at	least	to	the	1950s	and	60s	if	not	earlier	(Wilt	484),	Coon	points	out	of	the	past	two	decades,	“it	is	notable	that	such	a	large	number	of	high-profile	suburban	films	…	have	appeared	in	such	a	short	period	of	time”	(3).	The	retreat	to	domestic	concerns	may	seem	like	an	apolitical	gesture	to	a	surface	reader	of	these	films,	yet	politicoethical	upheaval	runs	deep	throughout.	Resistance	to	a	direct	political	prescription	could	also	be	off-putting	to	some	theorists,	however	instead	we	witness	onscreen	representation	of	a	specific,	contemporary	political	confusion	and	disillusionment,	and	tandem	inquiry	as	to	how	we	might	navigate	the	despair	of	political	uncertainty	and	associated	feelings	of	inconsequence.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	explores	how	the	suburban	ensemble	film	spoke	to	mounting	political	disillusionment	at	the	end	of	the	last	century.		Although	it	would	be	reductionist	to	equate	the	breadth	of	concerns	covered	here	to	a	handful	of	American	historical	events,	selectively	conjuring	political	occurrences	to	rationalise	the	emergence	of	a	broader	cultural	phenomenon,	one	still	might	speculate	that	a	collision	of	the	political	and	personal	had	already	reached	its	zenith	in	American	media	at	the	height	of	the	Lewinsky	scandal.	As	Thomas	de	Zengotita	put	it:	“no	one	ever	called	attention	to	his	privates,	literally	or	figuratively,	with	the	splendid	abandon	of	Bill	Clinton.	His	whole	persona	was	performance	intimacy.	In	the	long	run,	that	is	what	will	make	him	the	archetype	of	leadership	for	the	media	age”	(Mediated	153).	In	1999,	the	same	year	as	American	Beauty,	Payne’s	adaptation	of	Tom	Perrotta’s	novel	Election	provided	the	perfect	filmic	example.	Perrotta	said,	“so	much	of	it	has	to	do	with	what	I	was	seeing	out	of	the	Clintons	during	the	‘92	elections:	that	politics	is	personal,	the	‘character	issue’”	(Veis	np).133	We	had	effectively	been	taught	that	the	extraction	of	political	and	personal	relations	was	to	play	out	on	a	battlefield	of	sexual	politics.	It	may	seem	little	wonder	that	political	discussions	on	film	would	increasingly																																																									133	Author	and	screenwriter	Tom	Perrotta	is	an	important	figure	in	the	history	of	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy.	He	wrote	the	novels	both	Election	and	Little	Children	were	adapted	from;	he	also	co-wrote	the	screenplay	for	Little	Children	with	Field.	More	recently,	options	for	his	2007	novel	The	Abstinence	Teacher	have	been	associated	with	filmmakers	Jonathan	Dayton	and	Valerie	Faris	(Little	Miss	Sunshine)	and	Lisa	Cholodenko	(The	Kids	Are	All	
Right).		
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take	sexual	misdemeanour	as	a	springboard.	However,	we	could	equally	say	that	the	synthesis	of	(once	more	easily	distinguishable)	right	and	left	politics	into	a	blur	of	populist	opportunism	and	seemingly	condoned	narcissism	(culminating	more	recently	in	the	shock	of	the	Trump	presidency)	also	directed	us	to	a	re-evaluation	of	personal	beliefs.	We	had	been	purposefully	confused:	successive	administrations	moved	to	conceal	an	agenda	of	incremental	neoliberalism	by	directing	public	debate	to	questions	of	political	presentation	rather	than	conviction.	From	Ronald	Reagan	to	Arnold	Schwarzenegger	and	now	Donald	Trump,	the	unconcealed	conflation	of	Hollywood	and	politics	permitted	what	Bernard	Manin	has	termed	“audience	democracy”	(223),	in	which	voters	react	to	issues	generated	by	celebrity	politicians	rather	than	exercise	any	agency	to	set	a	people’s	agenda.	This	reduction	of	the	voting	populous	to	reactive	“audience”	has	embroidered	and	cemented	the	strategic	discourse	of	economic	liberalism	–	eventually	leading	to	Trump’s	obliteration	of	any	need	for	a	coherent	ideology	beyond	self-interest.	When	the	political	became	so	much	more	about	character	and	celebrity,	our	attention	was	so	diverted	that	any	dubious	political	compromise	became	plausible.134		As	Ben	Dickenson	explores	in	Hollywood's	New	Radicalism,	filmmakers	responded	to	this	disillusionment	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Cinema	began	to	trace	how	such	confusion	and	abuses	of	civic	trust	affected	our	lives.	If	we	could	no	longer	identify	a	continuum	of	political	conviction	or	evaluate	what	a	public	figure	stands	for,	if	after	Francis	Fukuyama’s	The	End	of	
History?	we	had	no	leaders	discussing	a	meaningful	alternative,	if	we	have	been	unwittingly	inaugurated	into	a	kind	of	political	anomie,	and	critically,	if	we	in	fact	require	mistrust	of	all	media	channels	that	communicate	political	values	(leading	eventually	to	ideologically	targeted	fake	news	on	social	media),	then	how	do	we	even	begin	to	discuss	such	values	anymore?	These	films	all	explode	any	remaining	certitude	in	our	political	identities,	and	then	go	about	building	our	values	back	up	from	rock	bottom.	We	cannot	forget	that	in	the	1990s	America	had	seen	a	huge	disturbance	of	suburban	voting	norms,	as	Seth	C.	McKee	and	Daron	R.	Shaw	reflected	in	2003:	“the	factors	that	led	to	GOP	dominance	of	the	suburbs	have	dissipated	…	This	context	varies	so	dramatically	by	region	that	we	would	be	surprised	if	suburban	voting	patterns	do	not	vary	more	significantly	in	the	future	than	they	did	in	the	1990s”	(“Suburban	Voting	in	Presidential	Elections”	144).	The	changing	demography	of	the	suburbs	is	a	deeply	political	subject,	and	these	filmmakers	have	recognised	it;	not	just	in	the																																																									134	For	more	on	the	Trump	era	and	future	directions,	see	the	last	chapter,	“Afterword.”		
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transformation	of	identity,	ethnicity,	sexuality,	equality,	ideology,	and	associated	imagery,	but	also	direct	electoral	influence.	Across	these	films,	there	is	the	sense	that	we	need	to	rediscover	a	political	identity	in	order	to	truly	combat	the	pervasively	impracticable	conservatism	stewing	in	our	adherence	to	politicised	media	cues.	Characters	in	these	films	attempt	to	match	their	unquestioned	ideals	to	a	lived	reality,	fail,	have	to	explain	themselves	to	others,	and	in	so	doing	discover	a	more	generous	way	of	looking	at	one	another	that	suggests	(usually	without	prescribing	any	particular	behaviour	or	action)	the	possibility	for	a	new	political	identity	that	will	respect	the	diversity	of	our	lives	and	moral	challenges.	The	social	critique	of	such	suburban	cinema	can	be	summarised	thusly:	our	political	assumptions	and	debates	no	longer	seem	to	match	the	reality	of	contextual	and	personality	diversity	they	must	address.		In	his	2004	“Declaration	of	Independents”	for	Variety,	Payne	wrote:		Whether	Bush	and	his	corrupt	gang	are	reelected	or	not	—	and	especially	if	they	are	—	these	times	ensure	increased	demand	for	films	with	human	and	political	content.	Art	is	all	we	have	to	combat	the	fearsome,	awful	animal	side	of	man	that	today	controls	events.	To	portray	real	people	with	real	problems,	real	joys,	real	tears	will	serve	as	a	positive	political	force,	a	force	for	comfort	and	possibly	for	change.	With	the	inhumanity	forced	upon	us	by	governments	and	terrorists	and	corporations,	to	make	a	purely	human	film	is	today	a	political	act.	To	make	a	film	about	disenfranchised	people	is	a	political	act.	To	make	a	film	about	love	is	a	political	act.	To	make	a	film	about	a	single	human	emotion	is	today	a	political	act.	And	bad	things	happen	when	good	people	fail	to	speak	up.	Intelligence	and	humanity	should	not	be	“specialty”	items.		(S7)		From	Reagan	into	the	bloody	results	of	the	Bush	Junior	years,	these	domestic	filmmakers	saw	themselves	not	only	as	responding	directly	to	the	accumulative	dehumanisation	of	their	era,	but	the	environment	of	cynicism	and	disengagement	that	made	such	regimes	(and	their	worst	results,	terrorist	retaliation	and	corporate	dominance)	possible.	The	most	sensible	way	to	talk	about	all	of	these	issues	on	a	level	that	seemed	pragmatically	relevant	to	mainstream	American	audiences	disaffected	by	political	distancing	rhetoric	may,	to	some	filmmakers,	seem	to	be	a	look	at	the	misalliance	of	our	political	values	and	our	everyday	lives,	in	the	family	and	at	home.		
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Coon	notes	that	many	suburban	storytellers	have	clearly	stated	in	interviews	that	they	were	reflecting	upon	the	disparity	between	suburban	images	they	grew	up	with	and	the	more	complex	realities	they	lived	through	(225-226).135	Somewhat	like	Stanley	Cavell	identified	across	remarriage	comedies	in	Pursuits	of	Happiness,	this	genre	is	a	philosophic	inquiry	into	the	sociopolitical	and	moral	upheaval	encroaching	on	our	everyday	lives;	its	narrative	conventions	service	questions	regarding	how	we	can	live	well	despite	the	ideological	and	domestic	uncertainty	of	our	epoch	(in	his	case,	the	Depression;	in	this	case,	a	politically	splintered,	incrementally	unequal,	disempowering,	media-drenched,	trust-poor	and	above	all	confounding	new	millennium).	The	filmic	responses,	in	both	cases,	continue	to	cite	a	kind	of	maturation	of	human	relations	based	upon	a	relinquishing	of	beliefs	and	practices	that	keep	us	from	a	deeply	satisfying	connection	with	others.	Concomitantly,	an	urgent	cosmopolitan	question	arises:	to	whom	do	we	owe	responsibility?	The	concentric	circles	of	accountability	found	in	these	films	–	to	partner,	to	family,	to	neighbourhood,	to	distant	family	and	friends,	to	nation	state	and	to	globe	–	display	characters	actively	juggling	these	interests	in	their	daily	lives,	and	position	difficult	cosmopolitan	ethics	as	unavoidably	quotidian.	Thus	we	must	also	keep	the	political	nature	of	ensemble	narrative	empathy	equalisation	in	mind	when	we	discuss	these	films,	as	it	is	a	cornerstone	of	their	intervention	against	Hollywood	individualism	(the	emphasis	on	individual	triumph	over	collective	or	collaborative	agency).136		Globalisation	puts	pressure	on	cosmopolitan	ethics,	which	may	help	explain	the	millennial	trend	toward	ensemble	film	narratives,	which	have	the	ability	to	“stress	a	sense	of	collectivity	and	community	at	odds	with	the	structure	of	protagonism	that	otherwise	characterizes	Hollywood	cinema”	(Mathijs	89).	Lorraine	Sim	makes	a	similar	point	in	her	analysis	“Ensemble	Film,	Postmodernity	and	Moral	Mapping”:		Through	its	use	of	the	ensemble	form,	Babel	reminds	us	that	a	recognition	of	our	responsibility	for,	and	connection	to,	others	is	particularly	important	in	the	era	of																																																									135	Again,	this	political	problem	is	mirrored	in	the	research	on	news	media	and	public	trust.	Stephen	Coleman	et	al.	found	that	“public	trust	collapses	when	journalists	are	perceived	to	be	reporting	on	social	groups,	areas	and	practices	that	they	do	not	understand.	Distrust	happens	when	the	news	fails	to	address	the	world	as	the	public	recognise	it,	leaving	them	feeling	like	outsiders	looking	on	at	a	drama	that	even	the	leading	performers	do	not	care	if	they	really	comprehend”	(2).		136	For	more	on	cinematic	individualism,	see	Richard	Rushton	on	Hollywood	and	the	“unified	subject”	(94).		
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postmodernity	as	our	lives	become	increasingly	intertwined	with	the	lives	of	more	and	more	strangers	who	–	while	often	geographically	or	socially	distant	–	are,	through	the	forces	of	globalization,	ever	more	proximate	in	ethical	terms.		(np)		Both	Sim	and	Vivien	Silvey	(“Not	Just	Ensemble	Films”)	point	to	recent	ensemble	narratives’	attempts	at	complex	cognitive	mapping	in	new	and	unfamiliar	social	spaces.137	Sim’s	analysis	becomes	more	specific	when	she	addresses	Zygmunt	Bauman’s	work	on	the	ethical	splintering	that	characterises	postmodernity,	the	narrativised	investigation	of	which	she	describes	as	“moral	mapping.”	In	Postmodern	Ethics,	Bauman	emphasises	the	increasing	invisibility	of	the	outcomes	of	our	personal	actions,	the	elusive	connection	of	social	consequences	to	their	respective	agents,	and	cognitive	limitations	in	summarising	moral	causalities:	“The	scale	of	consequences	our	actions	may	have	dwarfs	such	moral	imagination	as	we	may	possess”	(Bauman	18).	In	a	global	world,	our	moral	certainties	are	rendered	increasingly	ambiguous,	are	pluralised,	and	when	called	upon	for	revision,	the	resultant	insecurity	is	existentially	felt.	Thus,	Sim	suggests	in	order	to	avoid	“floating”	responsibility	into	a	colossal	global	bystander	effect,	we	resort	to	the	kind	of	moral	mapping	ensemble	narratives	are	apt	to	provide.	The	ensemble	mode,	then,	regularly	appears	as	another	narrativised	humanist	ethic:	again	we	find	ourselves	constructing	hypothetical	others	to	understand	and	talk	through	our	moral	effect	on	the	world,	with	respect	to	local	contextual	contingencies.	The	films	I	am	looking	at	do	not	merely	represent	onscreen	the	existential	feeling	of	this	millennial	condition	(as	do	the	fractal	or	hyperlink	narratives	discussed	at	the	top	of	this	chapter),	but	develop	from	the	political	roots	of	confounding	and	depreciative	feelings	of	disempowerment	into	questions	about	how	to	live	within	a	causally	entangled	and	variegated	world	–	open	contextualised	ethics.		The	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	in	particular	features	polyphonic,	intergenerational	perspective-taking	through	alternating	focalisation,	which	could	be	seen	as	comparable	to	the	real	family	narratives	discussed	by	Fivush	et	al.	in	“Personal	and	Intergenerational	Narratives	in	Relation	to	Adolescents’	Well-Being.”	The	films	not	only	recognise	and	represent	this																																																									137	They	both	attribute	this	conception	to	Frederic	Jameson’s	Postmodernism,	or,	the	Cultural	
Logic	of	Late	Capitalism	despite	the	treatise	having	been	prefaced	by	multiple	decades	of	work	on	cognitive	mapping	in	narrative,	and	its	complications,	both	within	narrative	theory	and	in	the	social	sciences	(see	Mar	and	Oatley	for	a	summary).	Jameson’s	contribution	may	be	the	application	of	précising	terms	such	as	post-capitalist	or	postmodern	to	the	vast	worlds	we	attempt	to	represent,	again	wrapping	up	entire	cultures	in	unifying	grand	theory.		
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activity,	integral	to	familial	wellbeing,	of	collectively	determining	a	family	narrative;	they	may	also	be	a	good	way	to	reflect	on	one’s	own	family	narrative-building	practices.	As	Fivush	et	al.	point	out,	for	example,	family	narrative	is	instrumental	in	the	teaching	and	learning	of	gender	identities,	particularly	for	adolescents:	“That	adolescent	males	and	females	tell	stories	about	their	parents’	childhoods	that	differ	by	parental	gender	suggests	that	adolescents	are	understanding	and	propagating	the	gendered	roles	their	parents	are	narratively	portraying”	(52).	The	kind	of	reflexivity	asked	of	us	in	the	ensemble	narrative	can	politicise	this	process.	It	encourages	us	to	wonder	at	others’	internal	states	and	perspectives,	and	thus	how	this	information	will	help	us	co-construct	identities	more	equally,	as	well	as	providing	a	simulation	of	the	kinds	of	stories	we	tell	in	our	own	lives,	a	model	for	thinking	through	our	own	construction	of	self-histories.	“The	multi-character	drama	is	inherently	positioned	against	individualist	monocausality”	(Moss-Wellington	“Humanist	Ethics	in	John	Sayles”	119),	and	the	alternating	focalization	of	an	ensemble	format,	at	its	best,	is	itself	a	striving	for	egalitarianism,	and	systemically	resists	elevating	the	concerns	of	one	above	another.		So	I	prefer	to	acknowledge	that	maybe	this	cinema	arose	precisely	because	we	did	have	a	lot	to	work	out,	a	kind	of	a	cry	against	a	climate	of	apathy	burgeoning	in	the	wake	of	ideas	such	as	Fukuyama’s	absurdly	bowdlerised	modernisation	theory	and	the	publicity	narratives	of	successive	presidential	offices,	sold	so	proficiently	to	us	by	an	elite.	We	needed	to	be	self-reflexive	about	consumerism,	gender	politics,	humility	and	narcissism	at	large,	because	we	had	been	ignoring	these	problems	in	popular	narrative	by	pinning	them	to	bygone	eras,	as	in	the	examples	in	the	years	leading	up	to	American	Beauty	(The	Ice	Storm,	Pleasantville).	Even	within	more	fantastical	near	future	settings,	as	in	The	Truman	Show,	the	politics	were	still	displaced	and	not	quite	our	problem.	It	has	been	curious	to	see	the	extent	to	which	EDtv	(Ron	Howard,	1999,	again	in	collaboration	with	Ganz	and	Mandel),	which	tackled	the	real	psychological	torment	and	contractual	immorality	that	astonishingly	endures	in	reality	television	production,	has	been	largely	forgotten	in	cinema	analysis	in	favour	of	The	Truman	
Show’s	pessimistic	fantasy	of	such	abuses	being	clear,	visible	and	unheeded.		Above	all,	this	cinematic	movement	offers	trust	in	people	to	work	things	out	on	their	own	despite	an	unpleasant	political	reality.	In	this	way,	it	attempts	to	restore	agency	to	the	majority.	Another	way	to	put	this	is	that	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	works	from	a	reasonable	scepticism	levelled	at	outmoded	institutions,	public	and	private	(for	example	academe	in	Smart	People,	systems	of	justice	in	City	Island,	business	enterprise	and	the	
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workplace	in	In	Good	Company),	foremost	among	these	the	family.	We	sympathise	with	the	cynic,	then	move	through	a	trajectory	of	comprehending	the	human	grounds	–	through	practical	situations	where	we	need	support	from	one	another	–	for	rebuilding	trust	and	integrity	into	our	communities	and	the	structures	that	bind	them,	demonstratively	expressing	how	humility,	understanding,	acceptance	of	complexity	and	the	will	to	cooperation	make	this	possible.	This	cinema	both	validates	a	sceptical	point	of	view	of	our	political	status	quo	and	asks	where	we	can	proceed	from	here.		The	following	chapter	uses	a	close	reading	of	progenitor	text	Parenthood	to	demonstrate	how	these	concerns	play	out	across	an	ensemble	film	narrative.			 	
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PARENTHOOD:	
A	Humanistic	Close	Reading			 The	following	chapter	studies	Parenthood’s	treatment	of	the	domestic	politics,	ethics	and	psychology	of	family	relations	from	a	humanistic	perspective.	I	turn	primarily	to	two	extant	substantial	readings	of	Parenthood	in	academic	monographs,	those	of	Kristin	Thompson	and	Joseph	H.	Kupfer,	as	well	as	some	passing	observations	made	by	other	scholars	and	critics.		The	film’s	domestic	realism	sets	up	some	of	its	political	questions,	and	especially	changing	gender	politics.	Once	raised,	it	asks	what	ethical	standards	will	be	appropriate	to	apply	to	these	problems.	Finally,	and	principally,	it	is	concerned	with	the	psychology	of	living	up	to	those	ethical	standards.	In	the	thesis	of	the	film,	scrutiny	of	domestic	situations	reveals	its	everyday	politics.	Those	politics	mandate	the	need	for	ethical	solutions,	and	thus	prompt	a	search	for	guiding	principles.	However,	we	can	hold	these	ethical	standards	in	our	head	but	fail	to	live	up	to	them	–	the	film	asks	what	conditions	allow	our	ethics	of	familial	responsibility	and	care	to	flourish	or	flounder,	and	in	so	doing	builds	a	picture	of	the	existential	components	in	family	life.	A	more	complex,	holistic	and	dynamic	understanding	of	domestic	life	and	its	problems	feeds	back	into	and	tempers	both	our	politics	and	ethics.			
The	Domestic	Realism	of	Parenthood		Halfway	through	Parenthood,	director	Ron	Howard’s	1989	collaboration	with	screenwriters	Lowell	Ganz	and	Babaloo	Mandel,	is	a	scene	in	which	the	disturbed	and	secretive	pubescent	teenager	Garry	Buckman-Lampkin	(Joaquin	Phoenix)	asks	his	working,	single	mother	Helen	Buckman	(Diane	Wiest)	if	he	could	live	with	his	estranged	father	for	a	while.	Emerging	as	we	do	from	a	sequence	in	which	Helen	reacts	with	comic	surprise	to	her	new	son-in-law	Tod	Higgins	(Keanu	Reeves)	shaving	her	daughter	Julie’s	(Martha	Plimpton)	head,	the	audience	is	caught	off-guard	by	the	question,	and	the	swift	change	in	mood.	The	ensuing	scene	encapsulates	the	way	the	film	rewards	close	listening	to	lives	in	domestic	environments.		
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Garry	is	first	introduced	in	a	medium	long	shot,	appearing	tentatively	behind	Helen	as	she	prepares	to	leave	for	work	–	she	manages	a	local	bank.	He	sticks	close	to	the	walls	as	if	being	in	the	open	space	of	the	house	might	be	hazardous.	The	camera	tracks	Garry,	moving	along	the	wall	and	away	from	his	mother	as,	in	a	pre-emptively	defensive	tone,	he	tells	her	the	house	is	“getting	crowded”	since	Tod	moved	in.	When	he	finally	gets	to	asking	if	he	could	stay	with	his	dad	for	a	while,	Garry	is	positioned	as	far	from	his	mother	as	possible	within	the	dining	room,	a	large	table	between	them,	standing	awkwardly	with	his	back	against	a	monolithic	white	cabinet,	hunched,	arms	crossed,	and	looking	up	sheepishly,	head	slightly	bowed,	aware	of	his	vulnerability	but	seemingly	unaware	that	he	is	being	dwarfed	by	a	looming	domestic	object	(a	technique	employed	more	than	once	in	this	film	to	convey	parent-child	power	relationships	in	a	space	governed	by	parental	agency).	He	occupies	a	portion	of	the	left	of	the	frame,	walls,	tables,	chairs	and	cabinets	all	larger	than	his	own	figure	–	the	wide	set-up	of	Garry	alone,	before	we	move	into	progressively	tighter	eyeline	coverage.		
Garry alone among the domestic objects 
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A	stillness	follows:	a	long	beat	with	a	hushed	buzz	track,	a	kind	of	showdown	of	information	processing	while	both	of	them	survey	an	inevitable	oncoming	sadness.	This	disappearance	of	background	noise	sustains	throughout	the	scene,	crafting	something	of	an	auditory	bubble	around	a	private	two-player	drama	that	speaks	to	the	fragile	acoustic	intimacy	made	possible	in	close	domestic	settings.	In	the	ensuing	shot	of	Helen,	Wiest	manages	to	convey	not	just	trepidation,	but	the	agony	of	not	knowing	what	to	do	in	these	charged	moments	of	parenting,	so	loaded	with	contradiction.	She	is	both	surprised	and	unsurprised,	as	she	has	speculated	on	her	son’s	desire	for	connection	with	his	father	but	wanted	to	suppress	it;	she	wants	to	prevent	him	from	the	painful	rejection	she	envisages,	but	also	knows	she	must	respect	his	agency	and	cannot	prevent	him	from	being	hurt;	she	is	both	longing	to	hold	onto	“that	little	boy	who	never	left	my	side”	and	aware	that	she	must	take	a	step	back	to	allow	him	to	explore	the	world	on	his	own	terms;	she	both	knows	the	aching	trials	of	growing	up,	but	not	his	own	specific	trails,	and	not	how	to	ease	them.		Wiest’s	portrayal	of	these	contradicting	emotions	earned	her	an	Academy	Award	nomination	for	Best	Supporting	Actress.	Reviewers	also	recognised	that	such	attempts	to	convey	the	realism	of	mixed	affect	were	key	to	understanding	the	film.	New	York	Times	critic	Stephen	Holden	observed	Wiest’s,	“anxious	longing,	exasperation	and	pained	tenderness	…	Even	being	the	most	sensitive	parent,	the	film	reminds	us,	has	its	limits.	No	matter	how	hard	you	try,	you	can’t	live	your	children’s	lives	for	them”	(234).	As	Kupfer	puts	it	in	his	chapter	on	virtue	in	Parenthood:		 Child-rearing	involves	a	tension	between	protecting	children	and	fostering	their	growth	and	independence	from	us.	Cushioning	the	blows	our	children	are	bound	to	receive	must	be	complemented	by	helping	to	prepare	them	to	meet	the	world	on	its	own	terms.	Complicating	the	work	of	raising	children	is	the	fact	that	not	only	do	the	children	change	but	the	world	changes	as	well.	Consequently,	parents	cannot	always	rely	on	what	has	worked	in	the	past	as	they	respond	to	their	children’s	growth.	Parents	must	adapt	to	great	changes	-	in	their	children,	the	world,	and	in	their	children’s	relationship	to	the	world.		(92)		What	is	being	asked	of	Helen	here	is	a	manner	of	humility	particular	to	childrearing:		
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Humility	is	essential	to	raising	children	because	parents	must	deal	with	the	fact	that	they	cannot	protect	their	children	from	all	harm.	In	addition,	parents	must	accept	their	ever-diminishing	control	over	children	who	are	becoming	increasingly	self-governing	and	involved	in	a	world	outside	the	home.		(ibid.	97)		Garry’s	arms	remain	folded	as	he	briskly	makes	his	case:	he	clenches	and	unclenches	his	fists	nervously,	and	positions	his	body	away	from	Helen	and	towards	the	kitchen,	where	he	will	soon	use	the	phone	to	call	his	father.	When	Helen	advises	Garry	against	calling	his	father,	telling	him	“you	don’t	know	your	father	like	I	do,”	she	does	so	in	an	uncharacteristic	whisper,	a	resigned	but	tense	monotone,	and	it	is	evident	she	knows	her	resistance	to	the	idea	is	a	matter	of	procedure	more	than	guidance.	“I	don’t	know	him	at	all,”	Garry	snaps,	using	reassertion	of	his	familiar	role	–	reactive	and	righteous	defiance	against	his	mother’s	authority	–	as	a	kind	of	courage,	and	the	impetus	to	move	toward	the	kitchen.		 Howard	and	cinematographer	Donald	McAlpine	shoot	this	as	Garry’s	over-the-shoulder	POV.	As	he	walks	to	the	phone,	the	camera	swings	around	Helen	and	pulls	away	from	her	while	she	watches	on,	her	eyeline	just	above	and	behind	the	camera,	and	then	finally	the	movement	ends	behind	a	framed	glass	divider	separating	the	kitchen	from	the	dining	area.	The	foregrounding	effect	emphasises	the	distance	between	them:	neither	can	stop	the	motion	that	has	started,	now,	and	they	only	see	each	other	refracted	through	the	glass,	not	quite	in	separate	rooms,	not	quite	in	the	same	room,	in	the	same	house	for	now,	but	one	of	them	is	looking	for	a	way	out.	Helen	quietly,	haltingly	provides	the	number,	and	Garry	looks	up	to	receive	the	information,	both	defiant	and	afraid,	reading	her	face	once	more,	a	last	moment	of	emotional	contagion	as	Garry	fails	to	resist	mirroring	his	mother’s	doubt	(c.f.	Hatfield	et	al.),	before	he	turns	away	and	dials.	With	each	shot	of	Garry	the	coverage	is	slightly	tighter,	but	it	is	only	now,	when	he	turns	his	back	to	Helen,	that	we	have	the	first	uninterrupted	close-up.	Behind	him,	Helen	sits	down	to	silently	watch,	her	hand	covering	her	mouth	to	protect	against	an	impulse	for	intervention.		Garry’s	father,	a	dentist,	has	a	receptionist	who	answers	the	phone,	and	Garry	explains	that	“it’s	his	son”	calling,	but	when	his	father	comes	to	the	phone,	clarifies	that	he	is	the	“other”	son	–	his	father	has	a	new	wife	and	kids.	Garry’s	voice	already	has	a	desperate,	raspy	quality	when	he	has	to	introduce	himself	to	his	own	father,	but	then	he	stumbles	over	his	words	when	he	asks,	“well…	would	it	be	ok	if	I	stay	with	you	for	a	while…	a	few	months?”	We	
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have	a	final	shot	from	Helen’s	perspective,	her	son	behind	the	glass	huddled	over	the	phone,	protecting	himself	from	her	gaze.		In	the	final	close-up,	we	do	not	hear	Garry’s	father’s	response;	we	just	witness	it	on	Garry’s	face.	The	camera	is	trained	on	his	reaction,	and	all	peripheral	details	have	fallen	away.	Garry’s	lip	quivers,	he	squints	back	tears,	and	his	voice	cracks	as	he	acquiesces	without	retort,	and	meekly	says,	“ok.”	At	this	cue,	Randy	Newman’s	bittersweet	string	section	fades	in	softly	underneath,	not	cloying,	not	sad,	not	certain,	but	still	comforting	in	its	resignation,	encouraging	us	to	accept	the	melancholy	of	the	circumstance	without	being	overwhelmed	by	it,	an	example	of	Newman’s	“tender,	melodic	writing	[that]	ultimately	defines	the	score”	(Clemmensen	np).	Helen	mirrors	this	resignation	when	she	sadly	and	quietly	curses	her	ex-husband	under	her	breath.	When	Garry	hangs	up	and	emerges	from	behind	the	glass	divider,	he	can	barely	face	his	mother	to	say,	on	the	verge	of	crying,	“he	didn’t	think	it	was	such	a	good	idea.”	Helen	reaches	out	to	her	son,	says	“oh	sweetie,”	and	tries	to	approach,	but	Garry	walks	in	the	opposite	direction	around	the	dining	table	to	avoid	her	embrace,	heading	for	the	exit.	“I’ve	got	to	go,”	he	says,	and	disappears	through	the	front	door.	Helen	hangs	her	head.	As	Thompson	puts	it,	“Garry’s	abrupt	departure,	rejecting	Helen’s	consolation,	leaves	dangling	her	inability	to	cope	with	his	problems”	(Storytelling	266),	but	also	her	struggle	to	be	released	from	shouldering	the	blame	for	her	ex-husband’s	neglectful	behaviour.	Both	are	left	alone	to	process	their	pain:	Helen	in	her	home,	and	Garry	somewhere	outside	of	it.		The	first	thing	this	scene	demonstrates	is	the	film’s	foundational	quotidian	humanism,	locating	drama	and	meaning	in	the	everyday	life	of	an	extended	family	in	personally	charged	situations	we	might	otherwise	read	as	unextraordinary,	or	are	omitted	from	more	conventional	dramas.	Parenthood	explores	the	space	between	people,	and	rewards	close	attention	to	that	social	space.	Comprehensive	description	of	the	filmic	resources	used	to	trace	a	quietly	unfolding	everyday	tragedy	reveal	rich	human	detail:	domestic	politics,	the	push	and	pull	of	emotional	contagion	in	proximal	spaces,	navigation	of	and	bartering	for	control	over	shared	familial	space,	the	internal	lives	we	struggle	to	share	even	when	living	so	closely	with	relatives,	the	quiet	pain	of	tacit	kinship	rejection,	need	and	desire	(in	physical	contact,	in	positive	attention,	in	mere	presence,	in	accommodation	of	one	another’s	needs	and	verbal	demonstrations	of	love),	and	an	intersubjective	chemistry	of	hope.	Garry,	for	instance,	can	read	his	mother’s	sense	of	futility,	and	on	one	level	knows	the	answer	he	will	likely	receive	
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to	mirror	this	hope	back	to	him,	and	let	him	own	it	for	this	short	time,	even	in	her	apprehension	of	its	consequences.	The	domestic	realism	of	the	suburban	ensemble	mode	challenges	us	to	read	nuance	and	infer	intersubjective	politics	from	everyday	events	seldom	represented	onscreen.		
New	York	reviewer	David	Denby’s	close	reading	of	Weist’s	performance	provides	a	good	example	of	how	sustained	attention	might	increasingly	reveal	conflicted	affect:		 Sensing	her	need,	her	teenage	daughter	and	son	have	disgustedly	pulled	away	from	her	…	Weist	has	those	crinkled	eyes,	her	clipped,	harried	look,	and	her	nervous	smile,	greeting	each	outrage	from	the	kids	with	a	beseeching	grin.	The	way	she	plays	Helen,	she’s	a	mother	whose	every	instinct	tells	her,	despite	much	hurt	feelings,	to	stay	available,	stay	open—they’ll	come	back.	Weist’s	soft	hopefulness,	combined	with	anger	underneath	(which	comes	bursting	out	in	weird,	almost	unconscious	little	jokes),	gives	the	performance	its	pathos	and	its	comic	tension.		(79-80)		Denby	recognises	that	the	film’s	true	conflicts	and	drama	are	discovered	only	within	such	close	attention,	as	they	are	largely	internal	and	closely,	quietly,	often	subliminally	held	by	each	protagonist,	iterated	in	domestic	spaces	where	we	feel	the	curious	blend	of	estrangement	and	sanctuary.	The	following	reading	attempts	to	map	some	of	the	complex	interactions	of	these	internal	worlds	as	they	are	externalised	into	a	causal	family	network.	The	interdependency	of	domestic	psychology,	behaviour,	politics	and	ethics	might	be	confounding,	as	both	characters	and	audience	try	to	draw	workable	meaning	from	the	family’s	multi-causal	social	structures,	but	these	interdependencies	also	reward	our	acceptance	of	their	complexity	rather	than	our	mastery	of	them,	or	the	distilling	of	information	into	doctrine	or	dogma.	Before	moving	into	an	analysis	of	the	politics,	ethics	and	psychology	of	the	film,	I	will	look	at	the	resources	of	onscreen	domestic	realism	it	uses	to	approach	these	topics.		In	reading	the	cinematic	devices	employed	to	construct	environments	that	resonate	with	social	detail,	it	pays	to	scrutinise	the	creative	exchanges	occurring	between	various	film	workers	(inherently	social	in	nature	too)	rather	than	isolate	contributions;	for	example,	the	production	designer	and	the	ensemble	cast.	Scholarship	on	production	design	has	traditionally	emphasised	its	haptic	materiality	and	contributions	to	film	texture	(Donaldson	
Texture	in	Film)	over	its	practical	use;	however	Howard	and	his	actors	use	designer	Todd	
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Hallowell’s	interiors	to	examine	behaviour	in	familiar	domestic	settings,	exposing	not	just	individual	character	identities	with	symbolic	art	direction	(the	work	of	Christopher	Nowak	with	decorator	Nina	Ramsey),	but	the	particular	methods	we	use	to	negotiate	physical	contact	and	verbal	exchange	within	these	proximal	environments.	Helen	has	to	read	Garry’s	cues	when	he	puts	objects	between	them,	yield	to	his	threats	of	complete	withdrawal,	and	resist	approaching	to	comfort	him.	After	the	call	to	his	father,	when	he	is	in	need,	Helen	attempts	to	enter	the	space	Garry	has	carved	for	himself,	but	he	uses	the	dining	table	as	a	shield	against	contact,	choosing	to	leave	the	house	to	feel	the	pain	on	his	own	terms	rather	than	hers.	Hallowell’s	design	speaks	of	controlled	domestic	space:	Helen’s	attempt	at	ordering	the	chaos	of	work,	life	and	family	commitments,	the	way	she	projects	her	upper-middle	identity,	and	implicit	material	requests	for	her	rebellious	teenaged	progeny	to	fall	into	a	commitment	to	the	life	she	envisioned	–	a	commitment	they	can	no	longer	provide	for	her.	Garry	sits	uncomfortably	among	the	objects	of	this	world,	but	has	learned	to	navigate	them.	In	this	scene,	we	witness	a	testing	of	the	boundaries	of	learned	behaviours	in	a	controlled	environment,	or	what	some	sociologists	might	call	(somewhat	hyperbolically)	the	tyranny	of	the	home:	“Even	its	most	altruistic	and	successful	versions	exert	a	tyrannous	control	over	mind	and	body.	We	need	hardly	say	more	to	explain	why	children	want	to	leave	it	and	do	not	mean	to	reproduce	it”	(Douglas	“The	Idea	of	a	Home”	303).	Yet	crucially,	negotiation	is	still	possible	here.	Although	they	are	playing	their	own	familiar	roles	in	this	location,	Garry	is	attempting	to	redefine	his	role	and	his	relationship	to	his	mother	through	the	domestic	space;	the	phone	call	to	his	father	is	just	one	amongst	many	attempts	at	escape.		Both	of	Helen’s	children	use	their	rooms	as	a	protective	shell	of	private	interests	against	their	mother’s	interventions	of	order.	When	we	first	meet	Helen’s	family,	we	are	provided	access	only	to	Julie’s	room:	“Indeed,	we	immediately	learn	that,	like	Garry,	Julie	has	turned	her	room	into	a	secret	domain	within	her	mother’s	house.	Tod	emerges	from	under	the	bed	…	She	plays	loud	music	(the	equivalent	of	Garry’s	lock	on	his	door)	as	the	two	begin	to	make	love”	(Thompson	Storytelling	255).	When	we	finally	catch	a	glimpse	of	Garry’s	room	later	in	the	movie	we	see,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	an	entropic	mound	of	toys.	But	they	seem	largely	neglected:	there	is	an	archaeology	of	puberty	here,	with	forgotten	beloved	items	still	in	transition,	still	held	near	despite	Garry’s	growing	interest	in	pornography	and	his	developing	sexual	shame,	putting	his	boyhood	toys	at	a	distance.	As	Joëlle	Bahloul	muses,	for	adolescents	a	closed	door	(or	locked	door	in	Garry’s	case)	can	conceptually	contain	their	liminal	space	of	self-perceived	dirt	or	impurity	(263).	The	room’s	chaos	may	represent	something	of	his	inner	
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tumult,	and	the	layers	of	deteriorating	and	forgotten	playthings	speak	to	the	discomforts	of	pubertal	transition	and	a	past	he	is	reluctant	to	leave	behind.	However,	the	props	are	also	used	practically	by	the	actors.	When	an	insouciant	Tod	picks	up	a	pair	of	bug-eyed	toy	glasses	in	Garry’s	room,	he	demonstrates	a	casual	affinity	with	Garry’s	world,	and	Garry	subsequently	trusts	Tod	enough	to	talk	to	him	about	sex.	The	chaos	in	Garry’s	room	somewhat	connects	with	that	of	his	aunt	Karen	(Mary	Steenburgen)	and	uncle	Gil’s	(Steve	Martin)	house,	which	is	equally	messy,	and	contrasts	with	Helen’s	more	orderly	settings	of	feature	pieces	and	imperial	furniture.	When	Garry	mentions	his	uncle	Gil,	he	does	so	somewhat	ruefully,	as	if	Gil’s	family	had	something	he	wishes	he	had	in	his	own	–	Garry	clearly	imagines	them	as	more	carefree,	and	Gil	as	a	man	who	is	not	struggling	under	the	weight	of	his	own	domestic	chaos.		The	set’s	lighting,	too,	will	affect	our	reception	of	the	relationships	that	are	bartered	within	its	confines.	Although	it	appears	sunny	outside,	the	light	inside	Helen’s	house	is	strangely	muted,	with	half	drawn	timber	windowshades	blocking	some	of	the	exterior	sources.	McAlpine’s	darker	yellow-brown	palette,	suggesting	the	languor	of	a	late	afternoon	rather	than	the	brightness	of	a	new	day,	implies	another	kind	of	control	within	this	space	–	a	subdued	affective	control	out	of	step	with	the	radically	exploratory	dawning	of	teenaged	identity,	but	which	Helen’s	progeny	might	take	cues	from	in	managing	their	own	privacy	and	self-containment.138	Moreover,	it	speaks	of	the	situation	this	family	has	reached,	struggling	to	let	light	in.	Set	in	St.	Louis	but	with	interiors	filmed	at	Universal’s	Orlando	studios,	these	scenes	are	where	we	primarily	witness	the	“scrubbed	and	anonymous”	look	of	1980s	suburban	settings	that	Parenthood	works	with	(Denby	79),	but	shrewdly	subverts.	
Parenthood	disrupts	prior	images	of	suburban	domesticity	by	contrasting	living	arrangements	instead	of	unifying	them,	and	this	might	be	more	due	to	subtle	differences	in	lighting	and	decoration	between	each	family	house	than	to	the	somewhat	similar	set	builds.	Lighting	changes	in	the	film	remain	understated,	with	McAlpine	maintaining	a	naturalist	standard	across	scenes,	flattening	these	contrasts	rather	than	interfering	with	perceptible	or	purely	symbolic	shifts	in	colour	palette	or	dynamic	range.	The	muted	change	in	Helen	and	Garry’s	scene	is	subtle,	but	palpable.		
																																																								138	McAlpine,	it	should	be	noted,	is	no	stranger	to	domestic	cinematography	and	became	somewhat	of	an	expert	in	lensing	these	environments	throughout	the	1980s	and	1990s	(Dawson	62).		
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This	domestic	study	is	not	purely	visual,	however:	the	space	between	Garry	and	his	father	is	suggested	in	close	attention	to	Phoenix’s	vocal	performance,	and	rejection	and	absence	are	represented	in	the	complete	omission	of	his	father’s	voice	from	the	soundtrack.	Garry’s	huskiness	indicates	not	only	the	discomfort	of	acclimating	to	a	transformed	voice	during	pubescence,	but	also	the	self-handicapping	behaviour	of	swallowing	one’s	words,	defensively	adapting	to	laryngeal	change	by	overemphasising	constricted	qualities,	becoming	quieter	and	raspier,	potentially	a	kind	of	adolescent	transitional	dysphonia	(see	Morrison	and	Rammage	“Muscle	Misuse	Voice	Disorders”).	Garry	is	clearly	uncomfortable	with	being	heard;	his	vocal	norms	usually	service	attempts	to	slip	by	his	family	members	unnoticed,	but	now	he	has	to	adopt	firmness	and	feigned	confidence	within	the	vocal	confines	he	has	set	for	himself,	and	those	of	male	puberty.	His	lack	of	familiarity	with	assertiveness	shows	in	abrupt	vocal	shifts:	he	becomes	suddenly	louder	for	a	single	sentence	without	changing	pitch	when	he	challenges	his	mother,	or	when	he	must	interrupt	his	father’s	initial	rejection	to	plead	for	a	moment	of	his	time,	in	lines	such	as	“I	don’t	know	him	at	all,”	or,	“It’ll	only	take	a	minute.”	However	he	lowers	his	voice	mid-sentence,	as	if	the	volume	change	took	enormous	effort,	or	was	not	what	he	intended.	Interestingly,	studies	have	found	that	the	absence	of	a	father	predicts	early	onset	of	pubertal	indicators	such	as	vocal	change,	potentially	as	a	father’s	absence	induces	hormone-altering	stress	(Bogaert	“Age	at	Puberty	and	Father	Absence”	544).	There	is	a	sense	that	Garry	is	struggling	with	a	maturation	that	he	feels	underprepared	for,	in	vocal	change	but	also	in	onset	of	masturbation,	which	we	later	learn	he	feels	is	a	shameful	activity,	and	is	a	primary	source	of	much	of	the	avoidant	behaviour	he	exhibits	toward	his	mother	and	sister.	Simultaneously,	editors	Daniel	Hanley	and	Michael	Hill	explore	social	space	using	pauses	and	their	attendant	opportunities	for	reflection:	the	temporality	and	rhythms	of	nonverbal	conversation	and	communication	that	occur	in	between	utterances,	as	well	as	the	time	the	audience	is	allowed	to	spend	considering	a	character’s	interiority	and	emotional	processing	before	moving	ahead	with	the	narrative.		Despite	this,	we	might	also	note	a	slightly	embellished	cinematic	realism	operating	within	the	sequence,	or	a	subtle	resistance	to	purist	naturalism	that	also	characterises	the	film.	For	the	most	part	the	scene	maintains	a	standard	of	conventional,	naturalist	two-character	conversational	shooting,	yet	at	times	Howard	chooses	grander	or	delicately	presentational	cinematic	gestures	–	potentially	conspicuous	indoor	dolly	shots	and	camera	movement,	domestic	objects	obscuring	parts	of	the	frame	or	played	symbolically	against	the	characters,	and	incidental	strings	intervening	on	the	soundtrack	–	which	would	not	be	out	of	
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place	in,	for	example,	one	of	Alfred	Hitchcock’s	apartment-bound	domestic	thrillers	such	as	
Rear	Window	(1954).	Recalling	analogous	techniques	in	Rear	Window,	we	might	be	so	focussed	on	the	anxiety	induced	by	a	sequence	that	we	could	conceivably	fail	to	notice	the	way	the	camera	moved	to	ratchet	tension.	Indeed,	Thompson’s	chapter	on	the	film	focuses	on	
Parenthood’s	recollection	of	classical	film	techniques	(she	comments	chiefly	on	narrative	structure	and	progression	with	particularly	fine	observations	on	the	transitions	between	scenes).	In	Populism	and	the	Capra	Legacy,	Wes	D.	Gehring	called	Howard	a	“contemporary	Capra	Auteur”	(85)	and	singled	out	Parenthood	as	a	primary	example:	“Parenthood	seems	to	soar	because	it	pushes	the	Capra	envelope	into	new	areas	(ibid.	107;	see	also	Thompson	
Storytelling	250).	Howard	is	a	Caprian	classicist	at	heart,	and	his	filmmaking	similarly	draws	from	some	of	the	earlier	domestic	settings	of	figures	like	Capra	and	Howard	Hawks,	helping	to	establish	the	“emotively	heightened”	realism	that	sustains	in	Hollywood	today.	Indeed,	Holden	wrote	that	Parenthood’s	central	relationship	“recalls	James	Stewart	and	Donna	Reed	in	It’s	a	Wonderful	Life,	a	film	whose	tone	Parenthood	periodically	echoes”	(Holden	234);	other	reviewers,	too,	made	the	connection	to	Capra’s	iconic	family	film	(Kempley	D1).	Howard	had	absorbed	these	classical	Hollywood	techniques	through	years	of	work	on	film	and	television	since	his	early	appearances	on	The	Andy	Griffith	Show	and	Happy	Days.	He	was	by	now	renowned	for	employing	them	in	fantasy	settings,	having	previously	directed	films	including	
Willow	(1988),	Cocoon	(1985),	Splash	(1984)	and	receiving	early	filmmaking	opportunities	with	budget	genre	producer	Roger	Corman.	In	the	production	notes	to	the	DVD	release	of	
Parenthood,	Ron	Howard	said,	“After	directing	films	which	were	very	theatrical	in	theme,	I	wanted	to	do	something	more	organic,	something	I	could	feel”	(np).	I	have	already	noted	some	of	the	film’s	very	tactile	environments	–	feeling	here	comes	to	mean	the	corporeal,	as	well	as	emotional	“feeling”	bound	to	the	corporeal.	In	Parenthood,	the	more	presentational	cues	of	early	Hollywood	are	sparingly	used	and	balanced	with	predominantly	realist	stylistic	choices.139	Grander	gestures	are	underplayed,	focussed	as	we	are	on	the	nuance	of	the																																																									139	When	I	write	that	Parenthood	works	in	a	realist	mode,	I	do	not	mean	that	it	presents	its	content	as	more	“real”	or	relevant	than	other	narratives,	or	that	it	encourages	unreflexive	thinking	about	the	world	it	constructs.	Instead,	we	have	our	attention	guided	away	from	the	filmmakers’	artifice	in	favour	of	immersion	in	the	social	ethics	of	the	film	–	or	what	André	Bazin	used	to	refer	to	as	the	attempted	“invisibility”	of	the	director	(74).	Realist	filmmaking	does	not	entail	a	lack	of	critical	analysis.	It	encourages	analytical	thinking	to	be	centred	upon	the	problems	within	its	diegesis;	the	spectator	still	understands	the	diegesis	as	constructed	(unless	something	has	gone	horribly	wrong)	and	might	disagree	as	to	its	construction,	but	ultimately	we	are	permitted	the	cognitive	space	to	see	“through”	the	work	of	the	creators	to	concentrate	on	the	dilemmas	they	have	concocted.		
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performances,	the	characters,	and	the	interpersonal	politics	of	each	scene.	In	later	interviews,	Howard	indicated	that	electing	to	do	a	realist	piece	“stretched”	him	as	a	director	(Wayland	and	Howard	np).	Working	outside	of	genre	filmmaking	was	a	challenge;	because	disparities	in	a	realist	diegesis	are	more	intuitive	for	the	audience,	they	might	then	be	more	discerning	(and	less	forgiving)	of	perceived	contrivances.		
Parenthood	also	employs	some	overlap	of	the	real	with	daydreams,	imagined	and	projected	realities	–	expressionistic	gestures	that	are	uniquely	bound	within	the	film’s	realism.	As	Gehring	observes,	“Like	Wonderful	Life,	Parenthood	begins	with	an	inspired	scene	of	fantasy	born	of	sadness”	(101).	The	film	opens	with	protagonist	Gil	Buckman	daydreaming	about	being	a	boy	(Max	Elliott	Slade	as	Young	Gil)	attending	a	baseball	game	with	his	father	Frank	(Jason	Robards),	who	pays	an	usher	(Ganz)	to	mind	his	child.	Young	Gil	motivates	pop	psychological	concepts	to	explain	to	the	usher	that	he	is	in	the	middle	of	a	daydream,	and	that	the	usher	does	not	exist,	being	an	amalgam	of	ushers	he	was	left	with	as	a	child,	at	which	the	usher	becomes	irate:	“that’s	great,	you	have	a	family	and	I’m	a	goddamn	amalgam!”	The	sequence	elegantly	(and	uncannily)	introduces	a	number	of	elements	the	film	will	be	working	with:	serious	concerns	raised	in	comedic	settings	or	punctuated	by	jokes	which	deflate	solemnity;	an	associated	question	regarding	how	we	might	balance	hard	work	with	playfulness	in	childrearing	(Young	Gil	mentions	that	his	father	taught	him	to	see	parenthood	as	“a	prison	rather	than	a	playground”);	family	politics	and	attempts	to	make	progress	through	superior	childrearing	(Easton	5);	the	collapsing	and	overlapping	of	generational	identities	to	explore	shared	meaning	in	intergenerational	collectives;	frictions	between	confounding	social	realities	and	our	simplified	interior	fantasy	lives;	the	power	and	importance	of	imagination	as	a	social	tool	(Kupfer	100);	critical	engagement	with	some	of	the	contemporary	pop	psychological	concepts	of	the	era	(such	as	the	“positive	male	influence”);	the	way	we	group	memories	together	or	“amalgamate”	them	to	narratavise	family	experience	and	develop	moral	goals	(Gil	promises	to	be	different	from	his	own	father);	the	difficulty	of	finding	the	place	for	humanistic	sympathy	in	this	process;140	and	affinity	with	the	uncanny	and	bizarre,	engendering	yet	another	affective	tension	throughout	the	film	as	we	are	asked	to	reflect	upon	some	of	the	absurdities	of	family	life,	even	while	we	acknowledge	the	seriousness																																																									140	Thompson	writes:	“Gil,	while	wanting	to	avoid	Frank’s	mistakes,	has	some	sympathy	for	and	understanding	of	his	father	…	Gil’s	tossing	around	of	pop-psychological	terms	suggests	that	he	has	read	books	on	child-rearing,	trying	to	avoid	his	father’s	mistakes”	(Storytelling	251).		
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of	family	ethics.	As	Thompson	points	out,	the	film	begins	with	an	absurdity	of	temporal	displacement	not	only	as	the	child	spouts	pop	psychology,	but	becomes	“doubly	odd”	in	its	anachronistic	twist:	“the	scene	seems	to	be	set	in	the	1950s,	while	the	‘positive	male	influence’	is	palpably	a	modern	term”	(Storytelling	250),	confounding	the	usher	further.	Gil’s	wife	Karen	soon	punctures	the	daydream	and	brings	him	back	to	the	present,	explaining	that	the	ball	game	is	over,	at	which	Newman’s	Oscar-nominated	song	“I	Love	to	See	You	Smile”	commences	and	the	opening	credits	roll	over	a	sequence,	gently	slapstick	and	comically	observational,	both	lovingly	and	astringently	depicting	the	trials	of	loading	a	family	into	a	car	to	go	home,	drawing	the	film’s	beginning	laughs	from	the	recognition	of	a	parent’s	end-of-day	weariness.		Daydream	sequences	permit	interior	lives	to	be	projected	and	realised.	In	Parenthood,	they	are	largely	used	to	poke	satirical	fun	at	our	internalisation	of	the	cultural-psychological	pressures	of	caregiving,	such	as	all-or-nothing	thinking	(binaristically	conceptualising	a	child	as	either	succeeding	or	failing	in	life)	or	dysfunctional	perfectionism	(obsessing	over	best	childrearing	practices	to	the	detriment	of	one’s	progeny).	Howard	makes	use	of	these	more	fantastical	elements	without	saturating	the	overarching	realism,	quotidian	insights	of	his	cast	and	crew,	or	guidance	of	the	spectator’s	focus	toward	the	work	of	the	performers	and	dialogue	–	the	actors’	efforts	to	communicate	meaning,	both	internal	and	social.		Of	course,	Helen	and	Garry’s	story	is	just	one	subplot	of	many	in	Parenthood’s	substantial	ensemble	drama.	Parenthood	surveys	four	generations	of	conflicting	motivations	and	desires	within	the	one	family	(and	the	film’s	conclusion	introduces	a	fifth	generation).	We	are	regularly	encouraged	to	be	considering	how	other	family	members	might	be	responding	to	the	action	of	any	given	scene.	The	attentional	politics	of	our	guidance	toward	narrative	focal	points	is	key	to	understanding	any	film	(Moss-Wellington	“Affecting	Profundity”	43,	53),	and	one	of	the	primary	methods	Howard,	Hanley	and	Hill	employ	to	achieve	polyphonic	perspective	taking	throughout	the	film	is	the	frequent	use	of	reaction	cutaways,	or	grabs.	In	a	scene	during	which	the	action	appears	focussed	on	a	particular	character	and	their	perspective,	we	cut	to	characters	who	may	have	been	forgotten,	see	the	unfolding	drama	momentarily	through	their	eyes,	and	adopt	a	plurality	of	perspectives	which	fosters	a	different	kind	of	engagement,	keeping	us	from	absorption	in	a	particular	character’s	emotional	state,	or	a	morality	that	fails	to	take	into	account	the	many	others	who	are	implicated.	The	editors	will	often	counter-intuitively	show	us	those	who	are	not	engaged	in	
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conversation,	as	People	reviewer	Ralph	Novak	noted:	“Howard	keeps	the	film	focused	on	the	painful-exhilarating	relationship	between	kids	and	parents.	One	way	he	does	it	is	by	often	showing	all	the	participants	in	a	conversation	onscreen;	the	actors	react	as	well	as	speak	their	lines”	(17).	This	is	a	primary	method	for	what	reviewers	identified	as	Parenthood’s	“masterstroke	…	offering	the	points	of	view	of	everyone	in	an	extended	and	wildly	diverse	middle-class	family”	(Variety	Staff	Rev.	of	Parenthood	np).	Early	in	the	film,	we	meet	the	extended	family	as	everyone	comes	together	for	a	Thanksgiving	dinner	at	grandparents	Frank	and	Marilyn’s	(Eileen	Ryan)	house.	We	have	already	met	three	of	their	four	children,	but	the	wayward	youngest	sibling	Larry	(Tom	Hulce)	arrives	as	a	surprise,	bringing	in	toe	a	black	son,	Cool	(Alex	Burrall),	who	he	has	until	now	kept	secret.	This	scene	demonstrates	innovative	use	of	the	cutaway:	when	Cool	first	turns	up,	amidst	all	the	shock,	we	cut	briefly	to	Julie’s	barely	concealed	pleasure	at	the	unfolding	family	drama;	during	Larry’s	speech	about	his	latest	get-rich-quick	scheme,	we	cut	briefly	to	Helen	and	Gil	exchanging	furtive	glances;	and	we	cut	to	the	reaction	of	Karen	and	Gil’s	two	eldest	children	Taylor	(Alisan	Porter)	and	Kevin	(Jasen	Fisher)	when	Larry	makes	an	inappropriate	comment	to	his	sister	Susan	(Harley	Kozak),	and	once	more	after	Gil	mistakes	Helen’s	vibrator	for	a	flashlight	during	a	blackout.	
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	Again,	the	sound	design	of	the	scene	reveals	as	much	as	its	visual	cues,	the	complicating	detail	of	family	chaos	off-screen	usually	sitting	softly	under	the	dialogue	track	–	children	at	play,	other	conversations,	a	distant	television.	The	soundtrack	works	as	much	with	the	absence	of	information	as	its	inclusion.	When	the	peripheral	sounds	disappear	–	as	in	Cool’s	introduction,	or	the	brief	lack	of	cutlery-on-crockery	foley	when	Larry	alleges	that	Cool’s	mother	was	involved	in	a	homicide	–	the	disappearance	is	noticeable.	The	blackout	sequence	recalls	The	Graduate’s	famous	bedroom	argument:	when	the	lights	go	out	and	we	no	longer	rely	on	visual	information,	our	focus	is	brought	to	spatial	sounds	and	the	dialogue	becomes	more	tense	and	complex.	Alongside	discussion	regarding	the	whereabouts	of	a	flashlight,	overlapping	thoughts	reveal	various	character	relationships.	Frank	tells	his	wife	“your	mouth	used	up	all	the	power,”	Gil	tells	Frank,	“don’t	worry	dad,	we	can	still	find	the	bar,”	Kevin’s	panicked	exclamations	drown	out	the	more	inquisitive	and	excited	children,	and	Nathan	begins	lecturing	the	kids	about	blackouts	while	Karen	attempts	to	sooth	them.		Musical	cues	are	also	regularly	used	to	bind	the	emotional	content	of	disparate	scenes	as	we	are	bounced	between	subplots	with	limited	narrative	continuity.	Thompson	uses	
Parenthood	as	an	example	of	a	multiple-protagonist	film	with	parallel	plotlines	and	what	she	sees	as	“virtually	no	causal	interaction”	(Storytelling	48).	She	says	that	with	“separate	goals	
and	causal	chains,	each	plotline	constitutes	a	nearly	self-contained	narrative”	(ibid.	248).	I	beg	to	differ:	the	causation	in	the	film	is	largely	attitudinal	and	unspoken,	as	Parenthood	uses	its	narrative	transitions	to	explore	the	psychological	network	of	an	entire	family.	The	trials	faced	by	each	character	are	not	primarily	physical	but	subliminal	and	social,	in	that	most	pursue	metacognitive	goals	relating	to	how	they	think	about	their	role	as	a	parent	or	child	or	sibling,	especially	when	the	reality	of	each	role	comes	into	conflict	with	other	components	of	their	self-schema.	Key	to	this	narrative’s	intentional	cognitive	map	is	the	way	such	attitudes	tacitly	affect	one	another	across	extended	family	lines,	how	in	a	family	we	come	to	absorb	one	another’s	expectations	and	hopes	and	woes,	how	we	distribute	responsibility	when	we	intervene	on	another’s	behalf,	and	the	effects	of	collective	familial	approval	and	disapproval.	This	unspoken	causation	is	evident	from	the	first	extended	family	dinner	scene	onward,	as	we	are	primed	with	some	of	the	key	relationships	and	(often	harmful)	attitudes	at	play	from	the	start.	Even	before	this,	the	film’s	first	transition	between	narratives	–	Gil	and	Karen’s	reproval	of	Garry	introduces	a	cut	to	Helen’s	subplot	–	performs	a	similar	function.	We	are	aware	of	the	
Julie’s reaction cutaway 
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field	of	expectation	the	family	has	erected	around	Garry	before	he	even	appears	onscreen,	and	thus	we	are	left	to	wonder	at	the	potentiality	of	a	Pygmalion	effect	(or	tacit	expectations	that	shape	behaviour	and	performance,	c.f.	Rosenthal	and	Jacobson)	in	the	extended	network.	
Parenthood	calls	for	spectatorial	attendance	to	the	social	psychology	of	a	family	unit	more	than	it	does	unfolding	causal	plot	points,	which	are	usually	tied	to	family	politics	and	present	a	primary	dilemma	regarding	its	protagonists’	attempts	to	achieve	clarity	in	thinking	about	families.	Audiences	are	liable	to	miss	this	psychological	substance	when	fixated	upon	a	search	for	more	conventional	narrative	cause-effect	configurations.		Thompson	is	correct	in	her	summation	that	the	transition	between	scenes	is	a	primary	thematic	device	the	film	asks	us	to	become	fluent	in	when	assembling	its	meaning:	“characters	are	compared	and	contrasted	in	ways	which	demand	a	fair	degree	of	alert	interpretation”	(Storytelling	249).	The	film	requests	this	comparative	work	as	it	cuts	between	narratives,	which	chiefly	reveal	thematic	links	between	the	dilemmas	faced	by	each	family.	However,	Thompson	also	points	to	the	fact	that	the	transitional	cuts	during	the	film’s	setup,	introducing	us	to	each	strand	of	the	Buckman	family	(except	Larry	and	Cool,	who	arrive	later),	are	focussed	on	comparison	between	the	relative	shortcomings	and	merits	of	their	children:	Julie’s	academic	performance	is	superior	to	Patty’s	(ibid.	256),	and	Kevin’s	emotional	disturbance	is	not	as	bad	as	Garry’s	(ibid.	254),	a	comparison	that	will	reach	across	scene	transitions	throughout	the	movie	(ibid.	269).	The	interesting	part	of	this	is	that	the	characters	themselves	are	doing	this	comparative	work	with	us,	putting	together	a	morally	charged	family	narrative	as	we	do,	yet	the	story	we	are	invited	into	often	subsists	on	unwarranted	judgment	that	speaks	more	to	the	parents’	anxieties	as	caregivers	than	it	does	to	their	child’s	actual	capabilities;	the	audience	must	locate	their	own	reflexive	distance	from	these	comparisons.	The	very	structure	of	the	film	invites	us	to	speculate	on	the	causal	relationships	between	family	gossip,	collectively	distributed	expectations,	and	each	individual’s	wellbeing.		There	is,	thus,	more	than	a	thematic	unity	to	the	parallel	narratives.	Although	of	course	the	thematic	parallels	between	plots	are	equally	pivotal,	there	is	a	psychological	causation	at	play	too.	Critics	recognised	this	psychological	causality	as	the	film’s	primary	ambition.	Even	ambivalent	and	hostile	reviews	noted	that	the	film,	despite	its	realist	veneer,	was	“the	most	artistically	ambitious	American	film	to	appear	this	summer”	(Kehr	2;	see	also	Hurlburt	1E),	or	called	it	“a	middlebrow	masterpiece,	with	the	latter	word	being	the	subject,	not	the	modifier”	(Henderson	np,	revealing	some	critical	disdain	for	studies	of	everyday	domestic	life	as	less	
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serious	or	important	than	their	more	fantastical	counterparts).	Retrospective	reviews	have	called	the	film	“revolutionary”:		
Roseanne	had	been	on	a	year,	but	cinematic	families	still	tended	to	fall	into	two	categories:	the	golden	sages	of	Ozzie	and	Harriet	(or	their	slightly	more	modern	incarnation	the	Huxtables)	versus	the	shattered	destroyers	of	Eugene	O’Neill	or	Tennessee	Williams.	Parenthood	instead	explored	what	many	Americans,	at	least	many	white	upper-middle	class	Americans,	were	experiencing	–	the	balancing	acts	of	exhaustion	and	ambition,	true	hearts	and	neurosis.	Families	in	which	love	means	sorting	through	the	trash	to	find	a	lost	retainer.		(McNamara	D1)		The	film’s	innovation,	then,	had	to	do	with	its	resistance	to	binaristic	thinking	about	families	and	what	they	represent.	As	in	many	of	the	subsequent	suburban	ensemble	dramedies,	family	is	not	a	metaphor	here	but	a	lived	experience,	neither	all	good	nor	all	bad,	and	this	permits	a	more	nuanced	version	of	psychological	causality	among	large	networks,	and	for	its	actors	a	freedom	of	expression	grounded	in	observation	of	human	detail	more	than	contrivance	toward	symbolic	detail.			 The	film’s	ethic	of	close	listening	to	causation	among	the	variety	of	lives	found	in	proximal	domestic	spaces	meant	that	performance	would	always	be	one	of	the	film’s	pivotal	narrative	devices.	Consequently,	Howard’s	method	for	working	with	his	ensemble	cast	is	key	to	how	the	narrative	polyphonics	would	be	received.	Reviewers	commented	on	Howard’s	thespian-centric	coverage	(holding	the	camera	on	his	actors	and	letting	them	do	much	of	the	communicative	work)	which	allows	performers	to	be:	“uniformly	expressive—using	every	second	onscreen	to	give	their	characters	dimension”	(Novak	17).	Other	reviewers	saw	that	the	film	was	“first	and	foremost,	a	showcase	for	wonderful	acting”	(Boyar	18;	see	also	TV	Guide	Staff).	Ernest	Mathijs,	on	the	other	hand,	thinks	that	ensemble	casts	are	more	likely	to	exhibit	a	kind	of	groupthink	in	their	performance	style,	which	he	calls	referential	acting	(“Referential	Acting	and	the	Ensemble	Cast”).	The	connectivity	stressed	in	such	filmmaking	may	make	actors	more	likely	to	reach	for	popularly	recognisable	types,	and	distribute	them	to	colleagues	through	the	sheer	pressure	of	achieving	an	artistic	unity,	or	some	kind	of	osmosis	of	technique	that	produces	homogeneity:		
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The	tools	of	polysemous	expression,	ostentation	and	referentiality	collapse	into	one	set	of	devices	…	Referential	acting	involves	the	self-conscious	design	of	a	performance	on	the	basis	of	a	previous	one,	often	by	the	same	actors,	but	also	based	on	archetypes,	exemplary	models	or	clichéd	stereotypes.		(ibid.	91)		In	the	Parenthood	DVD	production	notes,	Howard’s	emphasis	on	unity	would	appear	to	support	this	analysis:	“I’ve	had	two	very	good	experiences	with	ensemble	casts,”	he	says.	“First,	as	an	actor	in	American	Graffiti	and	then	directing	Cocoon.	Both	experiences	taught	me	that	the	director	has	to	balance	and	coordinate	the	acting	styles.	If	not,	you’re	left	with	pieces	of	a	film,	not	one	that	is	complete”	(np).	What	Howard	refers	to	here	is	not	deference	to	culturally	produced	types,	but	the	very	nature	of	constructing	a	diegesis	that	makes	sense	to	the	viewer	–	disparate	performers	with	a	variety	of	techniques	and	backgrounds	will	need	to	appear	as	part	of	the	same	film	world.	Despite	Mathijs’s	speculative	claims,	this	process	need	not	oblige	retrogression	to	types,	removal	of	nuance	or	the	flattening	of	an	actor’s	more	personal-behavioural	observations.	Referential	acting	theory	colonises	the	work	of	the	thespian,	denying	their	expertise	by	presumption	of	their	naivety,	or	their	ignorance	of	broader	issues	relating	to	acting	technique	and	practice.	It	might	be	kinder	and	more	generous	to	begin	instead	from	a	presumption	of	the	worker’s	knowledge	of	their	own	craft,	accepting	that	a	majority	of	actors	might	be	entirely	aware	of	potential	stereotypes	in	the	worlds	they	present,	and	may	choose	to	work	with,	ignore,	or	subvert	them.	The	acting	in	
Parenthood	is	a	perfect	example:	a	range	of	styles	still	appear	as	part	of	the	same	diegesis,	but	simultaneously	demonstrate	a	range	of	character	acting,	with	diverse	personalities	and	behaviours	rarely	slotting	into	pre-existing	character	moulds.	For	example,	Phoenix’s	naturalism	can	sit	peaceably	alongside	Reeves’s	comic	teenager	performance	(familiar	from	the	Bill	&	Ted	movies),	and	both	manage	to	communicate	surprising	nuance.	Another	intriguing	mix	of	identities	occurs	as	many	of	the	known	actors	were	cast	against	type,	such	as	Martin	and	Rick	Moranis	(at	the	time	not	known	for	serious	roles)	and	Robards	(known	for	playing	wiser	and	more	sympathetic	figures),	whose	stagey,	classical	style	(Gehring	105)	had	to	sit	alongside	the	adept	naturalist	performances	of	actors	like	Steenburgen.		 In	the	years	prior	to	Parenthood,	dramatic	ensemble	casts	were	usually	associated	with	art	filmmakers	including	Altman	and	Sayles,	but	intergenerational	multi-cast	narratives	were	much	more	rare.	Howard,	Ganz,	Mandel	and	producer	Brian	Grazer’s	innovation	was	to	explore	the	social	network	of	four	–	and	eventually	five	–	generations	in	one	suburban	family,	
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and	in	so	doing,	survey	the	conflicting	motivations	and	desires	of	people	at	different	times	in	their	life,	as	well	as	a	matrix	of	personality	features	that	somehow	come	together	to	make	an	endlessly	problematic,	but	occasionally	rewarding	whole.	Other	multi-cast	films	that	had	looked	at	family	life	tended	to	the	histrionic,	like	The	Godfather	(Francis	Ford	Coppola,	1972),	which	of	course	focussed	on	more	severe	family	pathology,	in	particular	psychopathy	and	Machiavellianism.	Parenthood	attempted	to	equalise	the	concerns	of	all	characters	without	such	hysterical	excitations:	the	idea	was	to	capture	something	of	an	everyfamily	of	America.	This	introduces	the	problematic	of	normativity	in	the	everyday.	Having	noted	some	of	
Parenthood’s	representational	methods,	I	now	turn	to	explore	the	politics	they	are	used	to	address.			
The	Politics	of	Parenthood		Freud,	Henri	Lefebvre	and	Michel	de	Certeau	have	perhaps	most	famously	explored	the	problematic	of	the	everyday,	with	more	recent	revision	by	figures	like	Ben	Highmore	(Ordinary	Lives).	Yet	the	white	male	dominance	of	writings	on	the	supposed	“everyday”	has	been	noted	as	colonising	and	presiding	over	the	lives	of	others,	who	must	then	fit	into	an	elite	vision	of	the	everyday	and	what	it	should	mean.	Theorists	including	Ágnes	Heller	(Everyday	
Life	in	1984)	and	Laurie	Langbauer	(“Cultural	Studies	and	the	Politics	of	the	Everyday”	in	1992)	have	reclaimed	the	philosophy	of	the	everyday,	and	since	the	millennium	there	have	been	many	more	women	making	interventions	in	everyday	theory:	Rita	Felski	(“The	Invention	of	Everyday	Life”	in	2000),	Claire	Colebrook	(“The	Politics	and	Potential	of	Everyday	Life”	in	2002),	Lesley	Johnson	and	Justine	Lloyd	(Sentenced	to	Everyday	Life	in	2004)	and	Bryony	Randall	(Modernism,	Daily	Time	and	Everyday	Life	in	2007).	Christian	Karner	also	reclaimed	the	space	of	Ethnicity	and	Everyday	Life	in	2007.	Everyday	theory	has	broadened	to	challenge	and	counterbalance	some	of	the	originating	normative	presuppositions.	In	the	narrative	arts,	however,	claims	related	to	the	everyday	may	be	less	grand,	signifying	a	much	more	practical	distinction:	we	do	need	to	separate	films	depicting	extraordinary	or	supernatural	circumstances	from	attempts	to	understand	ordinary	life,	the	day-to-dayness	of	a	handful	of	people.141	One	must	be	able	to	focus	on	the	everyday	of																																																									141	It	is	important	to	note,	too,	that	this	is	not	a	description	of	genre,	realism	or	otherwise	–	many	filmmakers	focus	on	the	everyday	without	resorting	to	realist	representation	–	but	a	description	of	the	film’s	primary	subject.		
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fictional	characters	without	normalising	the	world	they	are	presenting.	In	discussing	a	film	like	Parenthood,	perhaps	it	makes	little	sense	to	turn	to	the	everyday	as	discussed	in	theory;	this	is	just	someone’s	everyday,	a	microsociology	of	personal	interactions	and	phenomenology	rather	than	an	encompassing	theoretical	narrative	of	bell-curve	normality.	In	Parenthood,	there	are	enough	deviating	lives	existing	in	the	one	family	to	complicate	any	notions	of	a	superior	or	more	“normal”	everyday.		Still,	representing	someone’s	everyday	life	on	film	is	not	without	its	problems.	Selecting	the	characters	whose	everyday	will	be	represented	clearly	has	responsibility	attached.	We	become	very	familiar	with	the	everyday	of	some	at	the	expense	of	others.	Yet	equally,	we	need	to	permit	people	to	talk	through	their	own	everyday	in	narrative,	to	reflect	upon	their	own	lives	and	perhaps	even	learn	from	the	narrativisation	of	their	quotidian	selves.	As	Howard	says	in	the	Parenthood	DVD	production	notes:	“When	the	four	of	us	started	working	on	the	direction	we	wanted	Lowell	and	Babaloo’s	script	to	go,	I	learned	a	lot	that	made	me	a	better	parent.	Given	that	there	are	15	kids	between	us,	I	think	we	all	learned	a	lot	about	ourselves”	(np).142	This	is	not	a	claim	that	the	audience	should	be	assuming	this	family	is	allegorically	representative	of	all	American	family	units,	or	a	standardised	measure	of	families	across	the	nation.	The	Buckmans	are	positioned	as	a	family,	as	normal	as	families	might	ever	get	which,	as	it	happens,	is	not	very	normal.	On	the	other	hand,	one	of	the	film’s	great	failings	is	Gil’s	complaint	that	he	is	not	earning	enough	at	his	law	firm,	where	he	is	working	overtime	for	the	chance	at	a	partner	position,	while	living	with	his	family	in	what	appears	to	be	a	lakeside	mansion	in	St.	Louis,	throwing	lavish	parties	for	their	eldest	son.	EveryAmerica	this	is	not.	Clearly	many	were	put	off	by	the	film’s	apparent	claim	to	represent	something	of	an	“ordinary”	family,	with	all	of	the	bourgeois	standardising	politics	it	implies,	leading	some	scholars	to	bundle	it	in	with	other,	more	conservative	films	of	the	1980s	(Traube	150,	for	an	example	of	an	unfavourable	psychoanalytic	reading).	Suburban	scholar	Stephen	Rowley	includes	Parenthood	in	a	list	of	films	and	television	shows	that	“show	suburbs	as	an	affluent,	happy,	sun-soaked	background	for	genial	comedies”	(113),	but	this	effectively	excises	half	of	the	film	(the	melancholy	and	messy	half).																																																										142	The	filmmakers’	initial	inspiration	for	the	story	was	a	long-haul	flight	they	took	together	with	their	kids	during	prior	production	Gung	Ho	(Ron	Howard,	1986),	which	seemed	to	throw	every	parenting	dilemma	together	into	one	contained	space,	and	quickly	spiralled	out	of	control	(Gehring	100;	Gray	Ron	Howard	140).		
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Steve	Martin’s	persona	as	a	performer	thereafter	became	somewhat	synonymous	with	this	context:	consider	the	suburban	mansions	of	Housesitter	(Frank	Oz,	1992)	and	Charles	Shyer’s	remake	of	Vincente	Minnelli's	Father	of	the	Bride	in	1991.	Reflecting	on	the	latter,	Richard	Porton	pointed	out	that:		 Martin’s	character	once	again	opens	the	film	by	extolling	the	virtues	of	his	suburban	town	-	this	time	an	upscale,	southern	Californian	town	not	far	from	Los	Angeles.	Again,	Martin	enshrines	his	white	clapboard	house,	the	site	for	a	lavish	wedding	that	is	as	retrograde	as	it	is	silly.	Despite	an	occasional	trendy	reference,	the	film	tries	its	best	to	rehabilitate	the	lily-white	suburban	myth	of	Minnelli's	film	and	sitcoms	of	the	Leave	It	to	
Beaver	variety.		(“American	Dreams”	14)		It	is	indeed	ironic	that	Martin’s	subsequent	roles	ended	up	reinforcing	some	of	the	same	chimeric	perfectionism	that	Parenthood	positions	as	an	unworkable	(and	in	many	cases	damaging)	ideal.	While	we	may	empathise	with	Gil	just	as	we	do	with	the	rest	of	the	extended	family,	the	Buckman	family’s	attempted	protection	of	uninterrupted	normative	family	narratives	is	itself	under	scrutiny,	and	the	film’s	drama	arises	from	their	initial	inability	to	admit	changes	and	challenges	to	their	envisioned	suburban-familial	perfection.143	Chicago	
Tribune	reviewer	Dave	Kehr	wrote:		 The	thesis	of	Parenthood	…	holds	that	the	current	child-rearing	generation	is	caught	in	an	unwinnable	conflict	with	the	idealized	past,	determined	to	better	their	own	parents	in	terms	of	sensitivity	and	support	while	providing	even	more	of	a	material	paradise	than	they	themselves	knew	as	kids	in	the	mythic	‘50s.		(2)		Challenges	to	normativity	and	class	presumption	are	central	to	the	conflicts	explored	throughout	the	film:	for	Gil,	the	happy,	healthy	family	as	devoid	of	any	pathology,	anxiety	or	“mess”;	for	Helen,	the	ideal	of	the	unbroken	nuclear	family,	and	especially	revision	of	her	classist	attitudes	toward	Tod;	for	Susan’s	partner	Nathan	(Moranis),	of	intellect	and	normatively	defined	achievement	milestones	as	a	measure	of	personal	worth.	Like	the	best																																																									143	Nobody	is	present	with	whom	we	have	no	empathic	relationship,	except	for	those	who	completely	reject	or	deny	consanguineous	responsibility	such	as	Garry’s	absentee	father,	and	they	are	excluded	from	the	film:	“With	cinematic	justice,	the	film	mirrors	the	father’s	absence	from	Garry’s	life	by	absenting	him	from	our	view,	never	showing	his	character	on	screen”	(Kupfer	105).	
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ensemble	works,	Parenthood	shows	characters	working	to	relinquish	these	ideals	and	resolve	moral	dilemmas	with	respect	to	the	difficult	mental	work	they	must	undertake,	examining	the	conflicts	and	social	obstructions	that	prevent	simple	moral	conclusions.		 Lorraine	Sim	makes	the	distinction	when	looking	at	later	ensemble	dramas:		 while	Short	Cuts	presents	one	of	the	most	sophisticated	instances	of	ensemble	style	and	technique,	for	all	its	formal	emphasis	on	interconnection	and	its	political	and	moral	provocations,	it	somewhat	cynically	refuses	to	work	through	the	social	and	moral	issues	it	presents	and	portrays	a	social	landscape	of	moral	apathy	and	disconnection	…	Whereas	Short	Cuts	refuses	meaningful	emotional	connection	between	characters	or	the	resolution	of	inter/personal	conflicts,	Magnolia	works	to	resolve	the	personal	and	interpersonal	crises	it	explores.		(np)		In	Parenthood,	kindness,	generativity,	altruistic	impulses	and	inclusivity	mostly	win	out	against	normative	narratives	that	may	keep	us	discontented	and	apart.	Thus	the	film	suggests	a	progress	reliant	on	our	better	natures	–	in	fact,	it	is	the	very	simplicity	of	these	interior	narratives	the	film	takes	aim	at.	Parenthood	makes	a	running	joke	of	the	way	we	internalise	procedural	scripts,	making	life	less	complex	than	it	is.	Gil’s	increasingly	cinematic	daydreams	involve	the	possibility	of	his	son	becoming	either	a	perfectly,	self-avowedly	“well-adjusted”	valedictorian	(for	which	he	takes	the	credit),	or	a	“screwed	up”	gunman	attacking	a	crowd	from	a	belltower	(blaming	his	father	for	making	him	play	second	base	in	a	Little	League	baseball	match),	a	comic	depiction	of	all-or-nothing	thinking	(sometimes	called	“dichotomous	thinking”	or	“splitting”)	in	our	ordinary	daydreams.144	While	searching	for	Kevin’s	lost	retainer	after	an	abortive	and	disastrous	family	trip	to	a	gaming	arcade,	Karen	makes	a	realist	intervention	against	Gil’s	perfectionism:	“Gil,	what’d	you	think?	That	you’d	dress	up	like	a	cowboy	and	coach	Little	League	and	Kevin	would	be	fine?”	He	admits	he	was	clouded	by	the	narrative	of	simple	progress,	and	continues,	“You	know,	when	your	kid	is	born,	they	can	still	be	perfect.	You	haven’t	made	any	mistakes	yet.	Then	they	grow	up	to	be	like—like	me.”	Yet	even	the	self-reflexivity	in	this	sentiment	demonstrates	the	possibility	for	incremental	progress.	As	we	see	by	the	end	of	the	movie,	if	Gil	cares	this	much,	he	will	put	in	the	effort																																																									144	We	might	note,	too,	that	such	dichotomous	thinking	is	correlated	with	narcissistic	personality	traits	(Oshio	736-737).	These	daydream	sequences	similarly	register	cognitive	associations	between	perfectionism,	existential	and	catastrophic	thinking	(Graham	et	al.	“The	Existential	Model	of	Perfectionism”).	
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despite	its	personal	costs	and	uncertainty,	and	some	sort	of	progress	of	demonstrative	care	will	gradually	be	made.	No	one	turns	out	emotionally	perfect.		 These	problems	point	to	some	of	the	politics	of	sentimentality	that	would	surface	in	later	suburban	ensemble	dramedies.	BBC’s	Nick	Hilditch	wrote:		 In	amongst	the	cuteness	of	Ron	Howard’s	1989	feelgood	movie	there	are	some	pretty	bleak	visions	of	parenthood	…	Howard	combines	this	multi-generational	suburban	soap	almost	effortlessly,	considering	the	number	of	parents	or	would	be	parents	we’re	expected	to	care	about	…	While	the	film	mocks	its	own	sentimentality,	it	also	believes	in	it	wholeheartedly.		(np)		In	this	case,	we	should	be	careful	to	delineate	the	objects	of	sentimentality	and	satire	within	the	film.	Parenthood	clearly	authorises	sentimental	feelings	toward	our	nearest	and	dearest,	and	family	life	in	general.	Its	satire	arises	when	that	sentimentality	is	conducted	toward	an	ideal	family	rather	than	the	complicated	and	“messy”	people	we	live	with,	or	any	specific	notion	of	what	a	family	should	be	(for	instance,	a	family	that	fails	to	accept	newcomers	like	the	multi-ethnic	Cool,	the	working	class	Tod,	or	those	struggling	with	mental	health	issues).	Even	while	we	struggle	with	issues	of	acceptance,	feelings	of	sentimentality	toward	our	family	are	still	endorsed	as	authentic,	as	the	film	respects	the	effortful	juggling	act	that	is	caregiving,	and	familial	idealism	is	presented	as	an	understandable	(yet	ineffective)	method	we	turn	to	in	order	to	simplify	expanding	responsibilities.	This	creates	an	overlap	of	sentimentality	and	satire,	drama	and	humour,	optimism	and	cynicism	that	Ganz	and	Mandel	see	as	inseparable	in	life,	and	so	attempt	to	replicate	in	their	scripts	(Schanzer	and	Wright	161).	Howard	has	echoed	these	concerns	in	interviews,	indicating	that	celebration	of	people’s	earned	achievements	can	exist	alongside	knowledge	of	the	darkness	they	simultaneously	produce:	“I'm	always	interested	in	characters	so	there’s	sort	of	a	humanism.	I’m	inclined	to	celebrate.	To	create	moments	of	honest,	earned	celebration.	I’m	not	afraid	of	the	darkness.	Of	expressing	the	darkness	that	exists	out	there”	(Idato	np).	This	humanism	of	both	abject	and	affirmation	–	a	cohesion	amongst	the	suburban	ensemble	films	–	is	borne	out	in	the	film’s	blended	affect,	which	we	will	return	to	throughout	the	reading.145																																																									145	Many	scholars	find	even	the	rendering	of	a	family’s	affective	space	on	film	a	troubling,	tyrannical	normative	sentimentality,	reaching	back	to	Foucault’s	cynicism	regarding	familial	sympathy	in	his	oft	reiterated	claim	that	“the	affective	intensification	of	the	family	space”	is	culturally	produced	and	by	extension,	we	might	presume,	somehow	inauthentic	(The	History	
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	 Finally,	Larry	presents	another	kind	of	case	study:	someone	for	whom	the	very	notion	of	having	a	family,	norms	of	office	work	and	care	for	a	dependent,	are	scripts	he	has	half-heartedly	tried	and	failed	to	conform	to.	It	is	simply	not	possible	for	Larry	to	live	the	normative	suburban	life;	as	in	many	of	the	later	suburban	ensemble	dramedies,	Parenthood	also	depicts	those	who	do	not	fit	into	the	suburban	domestic	experience.	Larry	is	one	of	the	truly	interesting	characters	in	a	study	of	normativity,	especially	as	he	introduces	the	film’s	one	black	character:	his	son	Cool.	Cool’s	presence	in	the	narrative	represents	the	agency	a	family	black	sheep	might	have	in	testing	boundaries	of	acceptability.	At	times	this	agency	might	introduce	truly	damaging	behaviour,	such	as	Larry’s	high-stakes	gambling	with	his	father’s	assets,	but	at	other	times	the	impetus	for	exploration	(like	embarrassing	his	family’s	tacit	acceptance	of	class	and	racial	segregation	in	the	suburbs)	might	open	opportunities	for	hybridity	and	positive	cultural	change.	When	we	first	meet	Larry,	Gil	notes	that	he	is	no	longer	wearing	his	turban,	signalling	Larry’s	experimentation	with	non-Christian	religious	affiliation,	but	also	his	compulsive	transience.	Like	many	others	for	whom	such	domesticity	is	inadequate,	he	cannot	stay	put;	Hulce’s	performance	of	nervous	energy	and	compulsive	fidgeting	also	communicates	something	of	his	sensation	seeking	restlessness.	Sensation	seeking	personality	traits	are	associated	with	impulsivity	(Hur	and	Bouchard	“The	Genetic	Correlation”)	and	high-risk	sexual	behaviour	(McCoul	and	Haslam	“Predicting	High	Risk	Sexual	Behaviour”),	both	of	which	match	Larry’s	conduct.	Larry	laughs	off	the	turban	jibe,	says	“yeah”	and	quickly	moves	on.	His	discomfited	response	to	Gil’s	wry	reminder	of	his	ephemeral	religio-cultural	appropriations	shows	both	self-awareness	and	wilful	amnesia	around	the	problems	his	lifestyle	inaugurates.		Larry’s	experiments	in	social	mobility	destabilise	assumed	boundaries	within	the	family	when	Cool	is	introduced.	The	name	Cool,	which	initially	introduces	a	joke	regarding	the																																																																																																																																																																																									
of	Sexuality	109),	or	“a	continually	contested	fiction	that	masks	its	own	histories	of	becoming”	(Taylor	“Foucault	and	Family	Power”	202).	Foucault’s	largely	historical	argument	about	sovereign	and	disciplinary	power	floats	a	moral	regard	(especially	in	its	homogenising	consideration	of	any	kind	of	familial	“biopower”	as	regulatory	fabrication	and	subjugation	rather	than	a	practical	need	for	guidance)	that	has	been	elaborated	by	subsequent	scholars	into	hostility	toward	a	concept	too	broadly	designated	as	“the	institution	of	family.”	I	completely	reject	the	notion	that	kindred	sympathetic	affect,	and	the	problems	it	introduces,	is	anything	other	than	organic	and	essential	not	only	to	human	flourishing,	but	our	very	evolutionary	survival.	It	is	fine	to	take	the	family	unit	seriously	on	film,	whether	that	family	is	nuclear	and	unbroken	(as	in	Susan	or	Gil’s	family),	or	otherwise	(as	in	Helen	or	Larry’s	family).	
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Buckman	family’s	embarrassment	at	the	very	impropriety	of	Larry’s	lifestyle	and	values,	also	speaks	to	how	Larry	would	like	to	see	himself:	with	an	openness	to	the	vanguard,	embracing	the	kind	of	social	change	that	characterises	the	era.	The	trend	of	progressive	hybridity	he	embraces	outside	of	the	suburbs	is	clear	in	his	reported	biracial	romance	with	an	Elvis	on	Ice	showgirl.	Cool’s	mother	is	allegedly	on	the	run	following	a	homicide	(although	this	is	never	confirmed,	and	given	Larry’s	pathological	lying,	we	have	good	reason	to	doubt	the	story).	We	see	that	a	character	such	as	Larry	is	not	completely	morally	bankrupt:	he	brings	the	wonderful	Cool	into	the	world,	and	goes	some	small	way	toward	breaking	down	barriers	between	people	of	different	backgrounds.	However,	the	film	never	glorifies	any	one	character	or	disposition.	Larry,	like	everyone,	has	positive	and	negative	effects	on	those	around	him.	In	the	end	Frank	sees	that	Larry’s	arrival,	and	the	drama	circulating	around	him,	may	have	been	in	service	of	concocting	a	reason	to	leave	his	son	behind	in	the	care	of	the	Buckmans.	Roger	Ebert	observes	that	Larry	“betrays	[Frank’s]	trust	because	what	he	really	wants	is	not	help,	but	simply	the	freedom	to	keep	on	losing”	(Rev.	of	Parenthood	np).	Larry’s	gambling	is	not	merely	a	cautionary	narrative	device.	It	points	to	the	struggles	for	self-determination	and	sovereignty	of	identity	we	all	have	with	our	families,	but	also	how	its	resistances	can	come	to	absorb	us,	and	concurrently	services	an	earnest	look	at	addiction	by	focussing	on	those	implicated,	or	on	“the	tragic	results	of	Larry’s	disease	rather	than	on	his	gambling	itself”	(Dement	101).	Larry	has	searched	for	a	sense	of	self	in	many	different	identities,	represented	by	the	breadth	of	his	experiences	in	cultures	unfamiliar	to	the	Buckman	family	–	the	turban,	the	showgirl,	the	bookies,	and	so	on.	He	is	ultimately	unable	to	adjust	his	lifestyle	to	childrearing,	a	conventionality	he	cannot	reconcile	with	a	self-exonerating	ideology	of	his	own	uniqueness,	which	is	at	times	positively	disrupting	of	normative	family	narratives,	and	at	times	clearly	irresponsible.		Larry’s	abandonment	of	his	son	has	clear	consequences,	although	Cool	expresses	relief	amidst	the	sadness	to	have	the	opportunity	to	stay	put	in	a	stable	home	environment,	and	by	the	end	of	the	film,	has	also	clearly	brought	more	love	and	warmth	into	the	lives	of	Marilyn	and	Frank.	However	the	film’s	diagnostic	rather	than	retributivist	ethic	requests	us	to	understand	Larry’s	psychology	and	circumstance	more	so	than	settling	a	moral	position	on	his	behaviour.	Larry’s	attitude	is	inherited	from	his	father:	“Frank’s	failure	to	see	Larry	for	what	he	is	springs	from	Frank	vicariously	projecting	dreams	of	fabulous	wealth	onto	him.	Larry’s	quest	for	the	big	score	is	the	result	of	Frank	feeding	him	a	diet	of	unrealistic	expectations”	(Kupfer	116).	Kupfer	draws	an	intriguing	connection	between	Larry	and	Patty	
 219	
(the	daughter	of	Susan	and	Nathan,	played	by	Ivyann	Schwan),	both	being	the	subjects	of	parental	vicarious	projection.	As	a	result,	neither	possesses	their	own	sense	of	self	(ibid.	117),	but	rather	act	out	their	parents’	fantasies	of	the	life	they	could	have	had.	Larry’s	adventurousness	is	revealed	as	an	attempt	to	live	up	to	his	father’s	favouritism,	but	at	the	same	time	escape	its	pressures	and	own	his	decisions.	Favouritism	has	not	just	compromised	the	less	favoured	children,	but	perhaps	has	an	even	more	detrimental	effect	on	the	favourite	himself,	bestowing	upon	Larry	as	it	does	an	unreachable	filial	identity	to	live	up	to,	and	distancing	him	from	his	siblings.146	Ricky	Finzi-Dottan	and	Orna	Cohen	found	in	2010,	for	example,	“that	paternal	unequal	treatment	moderates	the	link	between	narcissism	and	perception	of	sibling	warmth”	(19).	Gil	in	particular	harbours	resentment	toward	his	brother;	his	sisters	never	seemed	to	expect	favoured	treatment,	being	exempt	from	the	male	competition	encouraged	by	their	father.	Frank’s	daughters	have	responded	to	their	father’s	neglect	in	different	ways:	Helen	has	overachieved	in	defiance,	and	Susan	has	found	a	partner	exhibiting	some	of	the	authoritarian,	at	times	chauvinistic	qualities	of	her	father.	At	the	same	time,	they	appear	free	of	the	rivalries	produced	when	Frank	explicitly	compares	his	sons,	commenting	openly	on	how	they	measure	against	the	dreams	he	dispenses	of	a	better,	wealthier	life.	As	Frank	perceives	Larry	as	more	like	himself,	Larry	received	the	brunt	of	Frank’s	unrealistic	expectations	while	Gil	received	the	brunt	of	his	neglect.	Frank	does	accept	this	in	the	end.	Parental	wedge	politicking	–	playing	children	against	one	another,	engendering	sibling	rivalry	–	is	what	Frank	finally	must	confront	when	Larry	yells,	pathetically,	“I	am	not	Gil.”	This	spurs	Frank’s	epiphanous	moment:	Frank	accepts	his	own	responsibility	in	his	son’s	irresponsibility,	and	will	no	longer	bestow	an	identity	on	Larry	that	he	cannot	match.	Of	this	particular	redemption	narrative,	Gehring	writes	that	Frank	simultaneously	recognises	the	inter-dependence	of	neglected	responsibilities	to	both	his	sons:	“Frank’s	quick	action	on	[Cool’s]	behalf	is	realistic,	despite	his	spotty	past	record	as	a	dad,	since	he	finally	seems	to	recognize	his	own	metaphorical	abandonment	of	the	young	Gil”	(104).	Frank	accepts	Larry’s	plan	to	run	away	again	and	is	honest	with	Cool	about	his	father’s	impending	disappearance	from	his	life.																																																									146	It	is	not	just	that	Frank	has	indulged	Larry,	making	him	spoiled	and	irresponsible;	
Parenthood	suggests	that	in	his	(mostly	fiscal)	high	hopes	for	his	youngest	son,	Frank	has	achieved	the	very	opposite	of	the	liberation	he	had	envisaged:	he	has	restricted	meaningful,	self-determined	identity	options	for	Larry	by	putting	them	out	of	reach.	Larry’s	listlessness,	itinerancy	and	self-protective	hubris	are	testimony	to	the	unviability	of	the	identity	bestowed	upon	him	in	the	family,	and	at	worst	this	manifests	as	self-destruction.	His	identity	is	built	upon	escaping	his	identity,	and	this	is	how	addiction	comes	to	consume	him.		
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	Reactions	to	characters	like	Tod	and	Cool	show	people	moving	through	the	difficulty	of	accepting	hybridising	changes	to	their	family	culture.	Importantly,	the	film	demonstrates	trust	in	this	suburban	family’s	ability	to	shift	their	sense	of	inclusion	over	a	period	of	time.	In	1989,	such	a	hope	was	timely,	propelled	by	the	momentum	of	American	hybrid	suburbia:	at	the	time	the	film	was	made,	the	hybridisation	of	the	American	suburbs,	once	considered	a	zone	of	white	exclusivity,	was	nascent	although	the	rate	of	change	was	increasing	(Palen	132-133).147	The	focus	of	this	narrative,	however,	is	not	on	the	historical	conditions	of	such	a	change,	but	personal	psychological	challenges	to	acceptance	of	change,	and	our	concurrent	extension	of	empathy	networks.	In	a	chapter	largely	focussing	on	Parenthood’s	second	nominal	television	serial	spinoff	in	2010,148	Catherine	R.	Squire	labels	the	Frank	of	the	originating	film	“a	crotchety	old	white	guy”	whose	redemptive	narrative	arc	presents	an	endorsement	of	white	paternalism	(106).	I	think	this	would	be	a	misreading	in	a	film	in	which	adaptability	is	central,	and	that	has	so	thoroughly	deconstructed	attempts	at	a	provision	of	some	kind	of	pure	paternal	care.	If	one	of	the	key	social	competencies	explored	in	Parenthood	is	adaptability,	Cool	represents	the	need	for	a	more	political	adaptability:	the	way	black	and	hybrid	identity	must	be	a	part	of	American	visions	of	domesticity,	family	life	and	the	suburbs,	a	hope	for	a	change	that	sees	these	identities	as	less	segregated.	As	young	people	represent	the	possibility	of	change,	Cool’s	symbolism	can	also	be	seen	as	a	response	to	real	demographic	shifts	in	American	suburbia,	a	reflection	of	developing	desegregation	and	ethnic	spatial	mobility	–	in	other	words,	emergent	attempts	to	modify	the	accepted	narrative	of	exclusion	in	American	suburbia.	Cool	instead	could	present	the	precipice	of	the	vast	changes	in	ethnic	diversity	about	to	hit	the	suburbs.	Similarly	to	characters	in	later	suburban	works	such	as	Destiny	(Yara	Shahidi)	in	Butter	and	Eloise	(Jillian	Estell)	in	Black	or	White,	the	young	Cool	becomes	an	exploration	of	developing	demographic	shift,	the	inevitability	of	positive,	inclusive	change,	and	the	various	reactions	to	such	a	change.	There	is	no	opportunity	for	any	of	the	Buckmans	to	ignore,	forget	or	exclude	Cool	–	they	are	all	part	of	the	same	family,	so	adversarial	attitudes	to	race	simply	do	not	make	sense.	Cool’s	ethnicity	bursts	the	family	bubble	by	wordlessly	and																																																									147	As	we	have	already	seen,	in	later	decades	this	trend	would	sadly	reverse	toward	a	new	spatial	resegregation,	with	whites	dominating	city	centres	and	ethnic	minorities	inhabiting	less	thriving	suburbs	(Wells	et	al.	128;	Freilich	et	al.	9).	This	may	represent	something	of	a	failure	to	maintain	the	narrative	of	positive	hybridity	that	we	see	as	pivotal	in	films	like	
Parenthood,	and	a	regression	to	the	divisive	attachments	of	adversarial	identity	politics.		148	An	initial	serial	adaptation	aired	for	one	season	in	1990	and	was	disowned	by	its	creators,	including	Howard.		
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powerfully	pointing	toward	its	exclusions,	which	are	easily	forgotten	as	we	become	absorbed	in	our	own	lives.		If	we	are	to	read	Cool	purely	as	a	symbolic	character,	the	symbol	appears	to	signal	an	approach	to	hybridity:	that	relinquishing	authoritarian	paternalism	will	assist	a	kinder	and	more	inclusive	version	of	American	family	life.	Yet	the	symbolic	nature	of	Cool’s	ethnicity	is	minimised	by	the	Buckman	family,	and	so	too	by	the	film:	“Although	the	family	is	shocked	when	Larry	presents	Cool	to	them,	they	seem	to	react	more	to	the	fact	that	their	unmarried	son	has	a	child	rather	than	to	the	child’s	race	…	The	unseen	mother	is	irresponsible	not	because	she	is	African-American	but	because	she	is	a	Vegas	showgirl,	which	is	linked	to	Larry’s	equally	irresponsible	gambling	obsession”	(Thompson	Storytelling	385).	This	minimisation	of	the	importance	of	race	relations,	bundling	it	into	a	more	general	commentary	on	the	need	for	hybridity	and	adaptability,	may	be	what	critics	like	Squire	object	to,	but	the	intrinsic	inclusivity	ascribed	to	the	Buckmans	also	embodies	a	hopefulness	for	the	future	that	the	film	attempts	to	convey.	It	suggests	that	as	most	people	express	an	instinctual	goodwill	to	others	in	their	vicinity,	we	will	see	eventual	progress	if	we	can	achieve	less	spatial	segregation.	This	is	no	myth	of	a	post-racial	America	or	disavowal	of	ethnic	inequity	in	America,	but	it	does	locate	the	family	as	one	site	in	which	the	work	of	inclusivity	is	performed.		So	Frank’s	authoritarianism	is	under	critique	here	and	is	by	no	means	endorsed	by	the	film.	Like	everyone	in	Parenthood,	he	has	to	adapt	to	become	more	open	to	human	otherness.	The	film	suggests	that	it	is	precisely	those	in	a	position	of	relative	status	who	have	to	adapt,	who	have	to	share,	who	have	to	awaken	their	responsibility	to	others,	and	crucially,	in	Frank’s	narrative,	who	have	to	allow	spaces	for	new	ethnic	identities	in	the	rapidly	hybridising	suburban	spaces	they	call	home.	This	is	equally	true	of	the	gender	politics	circulating	Frank’s	subplot.	He	must	relax	his	paternalistic	egoism	to	listen	to	and	learn	from	his	wife	Marilyn,	and	especially	her	more	demonstrative	exhibitions	of	care	for	loved	ones.	On	witnessing	his	youngest	son’s	fall,	Frank	embraces	his	responsibility	to	Cool	with	more	warmth	than	any	other	character	bar	Marilyn,	who	until	this	point	has	rallied	Cool’s	father	and	grandfather	to	participate	in	his	childrearing	with	little	success.	The	voices	of	Marilyn	and	her	mother	(Helen	Shaw,	referred	to	as	Grandma)	are	two	that	are	unfairly	relegated	to	the	background	by	the	more	dominant	men	in	the	family,	yet	are	revealed	to	be	integral	to	the	family’s	health	by	the	film’s	conclusion	(Grandma’s	climactic	rollercoaster	monologue	provides	the	metaphor	that	eventually	helps	Gil	embrace	his	lack	of	control	over	the	turmoil	of	family	life).	The	film	does	
 222	
not	use	their	wisdom	merely	to	dialogise	morals	and	politics,	but	instead	focuses	upon	gendered	inhibitions	to	respecting	the	views	of	older	women.		Each	family	narrative	contains	its	own	commentary	on	gender	politics.	Hannah	Hamad,	for	example,	includes	Parenthood	in	a	list	of	“family	comedies	centred	upon	the	pitfalls	of	male	parenting	in	a	domestic	environment	with	recently	rethought	mores	regarding	domestic	division	of	labour	and	the	gender	specificity	of	parenting	roles”	(104),	and	Ganz	has	verified	that	these	concerns	informed	the	writing	process:	“Men	have	a	different	role	and	responsibility	than	they	did	in	another	time.	All	of	us	felt	that,	as	dads,	we	did	not	have	the	license,	even	if	we	were	inclined,	to	say,	‘I'm	doing	my	part	by	bringing	home	the	check’”	(Easton	5).	In	some	plots	these	re-evaluations	are	more	explicit	than	in	others,	as	with	Gil	and	Karen’s	open	conversations	regarding	work	and	parenting	responsibilities.	The	gender	components	of	other	plots,	such	as	Susan	and	Nathan’s	marriage	breakdown,	are	more	subtextual.	At	the	same	time,	a	number	of	codes	for	masculine	identities	emerge	throughout	the	picture	–	cars,	cowboys	and	baseball	–	and	each	presents	a	more	symbolic	interrogation	of	different	problematic	traits	associated	with	maleness.		Cars	are	present	in	Tod’s	drag	racing	ambitions,	Frank’s	daily	work	on	his	trophy	car,	and	Gil’s	highway	crash	scene.	Thompson	recognises	this	comparison,	but	misinterprets	its	meaning:	“Tod’s	irresponsible	obsession	with	race	cars	is	compared	with	Frank’s	devotion	to	restoring	his	own	classic	car—both	of	which	make	them	bad	husbands”	(Storytelling	249).	For	each	man,	cars	are	sites	of	negotiation	between	work	and	play,	the	right	to	a	fantasy	life	and	exploration	of	the	bounds	between	male	fantasy	and	lived	reality.	Despite	the	film’s	scrutiny	of	the	problems	embedded	in	these	male	automotive	fantasies,	the	negotiations	happening	here	do	not	make	them	“irresponsible”	or	“bad	husbands.”	They	are,	in	a	sense,	necessary	indicators	of	our	internal	life	through	which	we	discuss	our	identities.	By	the	end,	it	appears	that	most	of	the	men	in	the	narrative	had	to	transition	through	an	exploration	of	alternative	lives	they	had	imagined	in	order	to	accept	and	embrace	the	life	they	have.	Parenthood	makes	an	appeal	for	less	censoriousness	than	Thompson’s	reading	suggests;	testing	the	boundaries	of	our	fantasy	lives	can	be	productive,	as	we	learn	what	we	really	care	about	when	we	separate	the	more	fanciful	elements	in	our	fantasies	from	the	reasonable,	as	Tod	discovers	after	his	foray	into	drag	racing.	These	are	open	questions,	not	a	closed	value	judgment	on	their	worth	as	husbands:	what	are	these	“obsessions”	providing	in	their	self-identity	as	men,	and	when	are	they	truly	impinging	upon	kindred	duties?	When	are	fantasies	of	uncomplicated	
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masculinity	a	necessary	time	out,	and	when	do	they	become	avoidant	behaviour?	And	finally,	when	is	avoidance	understandable,	when	is	it	irresponsible,	and	when	do	we	assert	our	fantasies	to	obstruct	a	more	frank	negotiation	of	domestic	roles?	As	Kupfer	points	out,	
Parenthood	looks	at	caregivers	“submerging	their	identities	within	the	family	and	its	requirements.	Parents	who	are	uncritically	accepting	of	their	children	demand	too	little	for	themselves	apart	from	their	role	in	their	children’s	lives”	(Kupfer	94),	with	Gil	standing	as	a	primary	example.	It	is	difficult	to	read	the	film	as	presenting	some	sort	of	moral	barometer	measuring	how	much	each	individual	values	their	family	and	its	responsibilities.	Responsibility	is	much	more	dynamic	here:	we	do	also	have	a	duty	to	look	after	ourselves	–	our	own	ambitions	and	identities	–	and	there	are	consequences	if	we	do	not.	Some	manner	of	healthy	fantasy	comprises	a	relief	from	myopic	focus	on	family	and	its	responsibilities	that	each	group	benefits	from.			 Frank	is	perhaps	the	most	avoidant	of	all	of	Parenthood’s	fathers,	and	Thompson’s	assessment	here	is	apt:	“As	soon	as	Larry,	the	youngest,	had	left	three	years	before,	Frank	apparently	began	to	avoid	his	wife’s	company,	spending	all	his	time	fixing	up	his	beloved	car.	His	nostalgia	for	his	youth	and	especially	his	association	of	the	car	with	his	sexual	initiation	suggest	a	perpetual	immaturity”	(Storytelling	261).	For	example,	while	in	the	garage	with	Larry,	Frank	snaps	at	Marilyn	after	she	recommends	the	pair	spend	time	with	Cool.	Here	we	see	Frank’s	fantasies	of	wealth	and	male	power	as	irresponsible	and	avoidant.	Frank’s	politics	are	embedded	in	a	fantasy	–	a	life	of	hard	work	has	left	him	imagining	a	possible	world	of	leisure	that	precludes	labour,	and	he	imagines	his	favourite	son	as	having	access	to	it:	“What’s	wrong	with	getting	rich	quick?	Quick	is	the	best	way	to	get	rich!”	For	Kupfer,	Frank	embodies	grudging	acceptance,	a	disposition	lying	in	the	moral	ground	between	overzealous	and	unreflexive	parenthood:	“it	is	an	attenuated	or	truncated	variation	on	interpersonal	adaptability.	In	grudging	acceptance,	we	bemoan	our	fate	but	don’t	disown	our	responsibilities	…	it’s	as	if	the	individual	dimly	recognizes	the	value	of	interpersonal	adaptability	but	resists	the	wholehearted	effort	it	requires”	(95).	The	projection	of	Frank’s	distant	juvenile	fantasies	through	his	vintage	trophy	car	is	contrasted	with	the	younger	Tod’s	more	present	motor	sporting	ambitions.	Tod	is	put	in	a	position	whereby	he	has	to	adopt	responsibilities	he	is	ill	prepared	for	in	his	late	teens:	marriage	and	fatherhood.	Julie	figures	his	drag	racing	as	irresponsibility,	although	perhaps	if	he	did	not	explore	the	limits	of	his	motoring	fantasies,	they	would	calcify	in	a	destructive	way	like	those	of	Frank.	Tod	clearly	needs	time	to	imagine	a	number	of	different	lives	his	newfound	responsibilities	have	closed	
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off	to	him,	and	in	particular	volatile	and	risky	vocational	pathways	like	racing	cars.	His	attempts	to	have	others	listen	to	his	plea	for	time	to	explore	these	parts	of	his	identity	are	mostly	thwarted,	but	he	shows	clear	devotion	by	pushing	through	this	aversion	instead	of	resenting	his	wife	and	mother-in-law	(and	they	in	turn	show	him	similar	kindness	and	leniency	by	the	film’s	close).	Ultimately,	Tod	does	manage	to	balance	his	fantasies	with	loving	attentiveness	to	Julie	and	her	family	(especially	as	he	provides	surprisingly	insightful	counsel	to	Helen	and	Garry	regarding	Garry’s	own	developing	male	fantasies).	So	it	is	possible	to	find	a	truce	between	one’s	fantasies	and	responsibilities.			 At	certain	points	in	the	narrative,	cars	are	substituted	for	another	mode	of	transport	that	also	speaks	to	male	status:	horses.	Equine	symbols	similarly	provide	commentary	on	problematic	masculinity	and	the	traits	necessary	for	positive	parenthood.	For	example,	Thompson	observes	that	during	a	scene	in	which	Gil’s	boss	Dave	(Dennis	Dugan)	passes	him	over	for	a	promotion,	ostensibly	because	Gil’s	rival	Phil	(never	seen	onscreen)	privileges	work	over	other	responsibilities,	“Dave	seems	not	to	be	a	family	man;	the	scene	begins	with	a	shot	of	a	photo	of	him	standing	next	to	a	sleek	race	horse	which	contrasts	with	the	pony	Gil	had	ridden	while	trying	to	make	Kevin’s	birthday	party	a	success.	Another	photo	shows	Dave	by	a	race	car,	suggesting	a	parallel	with	the	irresponsible	husbands	Tod	and	Frank”	(Storytelling	273),	and	Larry	too	given	the	gambling	references	inherent	in	horse	racing.	Howard	clearly	thought	that	Dave’s	association	with	horseracing	and	competitive	modes	of	transport	was	important:	the	scene	opens	with	a	close-up	of	the	horse	photo,	and	Dave	remains	ghosted	by	the	image	in	various	angles	throughout	the	first	half	of	the	scene.	By	the	end	of	the	sequence,	Dave	has	manoeuvred	to	stand	in	front	of	another	photo	of	himself	in	which	the	horse	is	replaced	by	a	sports	car,	drawing	a	direct	parallel	between	the	two.	These	juxtapositions	of	horse	and	car,	equine	sports	and	dragster	racing,	gambling	and	gaming	stand	for	male	tendencies	to	turn	playful	or	leisure	activities	into	work	or	serious	competition,	which	is	similarly	explored	across	the	cowboy	and	baseball	motifs.		 We	have	already	seen	how	male	automotive	fantasies	come	to	be	associated	with	sex	in	Frank’s	recurring	“the	first	time	I	got	laid	was	in	a	car	like	this”	monologue	and	a	scene	in	which	the	association	of	driving	and	sexual	contact	fails	to	appeal	for	Gil:	he	crashes	the	car	when	Karen	attempts	to	relieve	his	stress	with	fellatio	(a	technique	Susan	advocates	earlier	in	the	narrative	with	reference	to	her	husband	Nathan,	establishing	that	male	fantasies	are	not	universal	but	personality-bound).	However	during	Kevin’s	party,	the	pony	Gil	co-opts	into	his	
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impromptu	comedy	routine	bridges	the	gap	between	cars,	horses	and	another	symbol	of	male	fantasy:	the	cowboy.	In	Parenthood,	the	cowboy	becomes	a	symbol	of	male	sexuality’s	relation	to	play	and	youth.	This	association	is	established	early	on	in	the	picture	when	the	Buckmans	arrive	home	from	the	opening	ball	game.	Their	youngest	son	Justin	(Zachary	Lavoy)	enters	naked	except	for	a	gun,	holster	and	cowboy	hat,	and	Gil	quips,	“hey	what	do	you	say	later,	
when	the	kids	are	asleep,	I	wear	this	outfit?”	He	will	end	up	wearing	a	cowboy	outfit	later	in	the	narrative	at	Kevin’s	party,	and	this	moment	primes	the	audience	to	consider	the	film’s	associations	between	cowboys	and	sexuality.		The	cowboy	motif	introduces	two	central	concerns	regarding	the	importance	of	play	in	sexual	loving,	and	the	proximity	of	childhood	play	to	adult	sexuality.	Confusions	between	the	sexual	world	of	the	adult,	its	vital	playfulness	(Huizinga	43)	and	the	developing	sexuality	of	dependents	remain	relatively	subtextual	in	Parenthood,	although	these	concerns	establish	thematic	ground	that	would	be	elaborated	throughout	the	millennial	suburban	ensemble	
Dave is ghosted by Dave – and a sports car 
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films,	becoming	a	primary	theme	in	pictures	like	Little	Children,	Little	Miss	Sunshine,	American	
Beauty	and	The	Oranges.	Our	confused	attempts	to	deny	any	propinquitous	relationship	between	our	sexual	values	and	the	young	people	who	are	absorbing	them	remains	an	undercurrent	throughout	the	film.	A	number	of	plot	points	make	connections	between	the	convolutions	and	shame	of	an	adult	sexual	world,	and	the	way	they	inform	children’s	development:	Cowboy	Dan	works	for	the	same	entertainment	company	as	a	stripper,	leading	to	an	administrative	error	that	sees	Cowboy	Dan	“beaten	severely”	as	male	aggression	overwhelms	its	proximate	playfulness	and	sexuality;	Gil	needs	to	“get	clients	laid”	to	achieve	promotions,	and	when	pressured	to	take	his	job	back	opines	to	his	wife,	“I	hope	you	don’t	mind	if	I	bring	a	few	prostitutes	home	honey,	cause	that’s	what	it	takes	to	get	anywhere	and	I’m	not	getting	anywhere”;	Cool’s	absentee	showgirl	mother	has	allegedly	been	involved	in	a	homicide,	and	the	story	conceptually	links	sexuality	and	crime;	Garry,	on	the	cusp	of	adulthood,	hears	the	sexualised	anger	of	his	cohabitants	and	silently	imports	its	shame	inside	the	home	when	he	smuggles	pornographic	videos	into	his	otherwise	boyish	room.		The	family	bubble	never	completely	excludes	complicating	sexual	shame,	even	while	we	try	to	model	a	happier	and	safer	world	of	healthy	sexual	respect	to	dependents.	However,	where	these	worlds	overlap,	there	is	still	the	possibility	of	deflating	its	influence	by	identifying	the	incongruity	and	silliness	of	shame:	“Kevin	uses	Gil’s	‘hubba-hubba’	phrase	on	Karen,	and	if	it	had	had	an	inappropriate	sexual	overtone	earlier,	it	now	seems	the	sort	of	childish	comment	that	Karen	takes	it	to	be”	(Thompson	Storytelling	268).	The	initial	“hubba-hubba”	exchange	is	juxtaposed	immediately	with	a	successive	scene	in	which	Frank	holds	himself	back	from	divulging	the	“first	time	I	got	laid	was	in	a	car	like	this”	story	to	a	very	young	Cool.	In	Parenthood,	this	discomforting	propinquity	is	explored	through	scenes	in	which	older	men	teach	their	dependents	conflicting	messages	about	sex.	Here,	Gil	and	Frank	are	looking	to	do	two	things:	reinforce	the	importance	of	sex	in	male	identity,	but	also	a	playful	attitude	toward	sex.	In	so	doing,	they	teach	sex	as	joyful	while	at	the	same	time	problematically	minimising	the	seriousness	of	objectification	–	so	it	matters	how	our	sexual	nonseriousness	is	directed.	A	playful	attitude	toward	sex	need	not	encompass	lenience	toward	sexual	objectification;	there	is	space	for	a	pre-emptive	deflation	of	sexual	shame	in	caregiving,	yet	parents	still	must	ask	what	gender	politics	are	being	reinforced	by	our	silence	on	relatively	serious	sexual	matters,	and	in	particular	the	minimising	function	of	male-oriented	jokes.		
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This	is	where	the	central	party	scene	requires	closer	attention	to	uncover	its	gendered	and	sexual	connotations.	Kevin’s	birthday	is	another	pivotal	family	function	in	which	the	cutaway	reaction	shot	is	integral	to	comprehending	its	relevance.	When	Gil	dresses	as	Cowboy	Gil,	his	performance	takes	a	while	to	kick	off,	and	is	initially	embarrassing	before	he	wins	the	kids	over	with	flamboyant	gallows	humour.	In	coverage	that	moves	primarily	between	Gil’s	performance	and	the	children’s	responses	(with	special	attention	to	Kevin’s	repulsion	followed	by	his	growing	delight),	the	first	cutaway	to	an	adult	shows	Karen’s	apprehension,	as	she	clearly	wants	the	best	for	her	husband,	and	features	Helen,	Susan	and	Grandma	reacting	similarly	in	the	background.	The	next	cutaway	shows	us	this	same	trio	of	women	as	the	first	to	support	Gil	by	laughing	openly.	The	third	cutaway	is	even	more	telling.	The	first	man	we	see	reacting	is	Gil’s	father	Frank,	who	raises	his	upper	lip	in	disgust	as	Marilyn	excitedly	comes	to	join	him;	his	mood	infects	hers	and	her	face	falls.	We	then	jump	forward	in	time	to	a	tracking	shot	following	a	throng	of	kids	chasing	Gil	with	water	pistols.	Adults	are	at	the	fringes:	Marilyn	and	Helen	are	seen	at	the	beginning	documenting	the	event	on	a	camera,	and	at	the	end	Nathan	is	visible	skulking	in	the	background,	annoyed	by	the	water	and	disdainfully	attempting	to	avoid	the	action.	The	remainder	focuses	on	Karen’s	(and	to	an	extent	the	other	women’s)	concerns	of	the	event	getting	out	of	hand	as	Gil,	evidently	caught	in	the	rush	of	the	performance,	attempts	increasingly	dangerous	tricks,	and	then	Karen’s	coy	delight	when	Gil	incorporates	her	into	the	performance	before	an	assemblage	of	enchanted	children.	In	fact,	the	last	time	we	see	any	male	reaction	occurs	as	Frank	runs	over,	concerned	that	Gil	might	be	hurt	after	falling	off	a	horse	(Frank’s	expression	of	care	only	emerges	in	serious	scenarios	in	which	his	progeny	are	not	thriving,	but	may	be	in	danger).		Gil’s	vulnerability	has	paid	off	and	he	is	aware	of	the	romantic	aura	afforded	him	by	the	character’s	success,	and	Karen’s	demurely	spellbound	response	seems	intrinsic	to	her	self-effacing	character.	The	key	here,	though,	is	that	the	expression	of	vulnerability	in	gender	performance	and	play	impresses	women	and	not	men.	The	adult	men	present	can	only	comprehend	Gil’s	ludic	intervention	competitively,	not	playfully,	reading	its	spontaneous	
paidia	or	unstructured	mimicry	as	intrinsically	agonistic	(c.f.	Caillois	Man,	Play,	and	Games).	This	observation	underscores	the	difficulty	we	face	in	rejecting	gender	norms	amongst	same-sex	peers	–	the	vulnerability	of	making	one’s	vulnerabilities	visible	to	those	who	see	us	as	competition,	including	father-son	antagonisms	–	yet	also	what	we	stand	to	gain	by	rising	above	the	gender	expectations	we	place	on	one	another.	Thematic	linkages	between	the	cowboy	and	sexuality	are	used	in	this	sequence	to	locate	a	male	desirability	as	Gil’s	cowboy	
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fuses	performative	playfulness,	risk-taking	and	selflessness,	and	reignites	a	sense	of	passion	and	goodwill	between	Gil	and	Karen.	Here	we	see	the	genesis	of	their	“deep,	unspoken	rapport”	(Holden	234);	they	are	both	capable	of	being	vulnerable	together,	a	manner	of	compassionate	self-sacrifice.	Gil’s	ability	to	imaginatively	project	himself	into	the	children’s	world	of	play	similarly	impresses	women	more	so	than	men.	Vulnerability	here	becomes	its	own	healthier	and	more	democratic	kind	of	power	that	is	opposed	to	the	restrictive	and	domineering	power	often	associated	with	maleness.		This	moment	is	mirrored	by	a	similar	expression	of	curative	vulnerability,	also	performed	in	front	of	children,	at	the	climax	of	Susan	and	Nathan’s	narrative	arc.	The	scene	in	which	Nathan	sings	their	wedding	song	“Close	To	You”	at	Susan’s	school	features	another	kind	of	performative	and	romantic	vulnerability	–	that	of	artless	singing.	At	Kevin’s	birthday	party,	Susan	explains	her	attraction	to	Nathan	during	a	conversation	with	Karen:	“I	was	a	little	wild,	I	was	a	little	out-of-control	and	he	kind	of	…	took	me	in	hand.	I	liked	that,	he’s	very	…	commanding.	He	got	me	into	teaching,	he	got	my	shit	together.”	The	suggestion	is	that	her	wild	youth	was	a	reaction	against	her	father’s	authoritarianism,	but	that	she	may	have	escaped	her	father’s	dominance	by	finding	another	familiar	situation	in	a	new	relationship.	As	the	pair	have	grown	together,	those	very	ideals	of	maleness	that	once	attracted	Susan	by	now	have	manifested	in	Nathan	as	a	controlling	obstinacy.	None	of	their	life	decisions	are	mutual,	and	Nathan	not	only	refuses	to	compromise,	but	also	routinely	tells	her,	“I’m	not	discussing	this	any	further.”	He	regulates	the	lives	of	his	wife	and	daughter,	including	Susan’s	reproductive	and	dietary	choices	(Traube	152),	eliminating	possibilities	for	spontaneity,	fun	or	play.	The	source	of	Susan’s	earlier	attraction	is	reversed	when	Nathan	demonstrates	his	willingness	to	renounce	these	traits	and	win	back	his	wife	after	she	leaves	him.	Where	a	young	Susan	was	enthralled	by	Nathan’s	performance	of	male	dominance	and	intellectual	power,	life	experience	and	changing	needs	have	altered	her	appetite,	and	she	is	now	attracted	to	his	performance	of	vulnerability.	Claudia	Gorbman	points	out:		Artless	singing	in	scenes	with	two	characters	most	commonly	has	as	its	mission	to	get	the	characters	together,	to	bond	them	through	song,	quite	like	the	conventional	musical	number	does	in	musicals	…	the	camerawork,	with	its	increasingly	flattering	framings	of	Nathan	and	Susan,	and	its	gliding	tracking	shots,	as	well	as	the	rhythm	of	Susan’s	spoken	punctuations	every	two	lines,	all	enhance	our	reception	of	the	scene	as	a	veritable	musical	number.	The	students	as	the	onscreen	audience	start	out	with	sceptical	looks,	
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emitting	a	realistic	level	of	diegetic	noise	and	making	disbelieving	faces;	by	the	end,	they	are	completely	enveloped	in	the	romantic	gesture	they	witness.	The	charm	of	the	scene	is	that	Nathan	does	what	heroes	in	musicals	routinely	do:	they	take	a	risk	and	proclaim	their	love	in	song.	But	in	Parenthood,	the	prosaic	setting,	the	lack	of	an	orchestra,	and	the	very	real	danger	of	failure	create	tension;	Nathan	really	is	risking	rejection	and	public	embarrassment.		(162-163)		Nathan	demonstrates	an	understanding	of	the	qualities	he	lacks:	imaginative	play	and	vulnerability,	but	also	due	deference.	The	realist	qualities	of	the	scene	reinforce	what	precisely	is	at	stake	for	him	if	he	fails.	With	an	orchestra	the	vulnerability	would	be	conceptual	only,	and	therefore	no	longer	demonstrative.	He	needs	to	make	himself	vulnerable	before	any	deference	will	be	believable,	and	before	his	request	to	rekindle	their	partnership	will	make	any	sense.	In	singing	a	song,	Nathan	has	also	chosen	to	do	something	he	is	demonstrably	bad	at,	signalling	that	he	is	willing	to	revise	his	obsession	with	control,	virtuosity	and	achievement.	Susan	has	asserted	that	Nathan	needs	to	listen	to	her	terms	in	order	to	negotiate	their	relationship,	and	Nathan	uses	a	display	of	vulnerability	to	recognise	her	needs.	After	he	accepts	the	need	for	change,	their	mutual	faith	in	one	another’s	ability	to	adapt	wins	out	over	any	underlying	narrative	of	gender	essentialism	or	normativity	that	their	relationship	may	have	been	founded	on.		
Parenthood	is	invested	in	upsetting	gender	paradigms	we	continue	to	rely	on	that	are	out	of	date	or	simply	untrue.	For	example,	the	film	subverts	notions	that	men	are	more	interested	in	sex	than	women	and	women	more	invested	in	childrearing,	as	a	majority	of	women	in	the	narrative	work	to	distract	their	spouses	from	quotidian	concerns	to	allow	a	space	for	valuing	intimacy	and	a	sex	life.	This	is	especially	true	of	Susan,	whose	husband	rebukes	her	requests	for	childless	vacations	and	time	alone	together;	Nathan	is	more	concerned	with	Patty’s	education.	Early	in	the	film	Gil	cannot	focus	on	an	intimate	encounter	with	Karen,	as	he	is	fixated	on	Kevin’s	schooling	woes.	After	a	lingering	close-up	of	an	exasperated	Karen	rolling	her	eyes,	she	ultimately	agrees	to	engage	in	a	conversation	she	knows	is	important,	but	has	replaced	the	possibility	of	an	intimate	encounter.149	Helen’s	vibrator	is	initially	introduced	in	a	comic	reveal,	after	which	the	family	variously	attempts	to	diminish	its	importance	amongst	curious	youngsters,	but	in	ensuing	scenes	its	significance	is																																																									149	In	fact,	Parenthood’s	fathers	are	seen	to	be	overly	concerned	with	childrearing	problems	–	to	a	fault.		
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revealed	as	more	serious.	The	vibrator	comes	to	be	used	between	Helen	and	Julie	to	discuss	their	attitudes	to	sex	and	each	other.	Helen	craves	intimacy,	but	her	confidence	has	been	eroded	by	her	former	husband’s	lack	of	interest;	Julie	uses	the	vibrator	to	insult	Helen’s	sexual	pride	and	this	brings	to	the	fore	a	number	of	their	conflicts,	including	Helen’s	attempt	to	stem	Julie’s	sexual	experimentation	with	Tod	by	teaching	her	the	virtues	of	continence.	Helen’s	attitude	is	in	turn	motivated	primarily	by	her	hopes	that	Julie	will	not	become	distracted	by	her	sexual	needs,	will	go	to	college,	work	hard,	and	live	up	to	her	intellectual	potential	to	become	more	like	her	mother,	whose	ethic	of	abstinence	and	resistance	has	by	now	been	bundled	into	her	self-identity	of	successful	womanhood.150	Eventually	they	will	learn	that	these	values	are	harmonious:	Helen	and	Julie	can	both	be	sexual	and	successful	and	they	need	not	be	pitted	against	one	another.	This	mirrors	attitudes	to	work	and	play	that	characterise	many	of	Parenthood’s	fathers,	and	it	is	no	coincidence	that	they	come	from	a	hardworking	single	mother:	Parenthood	strongly	suggests	that	current	work	cultures	leave	little	room	for	relaxed	relations	with	our	families,	and	that	when	work	overwhelms	play,	we	will	bring	these	attitudes	home	and	they	will	be	applied	self-defensively	to	other	relationships	in	our	lives.	In	a	way,	the	vibrator	can	also	be	seen	as	a	counterpart	to	the	cowboy	motif,	exploring	feminine	youth	and	sexuality,	seriousness	and	play.			 Susan	and	Nathan’s	subplot	focuses	more	upon	Susan’s	needs	than	Nathan’s,	but	it	is	still	Nathan	who	must	adapt	–	Susan	has	a	need	for	more	intimacy	and	more	play,	but	it	is	being	denied.	Nathan	focuses	all	his	energy	on	his	daughter,	and	“in	trying	to	turn	his	child	into	an	adult,	Nathan	is	driving	his	wife	into	childish	behaviour”	(Thompson	262).151	The	comedy	in	Nathan’s	early	scenes	exaggerates	his	over-application	of	achievement-centric	psychology,	sometimes	to	slapstick	proportions	(for	example,	he	is	slugged	by	his	daughter	during	a	martial	arts	lesson).	Thus	Nathan’s	narrative	begins	looking	like	an	argument	in	favour	of	a	child’s	need	for	noninterventionist	play.	However,	by	the	conclusion	of	his	character	arc,	we	see	that	this	more	obvious	dilemma	has	cloaked	another	for	which	he	must	take	responsibility:	the	lasting	need	for	purely	autotelic	play	(without	a	particular	end	in																																																									150	Helen’s	position	is	also	reinforced	by	unexpressed	anger	at	the	thanklessness	of	single	motherhood,	and	envy	–	these,	again,	are	the	problems	of	vicarious	projection	that	have	been	associated	with	the	film’s	fathers.	Helen	has	invested	so	much	of	her	time	and	effort	in	providing	a	specific	pathway	for	Julie	that	Julie’s	independence	is	now	deeply	threatening.		151	Presenting	demanding	parents	as	“more	infantile	than	their	children”	(Denby	79)	is	a	common	theme	in	the	intergenerational	suburban	ensemble	film	(see	in	particular	The	Kids	
Are	All	Right).		
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mind)	later	in	our	lives.	We	might	associate	the	ludic	with	children,	but	perhaps	as	adults	we	need	playfulness	even	more.	Ganz	and	Mandel	have	made	a	clear	connection	between	aptitude	for	the	relief	of	play	and	healthy	relationships,	including	–	and	perhaps	most	of	all	–intimate	partner	relationships.		 Kupfer	recognises	the	relation	between	Nathan’s	artless	singing	and	Gil’s	cowboy	performance	as	demonstrations	of	a	playful	attitude,	which	both	men	are	lacking	as	they	become	overwhelmed	by	the	seriousness	of	parenting	responsibility	(and	this	is	especially	true	of	attitudes	toward	sex	and	sexuality):		 In	the	scene	of	Nathan’s	schoolroom	singing,	Parenthood	seems	to	propose	that	playfulness,	and	leaps	of	the	imagination,	are	also	needed	to	heal	breaches	in	our	deepest	relationships.	Family	itself	cannot	survive	unless	the	spirit	of	play	informs	it.	Family	needs	play	for	jolly	times	like	Gil’s	improvised	role	as	a	cowboy	at	his	son’s	birthday	party,	as	well	as	for	such	crises	as	Susan’s	rejection	of	Nathan	and	his	martinet	style	of	rearing	Patty.		(101)		Gil’s	triumph	of	ludic	modelling	at	the	party,	however,	is	short-lived.	From	cowboys,	the	Buckman	narrative	soon	moves	back	to	baseball,	and	this	motif	is	used	to	further	explore	the	impingement	of	male	social	aggression	upon	play.	Baseball	again	symbolises	a	male	imperative	for	work	to	overwhelm	play,	turning	potentially	nonserious	gaming	into	serious	competition.	Male	play	is	associated	with	competition	through	baseball	from	the	outset.	Kupfer	recalls	the	film’s	opening	scene:	“The	baseball	context	will	also	be	replayed	in	Gil’s	son’s	life.	Kevin	will	play	ball,	not	very	playfully,	and	Gil	will	be	taking	an	active,	coaching	role,	unlike	his	handsoff	father”	(100).	However	Gil	discovers	that	improving	on	the	caregiving	role	of	his	absentee	father	is	not	as	simple	as	being	more	active	in	his	children’s	lives.	One	can	demonstrate	more	care,	be	around	more,	but	still	impart	anxiety	and	a	serious	rather	than	playful	disposition.	This	becomes	magnified	in	team	sports:	its	social	interdependences	highlight	our	physical	and	emotional	shortcomings,	signalling	them	to	others	and	compounding	existing	anxieties,	and	the	conjunctive	challenges	of	team	sports	become	instrumental	in	the	formation	of	group	identity	(Bruner	et	al.	“Interdependence	and	Social	Identity	in	Youth	Sport	Teams”).	In	other	words,	as	an	introduction	to	the	twin	social	pressures	of	unanimity	and	competition,	the	sports	pitch	is	where	young	men	learn	the	seriousness	of	play,	which	will	be	thrashed	out	later	in	their	lives.	
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	 In	the	terms	of	play	theorist	Roger	Caillois,	baseball	again	demonstrates	a	male	capacity	to	transform	the	playful	instinct	of	paidia	into	competitively	structured	agon	(27-36).	There	is	indeed	a	difference	between	Gil	and	Nathan’s	problems	with	play:	“Whereas	Gil’s	vigilance	over	his	children	is	often	exhibited	in	a	manic	playfulness,	Nathan’s	vigilance	produces	stifling	seriousness”	(Kupfer	103).	Gil	might	be	obsessed	with	play,	but	the	play	must	be	controlled,	never	dangerous,	never	open	to	darker	possibilities	–	that	is	why	the	rollercoaster	metaphor	becomes	important	to	him	at	the	end	of	the	film,	and	it	is	also	why	the	Little	League	games	are	really	about	his	own	ego.	Unfortunately	for	Kevin,	this	means	that	the	competition	on	the	pitch	follows	him	home.	He	not	only	has	to	contend	with	the	competitive	aggression	of	peers	like	Matt	(Jordan	Kessler),	learning	sports	field	bellicosity	from	his	own	father	(Clint	Howard),	but	its	extension	and	abstraction	into	the	object	of	Gil’s	own	private	competition:	“creating”	a	successful	son	in	Kevin.	Gil	is	addressing	his	child’s	and	his	own	culturally	inherited	problems	through	baseball	(Gehring	102)	but	also	“Gil’s	rage	at	his	own	inadequacy”	(Travers	np),	as	he	remains	unrealistic	about	the	extent	of	his	influence	over	Kevin’s	life	outside	of	the	home.		As	cars	are	contrasted	with	horses,	baseball	is	contrasted	with	video	games.	In	video	games,	the	opponent	is	a	machine,	and	so	when	Kevin	loses	there	are	no	social	consequences.	Gil	can	encourage	his	son	to	laugh	it	off:	“Ah	well,	they’re	bad	dudes,	that’s	why	they	call	the	game	Bad	Dudes,”	he	quips.	This	makes	the	competitiveness	of	video	gaming	more	benign:	at	the	arcade,	Gil	and	Kevin	can	easily	dismiss	failures	in	a	way	they	cannot	in	baseball,	which	carries	with	it	a	particularly	male	social	stigma	of	physical	prowess	and	the	kind	of	interdependence	that	mandates	ingroups	and	outgroups.	Similarly,	when	Gil’s	family	later	visit	an	arcade	with	Frank,	problems	arise	not	from	the	games	themselves	but	from	Frank’s	insistence	that	Kevin	stand	up	to	a	bully	with	a	show	of	force,	a	violent	demonstration	of	physical	superiority	to	reassert	his	maleness	which	to	an	extent	the	aimlessly	ludic,	socially	unthreatening	video	games	have	offered	Kevin	respite	from.	Even	Grandma	is	found	playing	Nintendo	toward	the	end	of	the	film	–	a	gag	recognising	the	intergenerational	and	less	gendered	appeal	of	video	games.152																																																									152	Although	in	1989	the	prevailing	image	of	a	gamer	may	still	have	been	the	isolated	white	male,	Parenthood	is	percipient	in	its	observation	here:	later	studies	have	revealed	that	the	gender	balance	of	video	game	players	is	roughly	equal	(“What	is	a	True	Gamer?”),	and	revised	the	association	of	gaming	culture	with	masculinity.		
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	So	in	Parenthood	cars	are	a	cypher	through	which	men	negotiate	their	work	and	class	statuses;	horses	extend	the	class	components	of	a	masculine	obsession	with	modes	of	transport;	cowboys	link	with	horses	and	speak	to	sexuality,	youth	and	play;	vibrators	offer	a	female	counterpart	in	thinking	through	the	use	of	sexual	symbols;	baseball	introduces	a	continuum	along	male	propensities	for	frivolity	and	serious	competition;	and	video	games,	meanwhile,	appear	to	relieve	the	comparative	social	competition	of	team	sports,	being	introduced	as	a	more	gender-neutral	counterpart.	These	all	function	as	motifs	with	complex	symbolic	interactions	throughout	the	narrative,	but	also	become	practical	devices	for	measuring	and	discussing	male	ambitions,	values	and	responsibilities.	One	of	the	overarching	concerns	across	these	motifs	is	the	difficulty	in	maintaining	a	sense	of	lightheartedness	and	nonseriousness	in	the	face	of	male	cultures	of	aggression	and	competition,	which	impinge	upon	our	attempts	at	modelling	healthier	attitudes	for	our	children,	and	mediate	a	fluctuating	sense	of	responsibility	to	self	and	family.	Male	fantasies	are	presented	as	one	place	where	these	issues	are	dealt	with.			
The	Ethics	of	Parenthood		These	sexual	politics	extend	to	an	open	ethical	question:	how	are	we	to	deal	with	gender	identities	in	flux?	As	Thompson	points	out,	the	six	fathers	of	the	film	are	responsible	for	a	majority	of	problems	the	Buckman	family	faces	(Storytelling	264),153	yet	trying	hard	to																																																									153	The	existential	components	of	male	self-scrutiny	have	been	a	recurring	interest	for	screenwriters	Ganz	and	Mandel	(see	in	particular	City	Slickers).	As	Kupfer	points	out,	“the	male	emphasis	is	not	laudatory,	and	it	indirectly	serves	to	highlight	Helen	as	the	most	interesting,	stalwart	parent	in	the	film.	With	the	exception	of	Larry,	all	the	parents	at	least	embark	on	moral	improvement,	but	Helen	comes	further,	more	quickly,	and	in	more	trying	circumstances	than	any	other	parent”	(104).	The	point	is	that	it	is	men	who	must	change	and	adapt	to	new	domestic	roles	in	a	world	of	unbound	gender	identities	increasingly	distant	–	and	thankfully	so	–	from	that	of	Marilyn	and	Frank.	Ganz	also	commented:	“There’s	no	question	that	the	script	is	angled	a	little	bit	more	toward	the	dad.	We	questioned	that,	but	we	felt	it	was	more	honest	to	write	from	our	point	of	view”	(Easton	5),	yet	perhaps	the	film’s	most	interesting	subject	matter	emerges	when	they	extend	such	an	introspection	into	consideration	of	others’	circumstances,	like	those	of	Helen	and	Julie.	Still,	a	central	consideration	regarding	paternal	guilt	and	failing	continues	to	lead	many	scholars	to	brand	the	film	as	one	of	the	patriarchal	narratives	of	1980s	cinema	(Coughlin	106;	McManus	22);	this	manner	of	criticism	focuses	our	analytical	work	on	subject	choice	rather	than	what	a	narrative	might	then	achieve	with	that	subject.		
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be	a	good	parent	and	partner	still	supplies	relatively	happy	outcomes	for	all:	humanistically,	it	is	the	trying	that	matters,	no	matter	what	obstacles	must	be	overcome.	Although	it	is	largely	the	men	who	need	to	adapt,	their	partners	confront	problems	of	their	own.	For	one,	the	Buckman	women	all	have	difficulty	puncturing	these	masculine	self-absorptions,	and	encouraging	their	spouses	to	own	up	to	the	inter-dependency	of	domestic	and	vocational	responsibilities.	When	Gil	quits	his	job	Karen	reveals	that	she	is	pregnant,	which	thwarts	her	plans	for	returning	to	work.	Gil	becomes	sheepishly	quiet	and	defiant	when	he	tells	her,	offhandedly,	“well	that’s	the	difference	between	men	and	women	–	women	have	choices,	men	have	responsibilities.”	She	chides	him,	telling	Gil	she	“chooses”	for	him	to	go	through	the	stresses	of	childbirth	and	early	childrearing.	Self-absorption	in	his	own	anxieties	has	made	Gil	blind	to	the	stresses	under	which	others	in	his	family	are	operating.	(Later,	while	Karen	is	sewing	a	costume	for	a	play	and	pricks	her	finger,	he	fails	to	notice	and	goes	on	divulging	his	own	woes.)	Gil	ends	the	conversation	exclaiming,	“My	whole	life	is	have	to,”	and	leaves	to	entreat	a	reluctant	Kevin,	off-screen,	to	get	ready	for	Little	League.	The	camera	remains	trained	on	a	melancholy	Karen	as	Gil	tells	Kevin:	“If	I	have	to,	you	have	to.”	While	the	film	studies	a	sad	pedagogy	of	male	competition	and	attitudes	to	labour,	it	is	chiefly	concerned	with	those	who	are	impacted	by	the	severe	and	uncompromising	family	environment	it	cultivates	–	not	just	the	children,	but	the	women	who	live	with	it,	their	strategies	for	coping	with	its	restrictions,	and	struggles	to	have	their	own	desires	heard	and	accounted	for.	Yet	as	
Time’s	Richard	Schickel	puts	it,	“Gil’s	wise	and	patient	wife	can	deal	with	the	pressure	his	anxious	idealism	generates,	but	his	eight-year-old	son	cannot”	(54).		One	of	the	problems	encountered	here	is	that	we	often	do	not	know	our	own	desires,	and	this	problem	is	especially	acute	living	in	a	climate	of	female	identity	binaries.	Chatting	with	Helen	at	Kevin’s	party,	Karen	details	the	pressure	she	feels	from	others	when	asked	if	she	is	returning	to	work:	it	is	clear	she	is	being	asked	to	pick	a	side	between	the	working	mother	and	devoted	housewife.	Helen	and	Karen	currently	occupy	these	two	roles	but	find	much	accord	between	them.	Helen	empathises	when	Karen	describes	the	pride	she	feels	in	her	work	at	home,	however	she	also	details	the	reaction	of	her	peers:	“people	make	me	feel	embarrassed	like	I	don’t	have	goals	or	something,	oh	like	I	sit	around	here	eating	bonbons	all	day,	right?”	Domestic	labour	remains	underappreciated,	but	Karen	feels	good	when	she	is	parenting,	and	at	the	same	time	feels	the	allure	of	returning	to	work	–	her	path	is	not	clear,	but	she	is	asked	to	be	sure	about	her	role.	In	these	moments	Parenthood	echoes	literature	that	recovers	legitimacy	for	the	everyday	practical	ethics	of	women’s	domesticity,	such	as	Sara	
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Ruddick’s	works	(see	“Maternal	Thinking”).	When	Gil	tells	her	to	make	these	decisions	on	her	own,	he	is	avoiding	the	negotiation	of	gender	roles	because	they	are	difficult	and,	in	his	words,	“messy.”	The	pretence	that	we	deal	with	our	own	gender-bound	issues	in	isolation	is	inherently	conflict-avoidant	(as	Gil	also	tells	Karen	regarding	the	prospect	of	abortion,	“that’s	a	decision	every	woman	has	to	make	on	her	own”),	but	also	symbolises	the	difficulty	we	have	in	owning	up	to	a	lack	of	certainty	in	what	our	collective	future	should	look	like.		Uncertainty	here	is	key:	the	first	step	in	reaching	resolutions	to	our	open	relational	problems	is	accepting	that	both	men	and	women	face	social	pressures	to	live	up	to	identities	that	do	not	match	their	experience	in	an	era	of	gender	role	negotiation.	But	crucially,	these	negotiations	have	no	clear	end	in	sight,	they	are	ongoing	and	precarious;	the	belief	that	we	can	or	should	have	consistent	clarity	and	certainty	about	our	own	needs	and	how	to	meet	them	is	revealed	as	avoidant,	or	a	way	to	skirt	conversation	and	compromise.	Ultimately,	sex	roles	are	a	way	for	the	film	to	address	one	of	its	primary	ethics:	how	to	achieve	openness	and	accept	uncertainty.		One	of	the	uncertainties	the	characters	are	asked	to	accept	is	a	foundational	moral	scepticism.	The	film	represents	a	number	of	key	ethical	tensions	with	no	specified	resolution,	which	I	will	now	turn	to	analyse:	the	tension	between	a	search	for	universal	virtues	and	the	intrinsic	relativism	of	adaptability;	the	tension	between	moral	responsibility	and	moral	hyper-responsibility;	and	the	tension	between	accepting	our	lack	of	control	over	moral	outcomes	and	admitting	our	moral	interdependence.	In	this	way,	Parenthood	covers	ambiguous	moral	ground	more	than	it	dispenses	virtues.	Parenthood	is	concerned	with	moral	self-worth	–	living	up	to	our	own	standards	of	moral	conduct	–	rather	than	refereeing	or	castigating	those	who	falter	against	the	film’s	moral	schemata	(who,	as	we	have	seen,	are	mostly	absent	from	the	action	onscreen).		In	his	chapter	on	Parenthood,	Kupfer	comprehensively	details	many	of	the	personal	qualities	the	film	presents	as	virtuous,	offering	a	moral	map	of	the	film	with	adaptability	at	the	centre.	Kupfer	recognises	that	Parenthood	is	mostly	concerned	with	moral	nuances	and	ambiguities,	yet	the	virtue	of	adaptability	remains	key	(93).	It	is	important	to	keep	in	mind,	however,	that	Parenthood	is	humanistically	notable	in	not	quite	settling	for	any	morals	without	their	complication.	It	is	not	as	didactic	as	might	be	construed	from	exclusive	focus	on	the	behaviours	and	beliefs	positioned	as	virtuous,	and	the	obstacles	of	parenting	vice.	The	film	
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more	closely	studies	the	problems	that	keep	us	from	realising	the	virtues	we	know	we	could	or	should	embody	as	parents.		
Parenthood’s	emphasis	on	virtue	ethics	might	seem	to	work	somewhat	against	trend	in	ensemble	cinema,	the	multi-focalisation	of	which	tends	to	stress	local	contingencies	or	morally	relative	differences	within	a	given	social	milieu	(Sim	np),	but	we	should	begin	by	disengaging	the	characters’	search	for	a	stable	moral	identity	from	the	film’s	endorsement	of	any	objective	virtue.	In	fact,	Parenthood’s	pivotal	philosophies	of	vulnerability	and	adaptability	are	precisely	how	it	navigates	the	problem	of	relativity:	quandaries	particular	to	each	character’s	situation	require	different	responses	and	transform	the	ethics	we	apply.	In	settling	on	adaptability	it	simultaneously	advances	a	kind	of	moral	relativism.	For	example,	Helen	conveys	a	virtue	ethic	of	women’s	career	achievement	to	Julie	but	recognises	that	in	Karen’s	circumstance	it	cannot	be	so	easily	applied;	virtues	cannot	be	universal	but	rather	should	speak	to	aptitudes,	culture	and	circumstance.154	The	qualities	each	parent	wants	for	their	children	are	reasonable	–	“Gil	tries	to	bestow	confidence,	Susan	and	Nathan	try	to	bestow	intelligence,	and	Helen	tries	to	bestow	happiness”	(Mithaug	47)	–	but	where	they	become	fixed	ethics,	they	deny	human	difference	and	social	variation.	Adaptability,	then,	is	a	kind	of	humanistic	relativism:	in	its	apprehension	of	people	as	changing,	evolving	and	dynamic,	it	admits	that	our	virtue	ethics	must	adapt	as	we	do.	In	effect,	relativity	is	the	beginning	of	the	film’s	ethical	questions	rather	than	its	ends;	given	a	kind	of	instinctual	inclusivity	and	noninterventionism	each	character	maintains	as	a	matter	of	goodwill,	how	do	we	then	succeed	or	fail	to	live	peaceably	with	one	another?	Parenthood	registers	the	domestic	procedures	of	people	living	closely,	with	different	values	and	moral	trajectories,	finding	ways	to	get	along.	Those	thrive	who	can	locate	a	moral	coping	rather	than	a	moral	perfectionism.	If	adaptability	is	the	film’s	key	virtue,	it	entails	moral	adaptability.155																																																										154	Howard	expressed	his	own	views	on	parenting	in	an	interview,	and	they	match	the	philosophy	imparted	in	the	movie:	“It's	all	kind	of	a	big	experiment.	Every	kid	is	different.	It’s	sort	of	the	chaos	theory	on	display	in	certain	ways”	(Sheridan	C1).		155	This	also	goes	to	the	heart	of	the	antihumanist	challenge:	that	is,	the	fear	that	attempts	to	locate	universal	human	morality	and	values	will	obliterate	cultural	difference.	Yet	Parenthood	presents	a	clear	example	of	how	humanism	can	register	human	similarities	and	differences	at	the	same	time.	Its	narrational	scope	–	different	lives	in	the	same	family	–	shows	the	compatibility	of	an	interest	in	human	similarity	and	difference.	Markedly	different	lifeworlds	develop	even	for	those	who	share	many	psychological	traits,	like	the	Buckmans.		
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Each	character’s	sensitivity	to	others	in	their	environment	(rather	than	rigid	principles)	eventually	leads	to	mutually	acceptable	outcomes:	no	definitive	“success”	as	they	might	have	envisioned	it,	such	as	a	perfect	child,	but	a	tempered	happiness	that	is	mutual	rather	than	individual.	Gehring	positions	this	narrative	strand	as	a	trope	of	populist	filmmaking	in	the	Capra	legacy:	“sensitivity	leads	more	to	future	sacrifice	than	to	success”	(Gehring	102).	So	one	thing	both	vulnerability	and	adaptability	allow	us	to	do	is	focus	on	the	needs	of	others.	Attentiveness	to	the	needs	of	others	supports	the	reciprocal	health	not	just	of	our	intimate	social	spheres,	but	is	also	as	essential	for	our	own	mental	health.	We	have	long	known	that	when	we	altruistically	address	the	needs	of	others,	we	also	feel	better	about	ourselves	(Dunn	et	al.	“Prosocial	Spending	and	Happinesss”),	and	this	is	equally	true	at	a	more	personal	(Post	“Altruism,	happiness,	and	health”)	and	familial	level	(Schwarze	and	Winkelmann	“Happiness	and	Altruism	within	the	Extended	Family”).	Happiness	is	collective,	whether	giving	is	public	or	private.	At	the	same	time,	though,	researchers	such	as	Carolyn	Schwartz	have	found	that	“feeling	overwhelmed	by	others’	demands	had	a	stronger	negative	relationship	with	mental	health	than	helping	others	had	a	positive	one”	(Schwartz	et	al.	783).	These	are	the	liabilities	of	hyper-attentiveness	and	hyper-responsibility.	Attentiveness	to	a	particular	family	member	–	usually	a	child	–	can	calcify	into	hyper-responsibility:	“In	its	portrayal	of	Gil,	the	film	suggests	that	parents	who	felt	neglected	as	children	may	compensate	by	becoming	hyper-responsible	for	the	well-being	of	their	own	children”	(Kupfer	96).	Hyper-attentiveness	reveals	conflicting	levels	of	responsibility	in	time-poor	social	structures	–	to	spouse,	progeny,	workplace	and	self.	In	systems	that	make	these	conflicting	commitments	impossible	to	manage,	we	are	asked	to	choose	between	our	moral	commitments	to	others.	For	example,	when	we	are	asked	to	stay	back	at	work,	we	then	have	to	choose	who	will	most	benefit	from	the	limited	time	we	are	able	to	spend	with	family,	but	this	in	turn	affects	other	relationships,	usually	adversely:	“In	general,	the	narrative	strongly	suggests	that	being	a	good	parent	necessitates	being	a	good	spouse”	(Thompson	Storytelling	258).	To	avoid	addressing	these	problems,	we	might	become	distracted	by	hyper-responsibility	extended	toward	a	particular	member	of	the	family.		Hyper-responsibility	clouds	a	realistic	notion	of	our	limited	effect	on	others.	When	we	fixate	on	our	obligations	to	an	individual,	we	might	conceive	of	their	wellbeing	(or	ailments)	as	causally	determined	by	our	sole	influence,	distorting	the	humility	of	altruism	into	the	solipsism	of	hyper-responsibility:		
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Gil’s	hyper-responsibility	for	his	son’s	happiness	masks,	but	nevertheless	manifests,	a	lack	of	humility	in	that	Gil	falsely	believes	that	he	can	make	Kevin	happy.	Helen,	on	the	other	hand,	struggles	with	the	conflict	between	trying	to	protect	her	teenage	daughter,	Julie,	and	accepting	the	limits	of	her	control	over	Julie’s	life.	Only	when	Helen	is	able	to	realize	parental	humility	is	she	able	to	plumb	her	considerable	resources	for	interpersonal	adaptability	and	actually	help	Julie.		(Kupfer	97)156		The	reduction	of	one’s	field	of	moral	responsibility	to	immediate	family	and	household	members	is	one	of	the	moral	minimalisms	associated	with	suburban	isolationism,	and	the	social	divisions	(fences,	walls	and	hedges)	of	medium-density	living	(Baumgartner	132).	Similarly,	Nathan	maintains	a	myth	that	he	can	preserve	sole	influence	over	the	women	in	his	life	and	the	paths	they	will	take,	and	like	his	avoidance	of	open-ended	play,	the	myth	couches	him	from	any	dialogous	acknowledgement	of	complications	he	and	Susan	face	in	raising	Patty	(although	sometimes	he	lectures	others	on	best	parenting	practices).	This	is	another	gender	politics	the	film	recognises,	as	Thompson	writes,	“Karen	has	heart-to-heart	chats	with	both	her	sisters-in-law,	while	Helen	talks	with	Julie	and	Susan	…	In	contrast,	the	men	seldom	talk	among	themselves	[about	parenthood],	and	Nathan	angrily	refuses	to	discuss	the	issue	of	a	second	child	with	Susan”	(Thompson	Storytelling	270).	The	difference	here	is	that	women	are	regularly	seen	to	be	discussing	the	difficulties	and	uncertainties	of	childrearing,	while	when	the	men	discuss	parenthood,	they	are	less	comfortable	admitting	emotional	problems	and	so	tend	toward	conveying	ideological	statements	that	disavow	contradictions,	confusions	and	the	unstable	future	thinking	that	all	parenting	decisions	rely	upon.	Research	suggests	that	these	gendered	differences	in	family	narrative	construction	are	often	transmitted	to	our	progeny,	too:	in	reminiscence,	adult	women	favour	relational	(Fivush	et	al.	“Personal	and	Intergenerational	Narratives”)	and	emotional	information	(Bauer	et	al.	“Representation	of	the	Inner	Self	in	Autobiography”)	while	their	male	counterparts	tend	to	emphasise	strength	of	achievement	and	themes	of	personal	autonomy	(Fiese	and	Skillman	“Gender	Differences	in	Family	Stories”).	By	the	end	of	the	narrative	most	of	the	film’s	fathers	have	learned	to	accept																																																									156	Ironically	Gil	is	also	passing	this	same	attitude	onto	Kevin.	Consequently	his	daughter	Taylor	and	youngest	son	Justin	are	more	free	and	impulsive,	and	have	more	of	a	rapport,	as	his	fixation	on	Kevin	relieves	them	of	his	anxious	attention.	Their	bond	is	evident	in	the	film’s	climactic	sequence,	in	which	Justin	fails	to	recognise	the	fiction	of	a	school	play	and	yells,	“they’re	hurting	my	sister,”	before	running	onstage	to	fend	off	her	assailants.	Toward	the	end	of	the	scene,	despite	the	calamity,	we	see	Taylor	embrace	Justin	onstage	–	the	camaraderie	makes	more	sense	to	her	than	any	deference	to	the	schoolteachers	attempting	to	restore	order.		
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some	of	the	“mess”	of	life	that	challenges	their	dogma,	but	to	do	so	they	needed	the	humility	of	listening	to	alternative	views	proposed	by	their	partners.			 When	Nathan	forfeits	the	intellectual	control	of	relational	dogma	in	favour	of	vulnerability,	it	becomes	possible	for	him	to	admit	that	there	is	no	ethical	principle	–	not	even	adaptability	–	that	will	stop	us	from	encountering	new	and	unfamiliar	problems,	or	totally	end	all	of	our	woes.	A	humanism	of	existential	management	applies:	we	must	accept	that	human	complexity	and	dynamism	will	always	be	beyond	our	grasp,	and	so	we	will	never	have	the	silver	bullet	to	end	our	problems.	The	vulnerability	of	moral	scepticism	entails	honesty	about	our	epistemic	and	imaginative	fallibility	–	just	as	we	cannot	see	at	once	all	meaningful	human	and	social	causalities,	nor	can	we	always	predict	what	new	challenges	our	progeny	or	significant	others	will	face.	Dogma	presumes	that	we	can;	vulnerability	and	openness	know	that	we	cannot.	So	admitting	some	lack	of	control	over	the	personality	and	wellbeing	of	dependents	and	spouses	is	a	vulnerability	that	has	practical	effects	on	the	lives	of	our	family	members.		 Kupfer	points	out	that	where	the	effect	parents	have	on	their	children	is	the	subject	of	much	study	and	analysis,	Parenthood	instead	addresses	the	dialectic	interplay	of	childrearing,	considering	how	parents	and	children	affect	one	another,	often	emphasising	the	way	children	might	impact	upon	the	moral	character	of	their	parents	(91).	We	have	seen	how	admitting	social	interdependency	buttresses	any	realistic	response	to	open	moral	questions	such	as	gender	role	negotiation,	and	this	ethic	is	equally	reflected	in	the	film’s	structure.	Balancing	all	of	these	characters’	perspectives	requires	the	spectator	to	move	their	moral	attention	from	individual	virtue	to	broader	social-causal	structures,	and	thus	the	spectator	is	asked	to	go	through	the	same	process	of	ethical	sense-making	across	large	networks	as	the	characters	who	are	immersed	in	its	convolutions.	Thompson	notes,	for	example,	that,	“Gil’s	initial	criticisms	of	Frank	resonate	through	all	four	of	the	plotlines	and	cue	us	to	speculate	about	why	each	of	Frank’s	offspring	turned	out	so	differently”	(Storytelling	251).	This	is	typical	of	a	kind	of	rippling	effect	of	moral	behaviours	and	consequences	discernible	across	the	various	narratives.	Parenthood’s	structure	models	a	close	attention	to	the	details	of	human	striving	in	individual	domestic	settings,	and	within	the	social	politics	we	see	in	reaction	cutaway	shots,	the	art	direction	of	personal	and	common	spaces,	and	edits	between	narrative	strands	that	bear	witness	to	social	contagion.	At	the	same	time,	we	are	seeing	characters	lost	within	its	causal	dispersions	and	ethical	diffusion,	struggling	to	achieve	clarity,	or	a	mutual	
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understanding	of	ethical	causality	that	is	communicable,	and	which	we	need	to	begin	any	work	of	conflict	resolution.	In	this	way,	the	film	demonstrates	the	difficulty	of	achieving	equilibrium	between	individual	and	social	concerns:	we	must	balance	close	listening	to	the	needs	of	intimate	others	with	a	more	broad-minded	attention	to	inevitable	changes	in	culture	and	circumstances	that	produce	a	complex	social	multi-causality,	and	thus	a	complex	(and	confounding)	network	of	ethical	co-responsibilities.	This	is	sublimely	difficult,	and	we	should	not	admonish	those	who	struggle	with	or	fail	to	live	up	to	these	incredible	demands	–	this	is	the	generosity	and	openness	of	humanism,	in	that	it	values	striving	toward	these	ideals	rather	than	their	completion,	or	their	use	in	judging	another’s	moral	character.		Grandma,	the	eldest	character	in	the	film,	possesses	all	of	these	qualities	and	introduces	another	structural	element	that	the	film	works	with:	she	unites	everyone	almost	imperceptibly.	She	is	roundly	ignored	by	her	family	most	of	the	time	despite	possessing	insight	and	perspective	that	would	be	able	to	help	them	better	understand	their	own	situations	and	their	own	foibles.	Her	perspective	is	regularly	dismissed	or	forgotten	on	the	grounds	of	her	gender	and	age.157	Hence	she	is,	as	she	tells	us	comically,	“shrinking.”	Ferried	between	homes	and	making	wry	or	non-sequitur	comments	on	the	unfolding	drama,	generally	cheerful	and	playful	with	an	appetite	for	Nintendos	and	rollercoasters,	she	is	the	one	who	offers	the	metaphor	that	finally	helps	Gil	order	his	own	trials	into	a	meaningful,	and	therefore	surmountable,	problem.	As	Kupfer	notes,	“The	film	keeps	Grandma’s	parable	from	assuming	biblical	proportions	by	being	as	playful	with	her	as	she	is	in	her	life.	Gil	asks	an	off-screen	Karen,	‘If	she’s	so	brilliant,	how	come	she’s	sitting	in	our	neighbor’s	car?’”(115).	Gehring	also	commented	that	this	moment	minimises	the	sentimentality	of	the	anecdote	(105).	Other	invisible	positive	influences	Grandma	has	on	her	grandchildren	are	evident	in	casual	comments	that	are	easy	to	miss,	such	as	Helen	offhandedly	remarking	that	Grandma	recommended	George	Bowman	(Paul	Linke)	to	her	as	a	suitable	date.	Howard	biographer	Beverly	Gray	suggested	that	the	character	was	somewhat	modelled	on	the	director’s	mother	Jean,	whose	health	was	in	decline	during	filming	(Ron	Howard	145-146).	The	theme	of	Grandma’s	invisible	virtue	is	echoed	in	Howard’s	reflections	on	the	time	he	spent	with	Jean	following	her	heart	bypass	surgery:	“It	was	very	moving	for	me	when	I	saw	her	face	these	things	with	the	kind	of	courage	and	commitment	to	life	that	I	didn’t	know	she	had”	(ibid.	146).																																																										157	Frank	and	Gil	both	express	contempt	for	Grandma	when	she	speaks	up	at	various	points	in	the	narrative,	and	Nathan	speaks	of	a	positive	“multi-generational	influence”	while	condescending	Grandma	and	mandating	the	specific	influence	she	will	have	on	Patty.	
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Grandma	keeps	moving	to	stay	with	each	family	throughout	the	narrative,	but	her	movements	are	such	subtle	narrative	events	that	Thompson	believes	“most	spectators	probably	do	not	notice	this	motif”	(Storytelling	258).	This	barely	perceptible	narrative	thread	serves	the	theme	of	the	invisibility	not	just	of	Grandma’s	generation	or	the	cause	and	effect	of	caregiving	in	family	networks,	but	also	of	her	calm	and	noninterventionist	wisdom.	Grandma	knows	her	wisdom	is	largely	invisible,	but	also	appears	to	understand	that	the	rest	of	the	family	have	to	live	through	their	own	trials.	Closer	intergenerational	listening	might	help	unravel	each	character’s	psychological	and	ethical	dilemmas,	but	this	is	something	they	have	to	decide	to	do.	Ironically,	it	is	her	quiet	acceptance	of	messy	circumstances	that	keeps	her	from	being	heard	much	of	the	time,	yet	this	is	also	what	keeps	calmer	perspectives	like	hers	lacking,	as	the	most	anxious	voices	remain	the	loudest	in	the	family.	Grandma’s	noninterventionism	points	quietly	to	some	of	the	ethics	embedded	in	Parenthood.		
Parenthood	makes	the	case	for	a	number	of	ethical	positions	that	seem	to	be	applicable	across	a	multiplicity	of	domestic	circumstances,	but	then	puts	them	into	conflict:	adaptability	and	openness	to	change,	vulnerability	and	attentiveness	to	the	needs	of	others,	acknowledgement	of	moral	inter-dependence	rather	than	sole	responsibility,	and	nurturing	a	perspective	of	nonseriousness	in	the	face	of	these	most	serious	internal	undertakings.	
Parenthood	does	not	so	much	build	a	case	for	these	virtues,	it	instead	starts	from	their	presumed	knowledge	and	progresses	to	other	problems:	how	do	they	clash,	how	are	we	impeded	from	living	up	to	these	virtues,	and	how	do	we	affect	one	another’s	expression	of	them?	Ultimately	the	film	is	less	concerned	with	proselytisation	than	with	understanding	the	social	and	psychological	impediments	we	face	as	we	try	to	live	up	to	that	better	and	more	virtuous	version	of	ourselves,	weighing	heavily	upon	our	minds	as	we	proceed	through	our	daily	trials.			
The	Psychology	of	Parenthood		 Later	in	the	film,	when	Larry	has	revealed	that	his	gambling	debts	put	him	in	mortal	danger,	Frank	approaches	Gil	for	advice.	Frank	will	need	to	use	his	retirement	fund	to	help	Larry.	Gil	is	initially	shocked	that	Frank	would	ask	for	his	counsel,	but	Frank	tells	Gil,	“I	know	you	think	I	was	a	shitty	father	…	and	I	know	you’re	a	good	father.”	Gil	does	possess	many	of	the	virtues	positioned	as	vital	to	childrearing,	and	at	this	point	he	demonstrates	another	
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quality:	he	empathically	listens	to	his	father	despite	their	ongoing	disputes,	and	allows	Frank	to	come	to	his	own	solution	instead	of	intervening	with	moral	certainties.	Afterward	Gil	opines,	“Who’s	to	say	who’s	a	shitty	father?”	He	lists	some	of	his	own	woes	back	to	Frank,	and	the	tables	are	suddenly	reversed.	Frank	reveals	one	of	his	strengths,	his	own	resilience,	when	he	tells	Gil,	“You	worry	too	much	–	always	did.”	We	can	possess	all	the	virtue	in	the	world	and	still	struggle	with	ourselves	and	our	responsibilities	to	loved	ones.		So	if	the	film’s	virtue	ethics	are	not	its	end	point	or	its	answer	to	the	problems	of	parenthood,	and	if	it	presents	moral	idealism	as	inherently	fallible,	what	solutions	does	
Parenthood	arrive	at	for	conflict	resolution	in	family	contexts,	and	how	are	practical	interpersonal	ethics	resolved?	Even	if	we	accept	the	film’s	ethic	of	adaptability,	immediate	family	groups	must	still	develop	methodologies	to	actually	address	their	respective	problems	internally.	In	Parenthood,	conflict	resolution	appears	to	occur	when	characters	are	able	to	recognise	and	work	through	their	own	psychological	difficulties.	It	is	not	so	much	differences	of	opinion	that	create	conflicts	in	Parenthood;	it	is	interior	issues	that	cloud	our	will	to	compromise,	and	let	loved	ones	lead	their	own	lives.	I	turn	now	to	look	at	how	Parenthood	manages	a	resolution	to	its	psychological	issues.		Many	of	the	film’s	primary	psychological	problems	are	explored	through	Gil:	excessive	and	obsessive	worrying,	all-or-nothing	thinking,	dysfunctional	perfectionism	and	feeling	overwhelmed.	A	range	of	other	problems	attach	to	the	rest	of	the	characters,	for	example	Garry’s	sexual	shame,	Nathan’s	excessive	seriousness	and	dogma,	Frank’s	resentfulness,	Larry’s	addictions,	Helen’s	defensive	anger	and	need	for	control,	qualities	that	Julie	is	by	turn	translating	into	her	own	relationship.	Addressing	these	interior	matters	is	the	film’s	principle	method	for	resolving	conflicts	with	spouses	and	family	members.	The	will	to	compromise	is	simply	crowded	by	caustic	thought	processes	–	much	as	in	cognitive	behavioural	therapy,	when	we	challenge	those	thoughts,	the	need	to	uphold	conflict	dissipates	and	compromises	are	much	less	effortful.	The	film	focuses	on	these	impediments	as	a	barrier	to	realising	our	more	generous	and	virtuous	selves.	We	have	seen	that	the	politics	of	Parenthood	largely	focus	on	those	in	positions	of	relative	control	who	must	adapt	to	include	the	needs	of	others;	the	film	dissects	pressures,	internal	and	external,	that	keep	us	from	adapting.		Meanwhile,	in	the	scene	of	Frank	and	Gil’s	tentative	reconciliation,	Frank	speaks	of	his	aversion	to	the	pains	of	parental	sympathy	and	his	realisation	that	the	affective	work	of	
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parenthood	never	ends	–	even	at	sixty-four,	he	keeps	caring,	he	keeps	assisting,	despite	identifying	with	neither	of	these	qualities.	In	his	own	words,	“you	never	cross	the	goal	lines,	spike	the	ball	and	do	your	touchdown,	never.”	Sheila	Benson	wrote	of	this	line:	“How	many	sighs	will	float	through	the	audience	at	that	moment,	validating	a	sentiment	that	seems	to	come	from	one	parent’s	very	corpuscles”	(np).	Indeed,	the	audience	is	able	to	experience	the	validation	both	men	enjoy	on	co-authoring	a	narrative	of	their	parenting	trials,	and	if	they	are	parents	themselves,	their	own	validation	of	an	anxiety	vocalised	that	we	are	rarely	comfortable	broadcasting	outside	of	fiction.	Much	of	the	research	on	family	narratives	and	intergenerational	perspective	taking	looks	at	a	process	of	values	induction	during	childhood	and	adolescence	(Fivush	et	al.	“Personal	and	Intergenerational	Narratives”),	but	this	scene	shows	the	benefits	of	intergenerational	perspective	taking	as	they	progress	later	into	life.	Both	men	are	enriched	as	they	push	through	their	inhibitions	to	share	some	of	their	private	trials	that	go	on	to	form	a	more	complex	(and	thereby	more	robust	and	generous)	causal	and	moral	family	narrative.	Fivush	et	al.	stress	the	benefits	of	an	inclusive	and	transactional	family	history,	and	they	posit	that	wellbeing	arises,	“perhaps	because	these	stories	provide	larger	narrative	frameworks	for	understanding	self	and	the	world,	and	because	these	stories	help	provide	a	sense	of	continuity	across	generations	in	ways	that	promote	a	secure	identity”	(ibid.	50).	Families	can	co-author	notions	of	complex	multi-causality,	and	this	is	how	a	more	realistically	considerate	morality	comes	to	be	embedded	in	the	family	narrative.	But	again,	the	film	will	not	let	this	moment	be	uncomplicatedly	positive.	Frank	still	transmits	some	anxiety	back	to	Gil,	and	lets	slip	a	remark	that	he	“never	should	have	had	four”	children.	He	does	not	know	that	Gil	is	currently	discussing	this	very	prospect	with	Karen,	and	his	remark	connects	directly	to	Gil’s	own	insecurities.	Using	a	sporting	analogy,	Frank	also	holds	onto	his	self-defeating	rhetoric	of	winners	and	losers	in	parenthood	(Novak	17)	even	as	he	enjoys	the	bonding	catharsis	of	co-confession	with	Gil.		This	kind	of	values	contagion	across	family	narratives	and	networks	points	to	the	connection	between	ethics	and	affect.	Our	ethical	standards	and	projections	are	inextricable	from	the	emotions	that	mediate	them	(Haidt	The	Righteous	Mind),	and	our	emotions	will	inform	any	attempts	to	live	up	to	the	morals	we	distribute	amongst	the	family.	Some	of	them	pass	subliminally,	like	Frank’s	extemporaneous	“fourth	child”	remark	to	Gil.	On	the	other	hand,	when	expressions	of	care	exhausted	a	younger	Frank	to	the	point	of	resentment	and	avoidance,	Frank	became	part	of	a	family	narrative	as	the	“shitty	father”	and	to	an	extent	lived	up	to	the	moral	identity	it	bestowed	–	but	he	also	has	the	opportunity	of	challenging	it.	Family	
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narratives	bestow	moral	statuses	that	can	be	negative,	and	we	can	live	up	to	or	match	that	negative	appraisal	(conferring	again	something	of	a	golem	effect,	the	damaging	adverse	of	the	Pygmalion	effect),	and	at	the	same	time	derive	from	those	narratives	the	comforts	of	identity	consistency.	Identifying	our	agency	for	identity	change	within	these	structures	is	a	demanding	task.	The	stresses	of	achieving	clarity	in	such	environments	can	give	rise	to	generalised	anxiety,	and	in	order	to	cope	we	might	turn	to	dogmatic	principles,	all-or-nothing	thinking,	or	perfectionism	simply	because	they	appear	to	obliterate	such	challenges.	Yet	in	their	unrealistic	reduction	of	complexity,	they	only	compound	our	problems	every	time	they	rub	against	a	more	“messy”	reality.	They	can	therefore	be	thought	of	as	defective	coping	mechanisms.		As	I	have	suggested	throughout	this	chapter,	one	of	the	most	effective	coping	mechanisms	employed	by	the	characters	of	Parenthood	is	a	sense	of	humour,	which	helps	us	to	keep	perspective	in	the	face	of	overwhelming	familial	drama,	but	it	is	worth	considering	how	the	film	itself	embodies	humour	as	a	coping	mechanism.	One	of	Parenthood’s	most	striking	structural	components	is	a	refusal	to	separate	its	own	gags,	play	and	emotional	release	from	its	probing	moral-psychological	questions:	“Within	its	humorous	incidents	and	dialogue,	Parenthood	manages	to	cover	a	great	deal	of	moral	ground”	(Kupfer	92).	So	morals	are	embedded	in	the	film’s	humour	and	humour	is	embedded	in	the	film’s	depiction	of	moral	quandaries.	As	in	later	suburban	ensemble	dramedies,	satire	mediates	sentimentality	and	vice	versa	to	achieve	an	affective	realism:	“Parenthood,	heartfelt	and	howlingly	comic,	also	comes	spiced	with	risk	and	mischief.	Just	when	you	fear	the	movie	might	be	swept	away	on	a	tidal	wave	of	wholesomeness,	a	line,	a	scene	or	a	performance	pokes	through	to	restore	messy,	perverse	reality”	(Travers	np).	Humour	here	is	not	just	a	coping	mechanism	to	deal	with	harsh	realities,	but	a	reminder	of	the	dimensionality	of	our	problems	so	that	we	do	not	fall	prey	to	the	reductions	of	sentiment.		So	the	humour	of	Parenthood	has	a	satirical	component,	too.	Various	commentators	have	claimed	the	object	of	Parenthood’s	satire	as	both	out-of-date	normative	family	structures,	and	new	family	structures	that	respond	to	changing	domestic	circumstances.	Wendy	Kline	wrote	that,	“movies	and	television	series	of	the	late	1980s	and	1990s	suggested	that	the	breakdown	of	the	modern	nuclear	family	is	to	be	laughed	at	as	much	as	mourned”	(157),	including	Parenthood	as	a	primary	example,	while	Angela	McRobbie	found	that,	“Parenthood	doesn’t	try	to	role	[sic]	back	the	carpet.	Instead	it	pokes	gentle	fun	at	these	new	
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combinations	and	suggests	that,	for	the	good	of	the	child,	we	adults	lower	our	expectations”	(McRobbie	44).	The	film	does	not	request	or	enforce	normative	family	structures,	but	promotes	adaptability	to	what	Kenneth	MacKinnon	(205)	and	McRobbie	refer	to	as	“new	combinations.”	Parenthood	is	interested	in	the	ways	we	might	come	to	accept	and	embrace	such	changes	instead	of	maintaining	an	elite	vision	of	what	our	families	can	be.	It	suggests	that	dogma	and	militancy	are	less	likely	candidates	for	developing	familial	inclusion	than	a	lighthearted	disposition	and	a	liberally	applied,	playful	humanistic	empathy.	Militancy,	the	film	suggests,	is	anathema	to	openness,	and	so	will	not	provide	the	same	reciprocally	beneficial	results	(including	in	gender	relations)	as	open-minded	listening.	It	also	causes	us	to	miss	opportunities	for	change,	as	dogma	is	static	and	fixed,	training	us	to	see	circumstances	as	uniform	rather	than	dynamic.	Lowering	our	expectations	for	a	direct	and	directly	visible	impact	on	others’	lives	(a	narcissism	of	distilled	causality)	need	not	preclude	our	fight	for	gender	equality,	it	just	reframes	the	question	to	ask	how	this	is	achievable	within	the	scope	of	our	everyday	lives.	This	applies	to	everyone:	“When	Kevin	doesn’t	immediately	shape	up,	Gil	goes	stiff	with	disappointment,	as	if	every	effort	he	makes	should	instantly	be	answered	by	an	improvement	in	the	kid’s	mood”	(Denby	79).	In	a	way,	one	of	the	primary	targets	of	satire	is	the	narcissism	of	dogma	that	requires	current	and	visible	representations	of	power	over	our	circumstances	rather	than	faith	in	the	incremental	change	of	striving	to	do	the	best	by	our	loved	ones.		In	interviews,	Ganz	and	Mandel	have	reflected	on	the	fine	line	between	comedy	and	drama	both	in	their	personal	lives,	and	in	their	writing	work.	A	scene	written	as	a	drama	could	easily	be	tweaked	to	play	as	a	comedy,	and	vice	versa	(Schanzer	and	Wright	161).	They	conceive	of	the	overlapping	functions	of	narrative	drama	and	comedy	as	a	product	of	honest	reflection	on	the	way	these	things	are	also	indivisible	in	life.	Says	Ganz:		
Parenthood	has	several	scenes	that	have	no	comedy	in	them,	none	whatsoever,	and	several	other	scenes	that	could	just	as	easily	stand	up	as	valid	structural	scenes	with	no	comedy	in	them.	You	know,	if	you’re	talking	to	us	about	our	families	…	we’ll	talk	seriously.	But	comedy	is	very	much	part	of	life.	Whether	you	like	the	style	or	not,	it’s	very	honest.		(ibid.)		Reviewers	were	able	to	see	how	the	film	used	these	affective	structural	qualities	as	part	of	its	commentary	on	life’s	“mess.”	Jonathan	Rosenbaum	wrote:	
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	 The	complex	mix	of	comedy	and	seriousness	in	its	treatment	of	the	pitfalls	of	parenthood	steadily	grows	in	feeling	and	power.	The	movie	may	wind	up	being	as	messy	as	it	argues	that	family	life	is,	but	it	commands	admiration	and	respect.		(Rosenbaum	np).		Likewise,	Roger	Ebert	labelled	the	movie,	“a	delicate	balancing	act	between	comedy	and	truth	…	where	we	eventually	acknowledge	that	there	is	a	truth	in	comedy	that	serious	drama	never	can	quite	reach	…	each	hides	in	the	other	so	successfully”	(Rev.	of	Parenthood	np).	But	we	can	ask	here:	what	about	humour’s	potential	misuse?	What	about	minimising	a	conflict	to	avoid	it,	or	to	tell	another	loved	one	that	their	concerns	are	less	serious	than	our	own?	At	times,	Gil	uses	humour	as	a	deflective	device	to	avoid	dealing	with	Karen’s	concerns	(about	their	division	of	labour,	or	whether	she	should	have	an	abortion).	There	is	some	manner	of	affective	responsibility	at	work	here.	Thompson	agrees	that,	“One	of	Parenthood’s	strengths	is	that	it	manages	to	balance	comedy	with	melodrama”	(Storytelling	259),	and	this	is	equally	what	the	film	tells	us	about	parenthood	–	the	best	results	come	when	we	balance	genuine	care	for	one	another’s	emotional	space	with	good	humoured	play.	Gil	has	this	impulse,	as	Ganz	and	Mandel	provide	him	with	some	of	the	most	pointedly	humorous	lines	during	times	of	high	drama;	yet	even	though	he	misdirects	his	sarcasm	at	times,	this	more	light-hearted	impulse	furnishes	him	with	the	tools	to	make	steps	toward	recovering	from	his	moral	perfectionism.	Sarcasm	is	clearly	inherited	from	an	acerbic	father	whose	influence	Gil	would	like	to	renounce	and	distance	himself	from,	yet	where	Frank’s	sarcasm	is	regularly	deployed	to	mollify	responsibility,	Gil’s	more	often	makes	light	of	the	load	of	responsibility	he	is	struggling	under,	and	can	thus	be	cathartic	and	confessional	more	than	corrosive.		 There	are	benefits	when	we	listen	to	another’s	emotional	world	and	work	with	it,	whether	in	telling	a	story	or	living	our	social	lives,	especially	when	we	can	find	the	positive	affect	within	a	tense	or	difficult	situation.	This	is	the	“coping”	function	of	humour.	We	might	read	a	situation	as	personally	violating	or	threatening,	but	when	we	highlight	its	benign	elements	through	creative	analogy,	humour	is	produced	and	the	violation	is	minimised.	Schickel	writes:		There	is	something	brave	and	original	about	piling	up	most	of	our	worst	parental	nightmares	in	one	movie	and	then	daring	to	make	a	midsummer	comedy	out	of	them.	It	
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really	shouldn’t	work,	but	it	does.	The	movie	does	not	linger	too	long	over	any	moment	or	mood,	and	it	permits	characters	to	transcend	type,	offering	a	more	surprising	range	of	response	to	events.	Martin,	for	example,	gets	to	do	distraction	as	well	as	obsession,	and	Robards	is	allowed	sentiment	as	well	as	cynicism.		(54)		If	Gil	is	learning	to	relinquish	some	of	the	more	derisive	uses	of	humour	he	has	inherited	from	his	father,	then	we	can	see	Kevin,	the	eldest	male	child	of	his	own	generation,	as	the	next	in	line	of	humour’s	heredity,	and	his	attitude	to	play	seriously	fluctuates	throughout	the	narrative.	Gil	attempts	to	introduce	fun	into	Kevin’s	life	with	too	much	seriousness.	He	knows	the	kind	of	light-heartedness	he	wants	to	teach,	and	thinks	of	play	as	intrinsically	virtuous,	but	he	has	no	model	for	achieving	it	as,	using	his	father	as	a	benchmark,	he	has	defined	himself	by	what	he	will	not	be	rather	than	what	he	can	be.		 We	have	already	observed	how	hyper-responsibility	can	overwhelm	playful	attitudes,	and	produces	in	Gil	a	“manic	playfulness”	that	is	at	least	in	part	informed	by	a	competitive	attitude	to	gaming	passed	between	men.	Fortunately,	however,	Kevin	has	two	parents,	and	we	are	not	completely	subject	to	gender	role	inheritance.	During	the	film’s	title	sequence	small	character	details	are	foreshadowed	while	the	family	leaves	the	baseball	game,	and	this	is	where	we	first	witness	what	Thompson	calls,	“Karen’s	devoted	but	relaxed	attitude	toward	her	children	…	as	she	tries	unsuccessfully	to	clean	Justin’s	face,	then	makes	a	gesture	of	resignation”	(Thompson	Storytelling	252).	Later,	Gil	seems	surprised	as	“Justin’s	head-butting	behavior	leads	Kevin	to	joke,	‘And	I’m	the	one	in	therapy’—suggesting	that	he	is	developing	a	sense	of	humor	about	his	plight	and	hence	is	improving”	(ibid.	278).	Gil’s	efforts	likewise	are	not	wasted,	and	again	we	see	the	utility	of	striving	rather	than	realisation.	In	trying	to	teach	playfulness,	even	where	Gil	fails,	he	passes	on	an	attitude	that	Kevin	may	or	may	not	adopt	–	Kevin’s	own	growing	agency.		Attitudes	to	sex	–	and	especially	sexual	development	–	present	perhaps	the	film’s	most	challenging	intersection	of	agency,	morality	and	mixed	affect.	As	such,	sex	is	perhaps	the	area	that	most	requires	the	sense	of	perspective	provided	by	humour	and	play.	So	how	are	concerns	regarding	sexual	shame	resolved	in	Parenthood?	Garry	and	Tod’s	narrative	arc	represents	the	film’s	primary	example	of	modelling	healthy	attitudes	to	sex	and	sexual	relations	between	men,	and	deflating	shame.	Garry’s	narrative	begins	in	earnest	after	Julie’s	relationship	breaks	down,	and	she	returns	home	to	be	consoled	by	her	mother;	during	their	
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conversation,	they	both	agree	that	“men	are	scum.”	This	may	form	part	of	a	necessary	moment	of	bonding	for	mother	and	daughter,	but	we	soon	see	that	Garry	has	been	standing	nearby,	absorbing	their	conversation.	Until	now,	Garry	has	flown	under	the	radar.	Like	Helen	and	Julie,	the	audience	is	jolted	into	consideration	of	the	oft-silent	and	-absent	Garry,	and	the	attitudes	expressed	in	their	conversation	become	more	dimensional	as	we	see	others	implicated:	an	overheard	conversation	like	this	(in	a	household	where	it	is	hard	to	avoid	one	another)	informs	Garry’s	growing	sense	of	induction	into	the	world	of	male	sexuality	as	serious,	dark	and	shameful,	and	these	responsibilities	as	his	alone.	The	contagion	of	adversarial	gender	identities	also	explains	part	of	his	investment	in	living	with	his	father,	and	why	he	is	relieved	to	have	Tod	in	his	life	–	he	finally	has	someone	who	knows	his	situation	and	is	willing	to	talk	to	him	about	sex.		When	Helen	finds	some	pornographic	videocassettes	in	Garry’s	room,	she	asks	her	son	if	he	would	like	to	talk	to	Tod.	After	a	brief	shot-reverse-shot	of	Tod	playing	nonchalantly	with	the	toys	Garry	has	held	onto	from	his	boyhood	–	and	the	pair’s	ambivalent	reaction	–	Howard,	Hanley	and	Hill	cut	forward	to	Tod’s	debriefing	conversation	with	Helen	in	which	Tod	explains	how	he	soothed	Garry’s	fears	that	frequent	masturbation	meant	“there	was	something	wrong	with	him,	you	know,	like	he	was	a	pervert	or	something.”	This	is	followed	by	Tod’s	marvellous	line:	“and	I	told	him,	that’s	what	little	dudes	do,”	which	at	once	humorously	punctures	the	projected	problem	of	shame,	offering	insight	through	casual	understatement,	and	demonstrates	how	Tod	is	able	to	generously	translate	his	own	knowledge	and	experience	(in	this	case	of	male	puberty)	into	a	sensitivity	of	language	which	is	his	own	and	has	its	own	intelligence.	Helen	recognises	this,	in	turn	denting	her	classism	–	Helen’s	prior	ambivalence	toward	Tod	is,	at	this	moment,	revised.	Tod’s	chat	is	effective:	Garry	smiles.	In	Tod’s	words,	“I	never	even	knew	he	had	teeth.”	His	personality	changes,	a	weight	is	lifted,	and	a	more	playful	Garry	graces	the	remainder	of	the	movie.	Parenthood,	by	and	large,	deals	much	more	openly	and	candidly	with	sexual	politics	than	most	films,	using	practical	situations	to	talk	about	the	way	gender	problems	actually	play	out	in	our	lives.		Yet	this	is	not	the	end	of	Tod	and	Helen’s	conversation.	When	Helen	again	raises	the	notion	of	a	positive	male	influence,	Tod	complicates	the	presumption	of	a	man’s	presence	as	inherently	good	by	pointing	to	his	own	adversative	experience	–	an	abusive	paternal	influence.	“Depends	on	the	man,”	he	says,	and	launches	into	a	sensitive	and	considered	philosophical	monologue	about	abuse.	When	he	is	done,	he	physically	shakes	the	philosophy	
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out	of	himself,	and	returns	to	going	about	his	day	as	before.	Reeves	plays	this	gesture	as	comic,	again	displaying	the	kind	of	broad	physical	humour	engendered	by	observation	of	teenaged	mannerisms	that	he	made	famous	in	the	Bill	&	Ted	series.	Humour	is	also	part	of	the	healing,	as	signalled	earlier	when	Tod	is	playing	with	the	toys	in	Garry’s	room:	“The	humor	is	crude	in	that	Tod	is	clowning	around	while	Garry	and	Helen	are	dealing	with	a	crisis.	But	the	humor	is	also	subtle	in	that	it	captures	the	way	we	cannot	always	tell	from	appearances	who,	or	what,	is	going	to	be	effective	in	meeting	a	crisis”	(Kupfer	106).	In	pointing	back	to	Tod’s	modest	and	laidback	resilience,	these	gestures	cause	reflection:	we	now	understand	how	hard	won	these	qualities	are,	and	so	does	Helen.	When	she	thanks	him,	she	means	it,	and	she	is	thanking	him	for	more	than	talking	to	her	son.	Tod	has	almost	instinctively	improved	her	family’s	relationships,	and	all	she	had	to	do	was	include	him;	Tod	had	graciously	overlooked	the	classism	that	inhibited	these	positive	relations.	Helen	is	thankful	for	both	his	input	and	his	patience.	Wiest’s	performance	of	this	single	line,	“Tod…	thanks,”	is	loaded	with	extenuatory	feeling.	Tod’s	aptitude	for	deep	thinking	is	revealed	when	he	is	entrusted	with	environments	
Tod physically shakes the philosophy out of himself 
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through	which	it	can	flourish	–	his	very	different	experiences	of	family	trauma	have	caused	him	to	be	necessarily	reflective.	These	differences	make	his	perspective	unique,	and	thereby	all	the	more	valuable	in	families	as	they	come	to	encompass	considerably	divergent	backgrounds.		Helen’s	acceptance	of	Tod	presents	the	first	of	the	Buckman	parents	to	make	a	breakthrough	in	their	psychological	inhibitions	to	adaptability.	As	Kupfer	has	it,	single	working	mother	Helen	could	be	considered	Parenthood’s	superior	parent,	emerging	as	the	most	adaptable.	She	is	the	only	one	who	is	not	a	fantasist:	“Helen	is	upset	with	Julie’s	disregard	for	her	feelings	and	also	is	facing	the	weight	of	being	a	lone	parent.	But	she	is	realistic	–	missing	male	companionship,	distraught	that	Julie	is	throwing	away	college	and	a	productive	future,	and	upset	with	her	son’s	reclusive	behaviour”	(102).	Directly	after	her	resolution	with	Garry,	however,	Howard,	Hanley	and	Hill	cut	to	Frank	as	he	goes	to	polish	his	prize	car,	and	finds	it	gone.	His	problems	are	just	beginning.	The	next	cut	moves	us	later	in	the	evening,	and	Frank	brings	his	foul	attitude	to	a	games	parlour	where	Gil	is	in	the	middle	of	dealing	with	his	own	son’s	crises;	Frank	infects	those	around	him	who	are	already	struggling	with	their	own	anxieties.	The	causal	network	of	extended	family	is	vast	and	confounding,	its	positive	outcomes	come	riddled	with	negative	side	effects,	and	its	negative	outcomes	are	often	motivated	from	genuine	care.	It	is,	thus,	perfectly	natural	to	feel	overwhelmed.	The	existential	components	of	anxiety	–	often	addressed	by	the	characters	as	life’s	“mess”	–	are	perhaps	the	film’s	binding	psychological	concern.		In	a	way,	Parenthood	is	interested	in	the	difficulty	of	living	up	to	narrative	humanism’s	demands:	using	stories	to	understand	social	causality	as	realistically	complex.	Again,	this	is	borne	out	in	the	film’s	very	structure.	The	climaxes	in	each	plot	do	not	quite	match	up,	resolutions	and	breakthroughs	for	each	character	occur	at	different	times	rather	than	being	massaged	into	a	traditional	three	acts	that	coincide	epiphanies,	and	this	is	what	makes	
Parenthood	feel	alive.	Some	have	noted	that	this	structure	also	permits	sad	endings	to	certain	narratives	even	while	the	film	remains	positively	sentimental:	“Larry’s	story	does,	in	fact,	end	sadly,	but	the	film’s	ending	is	still	upbeat	and	happy”	(Dement	101).	Its	counterintuitive	structural	realism	points	to	the	uncertainty	of	parental	responsibility	in	its	unsynchronised	resolutions,	which	often	catch	the	characters	themselves	off-guard.	For	example,	Gil	does	not	expect	Grandma’s	rollercoaster	monologue,	Helen	does	not	expect	Tod’s	help	with	Garry,	and	Susan	does	not	expect	Nathan	to	appear	in	her	classroom	singing	a	song.	These	minor	
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resolutions	do	not	follow	from	one	another,	but	are	staggered	throughout	the	feature’s	running	time.	Nor	does	Parenthood	have	the	emotional	trajectorial	unity	of	most	ensemble	cinema.	It	does	not	start	humorous	before	herding	all	of	its	characters	as	a	unit	through	their	allotted	dramas	and	back	to	good	cheer.	The	affect	is	blended	throughout,	such	that	the	narrative	never	quite	coalesces	into	any	obvious	way	to	feel	about	the	action.		The	amalgamation	of	positive	and	negative	affect,	humour	and	drama	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	happy	and	comedic	scenes	following	sad	scenes	and	vice	versa;	it	is	the	filmmakers’	attempt	to	explore	more	nuanced	and	complex	emotional	landscapes,	as	rarely	in	life	do	we	find	ourselves	dealing	with	circumstances	so	clearly	defined	by	affect	as	they	are	at	the	movies.	We	live	with	an	infinitely	miscible	range	of	emotions,	blending	and	changing	inexorably	rather	than	following	logically	or	separably.	Attempting	narrative	representation	of	such	inconsistent	changes	can	be	one	aspiration	of	realist	genres.	Lowell	and	Mandel	may	have	their	characters	crack	jokes	in	situations	of	high	tension	to	attempt	to	stem	the	negative	affect	that	has	taken	hold,	mixing	bittersweet	uplift	into	anger	or	grief	or	confusion,	but	at	the	same	time	drama	intervenes	unhelpfully	throughout	a	happy	occasion.	At	Kevin’s	party,	children	yell,	scream	and	play,	but	while	playing,	Justin	gets	his	head	stuck	in	a	banana	lounge	and	Patty,	who	finds	it	hard	to	connect	with	other	children	through	play,	is	terrified	by	one	of	Gil’s	magic	tricks;	in	the	same	space	adults	are	exploring	their	gender	role	confusions,	Susan	and	Nathan	argue	about	childrearing,	and	a	stripper	wanders	into	the	mix.	The	film	registers	the	pains	of	happy	occasions	so	common	and	omnipresent	they	usually	go	unremarked.	For	example,	Ebert	lists	as	one	of	the	film’s	key	observations:	“when	kids	at	a	party	refuse	to	have	the	good	time	that	has	been	so	expensively	prepared	for	them”	(Rev.	of	Parenthood	np).	When	these	dramas	intervene,	we	have	complex	reactions	to	them,	and	here	the	film’s	reaction	cutaways	serve	yet	another	purpose:	blending	in	different	emotional	responses	to	convey	a	more	complex	affective	scene,	one	that	records	the	push	and	pull	of	micro	emotional	contagions.	This	all	sits	back-to-back	with	some	of	the	film’s	most	memorably	funny	moments,	such	as	Martin’s	performance	as	Cowboy	Gil,	entertaining	a	party	of	children	with	gallows	humour	and	bad	puns.	Denby	writes	of	the	depth	of	affective	and	personality	detail	within	his	comic	performance:	“Martin	has	often	used	his	explosive	clown’s	skills	to	suggest	pent-up	hostility;	it’s	fascinating	to	see	him	do	it	to	express	love	…	At	the	same	time,	he	brings	out	the	deeply	foolish	narcissism	in	Gil’s	drive”	(79).158	Even	in	triumphant	comic	moments	like	this																																																									158	Gehring	called	this	performative	style	“populist	implosion”	and	likened	the	performance	to	the	comedy	of	Eddie	Murphy,	who,	similarly	to	Martin,	has	a	wild,	comic	hostility	playing	
 252	
one,	where	Gil’s	ludic	sensibility	comes	to	the	fore,	there	is	still	the	complicating	detail	of	one’s	ego,	as	Gil	“turns	himself	almost	inside	out	seemingly	to	will	happiness	into	his	insecure	son”	(Gehring	102).		Our	own	emotions	are	rarely	dominated	by	one	clear	affective	source,	and	then	they	come	into	contact	with	the	emotional	mix	of	proximate	others.	In	parenthood	and	caregiving,	one	is	required	to	consistently	confront	inconsistent	affect:	elders	and	children	rarely	occupy	the	same	emotional	space	despite	their	propinquity.	When	Gil	quits	his	job,	he	arrives	home	miserable	to	a	hive	of	happy	youngsters	who	covet	his	playful	attention.	The	locus	of	Helen’s	anxieties	may	be	worlds	apart	from	her	son’s,	but	they	create	between	one	another	a	formidable	and	contagious	emotive	ambiance;	something	dark,	sad,	nostalgic	and	yet	new	to	both	of	them.	In	Mary	Douglas’s	view,	“The	mixture	of	nostalgia	and	resistance	explains	why	the	topic	[of	the	home]	is	so	often	treated	as	humorous”	(287).	This	is	the	pivotal	inextricability	of	narrativised	affect	that	the	suburban	ensemble	dramedy	relies	upon:	beneath	the	happy-sad	binary	there	is	another	more	nuanced	emotional	palette	that	always	rewards	closer	attention.	It	is	one	variety	of	storied	empathy	directed	towards	complex	causality,	in	this	case	acknowledging	the	complex	ways	we	affect	one	another	emotionally.	At	Kevin’s	party,	Gil	is	able	to	tap	into	that	empathy.	He	is	clearly	anxious	after	turning	away	the	stripper,	but	he	also	implicitly	understands	the	children’s	world	of	play	and	performs	best	as	a	parent	when	he	is	able	to	put	himself,	emotionally,	in	their	shoes	–	a	methodology	of	close	listening.		We	are	thus	delivered	back	to	the	close	listening	and	attention	to	the	lives	of	others	we	began	with,	but	it	is	more	informed	and	richer	thanks	to	the	information	gathered	through	political,	ethical	and	psychological	enquiry.	One	of	the	film’s	primary	means	of	close	listening	to	domestic	emotional	contagion	is	its	soundtrack,	and	in	particular	Newman’s	score.	Newman	biographer	Kevin	Courrier	suggests	that	the	composer	channelled	Howard’s	“unusual	gift	for	shifting	moods,	from	the	comically	endearing	(Night	Shift,	Splash),	to	the	unbearably	sentimental	(Cocoon,	Willow),	to	the	demonstrably	dark	(Ransom,	The	Missing).	In	
Parenthood,	Howard	used	a	little	of	all	three	elements”	(217).	As	Christian	Clemmensen	notes,	“the	disparate	emotional	pulls	in	Parenthood	required	Newman	to	write	a	score	that	covers	a	significant	amount	of	territory”	as	musical	ideas	and	motifs	are	transposed	between																																																																																																																																																																																									dynamically	against	a	more	light-hearted	surface	(102).	Later,	he	makes	a	connection	between	Martin’s	physical	humour	and	Charlie	Chaplin’s	Tramp	(ibid.	108);	this	is	a	testimony	to	the	actor’s	ability	to	combine	the	innocent	and	acerbic,	the	joyous	and	the	sad.	
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sentimental,	comedic	and	suspenseful	backing	(np).	Peter	Travers	also	wrote	of	the	film’s	affective	symbiosis	with	its	score,	in	that	the	music	and	action	are	not	always	so	unified,	but	rather	talk	back	to	one	another:	“Parenthood	prevails	when	the	script	takes	its	cue	from	the	rude	and	rowdy	Randy	Newman	score	and	packs	its	observations	with	a	sting”	(np).	Newman	and	orchestrator	Jack	Hayes	sometimes	link	thematically	disparate	scenes	by	blending	the	affect	between	them,	projecting	from	a	moment	of	unified	emotion	into	a	contrast	of	emotional	spaces,	and	then	ending	in	more	complex	sequences	without	music,	commanding	no	particular	emotional	response.159	Kevin’s	party	scene,	with	its	sexual	overtones	of	adult	male	shame	(the	stripper)	subdued	by	Gil	into	harmless	play	(the	cowboy),	is	followed	directly	by	Garry’s	assault	on	his	father’s	office,	and	a	sentimental	string	score	turns	spiky,	matching	Garry’s	fear	and	anger.	The	strings	then	follow	Helen	bursting	through	the	house	and	into	Garry’s	room,	blending	his	anger	into	her	distress,	and	a	piano	intervenes	against	the	drama	of	the	string	section,	at	times	reflecting	her	trepidation	(she	is	afraid	she	might	find	illicit	drugs	in	the	mysterious	brown	bag	he	carts	around),	and	at	times	reflecting	her	hope	that	she	might	instead	find	an	answer	to	Garry’s	unhappiness.		When	she	discovers	the	videocassettes,	the	score	disappears;	we	are	asked	to	withhold	an	emotional	response	along	with	Helen.	Susan	and	Grandma	arrive	while	Helen	is	watching	one	of	the	tapes,	clearly	gathering	her	thoughts,	and	their	comic	response	plays	against	a	backdrop	of	the	unconvincing	angry	grunts	(rather	than	gratified	moans)	of	a	pornographic	film	that	seems	to	emphasise	sexual	conflict	rather	than	pleasure.	While	these	sexual	noises	continue,	Grandma	makes	a	series	of	remarks	that	demonstrate	some	level	of	awareness	of	the	situation,	and	yet	she	ends	by	light-heartedly	commenting,	“you	know	one	of	those	men	reminded	me	of	your	grandfather.”	Garry	turns	up	furious,	and	the	sounds	of	the	porn	film	are	dismissed	along	with	Susan	and	Grandma.	Helen	has	to	work	with	this	strange	emotional	atmosphere	in	order	to	have	a	serious	conversation	with	her	son	(yet	despite	herself	throws	in	a	joke	that	seems	inherited	somewhat	from	her	grandmother’s	attitude:	“I	guess	you	have	these	because	you’re	interested	in	sex…	or	filmmaking”).	Tod	appears,	and	like	Grandma	he	brings	with	him	a	breezy	disregard	for	the	emotional	weight	in	the	air;	when	Garry	and	Helen	turn	to	Tod	for	assistance,	in	a	way	they	are	also	agreeing	to	forfeit	some	of	their	heavy	emotional	space	and	let	the	new	member	of	the	household	affect	their	mood.	There	is	no																																																									159	Jeff	Smith	writes	of	film	music	as	performing	three	dramatic	functions:	it	signifies	character	emotions,	sets	an	emotional	tone	or	mood,	and	attempts	to	inspire	emotion	within	the	viewer	(167).	The	score	here	blends	these	expressive	capacities	together,	too.		
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music	throughout	Tod	and	Helen’s	conversation,	or	then	Frank’s	transitional	missing	car	scene,	and	the	only	music	at	the	games	parlour	that	evening	is	the	overlaying	bang	and	crash	of	a	million	concurrent	noise-making	machines,	too	loud	to	ignore	and	unconducive	to	calming	a	distraught	Kevin	or	Gil.	Sound	and	action	perform	their	own	causal	dance	in	
Parenthood	that	informs	the	emotional	trajectory	of	the	characters,	and	the	film.		The	film	is	not	primarily	about	the	politics	of	the	everyday,	and	it	does	not	primarily	preach	sacrosanct	virtues;	Parenthood	is	primarily	about	the	existential	psychology	of	feeling	overwhelmed,	and	this	is	the	effect	of	piling	love	and	rage,	caution	and	abandon,	tenderness	and	resentment,	excitement	and	fear	on	top	of	one	another.	We	need	to	find	ways	to	accept	the	affective	mess	and	circumstantial	uncertainty	of	life,	or	we	cyclically	fail	to	resolve	even	its	most	trifling	conflicts	and	challenges.	When	we	feel	no	control	over	our	lives,	we	also	feel	helpless,	insignificant,	and	closer	to	oblivion	(Rowe	Beyond	Fear);	small	problems	tap	into	an	overarching	insecurity	or	generalised	anxiety,	and	become	catastrophic	to	our	sense	of	self	(Meetan	et	al.	“Investigating	the	Effect	of	Intolerance	of	Uncertainty	on	Catastrophic	Worrying”).	When	we	are	overwhelmed,	we	reach	for	a	sense	of	conceptual	control,	but	this	often	entails	a	reduction	of	life’s	mess	or	its	ineffable	causal	complexity;	to	strive	to	understand	complex	causality	is	to	accept	that	we	will	never	master	it.	Our	efforts	to	maintain	models	of	self-control	that	reach	beyond	what	we	can	possibly	control	will	produce	anxiety.	Generalised	anxiety	in	turn	produces	understandable	selfishness,	as	we	become	absorbed	in	a	cycle	of	dealing	with	our	own	woes	by	ineffective	means.	If	we	are	able	to	gain	some	perspective	using	light-heartedness,	jokes	and	play,	we	might	be	able	to	put	our	anxieties	aside	to	hear	from	others,	and	this	outward-listening	in	itself	presents	a	solution	to	most	conflicts	as	our	ire	is	stemmed	by	a	contagion	of	empathic	goodwill;	even	if	we	listen	with	empathy	and	still	disagree,	we	are	thereafter	endowed	with	the	resources	for	meaningful	compromise.	Helen	and	Garry’s	narrative	provides	one	of	the	best	examples	of	empathy	contagion	in	the	film:		 She	sees	Julie’s	marriage	to	Tod	for	the	frail	thing	it	is	and	doesn’t	hide	this	from	Garry	…	As	if	his	mother’s	self-conscious	concern	for	her	children’s	well-being	has	struck	a	resonating	chord,	Garry	expresses	his	wish	for	Helen’s	welfare.	He	tells	her	he’s	glad	she’s	going	out	with	the	biology	teacher,	Mr.	Bowman,	remarking	how	“he’s	funny	and	he's	the	kind	of	guy	that’d	be	nice	to	you.”	The	movie	hints	at	the	possibility	that	parental	devotion	and	attention	to	children	may	engender	in	them	a	regard	for	their	
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parents	as	people	with	lives	and	interests	of	their	own.	Such	regard	could	be	the	seeds	in	children	of	social	adaptability	toward	their	parents.		(Kupfer	108)		Likewise,	the	film	addresses	potential	audience	members	in	their	late	teens,	and	equally	asks	them	to	consider	what	their	parents	might	be	going	through	(Robledo	np;	Orndorf	np).	This	reciprocal	“close	listening”	is	a	learned	and	learnable	process	that	the	humanities,	since	Niethammer	and	Humboldt,	have	attempted	to	cultivate	and	liberalise.	Humanism	is	a	kind	of	base	level	of	respectful	kindness	we	begin	from	in	conflict	resolution.	So	one	thing	that	relieves	our	overwhelmed,	existential	feelings	is	refocussing	outward	to	look	at	others	in	our	vicinity	(suburban,	familial,	domestic)	with	acceptance	and	humour.	Providing	the	demonstrative	care	of	close	listening,	we	give	one	another	courage	to	overcome	the	daunting	nature	of	life’s	problems	and	attend	to	them	not	separately,	but	together.		 As	much	as	this	humanism	is	a	personal	conflict	resolution	method,	a	storytelling	method,	and	a	politico-ethical	interrogative	method,	it	is	a	hermeneutic	method	too.	While	I	was	busy	penning	this	close	reading,	I	battled	my	own	feelings	of	being	overwhelmed	in	these	attempts	to	order	Parenthood’s	multi-causal	complexity	into	a	meaningful,	essayistic	argument.	Whenever	I	began	to	write	on	a	scene	or	a	topic,	countless	mediating	factors	from	within	the	same	scene	or	others	would	come	flooding	in,	threatening	to	obliterate	the	clarity	one	could	achieve	in	writing	out	the	implications	of	each	event.	This	is	what	led	reviewers	to	describe	it	as	a	“multifaceted	essay	in	fiction	form”	(Rosenbaum	np)	combining	“sociology	and	sitcom,	making	it	into	one	perceptive,	delicious	whole”	(Benson	np).	Ebert	praised,	“The	complexity	of	the	movie	…	so	many	scenes	were	thought	through	to	an	additional	level.	Howard	and	his	collaborators	don’t	simply	make	a	point,	they	make	the	point	and	then	take	another	look	at	it	from	a	new	angle,	finding	a	different	kind	of	truth”	(Rev.	of	Parenthood	np).	When	writing	about	sexuality	in	one	scene,	for	example,	unexpected	lines	of	dialogue	and	later	events	that	speak	to	sexuality	would	always	complicate	any	clear	“message”	to	be	derived,	simply	by	pointing	to	other	circumstances	that	affect	the	one	we	are	currently	focussed	upon	–	it	would	simply	point	to	too	rich	a	multitude	of	causal	connections,	political,	ethical,	psychological,	social.	Because	of	its	complex	connections,	I	could	never	retain	and	record	all	meaningful	detail	arising	from	a	single	scene,	a	single	theme.	Rather	than	frustrating,	though,	this	was	hermeneutically	exciting,	an	alterity	and	sublimity	produced	by	realism	rather	than	metaphor	or	abstraction,	an	ineffability	that	truly	fulfilling	narratives	can	provide,	with	so	many	scenes,	themes,	motifs	and	dialogues	silently	causal,	silently	drawing	
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from	each	other,	silently	upsetting	a	holistic	or	comprehensively	clarifying	reading	of	any	given	moment.		
Parenthood	attempts	honesty	by	investigating	the	relationships	between	so	many	complex	social	psychological	concerns:	politics,	ethics,	causation,	gender,	inheritance,	interiority,	attitudes,	behaviour,	pathology,	contagion,	suburban	domesticity	and	so	on.	In	so	doing,	it	produces	in	the	attentive	viewer	the	overwhelming	feelings	that	it	speaks	to,	complicating	its	own	ethos	of	close	listening,	and	then	resolves	these	for	the	viewer	by	asking	us	to	accept	its	central	challenge:	to	observe,	to	comprehend	but	never	to	master	this	complexity.	This	is	how	hermeneutic	writing	processes	provide	comparable	humanistic	work	to	good	fictions,	and	it	is	also	one	reason	why	the	final	rollercoaster	analogy	works.	It	is	not	just	that	life	is	a	rollercoaster;	it	is	that	we	have	no	option	of	getting	off,	or	having	it	any	other	way.	We	can	also	know	this	all	along,	just	like	we	know	the	cliché	that	“life	is	a	rollercoaster,”	but	fail	to	accept	it	as	Gil	does.	We	can	have	someone	put	it	in	front	of	our	very	faces	with	poems	and	light	and	play	and	joy	–	as	Grandma	does	for	Gil	–	but	still	refuse	to	listen.	And	it	is	not	until	later,	when	this	wisdom	of	complex	acceptance	has	preconsciously	settled	in,	that	it	comes	through	and	makes	sense	for	us,	as	when	Gil	finally	realises	he	was	listening	to	and	empathising	with	Grandma	despite	himself,	and	in	a	moment	when	he	could	despair,	instead	her	message	becomes	real	and	changes	his	world.	When	the	film	itself	briefly	becomes	a	rollercoaster	during	the	climactic	school	play	scene,	with	the	camera	and	soundtrack	both	adopting	its	giddy	chaos,	Howard	echoes	the	interior	fantasy	of	Parenthood’s	opening	scene	(Gehring	105),	but	its	attention	has	shifted	from	Gil’s	earlier	control	of	the	world	(instructing	the	amalgam	on	his	role	in	the	daydream	and	dispensing	assured	childrearing	advice)	to	his	lack	thereof.	In	effect,	our	fantasies	and	daydreams	can	signal	our	mental	health.	Our	sense	of	interior	control	is	parsed	through	fantasy	and	imagination,	and	given	a	socially	generous	nature	we	might	instinctively	let	in	the	wisdom	of	others	like	Grandma	to	affect	our	daydreams;	paradoxically,	when	we	relinquish	control	over	our	external	circumstances,	we	must	first	do	so	internally.		
Parenthood	uses	its	character	study	of	loving	kinship	to	diagnose	necessary	pain	even	in	the	striving	of	humanism.	The	film,	for	example,	explores	a	humanistic	paradox:	avoidant	parenting	and	relationship	behaviours	may	be	motivated	from	genuine	care.	Frank	tells	Gil	that	he	was	excessively	anxious	when	he	thought	Gil	had	contracted	polio	as	a	child,	and	all	that	worrying	conflicted	with	his	self-schema:	“it	wasn’t	for	me,”	he	says.	Likewise,	when	Tod	
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crashes	his	car,	Julie	threatens	to	walk	away,	crying,	“I	can’t!	I	can’t!	This	is	too	intense!”	Both	of	these	responses	are	borne	from	the	pain	of	genuine	care,	not	just	affective	empathy	but	affective	sympathy,	when	we	adopt	another’s	goals	and	wellbeing	as	our	own,	the	kind	of	sympathetic	relations	a	family	requires	of	us.	We	will	then	also	feel	their	pains	as	our	own;	a	load	that	compounds	our	existing	troubles	and	can	threaten	to	overwhelm	the	unprepared.	Gil	finally	admits	to	his	similarities	with	his	father,	as	he	recognises	the	motivating	emotions	of	parenthood	yet	sees	too	the	opportunity	to	respond	to	aversive	affect	differently.160	Helen	indicates	her	support	for	Julie’s	marriage	even	while	she	recognises	from	her	own	marital	experiences	the	threat	posed	by	an	impulse	to	retreat	from	confrontation.	Although	we	may	push	others	away	in	times	of	crisis,	perhaps	in	attempts	to	simply	reduce	the	sheer	quantity	of	concerns	and	complications	that	cloud	us,	we	need	loved	ones	to	look	past	our	reactionary	impulses	and	foster	this	kind	of	empathy	and	support	–	precisely	what	family,	at	its	best,	can	provide.	In	the	psychology	of	Parenthood,	some	of	our	most	problematic	and	harmful	behaviours	are	motivated	from	our	most	genuine	concerns	for	the	wellbeing	of	others.	Denby	writes	of	the	film’s	eponymous	parents:		 Haunted	by	child-rearing	theories	they	only	half	understand,	vaguely	resentful	and	vaguely	guilty,	mortifyingly	self-conscious,	they	hang	on	to	the	tiller	with	baffled	determination	…	[Howard]	certainly	gets	onscreen,	as	no	moviemaker	before	him	has,	the	teasing,	taunting	complexity	of	child-rearing,	the	perversity	of	a	job	that	flummoxes	even	the	most	intelligent	and	self-composed	people.		(79-80).		Part	of	accepting	the	mess	of	life	is	accepting	one’s	own	failures.	With	this	acceptance	comes	new	hope,	and	the	film’s	penultimate	rollercoaster	scene	emphasises	the	difficulty	of	finding	hope	despite	fragmentation	and	confusion	(Gehring	104).	Howard,	Ganz	and	Mandel	then	turn	to	an	enduring	populist	trope	to	close	the	film:	the	hope	evident	in	new	life	(ibid.	105).		 The	final	scene	of	the	film	appears,	for	the	most	part,	to	be	a	sentimental	conclusive	montage,	showing	the	extended	family	together	at	a	happy	time	–	Helen	has	given	birth	to	a	new	child	–	played	over	images	suggesting	each	character’s	personal	development	toward																																																									160	There	is	some	circularity	to	the	narrative	structure	here.	Gil	extends	sympathy	to	Frank	right	from	the	opening	scene,	explaining	that	Frank	had	no	positive	model	for	fatherhood,	being	thrown	out	of	the	house	at	fifteen;	his	subsequent	efforts,	despite	all	of	his	shortcomings,	were	still	a	kind	of	progress,	and	two	generations	hence	produced	Gil,	an	even	more	caring	father	who	is	able	to	reflect	on	the	generational	changes	that	have	paved	some	manner	of	progress	in	male	caregiving.	
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overcoming	their	particular	challenges.	But	there	is	a	darkness	here,	too.	Astute	reviewers	noted	melancholy	undertones	(Novak	17;	Gehring	107),	suggested	both	in	the	piano	score’s	minor	changes	and	subtle	vignettes	at	the	edge	of	the	frame:	the	existential	anxieties	never	fully	subside.	The	film’s	final	image	is	of	Karen,	overwhelmed,	perhaps	unable	to	match	the	sentiment	asked	of	her	at	the	occasion,	brimming	with	tears	and	turning	away.	Gil	notices,	approaches,	and	puts	his	arms	around	her.	Where	she	has	helped	him	with	his	anxiety	throughout	the	picture,	now	he	comforts	her.	The	final	images	speak	to	the	inextricability	of	these	emotions	even	from	the	joyous	times	shared	with	one’s	family,	the	exhaustion	and	uncontrollability	inherent	in	the	family	experience,	the	pain	we	must	navigate	even	within	hopeful	new	beginnings,	and	the	reciprocity	of	care	demanded	in	a	family,	where	one’s	responsibilities	are	rarely	easy	to	identify,	but	ever	present.	Life’s	bittersweet	affective	tightrope	extends,	daunting	as	ever,	in	front	of	us,	but	as	long	as	we	attempt	to	help	each	other	through,	we	find	a	way.			 	
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AFTERWORD			 In	my	final	year	of	writing	this	thesis,	Donald	Trump	was	elected	president	of	the	United	States.	Like	so	many	others	at	my	university	and	within	my	peer	group,	especially	those	working	in	some	manner	of	American	studies,	I	went	through	a	brief	period	of	crisis:	what	was	I	doing	to	countervail	the	growing	influence	of	the	alt-right	at	home	and	abroad,	was	my	work	just	more	intellectual	dithering	while	Rome	burned,	and	why	should	I	be	writing	about	ordinary	lives	in	American	suburbia	at	a	time	like	this?	What	interested	me,	however,	were	the	campaigning	voices	of	intellectual	left:	Slavoj	Žižek,	John	Pilger,	and	new	digital	age	libertarian	heroes	like	Julian	Assange	all	threw	their	support	behind	the	Trump	presidential	bid;	their	reasoning?	Despite	the	vast	corporate	wealth	and	influence	that	make	up	the	American	political	system,	Trump	was	somehow	positioned	“against	the	system”	and	would	positively	shake	things	up	(Monbiot	np).	This	connected	with	much	of	what	I	had	been	reading	in	antihumanist	scholarship:	a	rather	simple	notion	that	anything	radical	or	transgressive	is	necessarily	good,	because	the	world	we	have	at	the	moment	is	bad.	In	Pilger’s	words,	“Donald	Trump	is	a	symptom	of	[Americanism],	but	he	is	also	a	maverick	…	The	danger	to	the	rest	of	us	is	not	Trump,	but	Hillary	Clinton.	She	is	no	maverick.	She	embodies	the	resilience	and	violence	of	a	system”	(np).		This	seductive	idea	has	become	a	careless	new	progressive	politics,	and	we	are	now	seeing	the	dawn	of	a	major	political	ideology	that	unites	the	far	right	with	leftist	intellectuals	(somewhat	like	the	bipartisan	libertarianism	that	birthed	it):	a	request	for	anything	destructive,	no	matter	the	cost.	This	is	careless	politics	in	that	it	values	impact	upon	concepts,	mindspaces	and	“the	system”	more	than	investigating	impact	on	people’s	lives.	An	eventual	positive	impact	on	human	lives	is	speciously	presumed,	abstracted	into	a	chimeric	and	unspecified	future	that	will	arise	after	the	maligned	minorities	have	undergone	allotted	violence,	and	paid	for	our	distant	utopia.	It	is	a	rarefied	and	removed	ethical	illogic,	in	that	it	chooses	to	be	blind	to	its	most	basic	outcomes	of	pain	and	injustice	not	inflicted	on	the	philosopher	himself.	This	is	how	Žižek	can	make	absurd	distinctions	between	humanist	and	antihuman	terror,	justifying	extreme	violence	(that	he	will	never	be	party	to	himself)	in	the	name	of	theory	(674).161	It	is	time	to	return	to	some	foundational	principles	that	have	stood																																																									161	As	Patrick	Stokes	puts	it,	“Political	violence	unavoidably	reduces	the	life	and	body	of	another	human	being	to	a	means	to	achieve	a	political	end.	There	are	desperate	circumstances	
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the	test	of	humanism’s	long	journey	through	various	theisms,	secularisms,	pedagogies,	canonical	protectionisms,	and	so	on,	and	they	are	found	in	Karl	Popper's	famous	summary	of	Immanuel	Kant's	humanist	perspective	on	ethics:	“Always	recognize	that	human	individuals	are	ends,	and	do	not	use	them	as	means	to	your	end”	(The	Open	Society	102).	This	mandates	our	attention	be	turned	to	human	outcomes	rather	than	ideal	or	morally	perfect	ones	like	toppling	“the	system.”			 What	I	ultimately	concluded	was	that	more	than	anything	right	now,	the	world	needs	the	kindness	of	humanism.	In	order	not	to	forget	the	people	on	which	our	theories	are	predicated,	or	to	lose	sight	of	their	lived	experience,	we	need	to	tell	their	stories;	filling	this	space	in	our	theoretical	accounts	is	what	fiction,	and	other	humanist	narrative	styles	like	humanistic	anthropology	(Gardner	167),	can	offer.	Our	adversarial	identity	politics	–	pointing	out	one	another’s	silent	and	nascent	bigotries,	naming	and	shaming	one	another	–	only	seems	to	calcify	regressive	positions	on	sexism	and	racism,	entrenching	pride	in	nationalism	and	prejudice.	From	Brexit	to	Trump,	bigotry	appears	to	have	grown.	Humanistic	scholarship	instead	appeals	to	scholars	to	write	of	social	consequence,	not	of	villainy;	the	humanism	of	storytelling	is	a	means	by	which	we	counterbalance	any	limits	placed	on	our	notions	of	accountability,	and	who	we	see	as	human	and	therefore	equal.	Humanism	is	regularly	under	fire	for	being	airy-fairy,	vague	or	not	militant	enough	(Torrance	165),	not	offering	a	distinct	program	for	change,	or	eschewing	interventionist	political	prescription	(Eagleton	207).	But	in	the	aftermath	of	wars,	periods	of	oppression	and	resistance,	what	remains	are	the	stories,	and	if,	as	Jablonka	and	Lamb	suggest,	a	distinctive	quality	of	human	evolution	is	symbolic	inheritance,	then	we	are	provided	a	unique	opportunity	to	learn	from	these	stories	as	they	accumulate	–	storytelling	could	be	the	greatest	responsibility	of	all.162		 I	hope	my	thesis	has	demonstrated	that	although	this	philosophy	is	unfashionable,	it	is	feasible.	I	hope,	too,	that	I	have	demonstrated	that	such	a	focus	can	be	political,	and	generous																																																																																																																																																																																									in	which	that	becomes	necessary.	But	in	those	instances	one	does	not	avoid	guilt	-	rather	one	takes	on	the	guilt	of	violence	for	the	sake	of	preserving	the	moral	life	we	share.	Violence	may	become	necessary,	but	that	does	not	make	it	good,	merely	least-worst”	(np).	There	may	indeed	be	political	circumstances	under	which	violence	is	both	understandable	and	necessary,	but	it	is	far	from	clear	that	constituents	of	Western	liberal	democracies	are	living	in	one	of	these	circumstances	–	although	consistent	theoretical	focus	on	subject	positioning,	governance,	and	the	worst	abuses	of	power	will	certainly	make	it	seem	that	we	are.		162	Humanism,	thus,	is	longitudinally	political,	and	morally	concerned	without	being	moralistic.	
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close	listening	can	reveal	the	inculcation	of	values	–	within	contexts	of	privilege	just	as	in	contexts	of	disadvantage	–	that	affects	others	in	the	world.	Humanist	storytelling	is	its	own	kind	of	ethical	intervention	(Moss-Wellington	“Humanist	Ethics	in	John	Sayles”	119),	yet	Booth	believes	that	reading	the	ethical	language	of	fiction	has	fallen	out	of	vogue,	and	our	theories	are	forced	to	be	indirectly	ethical:	“It	is	practiced	everywhere,	often	surreptitiously,	often	guiltily,	and	often	badly,	partly	because	it	is	the	most	difficult	of	all	critical	modes,	but	partly	because	we	have	so	little	serious	talk	about	why	it	is	important,	what	purposes	it	serves,	and	how	it	might	be	done	well”	(19).	Any	ethical	conversation	will	be	better	informed	the	more	perspectives	and	contexts	it	is	willing	to	encounter,	and	I	have	tried	to	demonstrate	what	attention	to	a	multiplicity	of	perspectives	might	look	like	both	in	narrative	and	in	my	own	scholarship.	Those	perspectives	I	have	included	here	–	a	mode	of	ensemble	filmmaking,	or	scholarly	works	that	inquire	into	human	difference	–	in	turn	demonstrate	their	own	close	attention	to	a	multiplicity	of	perspectives.	The	work	of	integrating	perspectives	treats	one	another’s	narratives	as	living,	mutable,	changeable,	and	thus	stasis	in	one’s	own	personal	beliefs	never	seems	like	a	viable	option	–	that	is	to	say,	humanism	is	one	way	to	never	stop	inquiring,	to	never	(as	in	canonical	humanism’s	inbuilt	inertia)	assume	we	have	among	us	the	unassailable	end	point	of	learning.		Suburbia,	as	we	have	seen,	is	a	place	of	overlap	and	tension	between	lifeworlds;	in	its	polymorphic	nature,	American	suburbia	has	been	a	site	of	shifting	perspectives	and	cultures,	and	when	those	lives	are	investigated,	we	might	understand	the	transactions	between	classes	and	cultures	where	everyday	politics	are	developed,	and	then	later	taken	to	the	polling	booth.	I	have	made	the	case	that	antisuburbanism	and	dystopic	suburban	cinema	often	take	the	form	of	a	cultural	classism.	Antisurbanism	can	present	as	leftwing	or	progressive	critique	of	a	political	status	quo,	but	it	takes	aim	at	the	inheritors	of	a	problematic	culture	rather	than	its	purveyors	(breaking	down	in	its	wake	a	historic	alliance	between	the	material	interests	of	the	working	classes	and	the	more	abstracted	goals	of	an	intellectual	leftwing	class,	often	expressed	through	identity	politics).	This	is	why	we	need	humanistic	understanding	of	the	broad	ideologies	that	emerge	therein	–	from	self-destructive	consumerism	to	outwardly	destructive	neo-Nazism	–	not	just	their	distanced	condemnation.	From	the	outset,	suburban	ensembles	like	American	Beauty	were	invested	in	asking	questions	of	the	lives	of	repugnantly	intolerant	characters:	neo-Nazis	like	Colonel	Frank	Fitts	(Chris	Cooper).	This	goes	to	the	heart	of	humanism’s	challenge:	that	there	is	a	difference	between	understanding	and	indulging.	For	many	of	those	working	in	fields	like	anthropology,	collapsing	the	distinction	between	
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cognitive	and	affective	empathy	makes	little	sense	–	it	is	the	foundation	of	ethnographic	work	to	empathise	deeply	while	retaining	a	critical	perspective	on	the	emergence	of	cultural	phenomena.	We	cannot	truly	reject	that	which	we	do	not	first	comprehend.	If	we	are	to	condemn	a	culturally	produced	ideology,	we	should	first	understand	the	context	in	which	it	arises	so	that	we	also	understand	how	it	will	change.	How	do	we	expect	to	understand	and	challenge	the	Trump	phenomenon	without	first	doing	the	work	of	empathy	to	understand	the	conditions	in	which	it	arises?		By	now	it	is	evident	that	I	keep	coming	back	to	another	central	theme	–	the	benefits	of	thinking	generously	about	others.	We	should	remind	ourselves	that	situations	of	desperation	produce	the	need	for	competition,	and	that	competition	will	in	some	cases	be	expressed	as	bigotry.	In	a	less	equal	world,	more	conflict,	resentment	and	bigotry	simply	make	more	sense.163	We	should	take	aim	at	those	with	the	means	to	relieve	the	artificial	scarcity	that	creates	such	cultures,	not	turn	our	backs	on	the	social	echelons	caught	in	its	throes.	This	care	
in	no	way	necessitates	adopting	any	bigoted	views.164	These	are	all	the	problems	of	humanism	and	the	abject,	and	point	to	the	need	for	further	articulation	of	an	“abject	humanism”	–	that	is,	a	humanism	that	accounts	for	the	place	of	narrating	human	ill.	For	example,	we	can	ask	how	one	might	attempt	humanistic	close	readings	of	antisocial	narratives,	both	fictive	and	non-fictive,	such	as	those	distributed	by	neo-Nazis	like	Fitts.	A	notion	of	abject	humanism	would	be	necessary	in	any	extended	reading	of	the	Tom	Perrotta	adaptations	Election	and	Little	
Children,	engaging	as	they	do	with	issues	of	sexual	abuse,	Machiavellianism,	mob	impulses	and	human	cruelty.	Although	intriguing,	a	sustained	consideration	of	abject	humanism	remains	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	and	a	project	for	another	time.		There	are	two	other	key	areas	of	concern	that	I	would	like	to	flag	for	future	research	before	closing.	Firstly,	the	problem	of	abject	humanism	causes	us	to	reflect	on	the	possibilities	for	admitting	personality	variation	into	humanistic	research;	in	particular,	how	we	might	account	for	those	who	have	little	appetite	for	complex	cognitive	tasks,	for	social	reasoning,	or																																																									163	The	same	generosity	of	thought	could	be	extended	to	interdisciplinary	antagonism	between	scholars	attempting	to	make	their	mark	in	a	field	of	limited	employment	opportunities.		164	We	can	have	cognitive	empathy	without	affective	empathy,	affective	empathy	without	sympathy,	sympathy	without	identification,	and	then	identification	without	adopting	the	same	goals	as	the	identified.	These	distinctions	are	too	often	blurred.		
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those	who	simply	do	not	empathically	respond	to	others	through	narrative	(c.f.	the	Interpersonal	Reactivity	Index	in	Davis	“Measuring	individual	differences	in	empathy”).	Any	recommendation	for	a	general	ethic	of	narrative,	for	instance,	must	take	these	personality	variables	into	account,	as	we	cannot	expect	everyone	to	display	the	same	aptitudes	or	appetites	in	reading	narrative.	This	is	a	broader	issue	going	to	the	heart	of	all	hermeneutics,	which	necessarily	rely	on	some	conjecture	or	versions	of	the	hypothetical	audience	member.	Even	in	the	more	quantitative	methods	within	audience	studies,	we	infer	general	types	of	audiences	and	trends	in	spectatorship	from	gathered	data.		Secondly,	there	is	a	cluster	of	terms	–	insight,	nuance,	subtext,	subtlety,	and	so	on	–	that	have	recurred	throughout	this	thesis	with	limited	exposition.	They	all	express	some	of	the	narrative	qualities	a	humanist	may	value,	and	they	all	describe	something	different	about	the	observation	of	human	psychological	and	social	complexity.	Humanism	holds	pride	of	place	for	the	forward-looking	vulnerability	of	the	new	(insight,	imagination,	discovery),	for	attention	to	micro-causal	details	(nuance,	subtlety),	and	for	a	connotative	realism	that	replicates	the	mental	work	of	our	attempts	to	understand	social	connections	at	the	level	of	inference	(subtext).	As	life	itself	provides	no	inherent	tools	for	crafting	a	specific	meaning	from	any	social	scenario,	all	of	these	qualities	come	together	to	create	a	sense	of	“eudaimonic”	purpose.	Oliver	and	Raney	write	of	eudaimonic	motivations	for	narrative	engagement	as	our	desire	to	derive	a	sense	of	meaningfulness	which,	for	some,	can	be	more	important	than	hedonic	motivations:	“this	broader	conceptualization	of	the	entertainment	experience	may	assist	in	untangling	the	seeming	paradoxes	of	‘sad’	or	‘tragic’	entertainment	by	suggesting	that	greater	insight	or	meaningfulness	is	the	more	important	and	sought-after	outcome	from	consuming	such	fare”	(1001).	There	can	also	be	a	selflessness	in	the	pursuit	of	the	eudaimonic	in	fiction:		 eudaimonic	motivations	(as	we	have	defined	them)	reflect	a	need	for	greater	insight	into	or	understanding	of	the	human	condition	more	broadly	than	the	fulfilment	of	needs	focused	on	the	self	…	Additionally,	though	grappling	with	issues	of	human	poignancies	and	life	meanings	may	be	gratifying	in	terms	of	added	insight,	we	also	believe	that	such	insight	may,	at	times,	be	somewhat	painful.		(ibid.	989)		Clearly	there	are	some	narratives	that	impress	upon	us	a	vast	cognitive	map	of	intentional	agents,	but	beyond	these	complex	connections	have	no	case	to	put	forward	that	we	might	
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read	as	a	specific	meaning	or	insight.	Some	television	shows,	like	Lost,	have	become	famous	for	constructing	mysteries	of	human	interaction	that	are	never	solved	–	the	authors	not	only	failed	to	come	up	with	a	solution	to	their	narrative	puzzle,	but	also	a	“meaning”	to	these	instances	of	human	interaction	by	which	we	might	identify	and	evaluate	a	broader	perspective	(the	hedonic	has	come	at	the	expense	of	the	eudaimonic).	So	ensemble	casts	and	the	multi-causality	of	multiple	intentional	agents	are	not	enough	to	make	a	narrative	humanistic:	both	can	still	fail	to	illuminate	anything	about	human	interaction,	and	simplify	or	fail	to	accurately	represent	human	interaction.	Our	judgments	of	a	story’s	level	of	“insight”	require	another	more	sustained	theoretical	inquiry,	perhaps	drawing	again	from	experimental	psychology,	which	I	will	leave	for	another	time.		 The	humanist	hopes	that	exploring	human	nuance	is	more	likely	to	achieve	a	longer	lasting	grounding	in	inclusive	politics	and	generous	thinking	than	more	militant	approaches.	Some	of	these	broader	questions	of	humanist	generosity	are	encapsulated	at	the	conclusion	of	Jim	Henson’s	television	series	The	Storyteller,	written	into	a	retelling	of	“The	Heartless	Giant”	by	Anthony	Minghella.	The	heartless	giant	in	question	discovers	his	long-buried	empathy	at	the	narrative’s	conclusion	(in	the	form	of	a	fragile	egg),	yet	those	he	has	tormented	cannot	forgive	him	for	what	he	has	done	–	they	crush	his	heart	and	kill	him.	But	the	protagonist	who	found	and	returned	the	giant’s	heart	lives	on	to	become	a	storyteller	himself,	and	amends	the	original	narrative	to	highlight	the	villagers’	capacity	for	mercy,	negotiation	and	peace.	One	can	ask	if	there	is	a	reinforcing	power	in	telling	of	our	facility	for	goodwill	to	other	living	things;	however,	if	we	value	realism	above	all,	to	what	extent	may	we	be	selective	about	the	spotlight	we	shine	on	human	existence	to	retell,	and	hopefully	reinforce,	its	best	qualities?		Humanism	was	the	beginning	of	the	humanities	disciplines,	and	there	remains	today	a	call	to	good-naturedness	at	the	heart	of	humanities	scholarship	even	in	its	more	militant	iterations.	If,	as	so	many	of	us	do	in	one	form	or	another,	we	are	to	insist	on	exhibiting	generosity	toward	others,	we	would	probably	best	achieve	this	by	thinking	generously	of	the	people	we	write	about;	in	this	way,	through	story,	we	can	demonstrate	the	world	we	want	to	live	in.			 	
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